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2001 - 2002 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS
A. INCOME TAX MATTERS
1. Section 67 - Application of2°A. Floor for Miscellaneous Deductions. TheCourt ofFederal Claims -
rejected the reasoning ofthe Sixth Circuit in O'Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), in Mellon Bank,
N.A., et at v. United States, 47 Fed. CI. 186 (2000). The issue was whether investment advisory fees were subject to
the 2% floor of section 67(a) or were within the exception of section 67(eXi). O'Neill said no; Mellon yes.
In J.H. Scott, et at. v. United States, 186 F.Supp.2d 664 (2002), the U.S. magistrate judge agreed with Mellon,
applying Virginia law to detennine a trustee's duty to obtain fmancial advice. The opinion states:
Thus, Virginia is one ofthe very few states, ifno~ the only, that affords a fiduciary,
whether individual or corporate, absolute immunity· from claims that it did not
follow the "prudent investor" rule in managing trust assets, provided the fiduciary
invests in the assets 'specified by statute. See Va. Code Ann. §§§§ 26-40, 2640.0 I
(Michie 1992). The Supreme Court of Virginia has decided three cases in which
it discussed the predecessor to what is now §§ 2640. While none ofthe decisions
involved a suit against a trustee who had complied with the statute, the court made
clear that the statute provides complete immunity to a trustee who chooses to invest
in one of the statutorily approved investments.
Thus, unlike the situation in O'Neill, a trustee in Virginia is not required to consult
a fmancial advisor to fulfill his statutory obligations.4 As unfair as it may prove to
be to the beneficiaries, a trustee in Virginia may arbitrarily decide to invest one
hundred percent of the assets ofa trust in United States Saving Bonds and he will
be deemed to have met the ttprudent investor" standard. See Va. Code §§ 26-
40.01.8.2.
***
Because of Virginia's unique fiduciary investment statutes, a trustee may choose
to invest in assets not listed in §§§§ 26-40.0 I and 26-40 in which case he will have
fulfilled his statutory fiduciary duties. The assets of the estate may suffer
substantial depreciation ifhe does so, but the situation is no different than what
would exist if a private individual invested in identical assets. In both c~es, the
parties involved would probably be better served by consulting with a fmancial
advisor, but unlike the situation in O'Neill, nothing in the law requires either to do
so. Ifa trustee elects to hire a financial consultant to assist in fmancial planning for
the trust, he is doing nothing different than what an individual investor might do.
A trust's "need" to incur the costs of a financial advisor is no different than the
"need" ofan individual. Both "needs" spring from the same desire, i.e. to increase
profitability. Here, the Plaintiffs have established that the trust incurred costs for
investment advice in order to preserve principal and income. Accordingly, it was
entitled to a deduction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 67(a). What they have not shown is that
those same expenses would not have been incurred but for the fact that property
was held in trust.
2. Definition of Trust Income - Proposed Regulations. REG-I06513-00 (February 15,2001) sets
forth prop~sed regulations defining income under section 643(b). These regulations will become increasingly helpful
A-I
as more states enact the latest Unifonn Principal and Income Act which allows capital gains to be allocated totmst
accounting income in certain situations. The explanation of the provisions states in general:
Under the proposed regulations, trust provisions that depart fundamentally from
traditional concepts of income and principal (that is, allocating ordinary income to
income and capital gains to principal) will generally continue to be disregard~ as
they are under the current regulations. However, amounts allocated between
income and principal pursuant to applicable state la~will be respected ifstate law
provides for a reasonable apportionment between the iricome and remainder
beneficiaries of the total return of the trust for the year, taking into account
ordinary income, capital gains, and, in somesituations, unrealized appreciation. For
example, a state law that provides for the income beneficiary to receive each year
a unitrust amount of between 3% and 5% of the annual fair market value of the
trust assets is a reasonable apportionment ofthe total return ofthe trost. Similarly,
a state law that pennits the trustee to make equitable adjustments between income
and principal to fulfill the trustee's duty of impartiality between the income and
remainder beneficiaries is a reasonable apportionment of the total return of the
trust.
I(laddition, an allocation ofcapital gains to income will be respected under certain
circumstances. Such an allocation will be respected ifdirected by the terms ofthe
governing instrument and applicable local law. Similarly, if a trustee, pursuant to
a discretionary power granted ·to the trustee by local law or by the governing
instrument (ifnot inconsistent with local law), allocates capital gains to income, the
allocation will be respected, provided the power is exercised in a reasonable and
consistent manner.
The proposed changes to the regulations will pennit trustees to implement a total
return· investment strategy and to follow the applicable state statutes designed to
treat the income and remainder beneficiaries impartially. At the same time, the
limitations imposed by the proposed regulations ensure that the Code provisions
relying on the defmition of income under section 643(b) are not undennined by an
unlimited ability of the trustee to allocate between income and principal.
The proposed regulations have special rules for pooled income funds. With respect to charitable remainder
trusts, the explanation states:
Under proposed state statutes, trust income could· be a fixed percentage of the
annual fair market value of the trust assets, and the fixed percentage may be less
than 5%. A net income charitable remainder unitrust using such a state statutory
defmition of income would in substance be a fixed percentage unitrust with a
percentage less than the 5% required by section 664(d)(2). Therefore, the proposed
regulations will amend section 1.664-3(a)(1)(i)(b) to provide that income under the
terms ofthe governing instrument and applicable local law may not bedetennined
by reference to a fixed percentage of the annual fair market value of the trust
property. If the applicable state law defines income as a unitrust amount, the
governing instrument of a net income charitable remainder unitrust must provide
its own definition of trust income. In addition, the proposed regulations will
provide thatcapitalgains attributable to appreciation in the value ofassets after the.
date contributed to the trust or purchased by the trust may be allocated to income
under the tenns of the governing instrument and applicable local law. Such an
allocation, however, may not be discretionary with the trustee. The section 664
regulations already prohibit the allocation of pre- contribution gains to income.
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In drafting charitable remainder trusts specific reference to state law may be desirable.
The marital deduction will be protected so long as a state statute is followed:
The proposed regulations will provide that a spouse's interest satisfies the income
standard set forth in sections 20.2056(b)-5(t) and 25.2523(e)-1(t) if the spouse is
entitled to income as dermed under a state statute· that provides for a reasonable
apportionment between the income and remainder beneficiaries ofthe total return
of the trust and that meets the requirements of ~ection 1.643(b)~r(a). As the
examples under Section 1.643(b)-I(a) make clear, reasonable apportionment can
be accomplished through a unitrust defmition ofincome or by giving the trustee the
power to make equitable adjustments between income and principal. In addition,
a conforming amendment is made to section 20.2056A-5(c)(2) providing rules
regardirig distributions of income from a qualified domestic trust.
Similarly, GST exempt status is protected:
• • • In addition, administration ofa trust in conformance with applicable state law
that defmes the term income as a unitrust amount, or pennits the trustee to adjust
between principal and income to fulfill the trustee's duty of impartiality between
income and principal beneficiaries, will not be considered to shift a beneficial
interest in the trust, if the state statute provides for a reasonable apportionment
between the income and remainder beneficiaries ofthe total return ofthe trust and
meets the requirements of section 1.643(b)-I of this chapter.
(E)·· •
Example II ..Conversion of income interest to unitrust interest under state statute.
In 1980, Grantor, a resident of State X, established an irrevocable trust for the
benefit ofGrantor's child, A, and A's issue. The trust provides that trust income is
payable to A for life and upon A's death the remainder is to pass to A's issue, per
stirpes. 102002, State X amends its income and principal statute to derme "income"
as a unitrust amount of 4% of the fair market value of the trust asSets valued
annually. For a trust established prior to 2002, the statute provides that the new
definition of income will apply only ifall the beneficiaries who have an interest in
the trust consent to the change within two years after the effective date of the
statute. The statute provides specific procedures to establish the consent of the
beneficiaries. A and A's issue consent to the change in the defmition of income
within the time period, and in accordance with the procedUres, prescribed by the
state statute. The 'administration of the trust, in accordance with the state statute
defming income to be a 4% unitrust amount, will not be considered to shift any
beneficial interest in the trust. Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the
provisions of chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Example 12. Equitable adjustments under state statute. The facts are the same as
in Example II ~ except that in 2002, State X amends its income and principal statute
to pennit the trustee to make equitable adjustments between income and principal
when the trustee invests and manages the trust assets under the state's prudent
investor standard, the trust describes the amount that shall or mus~ be distributed
to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's income, and the trustee after applying the
state statutory rules regarding allocation of income and principal is unable to
administer the trust impartially. The provision pennitting the trustees to make these
equitable adjustments is effective in2002 for trusts created at any time. The trustee
invests and manages the trust assets under the state's prudent investor standard, and
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pursuant to authorization in the state statute, the trustee allocates receipts between
the income and principal accounts in a manner to ensure the impartial
administration of the trust. The administration of the trust in accordance with the
state statute will not be considered to shift any beneficial interest in the trust.
Therefore, the trust will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 13 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
(ii) Effective dates. The rules in this paragraph (b)(4) are applicable on and after
December 20, 2000. However, the rule in the last sentence of paragraph
(bX4XiXD)(2) of this section regarding the administration of a trust in
conformance with applicable state law providing for a reasonable apportionment
between the income and remainder beneficiaries of the total return of the trust is
applicable with respect to trusts for taxable years that begin on or after the date that
final regulations are published in the Federal Register.
B. CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170,642,664,501,509,2055,2522, and
4940-4947
1. Recognition of Income When CRUT Terminated. In PLR 200127023 the Service explained the
income tax consequences of the early termination ofa CRT, and determined there was no self-dealing. The trust was
for a 20 year term and the donor/unitrust recipient ("A"), trustee, and charitable beneficiary each agreed to terminate
the trust and divide the trust assets actuarially. The ruling states:
Accordingly, we conclude as follows: A is selling A's interest in Trust to the
remainderman. Provided that the money and other property received by A are
distributed to A in accordance with A's interest in Trust, the amount A will realize
from the sale of A's interest in Trust is the amount of money and the fair market
value of the property received by A.
Pursuant to section 1001(e)(1), the portion ofthe adjusted uniform basis assigned
to A's interest in Trust is disregarded. The exception contained in section
1001(e)(3) is not applicable, because the entire interest in Trust's assets is not being
sold, or otherwise disposed of, to a third party. Accordingly, for purposes of this
transaction, A has no basis in A's interest in Trust. Therefore, the amount of gain
A must recognize under section 1001(c) is the amount A realized from the
disposition ofA's interest in Trust. The gain realized by A from the disposition of
A's interest will be long term capital gain.
We further conclude that no act of self-dealing, as defmed in section 4941(d)(I)
will result from the termination ofTrust and the distribution of the assets ofTrust
to A and the charity.
The above conclusions are based on the assumptions that the proposed termination
ofTrust is not prohibited by state law; that the proposed termination will be made
pursuant to a court order resulting from a proceeding to which the state attorney
general is a party; and that the amounts distributed to A are determined arid
distributed pursuant to the valuation rules set forth in section 7520. This ruling is
also contingent on the fact that any distribution of assets in kind is made in a pro
rata manner.
See also PLR 200208039 allowing termination of a net income CRUT where the donor had died and a child
ofthe donor was the only remaining unitrust beneficiary. The CRUT was invested for total return and had typically paid
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out less than 3% of net fair market value. The remaindermen in these trusts consented. An interesting question is
whether the CRUT could have been terminated if anyone had the power to change the charitable remainderman.
By contrast, where a charitable remainder trust is to be partially terminated such that a portion ofthe trust will
be distributed to charity, the unitrust recipient may be entitled to an income tax deduction so long as the transaction is
not deemed to be an end-run around the split-interest rules.. See~ e.g., 200140027.
2. Single Member LLC. PLR 200134025 held that a single member LLC created by a section
50t(cX3) organization would be exempt automatically under Section 501(a) without filing for exempt status. The
Service refused to rule on whether the LLC could receive tax deductible contribution under Section 170; the refusal is
inexplicable as a matter of policy. In PLR 200150027 the Service ruled the same with respect to an LLC created by a
community trust
3. Supporting Organization Creates Advised Fund. In PLR 200149045 a section 501(c)(6)
organization had created a supporting organization (defmed in section 509(aX3»). The ruling approved the supporting
organization operating a donor advised fund. See also PLR 200204040 (supporting organization ofa community trust
may have donor advised funds).
4. S Comoration Fails to Create Valid Charitable Remainder Trust. A charitable remainder trust
is not a permitted shareholder ofS corporation stock, however an S corporation may contribute assets to a CRT for a
tenn of years not to exceed 20. PLR 200203034 discusses the consequences if the S corporation is not the sole
beneficiary of the CRT. The ruling described these facts:
X proposes to create y, which is intended to qualify as a charitable reminder
unitrust under §§ 664. X corp intends to contribute appreciated marketable
securities to Y and y will pay the unitrust amount in quarter annual installments to
X corp for a period of 19 years, then to A and B equally for their lives, and then to
the survivor of A and !l for life. IfX corp is liquidated before the end of the 19-
year tenn, Y will pay the unitrust amount to the shareholder(s) of X corp for the
remainder of the 19 years. The unitrust amount will be an amount equal to a
specified percent (which is not less than 5 percent nor more than 50 percent) ofthe
net fair market value of the assets ofy valued as of the fIrst day of each taxable
year of Y and will yield a present value passing to the charitable remainder
beneficiary equal to at least 10% of the net· fair market value of the property
transferred to Y on the date ofcontribution. After the deaths ofboth A and ft or at
the end of the 19 years, whichever is later, the remainder ofY will be distributed
to qualified charitable organizations.
The Service concluded that the interest in the CRT held by the spouses would be considered a distribution to
the husband followed by his contribution to the CRT.
As a consequence, under §§ 1.671-2(e)(4), a portion ofthe appreciated marketable
securities that X corp proposes to contribute to Y will be treated as constructively
distributed to A, who then will be treated as making a gratuitous transfer of that
property to y. The amount of the constructive distribution will equal the present
values of A's and !l's unitrust interests and a proportional share of the charitable
remainder interest. We conclude that, under the proposed arrangement, both Aand
X corp will be grantors of the proposed trust.
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The regulation provides:
Section 1.671-2(e)(4) provides that, ifa gratuitous transfer is made by a partnership
or corporation to a trust and is for a business purpose of the partnership or
corporation, the partnership or corporation will generally be treated as the grantor
ofthe trust. However, ifa partnership or a corporation makes a gratuitous transfer
to a trust that is not for a business purpose ofthe partnership or corporation but is
for the personal purposes of one or more of the partners or shareholders, the
gratuitous transfer will be treated as a constructive distribution to such partners or
shareholders under federal tax principles and the partners or the shareholders will
be treated as the grantors of the trust
The ruling got worse for the taxpayer. The portion ofthe regulations dealing with the classification ofa CRT
as a trust cited by the ruling bears quoting in full:
Section 301.770I-I (a)( I) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations
provides that whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners for
federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether
the organization is recognized as an entity under local law.
S.ection 301.7701-1(a)(2) provides that a joint venture or other contractual
arrangement may create a separate entity for federal tax purposes ifthe participants
carry on a trade, business, fmancial operation, or divide the profits therefrom.
Section 301.7701-2(a) provides that a business entity is any entity recognized for
federal tax purposes (including an entity with a single owner that may be
disregarded as an entity separate from its owner under §§ 301.7701-3) that is not
properly classified as a trust under §§ 301.7701-4 or otherwise subject to special
treatment under the Code. A business entity with two or more members is classified
for federal tax purposes as either a corporation or a partnership.
Section 301.7701-4(a) provides that, in general, the tenn "trust" as used in the
Code refers to an arrangement created either by a will or by an inter vivos
declaration whereby trustees take title to property for the purpose ofprotecting or
conserving it for the beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or
probate court.
Section 301.7701-4(b) provides that there are other arrangements which are knoWn
as. trusts because the legal title to property is conveyed to trustees for the benefit of
beneficiaries, but which are not classified as trusts for the purposes ofthe Internal
Revenue Code because they are not simply arrangements to protect or conserve the
property for the beneficiaries.
Section 301.7701-4(c)(1) provides, in part, that an "investment" trust will not be
classified as a trust if there is a power under the trust agreement to vary the
investment of the certificate holders or if there are multiple classes of ownership
interests where the existence of multiple classes of ownership interests is not
incidental to the purpose of facilitating direct investment in the assets ofthe trust.
See also Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F.2d 545 (2d eire
1941),cert. denied, 314 U.S. 701 (1942).
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Applying those rules here, the Service stated:
Under the proposed arrangement, X corp and A will be treated as contributing
assets to y, the proposed trust. Throughout the term of the proposed trust, the
trustee will have the power to vary the investment ofthe grantors by investing and
reinvesting the assets in the trust, and as recipients of the unitrust amount, the
grantors will share in the profits derived from the joint investment oftheir assets..
X corp (or its shareholders ifX corp liquidates) will receive the unitrust interest for
a term ofyears, and A and I! will receive the unitrust interest after the end of that
tenn.. Such an arrangement is not appropriately classified as a trust under either §§
301.7701-4(a) or (c).
Because the proposed trust cannot be classified as a trust for federal income tax
purposes, the proposed trust cannot meet the defmition ofa charitable remainder
trust under §§ 664(d)(2). Because Y is not a charitable remainder trust, the
remaining issues raised in X corp's ruling request are moot.
The Service's position is that only spouses may make joint contributions to a CRT and be beneficiaries.
5. Assignment of Interest in CRUT in Exchange for a Gift Annuity. PLR 200152018 considered
the consequences oJa donorlbeneficiary ofa charitable remainder unitrust assigning the unitrust interest in exchange
for a gift annuity. The Service ruled as follows:
I. For the year in which Taxpayer transfers the entire balance of his unitrust
interest to Academy, Taxpayer will be entitled to a charitable income tax deduction
under §§ 170(a)( I) ofthe Internal Revenue Code, to the extent the date oftransfer
present value of Taxpayer's unitrust interest exceeds the date of transfer present
value of the annuity payments to be made by Academy to Taxpayer.
In addition, with respect to the income tax consequences of the transfer, the Service ruled:
2. For the year in which Taxpayer transfers the entire balance of his unitrust
interest to Academy, Taxpayer will be entitled to a charitable gift tax deduction
under §§ 2522(a), to the extent the date of transfer present value of Taxpayer's
unitrost interest exceeds the date oftransfer present value ofthe annuity payments
to be made by Academy to Taxpayer.
3. To the extent that Trust realized capital gains income thatw~ not included in the
unitrust amounts paid to, and recognized by, Taxpayer in prior years, Taxpayer's
transfer ofhis unitrust interest to Academy will not cause that capital gains income
to be included in Taxpayer's gross income for the taxable year of the transfer..
The taxpayer stipulated that the creation ofthe trust, and this transfer, were not an effort to avoid the section
170(t)(3)(A) partial interest rule.
6. Unitrust Interest Included in Bankruptcy Estate. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Minnesota
determined that the unitrust interest retained by the creator ofa charitable remainder trust was properly an asset of the
bankruptcy estate in In Re Mack, 269 B.R.. 292 (2002). The opinion summarized its holding as follows:
Basically, the Defendants contend that this court should interpret section 664 and
the regulations, or alternatively Minnesota Statute section 50 IB.32, as creating a
new form of unlimited exemption from creditor attack for the settlor's retained
noncharitable interest in a self settled trust Congress did create such a new fonn
of exemption in ERISA but its purpose in doing so was to increase retirement
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savings and accordingly it was necessary to protect such savings from attack by
creditors. The same public policy reasons do not apply here. Whether the Debtor
can or cannot protect the income stream of a noncharitable recipient is ~f no
consequence to the purpose of encouraging the formation of CRUTs, that is
charitable giving. Nothing said in this opinion will in any way impact on the
charitable remainder of the CRUT and there is a total disconnect between
protecting the charitable and noncharitable interests.
The court concluded that the assignment of the unitrust interest would not affect its tax-exempt status. The
Minnesota statute referred to by the court is a general "savings statute" prohibiting the trustee from violating any ofthe
private foundation restrictions that apply to charitable remainder trusts.
C. SECTION 408 - mAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS
1. Final Regulations Dealing With Minimum Distributions. On January 11,2001, the IRS issued
new proposed regulations under section 40 I(a)(9). REG-I 30477-00; REG-13048 1-00. Final regulations were issued
on April 16, 2002. T.D.8987.
a. Lifetime required distributions. Most taxpayers will use one Uniform Table. The Unifonn
Table will be used in all but one situation; namely, where the spouse is more than 10 years younger than P ("P"). The
initial division under the Uniform Table for a P who is age 70 is 26 years, and this is recalculated annually - the plan
need never be exhausted. No beneficiary need be named, nor does the age of the beneficiary, nor the identify of the
beneficiary-(i.e. a charity) matter. If the spouse is more than 10 years younger than P the life expectancy tables may
be applied using the age of P and spouse in the distribution year. Note that the spouse must be the sole beneficiary.
~:What ifspouse ceases to be the sole beneficiary because ofdeath, divorce or beneficiary change? It would make
sense ifP then began using the Unifonn Table. It appears that P, who marries a much younger spouse after P's required
beginning date ("RBD"), may then begin using the mortality tables.
b. Post-death distributions - the "applicable distribution period" will be the life expectancy of
the designated beneficiary who actually inherits the benefits when the P dies. The identity ofthis beneficiary will not
be fmalized until September 30 of the year following the year of death. At P's death, benefits will be distributed over
the beneficiary's life expectancy or, ifthere is no beneficiary, over the remaining fiXed tenn life expectancy ofP based
on P's birthday in the year of death.
Remember that Ps now past their RBD may 'Switch to the Unifonn Table. The choice of beneficiaries at the
RBD is no longer significant. Beneficiaries are determined by September 30 of the year following P's death. Thus,
disclaimers may "create" new beneficiaries provided they satisfy section 2518. If a beneficiary dies between P's date
of death and September 30 of the year following P's death, the beneficiary (not a successor beneficiary) continues to
be treated as the beneficiary. Distributions to beneficiaries before that date, take those beneficiaries "out of the mix",
ie, charities.
Note: P must still name beneficiaries and you cannot correct the situation where P's estate is the beneficiary.
On this point, the Explanation states:
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Some commentators requested that final regulations provide that, ifthe employee's
estate was named as the beneficiary in the beneficiary designation or the
em~loyee's estate became beneficiary by operation of law, the beneficiary of the
estate or the beneficiary ofthe IRA named under the employee's will could replace
the estate as beneficiary by September 30 ofthe year following the year ofdeath.
This change is not being adopted in these fmal regulations. The period between
death and the beneficiary detennination date is a period during which beneficiaries
can be eliminated but not replaced with a beneficiary not designated under the plan
as of the date of death. In order for an individual to be a designated beneficiary,
any beneficiary must be designated under the plan or named by the employee as of
the date ofdeath.
c. Distributions Before RBD
• One Beneficiary who is P's Spouse: (1) 5 year rule; over spouse's life expectancy
in the year P would have been 70 1/2 (and ifspouse dies before that year, the rules
will be applied as if spouse were the P and died before spouse's RBD).
• One Beneficiary, not the Spouse: (1) 5 year rule; or (2) beneficiary's life
expectancy based on beneficiary's age on beneficiary's birthday in the year after
P died.
Multiple beneficiaries and they have not established separate accounts by
September 30 in the year after P's death and they are all individuals: (1) 5 year rule;
or (2) over the oldest beneficiary's life expectancy based on beneficiary's birthday
in the year after P died.
One beneficiary, not an individual or more than one beneficiary, one of whom is
not an individual, and separate accounts have not been established by September
30 ofthe year after P died: P is treated as having no designated beneficiary and all
benefits must be distributed under the 5 year rule.
Multiple beneficiaries who have established separate accounts by December 31 of
the year after P's death: The rules above apply to each separate account. This is a
significant liberalization of the prior rules.
d. Distributions on or after RBD - Beneficiaries must take P's distribution for the year ofdeath,
(and in the year of death), based on the Uniform Table, ifP has not done so. Then:
Surviving spouse is sole beneficiary: Use the spouse's life expectancy in the year
after P's death and based on spouse's age. After spouse's death, benefits are based
on spouse's remaining (fixed) life expectancy. Spouse should roll-over and name
spouse~s designated beneficiaries to provide for longer pay-out period.
• One beneficiary, not the spouse: use the beneficiary's life expectancy.
Multiple beneficiaries, all individuals: unless they are able to established separate
accounts, use the life expectancy of the oldest beneficiary.
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One beneficiary, not an individual, or multiple beneficiaries and one is not an
individual: Unless separate accounts are established, P is treated has having no
designated beneficiary and benefits must be paid out over P's life expectancy based
on P's age in year ofdeath.
IfP's account has been divided into separate accounts, the rules, above, are applied to each
separate account.
• Trust for sole benefit of spouse - may not roll over unless trust is totally a grantor
trust (under §678) as to the surviving spouse.
Trusts as Beneficiaries - The Explanation states:
The final regulations retain the provision in the proposed regulations allowing an
underlying beneficiary of a trust to be an employee's designated beneficiary for
purposes ofdetermining required minimum distributions when the trust is named
as the beneficiary ofa retirement plan or IRA, provided that certain requirements
are met. One of these requirements is that documentation of the underlying
beneficiaries of the trust be provided to the plan administrator or IRA trustee,
custodian, or issuer. In the case of individual accounts, unless the lifetime
distribution period for an employee is measured by thejoint life expectancy ofthe
employee and the employee's spouse, the deadline under these regulations for
providing the beneficiary documentation is October 31 of the year following the
year ofthe employee's death, rather than the end ofthe year following the year of
the employee's death as provided under the 2001 proposed regulations.
This deadline for providing the trust documentation is coordinated with the
deadline for determining the employee's designated beneficiary. Amendments to
the 1987 proposed regulations published in 1997 eliminated the requirement that
the trust be irrevocable before death. Commentators indicated that some
beneficiaries would have qualified for a longer distribution period as a result ofthis
change except for the fact that they had not provided the required documentation
by the deadline provided in the regulations, which, in some cases, was a date before
the regulation was published. Consequently, the commentators requested that fmal
regulations provide a transition period for providing this documentation. In
response to these comments, these regulations provide that, ifthe date for providing
this documentation is before October 31, 2003, the documentation is permitted to
be provided to the plan administrator (or IRA trustee, custodian, or issuer) until
October 31,2003.
Commentators asked for clarification as to whether an election by a revocable trust
to be treated as part ofan estate under section 645 causes the trust to be treated as
an estate for purposes of section 40 1(a)(9). On this point, the IRS and Treasury
intend that a revocable trust will not fail to be a trust for purposes of section
40 1(a)(9) merely because the trust elects to be treated as an estate under section
645, as long as the trust continues to be a trust under state law.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4 provides:
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§ 1.40 I(a)(9)-4 Determination of the designated beneficiary.
Q-l. Who is a designated beneficiary under section 40 I(a)(9)(E)?
A-I. A designated beneficiary is an individual who is designated as a beneficiary
under the plan. An individual may be designated as a beneficiary under the plan
either by the terms ofthe plan or, ifthe plan so provides, by an affirmative election
by the employee (or the employee's surviving spo~e) specifying the beneficiary.
A beneficiary designated as such under the plan is an individual who is entitled to
a portion ofan employee's benefit, contingent on the employee's death or another
specified event. For example, ifa distribution is in the form ofa joint and survivor
annuity over the life of the employee and another individual, the plan does not
satisfy section 401(a)(9) unless such other individual is a designated beneficiary
under the plan. A designated beneficiary need not be specified by name in the plan
or by the employee to the plan in order to be a designated beneficiary so long as the
individual who is to be the beneficiary is identifiable under the plan. The members
of a class of beneficiaries capable of expansion or contraction will be treated as
being identifiable ifit is possible, to identify the class member with the shortest life
expectancy. The fact that an employee's interest under the plan passes to a certain
it:tdividual under a will or otherwise under applicable state law does not make that
individual a designated beneficiary unless the individual is designated as a
beneficiary under the plan. See A-6 of §§1.401(a)(9)-8 for rules which apply to
qualified domestic relation orders.
Q-2. Must an employee (or the employee's spouse) make an affmnative election
specifying a beneficiary for a person to be a designated beneficiary under section
401(a)(9)(E)?
A-2. No, a designated beneficiary is an individual who is designated as a
beneficiary under the plan whether or not the designation under the plan was made
by the employee. The choice of beneficiary is subject to the requirements· of
sections 401(a)(II), 414(P), and 417.
Q-3. Maya person other than an individual be considered to be a designated
beneficiary for purposes of section 40 1(a)(9)?
A-3. No, only individuals may be designated beneficiaries for purposes ofsection
401(a)(9). A person that is not an individual, such asthe employee's estate, may not
be a designated beneficiary. Ifa person other than an individual is designated as a
beneficiary of an employee's benefit, the employee will be treated as having no
designated beneficiary for purposes of section 401(a)(9), even if there are also
individuals designated as beneficiaries. However, see A-5 ofthis section for special
rules that apply to trusts and A-2 and A-3 of §§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 for rules that apply
to separate accounts.
Q-4. When is the designated beneficiary determined?
A-4. (a) General rule. In order to be a designated beneficiary, an individual must
be a beneficiary as of the date of death. Except as provided in paragraph (b) and
§§ 1.401(a)(9)-6T, the employee's designated beneficiary will be determined based
on the beneficiaries designated as ofthe date ofdeath who remain beneficiaries as
ofSeptember 30 ofthe calendar year following the calendar year ofthe employee's
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death. Consequently, except as provided in §§1.401(a)(9)-6T, any person who was
a beneficiary as of the date of the employee's death, but is not a beneficiary as of
that September 30 (e.g., because the person receives the entire benefit to which the
person is entitled before that September 30), is not taken into account in
detennining the employee's designated beneficiary for purposes ofdetermining the
distribution period for required minimum distributions after the employee's death.
Accordingly, ifa person disclaims entitlement to the employee's benefit, pursuant
to a disclaimer that satisfies section 2518 by that September 30 thereby allowing
other beneficiaries to receive the benefit in lieu o"f that person, the disclaiming
person is not taken into account in determining the employee's designated
beneficiary.
(b) Surviving spouse. As provided in A-5 of §§1.401(a)(9)-3, if the employee's
spouse is the sole designated beneficiary as of September 30 of the calendar year
following the calendar year ofthe employee's death, and the surviving spouse dies
after the employee and before the date on which distributions have begun to the
surviving spouse under section 401(a)(9)(B)(iii) and (iv), the rule in section
401(a)(9)(B)(iv)(II) will apply. Thus, for example, the relevant designated
beneficiary for determining the distribution period after the death ofthe surviving
spouse is the designated beneficiary of the surviving spouse. Similarly, such
designated beneficiary will be determined based on the beneficiaries designated as
of the date of the surviving spouse's death and who remain beneficiaries as of
September 30 of the calendar year following the calendar year of the surviving
spouse's death. Further, if, as of that September 30, there is no designated
beneficiary under the plan with respect to that surviving spouse, distribution must
be made in accordance with the 5-year rule in section 40 I (a)(9XB)(ii) and A-2 of
§§1.40I(a)(9)-3.
(c) Deceased beneficiary. For purposes of this A-4, an individual who is a
beneficiary as of the date of the employee's death and dies prior to September 30
of the calendar year following the calendar year of the employee's death without
disclaiming continues to be treated as a beneficiary as of the September 30 ofthe
calendar year following the calendar year of the employee's death in determining
the employee's designated beneficiary for purposes ofdetennining the distribution
period for required minimum distributions after the employee's death, without
regardto the identity of the successor beneficiary who is entitled to distributions
as the beneficiary ofthe deceased beneficiary. The same rule applies in the case of
distributions to which A-5 of §§ 1.401(a)(9)-3 applies so that, if an individual is
designated as a beneficiary of an employee's surviving spouse as of the spouse's
date of death and dies prior to September 30 of the year following the year of the
surviving spouse's death, that individual will continue to be treated as a designated
beneficiary.
Q-5. If a trust is named as a beneficiary of an employee, will the beneficiaries of
the trust with respect to the trust's interest in the employee's benefit be treated as
having been designated as beneficiaries of the employee under the plan for
purposes of determining the distribution period under section 40 I(a)(9)?
A-5. (a) If the requirements of paragraph (b) of this A-5 are met with respect to a
trust that is named as the beneficiary of an employee under the plan, the
beneficiaries of the trust (and not the trust itself) will be treated as having been
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designated as beneficiaries of the employee under the plan for purposes of
determining the distribution period under section 401(a)(9).
(b) The requirements of this paragraph (b) are met if, during any period during
which required minimum distributions are being detennined by treating the
beneficiaries ofthe trust as designated beneficiaries ofthe employee, the following
requirements are met --
(1) The trust is a valid trust under state law, or would be but for the fact that there
is no corpus.
(2) The trust is irrevocable or will, by its terms, become irrevocable upon the death
of the employee.
(3) The beneficiaries of the trust who are beneficiaries with respect to the trust's
interest in the employee's benefit are identifiable within the meaning ofA-I ofthis
section from the trust instrument.
(4) The documentation described in A-6 of this section has been provided to the
plan administrator.
(c) In the case ofpayments to a trust having more than one beneficiary, see A-7 of
§§1.401(a)(9)-5 for the roles for determining the designated beneficiary whose life
expectancy will be used to determine the distribution period and A-3 ofthis section
for the rules that apply if a person other than an individual is designated as a
beneficiary ofan employee's benefit. However, the separate account rules under A-
2 of§§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 are not available to beneficiaries ofa trust with respect to the
trust's interest in the employee's benefit.
(d) If the beneficiary of the trust named as beneficiary of the employee's interest
is another trust, the beneficiaries of the other trust will be treated as being
designated as beneficiaries of the frrst trust, and thus, having been designated by
the employee under the pian for purposes of determining the distribution period
under section 401 (a)(9)(A)(ii), provided that the requirements ofparagraph (b) of
this A-5 are satisfied with respect to such other trust in addition to the trust named
as beneficiary.
Q-6. Ifa trust is named as a beneficiary ofan employee, what documentation rl1'..lSt
be provided to the plan administrator?
A-6. (a) Required minimum distributions before death. Ifan employee designates
a trust as the beneficiary of his or her entire benefit and the employee's spouse is
the sole beneficiary ofthe trust, in order to satisfy the documentation requirements
of this A-6 so that the spouse can be treated as the sole designated beneficiary of
the employee's benefits (if the other requirements of paragraph (b) of A-5 of this
section are satisfied), the employee must either -
(I) Provide to the plan administrator a copy of the trust instrument and agree that
if the trust instrument is amended at any time in the future, the employee will,
within a reasonable time, provide to the plan administrator a copy of each such
amendment; or
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(2) Provide to the plan administrator a list of all of the beneficiaries of the trust
(including contingent and remaindermen beneficiaries with a description of the
conditions on their entitlement sufficient to establish that the spouse is the sole
beneficiary) for purposes of section 401(a)(9); certify that, to the best of the
employee's knowledge, this list is correct and complete and that the requirements
of paragraph (b)(I), (2), and (3) of A-5 of this section are satisfied; agree that, if
the trust instrument is amended at any time in the future, the employee will, within
a reasonable time, provide to the plan administrato~corrected certifications to the
extent that the amendment changes any information previously certified; and agree
to provide a copy of the trust instrument to the plan administrator upon demand.
(b) Required minimum distributions after death. In order to satisfy the
documentation requirementofthis A-6 for required minimumdistributions after the
death of the employee (or spouse in a case to which A-5 of §§1.40t(a)(9)-3
applies), by October 31 of the calendar year immediately following the calendar
year in which the employee died, the trustee of the trust must either --
(1) Provide the plan administrator with a fmallist of all beneficiaries of the trust
(including contingent and remaindermen beneficiaries with a description of the
cpnditions on their entitlement) as ofSeptember 30 ofthe calendar year following
the calendar year of the employee's death; certify that, to the best of the trustee's
knowledge, this list is correct and complete and that the requirements ofparagraph
(b)(I), (2), and (3) ofA-5 ofthis section are satisfied; and agree to provide a copy
ofthe trust instrument to the plan administrator upon demand; or
(2) Provide the plan administrator with a copy ofthe actual trust document for the
trust that is named as a beneficiary of the employee under the plan as of the
employee's date ofdeath.
(c) Relief for discrepancy between trust instrument and employee certifications or
earlier trust instruments. (1) If required minimum distributions are determined
based on the information provided to the plan administrator in certifications or trust
instruments described in paragraph (a) or (b) of this A-6, a plan will not fail to
satisfy section 401(a)(9) merely because the actual terms ofthe trust instrument are
inconsistent with the information in those certifications or trust instruments
previously provided to the plan administrator, but only if the plan administrator
reasonably relied on the information provided and the required minimum
distributions for calendar years after the calendar year in which the discrepancy is
discovered are determined based on the actual terms of the trust instrument.
(2) For purposes ofdetermining the amount of the excise tax under section 4974,
the required minimum distribution is determined for any year based on the actual
terms of the trust in effect during the year.
One issue that arose under the previous proposed regulations and that persists under these is whether the
presence of a broad special power of appointment means that the trust does not have identifiable beneficiaries and,
consequently, cannot be a "designated beneficiary.'~
e. Effective Dates The regulations apply for determining required minimum distributions for
calendar years beginning on or after January 1, 2003. For determining required minimum distributions for calendar year
2002, taxpayers may rely on the final regulations, the 2001 proposed regulations, or the 1987 proposed regulations.
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f. Conclusions
1. There is no longer a debate over whether or not to recalculate - all Ps and spouse
now receive the benefits of recalculation, without its drawbacks.
2. Significance ofrequired beginning date is eliminated except for 2 items: (1) must
begin withdrawing by that date; and (2) after P's death, the post death distributions rules are slightly different.
3. Use disclaimers to create younger beneficiaries.
4. No need for separate accounts for charities, because you may make distributions
to older and non-individual (charities) prior to September 30 ofthe year following
P's death.
5. Any beneficiaries, regardless ofwhen P died, should be able to use the new rules
in 2002.
6. Beneficiaries ofP who died in 2000, should be able to use the new rules and make
"corrections" before December 31, 2001.
g. Administrative
IRA providers must now report the end ofyear IRA account values, and also the amount of
the RMD for that year.
2. Lump-Sum Distribution and Rollover to a Charitable Remainder Trust. PlR 200215032 cbdt
favorably with the receipt ofa lump-sum distribution from a retirement plan and the roll-over to a charitable remainder
trust. The facts were presented as follows:
The submitted information indicates that Taxpayer is presently employed by
Corporation and has been a participant in the Corporation's profit sharing plan (the
Plan) for more than five years. The Plan is represented as being a qualified plan
under §§ 401(a) ofthe Internal Revenue Code and tax exempt under §§ 501(a). As
of Date 1, Taxpayers account under the Plan was funded with x shares of
Corporation stock having a value ofapproximately $A dollars. Corporation stock
is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Taxpayer's child (Child) is
currently designated as the primary beneficiary ofthe account. The Plan pennits its
participants to elect to have lump-sum distributions ·paid out in-kind with
Corporation stock.
The cost basis of the Corporation stock in the Taxpayer's Plan account is
approximately $B, which represents both employer and employee contributions.
The difference between the cost basis of the stock and its fair market value is
referred to as the net unrealized appreciation.
The Taxpayer had planned to retire from the Corporation on or about Date 2 and
shortly after that date, will attain age 55. All ofthe assets in the Taxpayer's account
balance will be distributed to the Taxpayer outright following the retirement date
and prior to the end of the calendar year in which Taxpayer retires.
The Taxpayer proposes to "rollover" a portion ofthe Corporation stock distributed
to him from the Plan account to an individual retirement account (IRA) described
in §§ 408. Within twelve months of retirement, Taxpayer will sell a portion ofthe
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Corporation stock distributed to him that was not "rolled over." In additio~
Taxpayer proposes to Contribute the remaining "non-rollover" Corporation stock
to a charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT), which Taxpayer will create. The
contribution of stock to the CRUT will be less than 10 percent of the value ofthe
outstanding Corporation stock. Taxpayer represents that the CRUT will comply,
with the requirements of §§ 664 and the regulations thereunder. Under the terms
of the CRUT, a unitrust amount will be paid to Taxpayer during his lifetime. On
Taxpayer's death, the trust corpus is to be distribu~ed to certain public charities
described in §§§§ 170(c), 2055(a) and 2522(a) designated in the instrument. The
Taxpayer will act as initial trustee of the CRUT. The Taxpayer may contribute
other property to the CRUT.
The IRS granted all of the requested rulings:
I. The proposed distribution of the entire balance ofthe Plan after retirement will
meet the requirement ofa lump.sum distribution within one year of the receipt of
the balance to the credit of Taxpayer's Plan balance within the meaning of §§
402(e)(4)(D)(i), despite a potential additional Year 1 profit sharing contribution
that would be made during Year 2.
2.. The net unrealized appreciation, within the meaning of §§ 402(e)(4), is the
difference between the cost basis and the fair market value of the non-rollover
shares on the plan distribution date. Taxpayer will not, under §§ 402(e)(4)(B),
recognize ordinary income on that portion of the non-rollover share plan
distribution representing the net unrealized appreciation.
3. Any taxable gain on the subsequent sale of the non-rollover shares will be
treated as capital gain income on the sale of a capital asset held in excess of 12
months to the extent of the original net unrealized appreciation, regardless of the
time period between the sale date and the distribution date. Post-distribution gain
in excess of the net unrealized appreciation amount will be taxed at the applicable
capital gain rate based on the holding period ofthe stock from the distribution date
to the sale date.
4. No portion of the Plan distribution will be subject to the 10 percent early
di~tribution penalty under §§ 72(t)(2)(A)(v) because Taxpayer will meet the
exception under §§ 72(t)(2)(A)(v) for distributions made to an individual after
attaining 55 years of age following separation from service.
5. Taxpayer will not recognize any immediate taxable income, gain or loss from the
act of contributing stock received from the Plan to the CRUT.
6. Taxpayer will qualify for an income and gift tax charitable deduction for the
contribution ofthe non-rollover shares to the CRUT equal to the fair market value
of the stock at the time ofthe transfer less the present value ofTaxpayer's retained
unitrust interest.
7. The stock transferred to the CRUT will retain Taxpayers cost basis and holding
period.
8. The gain from any subsequent sale by the CRUT ofthe non-rollover shares will
be exempt from immediate direct taxation Taxpayer and to the CRUT, assuming
the CRUT does not have unrelated trade or business income in the year ofthe sale.
A - 16
The amount ofany gain, to the extent of the net unrealized appreciation, from the
sale ofthe non-rollover shares will be characterized as capital gain income from the
sa~~ of a capital asset held in excess of 12 months for purposes of the distribution
characterization rules described in §§ 664(b) and the regulations thereunder. Gain
in excess ofthe net unrealized appreciation will be characterized according to the
holding period of the stock from the distribution date to the sale date.
D. SECTIONS 671-678 - GRANTOR TRUST RULES
I. Non-Grantor, Non-Gift Trust Created. PLR 200148028 is vel)' helpful. The taxpayer established
a trust that is not a grantor trust but gifts to which are incomplete. The facts were:
Grantor proposes to establish an irrevocable Trust which will be funded by
intervivos and testamentary transfers. The Trust provides for one trustee (Trustee)
and two members ofa Distribution Committee. Article 1.1 provides that during the
lifetime. of the Grantor ("Initial Term"), the Trustee shall have no power or
authority to make any distribution ofnet income or principal ofthe trust estate, to,
or for the benefit of, any trust beneficiary at any time when any person is serving
as a member of the Distribution Committee unless the distribution is made at the
direction ofthe Distribution Committee. Distributions may be made to the Grantor,
tl,e Grantor's Spouse or any ofthe descendants of the Grantor's parents.
Article 3.6 provides that the initial members of the Distribution Committee shall
be the two eldest adult and competent persons eligible to receive distributions out
of the Trust estate (other than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). At all times
during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall be comprised of two
persons, then eligible to receive distributions out ofthe Trust estate (other than the
Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). During the Initial Term, the Distribution
Committee shall direct the Trustee with regard to (i) all discretionary distributions
from the Trust estate to beneficiaries, and (ii) certain ofthe Trustee's powers. The
Trustee is authorized and directed to follow the direction of the Distribution
Committee. All rights and powers conferred on the Distribution Committee shall
be exercisable only by unanimous action of all members of the Distribution
Committee except that any memberofthe DistributionCommittee acting alone may
direct the Trustee to make one or more distributions upon obtaining the Grantor's
prior written consent to each such distribution and filing such consent with the
Trustee.
The Trust lasts during the Iifetime 0 f the Grantor. Under Article 1.2, upon the death
of the Grantor, income and principal of the Trust estate,· as it is then constituted
shall be transferred, conveyed and paid over to such person or persons then eligible
to receive distributions out of the Trust estate, other than the Grantor, as the
Grantor appoints by the Grantor's will. To the extent all, or any portion of the
income and principal of the Trust estate is not so effectively appointed, such
income and principal shall be divided into a sufficient number of equal shares so
that there shall be set aside one such share for each child ofthe Grantor who is then
living, and one such share for the collective descendants who are then living ofany
child of the Grantor who is not then living. From each such share so set aside for
the collective descendants who are then living of any child of the Grantor who is
not t~en living there shall be set aside per stirpital parts for such descendants. Ifno
descendant of the Grantor is living at the death of the Grantor, the income and
principal of the Trust, to the extent not effectively appointed, shall be distributed,
free from Trust, to the then living descendants per stirpes, ofthe Grantor's parents.
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Article 1.3 provides that the Grantor may, at any time during the Grantor's life
release the Grantor's right to receive discretionary distributions of income and
principal from the trust estate, the right to consent to distributions as described in
Article 3.6, and/or the power ofappointment described in Article 1.2, and may limit
the persons or entities in whose favor the power of appointment described in
Article 1.2 may be exercised. Article 1.3 further provides that notwithstanding any
of the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement, the Grantor shall have
no poweror authority to change the class ofpersons ~ligible to receive distributions
during the Initial Tenn (except to cause the Grantor personally to be excluded from
the class by releasing the Grantor's own right to be eligible to receive such
distributions.)
With respect to why the trust would not be a grantor trust the ruling states:
Because ofthe discretion ofthe Distribution Committee, acting together, or singly
with the consent of the Grantor, to make distributions from income and/or corpus
to one or more ofthe beneficiaries which includes the members ofthe Distribution
Committee, the members of the Distribution Committee have a substantial
beneficial interest in both the income and corpus portions of the Trust. Any
distribution that the Grantor wishes to make from assets contributed to the Trust
by that Grantor, could be made only if one of the members of the Distribution
Committee agrees. Since each of the two Distribution Committee members is a
potential recipient ofTrust distributions, a consent toa distribution could adversely
affect that individual's beneficial interest in the Trust. Thus, with respect to the
Grantor, both of the members of the Distribution Committee are adverse parties
within the meaning ofsection 672(a).
The requirement in Article 3.6 that the initial members, and any current or
successor member ofthe Distribution Committee shall be the two eldest adult and
competent persons eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate and that
at all times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall becomprised
of two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of Trust estate, ensures
that the Grantor will not be able to act independently of an adverse party. The
restrictions on the powers ofthe Trustee preclude the Trustee from independently
controlling distributions or making loans without the consent ofan adverse party.
The Grantor does not have a reversionary interest in excess of five percent in any
portion of the Trust. Accordingly, section 673 does not apply to treat Grantor as
owner ofany portion of the Trust. Because control over the beneficial enjoyment
of, and any distributions of, income and corpus is exercisable by the Grantor, only
with the consent of a Distribution Committee member, who is an adverse party,
Grantor will not be treated as the owner of any portion of the Trust under section
674 or section 677. The Trust agreement does not authorize any of the
circumstances that cause administrative controls to be considered exercisable
primarily for the benefit of the grantor under section 675. Section 676 does not
apply to Grantor because Grantor cannot revest title in the Grantor in any portion
of the Trust. Section 678 is not applicable since none ofthe trustees and no other
person will have a power exercisable solely by that person to vest the corpus or
income of the Trust in that person.
The existence of the grantor's special testamentary power of appointment prevented the gift from being
complete.
This kind of trust may be very useful to assist grantors in avoiding state capital gains taxes on sales ofassets.
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E. SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
1. Proposed Regulations on OSST Elections for Testamentary Trusts. REG-l06431-01 (August
23, 2001). The Supplementary Information explains the provisions as follows:
Section I. 1361-1(j)(6)(iii)(C) of the Income Tax Regulations provides guidance
regarding when a QSST election is made for a former qualified subpart E trust that
also satisfies the requirements of a QSST. Under the provision, a QSST election
may be made for a fonner qualified subpart E trust at any time, but no later than the
end of the 16-day-and-2-month period beginning on the date on which the estate
ofthe deemed owner ceases to be treated as a shareholder (as late as the end ofthe
2-year period). Thus, a fonner qualified subpart E trust can continue as a permitted
shareholder after the end of the 2-year period by electing to be a QSST.
Section 1.1361-1(h)(3)(ii)(B) provides that ifa testamentary trust continues to own
S corporation stock after the expiration ofthe 60-day period (now 2-year period),
the corporation's S election will terminate unless the trust otherwise qualifies as a
permitted shareholder. The trust otherwise qualifies as a pennitted shareholder if
it satisfies the requirements of a QSST under section 1361(d)(3) and the trust
income beneficiary makes a timely QSST election under section 1361(d)(2). The
regulations, promulgated before 1996, do not address when a QSST election may
be made for a testamentary trust during its 2-year period as a permitted shareholder.
The IRS and the Treaswy Department believe that the regulations should provide
guidance similar to that for former qualified subpart E trusts clarifying when an
income beneficiary of a testamentary trust may make a QSST election.
Accordingly, the proposed regulations clarify that a current income beneficiary of
a testamentary trust that satisfies the QSST requirements may make a QSST
election at any time during the 2- year period that the trust is a permitted
shareholder or the 16-day- and-2-month period beginning on the date after the 2-
year period ends. Under this provision, a testamentary trust continues .as a
pennitted·shareholder after the end of the 2-year period by becoming an electing
QSST. Once the trust becomes an electing QSST, the beneficiary is treated as the
shareholder of the S corporation as of the effective date of the QSST election.
2. Final ESBT Regulations. On May 14, 2002 the IRS published final regulations regarding electing
small business trusts. A Summary ofContents and Explanation ofRevisions was provided by the IRS. Parts of it state:
Beneficiaries and Potential Current Beneficiaries
For a trust to qualify as an electing small business trust (ESBT) and as a
shareholder in a subchapter S corporation, only certain types of persons are
permitted to be beneficiaries of the trust. Once a trust makes the ESBT election,
each potential current beneficiary (PCB) of the trust is treated as a shareholder of
the S corporation. Thus, the identity ofthe beneficiaries affects whether a trust can
be an ESBT, while the identity and number ofPCBs affect whether the corporation
can be a S corporation. It is possible under certain circumstances for a person to be
a PCB, as that term is defmed in section 136 I(e)(2) and the proposed regulations,
without being a beneficiary, as that tenn is defmed in the proposed regulations. For
example, a person who may receive a distribution from an ESBT under a currently
exercisable power ofappointment is a PCB but is not treated as a beneficiary until
the power is actually exercised.
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Some commentators expressed concerns about the possible adverse effects ofthe
defmition of PCBs, especially in situations involving potential recipients of a
currently exercisable power ofappointment Some commentators suggested that a
person should have to meet the defmition ofa beneficiary before the person could
be considered a PCB. Commentators also suggested that a person who may receive
a distribution under a currently exercisable power of appointment should not be
treated as a PCB until exercise ofthe power. Several commentators suggested that
a temporary waiveror release ofa broad powerofappointment should be sufficient
to limit the number of PCBs during a period of time.
The fmal regulations do not change the basic defmition ofPCBs. While there is no
statutory defmition ofbeneficiary in section 1361(e), there is a statutory defmition
of PCB. Under section 1361(e)(2), a PCB is, "with respect to any period, any
person who at any time during such period is entitled to, or, at the discretion ofany
person, may receive, a distribution from the principal or income ofthe trust." The
IRS and the Treasury Department believe that it would be inconsistent with this
statutory defmition not to treat a person as a PCB until an actual distribution is
made to that person pursuant to the exercise ofa power ofappointment. The final
regulations provide that an attempt to temporarily waive, release, or limit a power
ofappointment would not be effective to limit the PCBs because ofuncertainty as
to the effectiveness of a temporary waiver, release, or limitation on the power of
appointment under state law and the potential to manipulate a temporary waiver,
release, or limitation on a power of appointment to avoid the S corporation
shareholder limitation rules. However, a pennanent release of a power of
appointment that is effective under local law may reduce the number of PCBs of
an ESBT.
Another commentatorsuggested that the separate share provisions ofsection663(c)
should apply so that beneficiaries or PCBs of the share holding the assets other
than the S corporation stock would not be counted as beneficiaries or PCBs ofthe
S portion. There is no authority to ignore beneficiaries and PCBs ofa portion ofa
trust holding assets other than S corporation stock. The statutory defmitions ofan
ESBT and of a PCB look to all the persons who are beneficiaries or PCBs of the
trust, not just the S portion. In addition, the separate share provisions of section
663(c) are not applicable because they generally apply only for purposes of
allocating distributable net income under sections 661 and 662.
Two commentators'requested guidance on what period of time is considered in
determining who are PCBs in light ofthe statutory definition. They suggested that
period means any moment in time. Thus, if an event occurs during a taxable year
that changes who the PCBs are, the PCBs before and after the event would not be
counted cumulatively for purposes of the 75-shareholder limit. The shareholder
limitation'in section 1361(b)(1)(A) means that an S corporation may nothave more
than 75 shareholders at any particular time during the taxable year. See Rev. Rut.
78-390 (1978-2 C.B. 220). The fmal regulations clarify that a person is treated as
a shareholder of the S corporation at any moment in time when that person is
entitled to, or in the discretion ofany personmay, receive a distribution ofprincipal
or income of the trust. The final regulations also provide that a person who, after
the exercise of a power of appointment, receives only a future interest in the trust
is not a PCB.
A - 20
--.
One commentator was concerned about the statement in the proposed regulations
that ifa person holds a general lifetime power ofappointment, the corporation will
exceed the 75-shareholder limit and thus the corporation's S election will terminate.
The commentator pointed out that a beneficiary's power to withdraw assets from
a trust is considered a general power ofappointment but the beneficiary is the only
one who can receive those assets. The fmal regulations clarify that the potential
recipients of current distributions pursuant to an exercise of the power are
considered, not whether the power is a general or special power ofappointment.
The proposed regulations provide that a person with a future beneficial interest is
not a beneficiary of an ESBT if that interest is so remote as to be negligible. This
provision permitted trusts to qualify as ESBTs even though there was a remote
possibility that all the named beneficiaries would die and the trust assets would
escheat to the state, an impermissible beneficiary of an ESBT. The Community
Renewal Tax ReliefAct of2000 eliminated this potential problem by changing the
statutory defmition of permissible beneficiaries to include an organization
described in section 170(c)( I) that holds a contingent interest in the trust and is not
a PCB. The final regulations, therefore, remove the provision regarding remote
beneficiaries and the accompanying example.
Interests in Trust Acquired by Purchase
Two commentators requested clarification on whether a trust is eligible to be an
ESBT if it acquires property in a part- gift, part-sale transaction, such as a gift of
encumbered property or a net gift, in which the donor transfers property to a trust
provided the trust pays the resulting gift tax. Section 1361(e)(I)(A)(ii) provides
that a trust is eligible to be an ESBT only if "no interest in the trust was acquired
by purchase." Section 1361(e)(I)(C) defmes purchase as "any acquisition if the
basis of the property acquired is determined under section 1012." The proposed
regulations provide that if any portion of a beneficiatYs basis in the beneficiatYs
interest is determined under section 1012, the beneficiary'sinterest was acquired
by purchase. The fmal regulations clarify that the prohibition on purchases applies
to purchases ofa beneficiary's interest in the trust, not to purchases ofproperty by
the trust. A net gift ofa beneficial interest in a trust, where the donee pays the gift
tax, would be treated as a purchase ofa beneficial interest under these rules, while
a net gift to the trust itself, where t~e trustee of the trust pays the gift tax, would
not.
Grantor Trusts
Most commentators praised the position in the proposed regulations that a trust, all
or a portion ofwhich is treated as owned by an individual (deemed owner) under
subpart E, part I, subchapter J, chapter 1 of the Code (grantor trust), may elect to
be an ESBT. One commentator, however, suggested that grantor trusts should not
be permitted to make ESBT elections. The final regulations continueto provide that
a grantor trust may elect to be an ESBT.
The proposed regulations provide that if a grantor trust makes an ESBT election,
the trust consists ofa grantor portion, an S portion, and a non-S portion. The items
of income, deduction, and credit attributable to the grantor portion are taxed to the
deemed owner of that portion. The S portion is taxed under the special rules of
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section 641(c), while the non-S portion is subject to the normal trust taxation rules
of subparts A through D of subchapter J.
Commentators made several suggestions regarding the taxation of a grantor trust
that elects to be an ESBT. Some suggested that the taxation rules ofsection 641(c)
should override the grantor trust rules of section 671, and thus all tax items
attributable to the trust's shares in the S corporation should be taxed to the trust, not
the deemed owner. Some suggested the grantor trust rules should not apply to any
tax items ofa trust that makes an ESBT election. AccOrding to these commentators,
this approach would eliminate administrative complexity in determining what
portion ofthe trust is treated as owned by the deemed owner. Others suggested that
,the trustee should be permitted to elect to have all items attributable to the S
corporation taxed to the trust, not to the deemed owner. Others suggested that none
of the S items should be taxed to the deemed owner but that ESBTs should be
subject to additional reporting requirements to ensure the collection ofthe proper
tax. Another suggested that the deemed owner should be taxed on the items from
an ESBT only if the deemed owner is treated as owning the entire trust, not just a
portion ofthe trust. Other commentators agreed with the taxation regime set forth
in the proposed regulations.
The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the qualification and taxation
ofESBTs are two separate issues and that the proposed-regulations takethe correct
position regarding the taxation ofgrantor trusts that make ESBT elections. Section
1361(e)(l) expands the pennissible shareholders of an S corporation to include
trusts that meet the definition ofan ESBT. Grantor trusts are not excluded from the
defmition of an ESBT and, therefore, are permitted to make ESBT elections.
Making an ESBT election, however, does not alter the long established treatment
oftax items attributable to the portion ofa trust treated as owned by the grantor or
another. Section 671 requires that items of income, deduction, and credit
attributable to the portion ofthe trust treated as owned by a grantor or another must
be taken into account by that deemed owner. Only remaining items ofthe trust are
subject to the provisions of subparts A through D of subchapter J. The special
taxation rules for ESBTs are contained in subpart A and, therefore, only apply to
any portion ofthe trust that is not treated as owned by the grantor or another under
subpart E.
As pointed out by one ofthe commentators, the issue ofdetermining what portion,
ifany, ofa trust is treated as owned by the 'grantor or another has existed for'years
in a much broader context than in the application of the ESBT rules. The special
taxation rules of section 641(c) would apply only to S items, while normal trust
taxation rules clearly apply to non-S items. As a result, taxing all the S items to the
trust would not eliminate the need to determine what portion ofthe trust is a grantor
trust and the resulting administrative difficulties with respect to the non-S tax items
of the trust
Some commentators requested clarification of the effect of an ESBT election by
a grantor trust. One commentator suggested that if a wholly-owned grantor trust
makes an ESBT election, only the deemed owner should be treated as the
shareholder ofthe S corporation. Another commentator made a similar suggestion
where the grantor has retained the power to amend or revoke the trust or to make
gifts from the trust. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the
defmitional and qualification requirements of section 1361(e) apply to any trust
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that makes an ESBT election irrespective ofwhether it is a grantor trust. Therefore,
the fmal regulations continue to provide that the deemed owner is treated as a PCB
along with others who meet the defmition of a PCB.
Charitable Contributions
The proposed regulations provide that if an otherwise allowable deduction of the
S portion is attributable to a charitable contribution .paid by the S corporation, the
contribution will be deemed to be paid by the S portion pursuant to the tenns ofthe
trust's governing instrument and will be deductible .if the other requirements of
section 642(c)(1) are met. Several commentators requested clarification concerning
the other requirements ofsection 642(c)(1), the application ofthe limitations under
section 681, and the election to treat charitable payments made after the close of
a taxable year as made during the taxable year. One commentator suggested that the
S portion should be entitled to a deduction for its share of any charitable
contribution made by the S corporation because it is a separately stated item under
section 1366 that the S portion takes into account under section 641(c)(2)(C}(i).
Section 641(c)(2)(C) specifies the items of income~ loss, deduction, or credit that
the S portion is required to take into account in determining its tax. These items
ulclude items required to be taken into account under section 1366, that is, the
trust's pro rata share of the S corporation's items passed through to it as .a
shareholder. Both section 641(c)(2)(C) and section 1366(a) reference items that
must be taken into account but do not themselves provide the authority to include
in income, deduct from income, or claim a credit with respect to those items. That
authority comes from other Code sections. A charitable contribution made by an
S corporation is required to be a separately stated item under section 1366 because
whether the item is deductible depends on the identity of the shareholder and the
provisions ofthe Code applicable to charitable contributions made by that type of
shareholder. Thus, for an individual shareholder, the contribution is deductible only
in accordance with the provisions of section 170, while for a trust or estate, the
contribution is deductible only in accordance with the provisions ofsection 642(c).
The fmal regulations continue to provide that the S portion's share ofa charitable
contribution made by the S corporation is deductible only if it meets the
. requirements of section 642(c)(1). The fmal regulations clarify how those
requirements apply to such a contribution. If a contribution is paid from the S
corporation's gross income, the contribution will be deemed to be paid by the S
portion pursuant to the terms of the trust's governing instrument The limitations
of section 681, regarding unrelated business income, apply to determine whether
the contribution is deductible by the S portion. The fmal regulations also clarify
that the charitable contribution is deductible by the S portion, if at all, only in the
year that it is an item required to be taken into account by the trust under section
1366. The trustee may not make the election to treat a contribution made by the S
corporation after the close ofthe taxabIe year as made during the taxable year. This
election is available only for charitable payments actually made by the trust, not for
the trust's share of contributions made by another entity.
One commentator suggested that if the trust contributes Scorporation stock to a
charitable organization, the S portion should be entitled to a charitable deduction
with respect to the contribution. Deductions available to the S portion are limited
by section 641(c)(2)(C) to S corporation items required to be taken into account
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under section 1366 and the S portion's share of state and local income taxes and
administrative expenses. Charitable contributions by the trust are not items
included in the list of items that may be taken into account by the S portion 1JIlder
section 641(c)(2)(C). Therefore, the fmal regulations do not change the rule that
no deduction is available to either the S portion or the non-S portion with respect
to a contribution of S corporation stock to charity.
Interest Paid on Loans to Acquire S Corporation S~ock
The proposed regulations provide that interest expense incurred by the trust to
purchase S corporation stock is allocated to the S portion but is not an
administrative expense. Therefore, the interest is not an allowable deduction ofthe
S portion under section 641(c)(2)(C)(iii). Several commentators suggested that the
interest should be deductible. Some thought the interest should be allocated to the
non-S portion and deducted under the investment interest limitations of section
163(d). Others thought the interest should be allocated to the S portion but should
be considered a deductible administrative expense. One commentator suggested
that if the shareholders are required to buy the stock of a departing shareholder
pursuant to the tenns ofa stock purchase agreement, any interest expense incurred
~ a result of fmancing the stock purchase with a loan should be deductible when
paid by an ESBT. Another commentator suggested that if interest paid on a loan to
acquire S corporation stock is not deductible, it should be added to the basis ofthe
acquired stock.
Because the purchase 0 f S corporation stock increases the S portion, rather than the
non-S portion, of the trust, interest expenses incurred in the purchase should be
allocated to the S portion. These interest expenses would be deductible by the S
portion only if they are "administrative expenses" under section 641(c)(2)(C)(iii).
The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that, for purposes of section
641(c)(2)(C)(iii), "administrative expenses" include the traditional expenses
necessary for the management and preservation of trust assets;-but do not include
expenses incurred to acquire additional assets. The final regulations, therefore,
continue to provide that, in all" cases, interest incurred to purchase S corporation
stock is a nondeductible expense allocable to the S portion. Because there is no
authority to permit nondeductible interest expenses to increase the basis ofassets,
the final regulations do not adopt this suggestion.Tax
***
ESBT Election
The proposed regulations provide that the ESBT election is filed with the service
center where the trust files its income tax returns. The election to be a qualified
subchapter S trust (QSST) is filed with the service center where the S corporation
files its income tax returns. The preamble to the proposed regulations requested
comments on whether the rules for filing the QSST election should be changed so
the election is filed with the service center where the trust files its returns. One
commentator suggested there should be consistent filing locations for QSST
elections, ESBT elections, and conversions from QSST to ESBT or ESBT to
QSST. The commentator, therefore, suggested that all these documents be filed
with the service center(s) where the trust and the S corporation file their returns.
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The [mal regulations provide that the ESBT election and the election to convert
from an ESBT to a QSST or from a QSST to an ESBT are all filed with the service
ce'1ter where the S corporation files its income tax returns. Thus, the rule in the
[mal regulations will establish a consistent filing location for QSST and ESBT
elections and conversions.
One commentator suggested that grantor trusts should be pennitted to make
protective ESBT elections in light of the uncertain status of some trusts that may
be grantor trusts under section 674. The IRS and the Treasury Departmentcontinue
to believe that a conditional ESBT election that only becomes effective in the event
the trust is not a wholly-owned grantor trust should not be available. A conditional
ESBT election should not be allowed because the ESBT election must have a fIXed
effective date. If, in the absence of a conditional ESBT election, the trust is an
ineligible shareholder, relief under section 1362(0 may be available for an S
corporation. In addition, a trust that qualifies as an ESBT may make an ESBT
election notwithstanding that the trust is a wholly-owned grantor trust.
•••
E/feet under Section 1377 ofChange in Status ofa Trust
A commentator suggested that a trust's conversion to an ESBT should result in" a
complete termination of the trust's interest in the S corporation for purposes of
section 1377(a)(2) because the incidence oftaxation with respect to S corporation
items will change as a result of the ESBT election. The proposed regulations
provide that the election would result in a termination only if, prior to the election,
the trust was described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii). The commentator also
recommended that the regulations address the conversion from an ESBTto another
type of trust and the availability ofan election under §§ 1.1368-I(g) to treat the S
corporation's taxable year as two separate years in the case of a qualifying
disposition.
The fmal regulations do not adopt the suggestion that all conversions of a trust to
an ESBT should be treated as a complete termination of the trust's interest in the
S corporation for purposes ofsection 1377(a)(2). The fmal regulations expand on
the rule in the proposed regulations to cover all types of conversions. Under this
rule, conversion ofa trust to an ESBT or a QSST does not result in the prior trust
terminating its entire interest in the S corporation, unless the prior trust was
described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii). When a trust described in section
1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii) converts to an ESBT or a QSST, the shareholders of the
S corporation under section 1361(c)(2)(B) change from the estate of the deemed
owner artestator to the PCBs ofthe ESBT, or the current income beneficiaryofthe
QSST. When a trust changes from a wholly-owned grantor trust or QSST to an
ESBT or from an ESBT to a QSST, the individuals who are shareholders ofthe S
corporation under section 1361(c)(2)(B) remain the same. The election to terminate
the taxable year provided in section 1377(a)(2) applies to the termination of a
shareho/der'sinterest in the S corporation. Accordingly, it is appropriate to treat the
conversion ofa trust described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii) to an ESBT or
QSST as a termination of the prior trust's interest in the S corporation, but not to
treat other conversions to an ESBT or QSST as terminations. The election under
§§1.1368-1(g) is also not available because the conversion of the trust is not a
qualifying disposition.
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The effective date rules are complicated:
Effective Dates
The portion of the regulations involving the taxation of the grantor, S, and non-S
portions ofan ESBT was proposed to be applicable for taxable years ofESBTs that
end on or after December 29, 2000, the date that the proposed regulations were
published in the Federal Register. The remainder of the regulations involving
ESBTs was proposed to be applicable on or after the date that final regulations are
published in the Federal Register. Several commentators expressed concerns
about the proposed applicability with regard to the taxation of the grantor portion
of an ESBT. One commentator suggested that the proposed effective date
discriminated against trusts with a situs in Guam. Others suggested that the rules
regarding taxation of the grantor portion should not be applicable before the date
the final regulations are published. One commentator suggested that these rules
should only apply either to trusts created after the final regulations are published
or after a substantial transition period.
The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that the applicable date for the rules
concerning the taxation of an ESBT with a grantor portion is reasonable and
appropriate. These rules do not discriminate against trusts with a particular situs
because they apply to all trusts wherever situated. In the caseofagrantor trust that
made an ESBT election, the tax treatment ofthe grantor portion set forth in the
proposed regulations may be different from the tax treatment that the trust and the
grantor had thought was available. The proposed regulations, however, were
published before the end of the 2000 taxable year and before income from that
taxable year was required to be included on any person's income tax return. Thus,
prior to the filing of income tax returns for 2000, it was known that the income
from the grantor portion of the trust was to be taken into account by the deemed
owner, not by the trust. In some situations, the trust, rather than the deemed owner,
may have made estimated tax payments. Recognizing that the payment ofestimated
tax by the trust might subject the deemed owner to a penalty for underpayment of
estimated taxes, the IRS and the Treasury Department provided relief by issuing
Notice 2001-25 (2001-13 LR4B. 941). That Notice provides procedures for a trust
to elect to have its estimated tax payments credited to the account of the deemed
owner and provides that, for purposes of calculating any underpayment of
estimated tax, income attributable to the S corporation was to be taken into account
on the last day of the deemed owner's 2000 taxable year.
Some commentators were concerned that existing ESBTs with currently
exercisable, broad powers of appointments have resulted in S corporations
exceeding the shareholder limit and have caused the tennination of the S
corporations' elections. The regulations regarding the definition of PCBs are
applicable only for taxable years of ESBTs that begin on or after May 14, 2002.
Therefore, persons who may receive a distribution from an ESBT pursuant to a
currently exercisable power of appointment will not be considered PCBs of the
ESBT until the first day ofthe ESBT's fIrSt taxable year that begins on or after May
14, 2002~ and the S corporation's election will not terminate before that date. In
addition, under section 1361(e)(2) if the trust disposes of all its stock in the S
corporation within 60 days after that date, the persons, who would fIrst meet the
defmition ofPCBs on that date, will not be PCBs and the corporation's S status will
not be affected.
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One commentator was concerned by the applicability date of the regulations
involving the deductibility of state and local income taxes and administrative
expenses. Section 641(c)(2)(C)(iii) provides that the S portion may take into
account its allocable share of state and local income taxes and administrative
expenses, but only to the extent provided in the regulations. The commentator
noted that before fmal regulations are issued there is no authority for an ESBT to
deduct any of these items. Therefore, the commentator requested that trusts be
allowed to rely on the regulatory provisions regard~g these items for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1996. The effective date provisions have been
modified based on this suggestion.
F. SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 - VALUATION
I. Valuation of Votine Stock of Closely-Held Corporation. The case of the Estate of Richard R.
SimDlot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. No. 13 (1999), is very important. In 1993 Richard Simplot died owning 18 of the
76.445 shares ofthe Class A voting stock, and 3,942.48 ofthe 141,288.584 shares ofthe Class B non-voting stocks of
J.R. Simplot Co., a closely-held corporation best known for being the primary supplier ofpotatoes to McDonalds but
also operating in a variety of other businesses. At issue was the value of the decedent's stock.
After determining the underlying value of the company as a whole, the court calculated the per share value of
the Class A and Class B shares. The court then applied to the Class A shares a 3% premium ofthe value ofthe whole
company. Finally the court applied a 35% discount for the Class A shares, and a 40% discount for the Class B shares,
based on the lack ofmarketability. That result was a value for a Class A share of$215,539.01 and the value ofa Class
B share QfS3,417.05.
The rationale for the 3% premium for the voting stock was not entirely clear. An important consideration was
the ratio of the number of Class A shares to the number ofClass B shares, which was approximately I to 1,848. The
opinion states:
We recognize that on the valuation date the hypothetical buyer of decedent's 18
shares ofclass A voting stock would not have the ability to control the Company's
management and would be subject to the philosophy of the other three class A
shareholders, all of whom were related and had family interests to protect. And
obviously, an investor would pay more for a block ofstock that represents control
than for a block of stock that is only a minority interest in the Company. On the
other hand, here, no one individual had a controlling block of voting stock.
We also recognize that Don, Gay, and Scott [the other voting Shareholders] would
want to maximize their children's interest in the Company and that if a sale or
liquidation of J.R. Simplot Co. occurred or if the Company merged with or into
another, the benefits derived therefrom would probably be distributed not by class
ofstock, but rather on an equal per- share basis, regardless ofclass. In other words,
after having paid for voting privileges, if on or after June 24, 1993, the Company
were merged, sold, or liquidated, the hypothetical buyer would suffer a loss if the
proceeds of the sale, merger, or liquidation were to be distributed among all
shareholders of J.R. Simplot Co. on a pro rata share basis, rather than on a class
basis.
On the other hand, we agree with Mr. Matthews [one of the IRS experts] that
although on the valuatinn date decedent's class A voting shares constituted a
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minority interest in J.R. Simplot Co., it was foreseeable that one day (but NOT ON
the valuation date) the voting characteristics associated with them could have
"swing vote" potential if the hypothetical buyer combined his 18 class A voting
shares with Scott's 22.445 shares or joined with Don and Gay (combined having
36 class A voting shares) to form a control group.
Considering and weighing all ofthese factors, we adopt Mr. Matthews' lower range
figure of 3 percent ofJ.R. Simplot Coe's equity value as the fair premium for the
voting privileges (NOT voting control) associated with the class A stock of J.R.
Simplot Co. We have adopted Mr. Matthews' 3-percent premium for voting
privileges because we give the greatest weight to the fact that Do~Gay, and Scott
would be inclined to vote in a manner that would maximize their children's
interests. Thus, we believe the collective premium for the voting privileges of the
76.445 shares ofclass A stock ofJ.R. Simplot Co. as ofthe valuation date is $24.9
million (3 percent x $830 million), or $325,724.38 per share.
The court appeared uncomfortable with its decision:
A few final words before leaving the valuation issues. We recognize the disparate
ratio of our determined value before consideration of a liquidity discount·of the
class A voting stock ($331,595.70 per share) to that ofthe class B nonvoting stock
($5,695.09 per share), that is a ratio ofapproximately 58 to 1. This disparity is the
consequence of the unique capital structure of J.R. Simplot Co. and the skewed
ratio of the number ofclass A voting shares to the class B nonvoting shares, that
is, approximately 1 to 1,848.
The decision is unprecedented and can be criticized. In the real world would a buyer pay more unless acquiring
control? The benefit of being a director, for instance, seems ephemeral as an economic matter.
If the Simplot rationale were followed with respect to transfers of general partnership interests, significant
taxable gifts could result. To illustrate, suppose a family limited partnership were formed with 100 general partnership
units and 9,900 limited partnership units and owned $10 million in marketable securities. If a 3% premium were
attributed to the general partnership units then the value of the 100 general partnership units would increase from
$100,000 to $400,000.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the Tax Court on May 14,2001, 87 AFTR2d ~2001-923, in a 2-1
decision. The majority opinion was straightforward:
The Tax Court in its opinion accurately stated the law: "The standard is objective,
using a purely hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller .... The hypothetical
persons are not specific individuals or entities. It The Commissioner himself in his
brief concedes that it is improper to assume that the buyer would be an outsider.
The Tax Court, however, departed from this standard apparently because it
believed that"the hypothetical sale should not be constructed in a vacuum isolated
from the actual facts that affect value. t1 Obviously the facts that determine value
must be considered.
The facts supplied by the Tax Court were imaginary scenarios as to who a
purchaser might be, how long the purchaser would be willing to wait without any
return on his investment, and what combinations the purchaser might be able to
effect with Simplot children or grandchildren and what improvements in
management ofa highly successful company an outsider purchaser might suggest.
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"All ofthese factors," Le., all ofthese imagined facts, are what the Tax Court based
its 3% premium upon. In violation ofthe law the Tax Court constructed particular
possible purchasers.
The Tax Court erred further by finding what premium all the Class A shares as a
block would command and then dividing this premium per each Class A share.
Doing so, the Tax Court valued an asset not before it -- all the Class A stock
representing complete control. There was no basi~ for supposing that whatever
value attached to complete control a proportionate share of that value attached to
each fraction ofthe whole. Under the applicable regulations, the fair market value
of"each unit ofproperty" is to be ascertained; in the case ofshares ofstock, "such
unit ofproperty is generally a share ofstock." 26 C.F.R. section 20.2031- I(b).
The Tax Court committed a third error of law. Even a controlling block ofstock is
not to be valued at a premium for estate tax purposes, unless the Commissioner can
show that a purchaser would be able to use the control "in such a way to assure an
increased economic advantage worth paying a premium for." Ahmanson
Foundation v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 770 (9th eir. 1981). Here, on
liquidation, all Class B shareholders would fare better than Class A shareholders;
apy premium paid for the 18 Class A shares be lost. Class A and B had the right to
the same dividends. What economic benefits attended 18 shares ofClass A stock?
No"seat at the table" was assured by this minority interest; it could not elect a
director. The Commissioner points out that Class A shareholders had fonned
businesses that did business with Simplot. If these businesses enjoyed special
advantages, the Class A shareholders would have been liable for breach of their
fiduciary duty to the Class B shareholders. See Estate ofCuny v. United States,
706 F.2d 1424, 1430 (7th Cir. 1983).
Much ofthe Commissioner's argument is.devoted to speculation as to what might
happen after the valuation date -- the Simplots might fall out with each other, the
purchaser might fmd ways of making Simplot more profitable and persuade the
company to adopt his strategy, the purchaser might be willing to wait fifteen years
to get any return. The speculation is as easily made that the company would go
downhill when its founder, J. R. Simplot, 84 at the valuation date, retired; or that
McDonald's, Simplot's largest customer for its potatoes, would change its supplier;
or that Micron would prove to be an unwise investment. Speculation is easy but not
a proper way to value the transfer at the time of the decedent's death. Olso;) v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 259 (1934). In Richard Simplot's hands at the time of
transfer his stock was worth what a willing buyer would have paid for the
economic benefits presently attached to the stock. By this standard, a minority
holding Class A share was worth no more than a Class B share.
The dissent's view was that the purchaser would pay a premium in hopes of reselling the shares to form a
majority block:
The question then becomes whether Scott, who owns 29.35% of the A shares,
would be willing to pay a little less than four million dollars in order to gain voting
control ofa company worth $830 million, or whether Don and Gay, who together
own 47.10% of the A shares, would be willing to p~y that amount to gain such
control. I believe the answer is clear. Scott, Don, and Gay would each be extremely
interested in controlling the A shares, because with control of the A shares they
could make decisions - such as issuing dividends or taking the company public --
that would be of economic advantage to them and their descendants given their
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substantial ownership interest of the B shares and their descendants' beneficial
ownership ofB shares. Scott, Don, and Gay themselves have substantial ownership
ofB shares, and trusts benefitting their descendants have much greater ownership
of B shares. Once the B share interest is taken into account, the disjunction
between voting rights and economic interests disappears with respect to Scott, Don,
. and Gay. Given these facts, ourhypothetical buyer, "maneuveringa course between
them," would be able to able to sell 18 A shares for a substantial amount. In my
view, that amount probably exceeds the $3.9 millio~valuation reached by the Tax
Court. At the very least, I can fmd no clear error in the Tax Court's valuation of
53.9 million.
2. Aggregation ofStock. The holding in Estate ofOonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)
was followed in a case appealable to the Ninth Circuit by the Tax Court in Estate of Harriett R. Mellinger v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. No.4 (1999). The decedent and her husband originally owned, as community property, 4.9
million shares ofFrederick's of Hollywood, Inc. Frederick died frrst and left his community property interest of2.46
million shares in a QTIP trust for the benefit of Harriett. The remaining 2.46 million shares were owned by Harriett
in her own revocable trust.
Together the two blocks of stock represented 55.7% of the stock. The estate valued these shares as separate
27.8% interests using a discount of about 30%.
The court valued the interests separately but applied a 25% discount. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the decedent should be treated as the owner ofthe QTIP property for valuation purposes under section 2044. The court
noted that neither decedent had any power of disposition over the assets of the QTIP trust. The Tax Court followed
Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26 (1999) in the Estate ofAmbrosinia Blanche Lopes v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1999-225.
Estate ofEthel S. Nowell v.Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-15, came to the same conclusion as Mellinger
with respect to a partnership interest. ChiefJudge Mary Ann Cohen wrote the opinion in both Nowell and Mellinger.
Also at issue in Nowell was whether the interest in the partnerships passing at the death ofthe decedent should
be valued as an assignee interest or as partnership interest. The Tax Court detennined that the interest should be valued
as an assignee interest because the estate tax is levied on the property interests that were transferred at decedent's death
as detennined by applicable state law.
The partnership was created under the Arizona limited partnership act which provided that a limited partner
could not transfer the partner's interest without the consent of the general partner unless the partnership agreement
provided otherwise. Here, the partnership agreement did not provide otherwise. The court noted that whether general
partners will consent is a subjective factor that would not be taken into consideration under the objective standard of
the hypothetical buyer, hypothetical seller analysis, citing Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982),
Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. 938 (1982), and Kolom v. Commis~ioner, 71 T.e. 235 (1978), affd. 644
F.2d 1282 (9th. Cir. 1981).
The opinion did not state whether the previous practice of the partnership had been to admit assignees as
limited partners.
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In FSA 200119013 the IRS took the position that the Bonner line of cases did not apply to assets held in a
general power of appointment marital trust.
Further, this position is consistent with the recent litigation concluding that
fractional or minority interests in property held in a trust qualifying as qualified
tenninable interest property (QTIP), includible in the decedent's gross estate under
section 2044, is not aggregated for valuation purposes with fractional or minority
interests in property owned outright by the decedent. Estate of Bonner v. United
States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996); EstateofMellingerv. Commissioner, 112 T.e.
4 (1999), acq., 1999-2 C.B. xvi; Estate ofLopes v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225;
Estate ofNowell v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225. As discussed below, the nature
of the surviving spouse's interest in a marital deduction trust subject to a general
power of appointment and includible in the gross estate under section 2041 is
fundamentally different from the QTIP trust situations previously addressed by the
courts.
The FSA discussed one aspect of Mellinger:
The estate next cites language in the Tax Court's decision in Estate ofMellinger v.
Commissioner where the court, in reaching the conclusion that assets includible
under section 2044 are not aggregated with assets includible under section 2031,
stated:
Furthennore, at no time did decedent possess, control, or have any power
of disposition over the ... [property] in the QTIP trust. Cf. sees. 2035,
2036, 2041 (requiring inclusion in the gross estate where a decedent had
control over the assets at some time DURING HER LIFE).
Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 35-36 (emphasis added.)
The estate infers that the reference to control "during her life" indicates that the
Tax Court would not view a testamentary general power, which can only be
exercised to dispose of the property at death, as according the decedent sufficient
control over the property to justify aggregation. For several reasons, we do not
agree.
First, we believe the statement, as it applies to testamentary powers, merely
recognizes that in the case ofa testamentary power, the power holder has the power
to dispose of the assets at death but exercises that power during life by executing
the appropriate instrument. Thus, the power holder has lifetime control over the
property in the sense that the power holder's control is exercised during life, and
becomes effective on death. Many courts have characterized testamentary general
powers ofappointment as providing the holder with lifetime control. For example,
in Fidelity- Philadelphia Trust Co., v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945), the
decedent held a contingent testamentary general power of appointment and the
Court commented that, "[T]he ultimate disposition of all the trust property was
suspended during the life of the decedent." See also, Goldstone v. United States,
325 U.S. 687 (1945) (applying the decision in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. to
a decedent's reversionary interest). In Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102
T.e. 790, 800 (1994), affd, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996), the Tax Court
characterized the surviving spouse, as the holder ofa testamentary general power
ofappointment, as having "maintained effective control over the disposition ofthe
property in the marital trust until her death." 3 Thus, we do not believe the quoted
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language can reasonably be viewed as referencing only inter vivos general powers
ofappointment. .
In Nowell, the decedent had a testamentary special power of appointment:
Finally, the estate argues that in Estate of Nowell the decedent possessed a
testamentary .limited power of appointment over the trust assets, and, thus, could
exercise a degree of control over the disposition of the trust assets at death.
Nonetheless, the court did not take this power .into account. in fmding that
aggregation was not appropriate. We recognize that in some situations, a limited
power of appointment may afford the holder broad powers of disposition.
However, the power holder would not, in any event, be authorized to appoint the
property to his or her estate (or his or her creditors) as is the situation presented
with a general power.
Thus, there is a significant practical difference between the two kinds ofpowers,
and this difference is reflected in the tax treatment accorded the two powers. For
tax purposes, property subject to a limited power is not treatedas effectively owned
by the power holder, and is not subject to inclusion in the gross estate. Given the
nature of a limited power, and the fact that a limited power is not recognized for
estate and gift tax purposes as affording the power holder sufficient control to
g~nerateany transfer tax consequences when possessed or exercised, the court in
Estate ofNowell was justified in treating a QTIP trust subject to a limited power
in the same manner as a QTIP trust where the remainder beneficiaries are
designated by the fIrst spouse to die. However, as discussed above, it does not
follow that the same result should obtain in this case where the Decedent possessed
a general power ofappointment over Trust A.
The Tax Court agreed with the FSA in Estate of Aldo H. Fontana, et at. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 16
(2002). The opinion states:
Historically, a GPA has been equated with outright ownership of the property
because the powerholder (i.e., the decedent) can appoint the property to his estate
and, thus, dispose ofit as his or her own property. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315U.8.
657, 659 ( 1942) (stating "For purposes ofestate * ** taxation the power to dispose
of property at death is the equivalent of ownershipU); Peterson Marital Trust v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating "For tax purposes, a general
power of appointment has for many, many years been viewed as essentially
identical to outright ownership ofthe property"), affg. 102 T.C. 790 (1994). In fact,
the legislative history to section 402(e) ofthe Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,40 Stat
1097, the predecessor to section 2041, states:
A person having a general power of appointment is, with respect to
disposition of the property at his death, in a position not unlike that of its
owner. The possessor of the power has full authority to dispose of the
property at his death, and there seems to be no reason why the privilege
which he exercises should not be taxed in the same degree as other
property over which he exercises the same authority. * * * [H. Rept. 767,
65th Congo 2d Sess. 41-42 (1918),1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 86,101.]
In Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, supra at 35-36, we reasoned that although
section 2044 required that property held by the QTIP trust be included in Harriett's
(Le., the surviving spouse's) gross estate, the property U[did] not actually pass to or
from" her, and that she "at no time" possessed "control" or had "any power of
disposition over" the property. Unlike Harriett, who could not control the ultimate
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disposition ofthe property held by the QTIP trust, Aldo possessed a testamentary
GPA, which allowed him to control the ultimate disposition of the stock. Thus,
p'!rsuant to the GPA, Aldo, at the moment of death (i.e., the critical moment for
estate tax valuation purposes), had control and power of disposition over the
property. Accordingly, the Ledyard stock subject to Aldo'~testamentary GPA must
be aggregated with Ledyard stock Aldo owned outright.
3. Relevance ofPost-Deatb Sales. The case ofEstate ofAlice Friedlander Kaufman v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1999-119, illustrates the importance ofhaving a competent and credible appraiser. At issue was the value
ofalmost 20% ofthe stock in a closely-held company, Seminole Manufacturing Co., a makerofuniforms. The taxpayer
contended that the value ofthe shares was $29.77 based on sales two months after the valuation date oftwo blocks, one
of4.7% and another of3.25%, sold to other family members. The court found that those sales were not truly at arm's
length because the sellers were not reasonably informed about the facts relating to the stocks' value before they sold.
The estate had engaged an expert as had the IRS. However, the IRS' expert's report used the wrong valuation
date and made other mistakes and thus was held irrelevant other than asa rebuttal to the taxpayer's expert.
The court found that the taxpayer's expert was unpersuasive, and the taxpayer's expert testimony was
unsupported by the record, so that the court gave no weight to the taxpayer's expert and accepted the IRS determination
ofthe stock which was $56.50 per share. The case contains a lengthy discussion ofthe inadequacy of the taxpayer's
expert, ranging from confusion about the expert's assumptions, to mistakes in the interpretation ofvaluation methods.
The case should be reviewed by any expert preparing valuation opinions.
However, on the substance, the Ninth Circuit reversed in James J. Morrissey, et.al. v. Commissioner, 87
AFTR2d '2001-643 (2001). The Court held that the post-death sales were reliable:
In 1993, A. Max Weitzenhoffer, Jr. (Weitzenhoffer) asked Merrill Lynch to
appraise the value of a minority interest. .The Merrill Lynch fmal report was
delivered to him on July 5, 1994. However, on March 29, 1994 Merrill Lynch
wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its fonnal opinion that the fair market value of a
minority interest was $29.77 per share.
On the basis of this report Weitzenhoffer advised .two shareholders that Merrill
Lynch set the value at $29.70 per share, and each sold to him at this price. Edmund
Hoffman sold him his 10,000 shares on May 12, 1994; Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer
Branch sold him her 6,960 shares on June 16, 1994. Each seller subsequently
testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been
under no compulsion.
The Estate filed an estate tax return valuing the stock at $29.77 per share. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the stock at $70.79 per share and
asserted a deficiency based on this amount.
******
No good reason existed to reject the sales by Branch and Hoffman as evidence of
the fair market value of Seminole stock on April 14, 1994. The sales took place
close to the valuation date. The sellers were under no compulsion to sell. There was
no reason for them to doubt Weitzenhoffer's report ofthe Merrill Lynch valuation.
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That the fmal report was delivered only in July did not undercut the weight of the
fonnal opinion letterwritten in March. The sellers had no obligation to hire another
invesbnent fmn to duplicate Merrill Lynch's work.
The Commissioner tries to make something out of the family connections of the
sellers with the buyers. They were not especially close. Hoffinan had an uncle
related by marriage to Weitzenhoffer's uncle; there is no English word to name this
relationship. Branch was Weitzenhoffer's fIrst cousin. Each seller testified that
there was no intention to make a gift to Weitzenhoffer. .
The Commissioner notes that Hoffinan was a very successful businessman, so that
the Seminole stock may not have meant much to him. People don't get to be very
successful in business by treating valuable property carelessly. To be sure, there
was a seven cents spread between Merrill Lynch's price and Weitzenhoffer's offer;
the resulting difference ofS700 and $487.20 were in context de minimis.
The Commissioner also notes that Branch had a misimpression that Seminole still
owned a losing facility that it had, in fact, already sold. Nonetheless Branch was
rightly aware that a substantial loss had occurred due to this facility in 1991 when
no dividends had been paid. Both sellers were aware that dividends had, even in
p~osperous years, been meager.
On the other hand, in William J. Desmond v.Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-76, the court largely accepted
the estate's expert in valuing Deft, Inc. The court looked at two methods to detennine value, what is described as the
income method, the discounted cash-flow method, and the market method, comparing the stock to public companies.
The chart shows the calculations of the court, following the taxpayer's expert:
3,155,759 + 3,411,565 =
Unadjusted Value
Less Marketability Discount:
Nonenvironmental
Environmental
Add Control Premium
Fair Market Value of
100 percent Interest
x Decedent's
Interest
x Weight Given
Fair Market Value of
Decedent's Interest
10%
25%
81.93%
50%
$8,109,000
(1,621,800)
( 810,900)
2,027,250
7,703,550
6,311,519
3,155,759
$10,410,000
20% (2,082,000)
0%
0%
8,328,000
81.93% 6,823,130
50% 3,411,565
6,567,324
As the chart shows, there was a significant environmental liability potential in the company because it was a
manufacturer ofpaints, and that went into the lack ofmarketability discount when value was detennined using the cash-
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flow method. In addition, because the decedent owned a majority ofthe stockthe decedent could liquidate the company,
which was an S corporation, at any time. Thus the court found that a control premium should be added in the discounted
cash flow method. A control premium had already been added in the market method when reaching the $10,410,000
value.
With respect to calculating the amount of the lack of marketability discount, the court stated:
The following factors favor a high lack ofmarketability discount: (1) There was no
public market for Deft's stock; (2) Deft's profit margins were below the industry
average; (3) all stock in Deft was subject to a restrictive share agreement which
provided that a shareholder could transfer his or herstock to a nonshareholder only
after the shareholderoffered the shares to the remaining shareholders; (4) given the
size and low profitability ofDeft, a public offering ofthe stock was unlikely in the
future; (5) the size of the interest is so large that it may be hard to find potential
buyers in the future who could finance such a purchase; and (6) where not already
considered, Deft has large potential environmental liabilities.
Only one factor favors a low lack ofmarketability discount: Deft had an historical
favorable distribution policy (it distributed most of the company's earnings to its
shareholders through higher-than-market compensation in the past).
We conclude that a 30-percent lack ofmarketability di~count is appropriate for the
Deft stock. Ofthis 30-percentdiscount, 10 percent is attributable to Deft's potential
environmental liabilities. We shall apply the 30-percent lack of marketability
discount to the unadjusted value we determined under the income method. We
however shall apply only a 20-percent lack of marketability discount to the
unadjusted value we determined under the market method because as discussed
supra, the environmental liabilities have already been included in the unadjusted
value under that method.
4. Effect ofPost-Death Events. At issue in Estate ofElizabeth P. O'Neal, et. at. v. United States,88
AFTR2d ~2001-5101 (July 26, 2001) was the effect of post-death events on an estate's value. The' facts were
complicated:
Elizabeth Paramore O'Neal and her husband were minority shareholders in O'Neal
Steel, Inc., a closely-held family corporation located in Alabama. Together they
had two children, Emmet and Elizabeth (the children donees), and seven
grandchildren (the grandchildren donees) (collectively the nine heirs).
In 1987, the O'Neals gifted all their stock to the nine heirs. On the day of the gift,
the nine heirs entered into a consent and supplemental stock purchase agreement,
in which each ofthem agreed to contribute on a pro rata basis toward the payment
of transferee (or donee) gift tax liability, if any. Emmet held the shares in escrow
until the agreement was signed by all. Approximately nine months after the gifts
were made, Mr. O'Neal died.
Mrs. O'Neal's gift tax returns were timely filed. She paid $810,000 in gift taxes.
This amount was calculated based upon the stock values set forth in a 1951
company buy-sell agreement, as amended in 1976. The buy-sell agreement created
an option in other members of the O'Neal family to buy stock in the family
company at set prices. Class A non-voting stock was valued at $54.00 per share.
Class B voting stock was valued at $61.00 per share. The ONeals did not have
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sufficient share ownership to change the option prices, as this required the consent
of 75% of the shareholders.
The government did not begin an 8;udit of either Mr. or Mrs. O'Neal's gift tax
returns until July 1990, nine months prior to the expiration ofthe three-year statute
of limitations for assessing gift tax liability against them personally. During the
audit, the agent requested much information. Much was supplied, well in advance
of the statutory deadline. At no point prior to the deadline did the government
assert that either Mr. or Mrs. O'Neal had failed to pay the appropriate amount of
gift tax owing with respect to the 1987 gifts. Neither did the government request
an extension oftime in order to assess any additional gift tax due. When the statute
of limitations expired, the government was barred from collecting any additional
gift tax from either Mr. O'Neal's estate or Mrs. O'Neal.
Nevertheless, the audit continued. In September 1991, the examining agent
requested that an expert valuation study be perfonned on the 1987 value of the
Class A and Class B stocks. Two months later, the nine heirs were advised that the
government intended to assert transferee gift tax liability against them based upon
its pending revaluation of the family company stock. Two months after that, the
government valuation report issued. The government appraiser stated in his report
that, in his opinio~ on the date of the gifts, the value of the Class A nonvoting
stock was $375.00 per share, and the value ofthe Class B voting stock was $415.00
per share, a seven-fold increase in each class.
Two days before the statute of limitations to assert transferee gift tax liability
against the nine heirs was to expire, the government issued statutory notices of
deficiency asserting that Mrs. O'Neal owed an additional $9,407,226 in gift taxes
on the 1987 gifts, for which the nine heirs were liable. Similar notices were issued
on Mr. O'Neal's gifts. At this point, Mrs. O'Neal was still living.
The grandchildren donees made partial transferee gift tax payments totaling
$4,244,994. They then filed for a redetermination oftransferee gift tax liability in
tax court, contesting the government revaluation of stock and the government's
right to assert transferee gift tax liability against them. In April 1994, the tax court
found the grandchildren donees liable, although it did not detennine the dollar
amount of liability at that time.
The children donees made partial transferee gift tax payments totaling $15,770.
Instead of filing in tax court, the children donees first filed claims for refund with
the government that were quickly disallowed thirteen days later. Thereafter, they
filed claim for refund actions in Alabama federal district court, with assertions
similar to those made by the grandchildren donees in tax court. 6
Mrs. O'Neal died in July 1994. Her estate tax return was timely filed in April 1995.
It reflected a negative taxable estate and no estate tax due. The negative taxable
estate resulted from the Section 2053(a)(3) deduction of $9,407,226 taken on
Schedule K for "claims for reimbursement of transfer gift tax liability by donees
of 1987 gifts." The amount ofthe deduction claimed by the estate was calculated
using the government's per share stock values.
Shortly after it was filed, Mrs. O'Neal's estate tax return was selected for audit. The
most notable challenge by the government was to the amount of the Schedule K
deduction.
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In April 1995, more than nine months after Mrs. O'Neal's death and more than a
year after the action had been filed, the grandchildren donees and the government
settled their tax court litigation. Pursuant to the tenns ofthe settlement, the parties
agreed that the Class A stock was to be finally valued at $77 per share (instead of
$375) and that the Class B stock was to be finally valued at S82per share (instead
of$415).
A joint stipulation was submitted to the tax court. Both sides agreed that the
grandchildren donees had a total transferee gift tax liability of $487,814, plus
interest. The tax court then entered fmal decisions in the seven consolidated
grandchildren donee cases. The district court followed suit in the pending children
donee cases. Thereafter, the probate court entered an order holding that the claims
of the nine heirs were now valid and enforceable, and the nine heirs received
$563,314 in reimbursement monies from the estate.
The estate then filed an amended estate tax return reducing the Section 2053(a)(3)
deduction for claims against the estate on Schedule K from 59,401,226 to
$563,314. This changed the amount ofestate tax due dramatically. Once a negative
figure, Mrs. O'Neal's taxable estate swelled to $4,302,539, generating $1,883,762
in estate taxes that were paid by the estate with the amended return. The estate then
filed a claim for refund action in district court on the Section 2053(a)(3) issue. The
government asserted three counterclaims pertinent to this appeal. See Parts I.B -
tD. infra.
The court discussed competing authorities:
How do we value this deduction for a claim against the estate? Do we take a
valuation snapshot on the day Mrs. O'Neal died? Or, do we consider events
occurring after her death, such as the tax court settlement between the
grandchildren donees and the government? These questions reflect the dilemma
where a valid, enforceable claim may exist at the time of the decedent's death, but
subsequent events may relieve the estate ·of all or a portion ofits liability for the
claim. 18 In this context, two distinct and irreconcilable lines of cases have been
spawned.
There are those circuits that strictly follow the 1929 Supreme Court decision in
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 29 S.Ct. 291 (1929), and its general rule that
post-death events must not be considered in valuing the amount of the deduction,
as "[t]he estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator's death."
And, there are those that follow the 1929 Eighth Circuit decision in Jacobs v.
Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 50 S.Ct. 85 (1929), and
its approach that post-death events must be considered, as "[t]he claims which
Congress intended to be deducted were actual claims, not theoretical ones."
We prefer to follow the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust, 49
S.Ct. at 291. In Ithaca Trust, the decedent bequeathed property to charity and
reserved a life estate in his spouse. The widow died six months after her husband
died, but before his estate tax re~was filed.
The question presented was whether the charitable deduction should be calculated
using the actuarial value ofthe widow's life expectancy at the date ofher husband's
death (a decrease in value), or calculated by using the actual and known date ofher
death (an increase in value). The Supreme Court concluded that the charitable
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deduction had to be valued based on the wife's probable life expectancy as ofher
husband's date of death rather than the known fact that she died only six months
after her husband.
Cited many times, Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, reasoned:
The fIrst impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities
when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. The estate
so far as may be is settled as ofthe date ofthe testator's death ... The tax
is on the act ofthe testator not on the receipt ofproperty by the legatees.
. . Therefore, the value ofthe thing to be taxed must be estimated as ofthe
time when the act is done. But the value of property at a given time
depends upon the relative intensity of the social desire for it at that time,
expressed in the money that it would bring in the market . . . Like all
values, as the word is used by the law~ it depends largely on more or less
certain prophecies of the future, and the value is no less real at that time
if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true . . .
Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact,
we are of opinion that it cannot be done, but that the value of the wife's
life interest must be estimated by the mortality tables.
49 S.Ct. at 291-292.
[footnotes omitted]
5 Valuation ofS Corporation Shares. Walter L. Gross, Jr., et UK., et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1999-254, involved the value of S corporation shares. The court did not allow the taxpayer to reduce the assumed cash-
flow of the S corporation as if it were a C corporation. That is, the Court rejected "tax-affecting" the earnings.
Arguably this is contrary to the training and audit handbooks of the IRS itself. The court also allowed a 25%
marketability discount.
At 88 AFTR2d 1f 2001-5553, the Sixth Circuit affmned as to the tax-affecting issue (rehearing denied March
21,2002). Although it is not entirely clear, the court appeared to afftrm the Tax Court's refusal to tax-affect in this case,
rather than to try and state an absolute rule. The opinion states:
Overall, the entire valuation process is a fiction -- the purpose of which is to
determine the price that the stock would change hands from a willing buyer and a
willing seller. However, a court is not required to presume hypothetical, unlikely,
or unreasonable facts in determining fair market value. See Estate of Watts, 823
F.2d 483,487 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). Valuation is a fact specific task exercise; tax
affecting is but one tool in accomplishing that task. The goal of valuation is to
create a fictional sale at the time the gift was made, taking into account the facts
and circumstances of the particular transaction. The Tax Court did that and
determined that tax affecting was not appropriate in this case. I do not fmd its
conclusions clearly erroneous.
The Tax Court refused to tax-affect in Estate ofWilliam G. Adams, Jr. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-80,
on the same grounds as in Gross, namely that an S corporation pays no corporate income tax and thus any reduction for
an "assumed tax" would be hypothetical.
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In Estate of Richie C. Heck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-34, the Tax Court rejected the IRS attempt
to value Korbel, the champagne company, using comparables because, it found, the government's expert had not
identified any truly comparable companies. Instead, the Tax Court relied on the discounted cash--flow model-- used
by the government's and taxpayer's experts -- followed by a 35% combined discount, for lack of marketability and
control. The opinion states:
V. Utilization ofthe Discounted Cashflow Method in Valuing the Stock ofKorbel
A. Introduction
This Court considers the discounted cashflow (DCF) method employed by both experts to be an
appropriate method for use in valuing corporate stock. See, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 349, 379 (1986). Moreover, where we have rejected use ofthe market approach as unreliable,
we have based the value ofa closely held corporation on the DCF ~pproachalone. See Estate ofJung
v. Commissioner, 101 T.e. 412, 433 (1993). We, therefore, fmd that the DCF method utilized by
both experts in this case is an appropriate method for valuing the stock ofKorbel as ofthe valuation
date.
B. Analysis of the Experts' Application of the Discounted Cashflow Method
I. Introduction
Recently, in Estate ofTrue V. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-167, we described the DCF method
as follows:
The discounted cash-flow method is an income approach based on the
premise that the subject company's market value is measured by the
present value of future economic income it expects to realize for the
benefit of its owners. This approach analyzes the company's revenue
growth, expenses, and capital structure, as well as the industry in which
it operates. The subject company's future cash-flows·are estimated, and
the present value of those cash-flows is determined based on an
appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return.
6. Blockage and Fractional Interest Discounts for Real Property. In Estate ofEileen K. Brocato v
Commissioner, TC Memo 1999-424, the court allowed an II% blockage discount and a 20%·fractional interest discount,
largely accepting the taxpayer's expert, for 8 apartment complexes of between 12 and 45 units each.
In Estate ofWilliam Busch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-3 (2000), the court allowed a 10% fractional
interest discount for a 50% interest in real estate the highest and best use ofwhich was residential. The court rejected
the taxpayer's expert's claim ofa 40% discount finding that discount to be based on studies ofpartnerships and REITS.
The court gave no justification for 10% but did note that it would be "more than adequate to accommodate reasonable
costs of partition" on the facts of the case.
Pending in the Tax Court is Estate ofEileen Kerr Stevens v. Commissioner, No. 22643-97, in which the IRS,
on brief, cites its expert in ceding between a 10% and 20% discount for fractional interests in commercially leased real
estate. The brief states that the costs of partition are one factor the expert relied on.
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In Estate of John L. Baird, et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-258, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 666, the court
allowed a 600!'c. discount when valuing a partial interest in Louisiana timberland. The court primarily relied on one of
taxpayer's experts:
Mr. Steele's unique and extensive experience makes him particularly well qualified
to address the amount ofdiscount for a fractional interest in Louisiana timberland.
Although Mr. Steeleand petitioners' otherexperts opined, in general, that fractional
interests in Louisiana timberland should be discounted by 55 percent, those
opinions were based on means or averages of the fractional sales information
available. We also note that the full fair market value of the properties used as
comparables may have been questionable, so that the discounts could have been
smaller or larger depending upon whether the actual fair market value was lower
or higher.
Mr. Steele's personal experiences during more than 20 years of involvement with
fractional interests in Louisiana, reflect the following.
(1) The fact that the market is severely limited drives prices down
(increasing discounts). Most buyers have no desire to expend the time and expense
to acquire full ownership. Generally, timber companies are not interested in
purchasing fractional interests and lending institutions are not likely to lend money
to holders of fractional interests.
(2) Problems ariseconcerningthe managementofundivided interest
properties. There is a tendency for persons who own partial interests in property to
expend less time and money than they would have spent on solely owned property,
resulting in some amount of mismanagement.
(3) Louisiana fractional interestholders with less thanan 80- percent
interest lack control over the use ofthe timber without consent ofthe other owners.
(4) The choices available to a Louisiana fractional interest holder
with less than 80-percent ownership are to:
(a) Sell the fractional interest but incur the additional
expense of advertising and/or locating a buyer;
(b) buyout the other interests. This process can involve
expenses and delays related to locating fractional interest holders, recording
expenses, deed preparation, title opinions, and the possibility of perfecting title
with respect to ancestral predecessors of current owners;
(c) attempt voluntary partition in kind, which is often
"complex, rancorous, and protracted". It has been Mr. Steele's experience that the
problems encountered increase as the number of fractional owners increases. In
some instances it may reach a point where agreement becomes impossible;
(d) bring suit for partition in kind or by licitation. This
process will result in "significant legal expense" and delays.
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(5) The delay associated with partition is at least I year, but it is
more likely to take several years. In the interim expenses are being incurred and the
inY~stment in the fractional interest is "frozentI •
(6) It has been Mr. Steele's experience that unexpected expenses
occur in connection with perfecting sole ownership or control. It has been his
experience that unanticipated legal problems may arise.
(7) The buyer ofan undivided interest must have fmancial t'staying
power" and be able to buy the entire property at any partition sale because of the
possibility ofunderbidding ofamounts that would be proportionately less than the
cost of the undivided interest.
Mr. Steele considers the following factors in determining the amount of discount
that should be applied in the purchase ofa fractional interest: Fair market value of
tOO-percent ownership; percentage available for sale; total number of owners;
"staying power" of existing owners; property location; number of tracts; number
of acres; ability to influence property management by the buyer of a fractional
interest; continuity ofthe tracts; access to the property(ies); topography (including
~etland classifications); and mineral value, either in or out of production.
Using his knowledge and experience, he opined in his written report .that the
discount for the fractional interests under consideration should be at least 55
percent. Dwing his trial testimony, Mr. Steele concluded that he would discount"
the fractional interests in question by 90 percent on the basis ofthe following: (1)
The fractional interests are held in a trust causing an inability to directly access any
proceeds of partition; (2) the beneficial fractional interest holders were from the
same family generally resulting in less agreement on a course of action; S (3)
partition suits in Louisiana require that all mineral owners be made parties to the
proceeding; (4) the costs of partition might be assessed against and borne by the
instigating partial interest holder; and (5) a buyer ofa 14/65 or 17/65 interest would
have no control and the other interests could limit profitable use or sale of the
property. In this case, the property has been poorly managed by one of the
beneficiaries/family members for years, and the only remedy would be to wait until
other interest holders die or to attempt partition.
The reasons cited by Mr. Steele do not support his conclusion for a 90-percent
discount. Several of the reasons he cites were already considered in his written
report to arrive at his "at least 55 percent" discount opinion. We do agree, however,
with his observation that this family has experienced prior disagreement, which
precipitated the creation of the trust. In addition, one family member has been
allowed to independently manage the 16 parcels, and it has been shown that his
management was poor. These are facts that were available to and would certainly
influence a knowledgeable buyer and should be factored into the discount
percentage.
The estates argue that the use of partition, as a legal matter, is fraught with
uncertainty. Relying on their experts~ petitioners c()ntend that partition of the
properties in question would be protracted, thus increasing the discount on the
fractional interests in issue. Respondent disagrees with petitioners and contends
that the properties could be relatively easily partitioned in 3 or 4 months ifpartition
were uncontested.
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Generally, the "Potential costs and fees associated with partition or other legal
controversies among owners, along with a limited market for fractional interests
and lack of control, are all considerations rationally related to the value of an
asset." Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196, 197-198 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, the cost of partition does not set some absolute limit on the amount
of discount. Instead, it is a factor to be considered.
Each party has attempted to either maximize or minimize the effect that partition
may have upon the discount attributable to a fractional interest in timberland. There
is no way to accurately predict that partition will be necessary. It is possible that the
remaining family members may be open to dividing or managing the property in
accord with a new owner's wishes. Conversely, it is also possible that the remaining
family members will be adverse to a new owner's wishes.
Here~ the estates have shown that, under Louisiana law, there are uncertainties and
disabilities associated with an undivided minority interest in property. That is
especially true here where the property is held in trust and where the family
members have previously experienced difficulties and have allowed one family
member to manage the properties without holding him to a high standard. It has
also been shown that the family members placed the property into trust in order to
keep the property in their family. The circumstances that would have been
perceived by a willing buyer indicate that the remaining family members would be
resistant to and make it difficult for an outside buyer. We reach this conclusion, in -
part, on the basis of the family's propensity to allow poor management of the
timberland to their own fmancial detriment. Accordingly, some additional discount
is appropriate on the basis of the record in this case.
7. Majority ofOperating Comoany. In Estate ofBeatrice Ellen Jones Dunn v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2000-12, the court valued a 62.96% interest in a heavy equipment rental business. The court applied a 5%
discount for built-in capital gains, without useful discussion, and a 15% discount for lack of marketability, agreed to
by the experts for the taxpayer and IRS. Under Texas law a shareholder cannot compel liquidation of a corporation
without 66.67% of the vote. The IRS conceded a discount of 7.5% for lack of a super-majority.
8. Tax Court Values Decedent's Stock in Two Nonpublicly Traded Coroorations. The value of
one-third of a farm corporation and 12% of a family owned bank were at issue in Estate of Helen J. Smith v.
Commissioner,. T.C. Memo 1999-368. The case was mostlyataxpayer victory because Judge Gale was more persuaded
by the taxpayer's experts. One point is especially instructive. In valuing the fann corporation the court accepted an
expert's opinion that the valuation would be based 70% on assets and 30% on earnings.
9. Value of Partnership with Pre-2703 Options. Estate of Fred o. Godley v. Commissioner, T.e.
memo 2000-242 involved the valuation of five 50% interests in housing partnerships owned by a decedent who died
in May, 1990. The estate valued the interests at $10,000 each because the decedent's son, Fred, Jr., could purchase
the interests at that price. The Tax Court disregarded the options:
It is well settled that an option agreement may fi~ the value of a business interest
for Federal estate tax purposes if the following conditions are met: (i) The price
must be fixed and determinable under the agreement; (ti) the agreement must be
binding on the parties both during life and after death; and (iii) the agreement must
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have a bona fide business purpose and must not be a substitute for a testamentary
disposition. See Estate of Bischoffv. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32, 39 (1977); see
also sec. 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs. Respondent does not dispute that
petitioner meets the frrst two conditions but challenges whether the option
provision had a bona fide business purpose and whether it was a substitute for
testamentary disposition. According to petitioner, the option provision was inserted
in each of the partnership agreements for the purpose of allowing Fred Jr. to
maintain control ofthe businesses without the possibilityofinterference from other
family members. The maintenance of family ownership and control constitutes a
bona fide business purpose. See Estate ofBischoffv. Commissioner, supra at 39-
40. However, even ifwe fmd that the option had a bona fide business purpose, it
will be disregarded ifit served as a device to pass decedent's interest to the natural
objects of his bounty and to convey that interest for less than full and adequate
consideration. See Bommer Revocable Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-
380; Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-736; see also sec.
20.2031-2(h}, Estate Tax Regs. We find that the option provision in each of the
partnership agreements represents a testamentary device to convey decedent's
interest to his son for less than full and adequate consideration, and therefore we
disregard it in determining the value of those interests.
Petitioner argues that the options were not a testamentary device because they were
exchanged for full and adequate consideration. Petitioner claims that the options
were granted in exchange for allowing decedent to participate as a 45- or 50-
percent partner in the partnerships without a substantial contribution, eitherofcash
or in kind, and that, therefore, decedent's agreement to concede to Fred Jr. all future
appreciation exceeding $10,000 was the product of a bona fide, arm's-length
transaction. That is, Fred Jr. testified at trial, and petitioner argues on brief, that
Fred Jr.'s contribution to the partnerships substantially outweighed decedent's;
namely, that Fred Jr. had the original idea ofseeking HUD contracts; that Fred Jr.
mastered the HUD bureaucracy and regulations encountered in the undertaking;
and that, as managing partner, Fred Jr. did the lion's share of the work in
developing and managing the housing projects, whereas decedent served merely as
a "sounding board". Thus, petitioner's argument goes, decedent's agreement to give
the options to Fred Jr. -- in which decedent effectively gave up any future
appreciation in the value of his interests exceeding the $10,000 option price and
settled for a share of each partnership's current operating income -- was arm's
length and bona fide, given the vastly unequal contributions of father and son.
When both parties to the agreement are members of the same family and
circumstances indicate that testamentary considerations influenced the creation of
the option agreement, we do not assume that the price as stated in the agreement
was a fair one. See Bommer Revocable Trust v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of
Lauder v. Commissioner, supra. We frrst note that the fixed price of the option,
without any adjustment mechanism to reflect changing conditions, invites close
scrutiny. If decedent and Fred Jr. really engaged in an ann's-length transaction in
which it was decided that Fred Jr~'s greater contribution required decedent to give
an option, we believe the price of the option would have included an adjustment
mechanism to account for future appreciation. See Bommer Revocable Trust v.
Commissioner, supra. The factthat the price was set at $10,000, combined with the
fact that the agreement was between a father and son, strongly suggests that there
was no arm's-length bargain for the option price, but rather that the option was a
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testamentary device designed to pass decedent's interest for less than adequate
consideration.
Moreover, the foregoing picture of the partners' relative contributions is based
almost entirely on Fred Jr.'s self-serving testimony at trial. In contrast to Fred Jr.'s
efforts to portray the options in the instant proceeding as the product ofan arm's-
length bargain, in their sworn testimony in the equitable distribution proceedings,
Fred Jr. and decedent both characterized the options as Itgifts", suggesting that both
thought it was decedent who was giving something of value to Fred Jr., not the
other way around. We note also that decedent's second wife provided detailed,
credible testimony concerning decedent's frequent trips (on which she accompanied
him) to inspect each partnership property and attend to problems thereby
discovered; that decedent had an entire career's worth of experience in the
construction business; and that Fred Jr.'s brother testified credibly that when
decedent entered into a business venture, he was almost always in charge - all of
which tend to rebut Fred Jr.'s characterization of decedent's role in the enterprise
as minimal.
On balance, we believe the evidence that the options were a substitute for a
testamentary device outweighs any evidence of their bona fide business purpose.
In an unusual circumstance, we have the sworn testimony ofthe grantor-decedent
himself as to the options' essentially testamentary purpose; as well as the sworn
testimony of the grantee to the same effect, albeit a grantee who now testifies in
changed circumstances that the options had a bona fide business purpose.
The taxpayers appealed on the issue ofwhether a minority interest discount should have been allowed by the
Tax Court.
The Fourth Circuit affmned and allowed only a 20% lack ofmarketability discount. Estate ofFred o. Godley
v. Commissioner, (2002). The opinion states:
In this case, the Tax Court determined that the value of the partnership interests
was subject to a discount for lack of marketability, but not for the alleged lack of
control. This fmding was not clearly erroneous. As the evidence demonstrates,
there was little to be gained by having control of these partnerships and little risk
in holding a minority interest.
Here, the Housing Partnerships were guaranteed a long- term, steady income stream
under the HUD contracts. The Housing Partnerships had little risk of losing the
HUD contracts and the management of the properties did not require particular
expertise. Indeed, the HUD contracts allowed the Housing Partnerships to collect
above-market rents, and there was no other use for the partnerships that would
increase their profits. Therefore, control ofthe Housing Partnerships did not carry
with it any appreciable economic value. Nor did a lack ofcontrol reduce the value
of a fifty percent interest such that a minority discount was required.
The Estate argues that a minority discount was required because nthe record
supports a fmding that the managing partner had significant latitude in determining
the extent of partnership distributions and the amounts set aside in reserve.n
However, each partnership agreement required the partnership to distribute its nnet
cash flow" annually and set forth a specific calculation ofthat net cash flow. There
was no risk that Godley, a fifly percent partner, would not realize an annual payout.
Although the agreements also granted the managing partner the power to set aside
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reserves, that power was characterized as one of "day-to-day management." It
appears unlikely that this "set aside" power could be used to defeat the requirement
ofan annual distribution. At a minimum, Godley could exercise his power under
the partnership agreements to prevent any change to the guarantee of an annual
distribution. Thus, as the Tax Courtdetermined, Godley was effectively guaranteed
a reasonable annual distribution ofpartnership income. And while an inability to
force a distribution of income may under other circumstances warrant a discount
for lack ofcontrol, the Tax Court correctly found that this factor was not relevant
in this case.
Similarly, the Estate contends thatGodley's fifty percent interestmade it impossible
for him to compel liquidation or sell partnership assets. However, neither Godley
nor Godley, Jr. could compel liquidation or make any "major decision" without the
affmnative vote ofseventy-five percent ofthe partnership shares. Moreover, given
the passive nature ofthe business and the almost certain prospect ofsteady profits,
the ability to liquidate or sell assets was oflittle practical import. Thus, as the Tax
Court reasoned, the guarantee ofabove-market rents and other factors unique to the
Housing Partnerships meant that the power to liquidate the partnership or to sell
partnership assets would have minimal value to an investor.
The Tax Court's decision not to apply a minority discount to GMA, the fifth
partnership, was also not clearly·erroneous. GMA was a holding company·without
any assets that served as a vehicle to ensure compliance with HUD regulations.
Any profits or losses attributed to GMA were simply those funneled through it
from the Housing Partnerships. Thus, the presence ofa low-risk, stable streal1) of
income that justified not applying a minority discount to the value of the Housing
Partnerships was equally present with respect to GMA.
The Tax Court carefully considered the expert testimony, the expert valuations of
the partnerships, and the unique nature of the rent-controlled housing business in
reaching its decision not to apply -a minority discount to Godley's fifty· percent
interest. That court looked at "the existing facts, circumstances, and factors at the
valuation date that influence a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller in
detennining a selling price. tf Estate ofNewhouse, 94 T.C. at 231. We are satisfied
that the Tax Court's valuation determinations were not clearly erroneous.
10. Use ofCaDital Asset Pricing Model. The Tax Court will not accept an expert's use ofthis method
unless a company is going public. In Estate of Emily F. Klauss v. Commissioner, T.C.Memo. 2000-191, the court
stated:
Fuller [IRS expert] calculated his discount rate using the capital assetpricing model
(CAPM). In contract, Johnson [taxpayer expert] used a discount rate based on the
build-up method. We believe that Fuller should not have used the CAPM in this
case. Green Light should not be valued by using the CAPM method because
Johnson and Fuller agreed that it had little possibility ofgoing public. See Estate
of Maggos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-120; Estate of Hendrickson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-278; Furman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-157.
11. Burden of Proof. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Estate of Paul Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 87 AFTR2d Par. 2001-881 (9th Cir. 2001), fmding that the testimony ofthe Internal Revenue Service's
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own expertat trial about the value ofstockofJPMS (a closely-held corporation) in the Estate was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of correctness for IRS determinations. The opinion states:
According to the Notice, the Commissioner concluded the value ofthe JPMS stock
at the time ofPaul Mitchell's death was $105 million. The Estate had reported the
value at $28.5 million in its tax return. Due to the $76.5 million difference in value,
the Commissionerasserted that the Estate owed an additional $45,117,089 in estate
taxes, not including a total of $8,543,643 in penalties. At trial, Martin Hanan, a
witness for the Commissioner, valued the stock at $81 million -- $34 million less
than the Commissioner's original valuation. Furthermore, a letter written by the
Commissioner's appraiser, AIBE Valuation, dated March 18, 1993, indicates that
AIBE Valuationoriginally appraised Mitchell's interest at $85 million as a minority
interest, but increased it to $105 million, at the request of the IRS, to reflect the
Estate's interest as a controlling interest We fmd that Hanan's testimony and the
AIBE letter support the conclusion that the Commissioner's assessment was
arbitrary and excessive. United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that "where the assessment has separable items, ... error which
demonstrates a patternofarbitrariness orcarelessness will destroy the presumption
for the entire assessment"); Cohen, 266 F.2d at II (holding that when the taxpayer
h~ shown the detennination to be arbitrary and excessive, theburdenofpersuasion
shifts to the Commissioner to prove the correct amount of tax owed and the
presumption as to the correctness ofthe Commissioner's determination is outofthe
case); see also Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507,513-15 (1935).
We conclude that the Tax Court erred in denying the Estate's Motion to Shift the
Burden of Persuasion. Consistent with Cohen, because the Commissioner's
determination was demonstrated, by its own experts, to be invalid, the
Commissioner ~- and not the Estate -- had the ftburden of proving whether any
deficiency exists and if so the amount. tt Cohen, 266 F.2d at 11. The Tax Court
treated the case as one where the burden of proof made no difference; it did not
fmd thatone party failedto carry-its burden, but proceeded with its own valuation,
"weighing the evidence and choosing from among conflicting inferences and
conclusions those which it considers most reasonable.1f Tax Court Or~er, Docket
No. 21805-93 (July 8, 1998) (citing Comm'r v. Scottish Am. Inv. Co., 323 U.S.
119, 123-24 (1944)). However, in responding to the petitioner's second motion for
reconsideration, the Tax Court erroneously s~ted that valuation was a matter of
approximation and judgment "on which the PETITIONER has the burden of
proof." (emphasis added).·Because the burden ofproving the evaluation of the
Estate and the commensurate deficiency shifted to the Commissioner, it was error
not to put the Commissioner to its proof.
The case was remanded to the Tax Court for a determination ofvalue. On remand, the Tax Court reaffmned
its original holding on the value question. T.C. Memo. 2002-98. The opinion discusses the valuation question as
follows:
We are ofthe opinion that here the comparable companies and discountedcashflow
methods (which are theoretical valuation methods) are not appro?riate. We did not
use them because (I) there were real-world acquisition offers by Minnetonka and
Gillette, and (2) the discounted cashflow and comparable companies analyses, as
determined by the estate's experts, produced theoretical values for JPMS that were
substantially less than these real-world acquisition offers.
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While listed market prices are the benchmark in the case ofpublicly traded stock,
recent arm's-length transactions generally are thebest evidence offair market value
in the case of unlisted stock. See Estate ofAndrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. at
940; Duncan Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 266, 276 (1979); Estate of
Bransonv. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-231.
In Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-461, we began our
analysis by placing a $150 million value on JPMS at the moment immediately prior
to Mr. Mitchell's death. In determining this value, we considered all the evidence
but gave the greatest consideration to Minnetonka's real-world $125 million offer
in the fall of 1988 (which Mr. Deloria [executive ofIPMS] found "a little shorttt)
and the Gillette offer of$150 million. This value represents the acquisition value
ofall the nonpublicly traded stock of JPMS.
[70] In Estate ofMitchell v. Commissioner, 250 F.3d at 705, the Court ofAppeals
stated:
Acquisition value and publicly traded value are different because
acquisition prices involve a premium for the purchase of the entire
company in one deal. Such a lumpsum valuation was not taken into
account when the minority interest value of the stock was calculated by
the experts. In general, the acquisition price is higher, resulting in an
inflated tax consequence for the Estate.
In reaching our valuation determination, we were, and are, mindful that, in general,
a publicly traded value (determined under the comparable companies analysis)
represents a minority, marketable value. Moreover, we were, and are, mindful that
acquisition value, if determined by reference to acquisitions of publicly traded
companies, reflects a premium over the publicly traded value. It produces a control,
marketable value that is greater than the minority, marketable publicly traded value.
If the acquisition price of publicly traded companies is used to value a minority
interest ina closely held corporation, discounts for both lack ofmarketability and
lack ofcontrol would apply.
The real-world acquisition value of $150 million we applied in this case is the
acquisition value based on an offer to purchase all of the stock ofJPMS, which is
not publicly traded. The acquisition value based on that offer reflects the fact that
there is no ready market for shares in JPMS, a closely held corporation. As we
pointed out in Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. at 953, "even
controlling shares in a nonpublic corporation suffer from lack of marketability
because of the absence of a ready private placement market and the fact that
flotation costs would have to be incurred if the corporation were to publicly offer
its stock.tt The $150 million acquisition value reflects a control, nonmarketable
value. Therefore, a discount for lackofmarketability ofJPMS stock from the value
detennined by reference to the offer to purchase the JPMS stock is not appropriate.
Because we used the real-world acquisition (control, nonmarketable) value of$150
million for the entire company, we were not convinced that the combined discounts
opined by the experts in their theoretical values are appropriate. Those combined
rates would apply an additional separate 30-to 40-percent discount for lack of
marketability to a value that reflects that lack ofmarketability, in effect doubling
the discount.
A - 47
We recognize, however, that there may be some overlap between discounts for a
minority interest and for lack of marketability in that lack of control may reduce
marketability. Mr. Weiksner (a taxpayer expert] applies a larger la~k of
marketability discount for minority interests than for a controlling interest. In his
report, he opines that a "larger illiquidity and private company discount" always
applies to a minority shareholding of stock than to a control shareholding of that
same stock because the minority holder does not have the same access to
information and ability to create liquidity as a control holder has. In this case,
because the acquisition price includes the discount for .lack of marketability, we
were, and remain, ofthe opinion that it is more appropriate to account for any lack
of marketability attributable to the minority interest in the minority discount we
apply, which for lack ofa better term we have referred to as the combined discount.
Mr. McGraw [a taxpayer expert], in setting his discount rate under his discounted
cashflow analysis, attributed 6 percent to the individual risk, described by him as
the limited number of prospective purchasers for the stock due to the size of the
investment, the minority interest status of the block of stock, and the control
exercised by Mr. DeJoria. Mr. McGraw's individual risk reflects lack of
marketability specifically related to decedent's minority interest. We have increased
tl;te minority discount by 6 percentage points to reflect this additional lack of
marketability.
Mr. Hanan's [a government expert] discounted cashflow analysis setting Mr.
DeJoria's compensation at S2.5 million, resulting in a value of $227 million,
reflects a control value of the enterprise. His analysis setting Mr. Deloria's
compensation at $12 to $17 million, resulting in an enterprise value of S155
million, reflects lack ofcontrol. Finally, his analysis setting the compensation at $5
million, resulting in an enterprise value of S218 million, reflects some power but
less than control. We think that a comparison of those values demonstrates most
accurately the difference between the value of control of the company, the value
of shares having- some power, and the value of shares lacking any control. A
comparison of these values supports a minority discount of 29 percent for some
power but less than control (155/218 = 0.711) and 32 percent for lack of any
control (155/227 = 0.683).
The 49.04-percent interest in JPMS to be valued in this case had significant power.
This interest, through the cumulative voting provision, could elect at least one of
three directors. (If there were four directors as provided for in the articles of
incorporation, decedent's stock could elect two directors, giving decedent's stock
power equal to that ofMr. DeJoria). Mr. Weiksner acknowledges in his report that
in some cases investors would consider a 49.04-percent shareholding adequate to
influence or even control a company but cautions that an investor would have had
no assurance of his ability to influence the management or disposition of the
company except through cooperative means.
We fmd that a 29-percent discount for decedent's 49.04-percent shareholding is
appropriate to reflect some power but less than control. We also fmd that here the
minority discount should be increased by 6 percentage points (a total of35 percent)
to reflect the additional lack of marketability attributable to a minority interest.
On the basis ofa thorough review ofthe entire record before us, we believe that we
correctly arrived at a 35-percent discount rate that combines the lack ofcontrol and
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any additional lack of marketability attributable to that lack of control that is not
reflected in the $150 million control, nonmarketable acquisition value.
12. Tax Court Recommends Settlement. In John E. Wall, et.ux. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-75,
the taxpayers valued stock on gift tax returns at $221 per share and the IRS claimed $260 per share. During the
litigation both sets ofexperts became more extreme. Judge Beghe upheld the $260 per share value and suggested the
parties should have settled.
In footnote 19, the Tax Court suggested that the pass-through nature ofan S corporation would increase its
value compared with an identical C corporation (but see Gross supra)..
13. Discounts, Closely-Held Stock. In Donald J. Janda, 181 TCM 1100 (2001) the donor's expert
applied a 65.77% discount to minority interest gifts to each of four children in a holding company that owned almost
all ofa small Nebraska bank. The court applied a 40% discount. The IRS had argued for 20%. the court did not use
the quantitative marketabilitydiscount model set forth byZ. ChristopherMercer inQuantifying Marketability Discounts
(1997).
14. Discounts, Real Estate. In EstateofAugusta Porter Forbes, 81 TCM 1399 (2001), the court accepted
the 30% discount propounded by the estate's expert. The opinion discusses the issue as follows:
Petitioner presented testimony of two expert witnesses: Mr. James F. Lawton
(Lawton) and Mr. Glen A. Hultquist (Hultquist).
Lawton determined that a fractional interest valuation discount is appropriate
because the QTIP trust's undivided interests were minority interests and because
the market for such interests would be restricted taking into consideration the
limited pool ofpotential buyers, the likely difficulty ofsecuring fmancing, and the
likely costs of partitioning the two separate parcels. Lawton was unable to locate
comparable sales; but he determined that in the market in which the subject
property is located, real estate brokers had applied fractional interests of 10 percent
to 30 percent in liquidating partnerships. Basedon this information, and taking into
consideration the specific characteristics of the subject property, possible intra-
family conflicts, and other factors adversely affecting the marketability ofthe two
undivided interests in the subject property, Lawton concluded that a valuation
discount of 30 percent is appropriate.
Hultquist, petitioner's other expert, concluded that the fair market value ofthe two
undivided interests in the subject property as of decedent's date of death was
$720,000, based on the correlated present value ofnet annual income streams that
he projected from hypothetical partitions or forced sales of the subject property
under various scenarios. Hultquist assumedthat the QTIP trust's undivided interests
included the value ofpecan orchards but not the value ofany timber. Because this
assumption is contrary to our previous determination that the QTIP trust's
undivided interests included no beneficial interest in the pecan orchards, his
$720,000 estimate ofdiscounted fair market value is of little utility.
Because Hultquist's $720,000 estimate of the discounted fair market value is
approximately 36 percent less than what Hultquist assumed to be the undiscounted
fair market value ofthe undivided interests in the subject property (again assuming
that pecan orchards but not timber are included), petitioner argues that a 36 percent
discount rate is appropriate. We disagree. We are unconvinced that a discount rate
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extrapolated from one setofindicated values, under assumptions inapplicablehere,
would correspond to the discount rate extrapolated from a different set ofindicated
values ifthe underlying assumptions were altered. Moreover, evendisregardinghis
faulty assumptions, Hultquist's present value computations are inadequately
explained andjustified, particularly in regard to the manner in which he derived the
projected revenues from his hypothetical partitions or forced sales and the manner
in which he derived his chosen 14 percent equity yield for purposes ofhis present
value computations.
Respondent's expert, Mr. Richard Parks (Parks), purported to use a comparable
sales approach to determine an appropriate valuation discount for a 42-percent
undivided interest in the subject property. Parks indicated that because he was
unable to locate minority interest sales in the market where the subject property is
locat~ he had identified three other "appropriate examples" involving: (I) A 1989
sale of an office building in Birmingham, Alabama; (2) a 1961 sale ofa 128-acre
vacant tract in Jefferson County, Alabama; and (3) a 1981 sale ofa 1,600-acre tract
known as Bell Plantation (location not specifically identified but. apparently
somewhere outside of Georgia). These three "comparables" suggested discounts
ranging from 25 percent to 64 percent. With little explanation, Parks concludes that
based on these examples and "other market oriented research completed by this
appraiser" (not otherwise described by Parks), the appropriate discount rate is 18
percent.
We are unpersuaded that the "examples" on which Parks bases his comparable
sales analysis actually represent comparable sales. Even if they did, we fmd no
adequate justification for his selection ofan 18-percent discount rate -- a rate that
is well below the smallest discount indicated by Parks' own "comparables".
Consequently, we do not rely on Parks' report. See "Rule 143(t)(1).
We are unsatisfied that-any of the parties' experts have adequately justified their'
recommended discount rates -- a shortcoming that might be attributable in part to
a lack ofavailable empirical data. Given that the parties agree that some valuation
discount is appropriate, however, and lacking any frrm basis on which we might
independently derive one, we accept Lawton's recommended 30- percent valuation
discount as being the most reasonablyjustifiedofthe opinions presented to us. This
is the same discount rate that petitioner used in reporting the value ofthe undivided
interests for Federal estate tax purposes.
15. Lottery Payments. This issue has generated substantial litigation, most recently in Estate ofGladys
J. Cook v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2001-170, and Estate of Shackleford v. United States, 262 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.
2001). In Shackleford, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that various state law restrictions on
transferring the lottery payments justified a departure from section 7520. The opposite result was reached in Estate of
Gribauskas v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 142 (2001). The Cook opinion states:
The facts here are substantially similar to those in Estate of Gribauskas v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 142 (2001). The only significant factual difference is that
here a partnership, rather than an individual, owned the right to receive the lottery
payments. Here, decedent won the lottery and shared the prize with Newby. The
lottery payments could not be assigned or transferred without a court order, they
could not be distributed in one lump sum, and they were funded through
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investments in U.S. Government bonds. Additionally, the valuation dates are
similar with regard to the applicable statutes, regulations, and caselaw.
In the context ofresolving the narrow dispute as framed by the parties concerning
the value of the partnership's right to the lottery payments, there is no difference
between a right to receive lottery payments that is owned by a partnership in which
decedent owned an interest and an identical right to receive lottery payments that
was owned directly by decedent. In both instances, the asset must be given a value
in order to determine the tax consequences to the estate. Sec. 20.2031-3, Estate Tax
Regs. The rate of return and the risk of return are the same, and the term ofyears
during which the payments are made ends on a date certain. To depart from tabular
valuation in this case simply because the annuity was owned by a partnership
would be contrary to our decision in Estate ofGribauskas v. Commissioner, supra,
as the facts here are otherwise indistinguishable.
Presumably all future cases will be litigated by taxpayers in district court unless financial circumstances prevent
it.
16. Aggregation of Voting and Non-Voting Stock; Effect of Redemption Agreement. In Estate of
Marvin M. Schwan, et. at. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2001-174, the Tax Court held:
At the time ofhis death, D owned two-thirds ofthe voting and nonvoting shares in
SSE, a closely held corporation. D's estate plan provided for the distribution of
such shares to a charitable foundation and for the subsequent redemption by SSE
of certain of the "securities" as defmed in a redemption agreement. The dispute
between the parties in these cases centers on the valuation of D's SSE stock for
purposes ofcomputing the gross estate and the allowable charitable
deduction under Federal tax laws. On petitioners' motion for summary judgment
and respondent's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, HELD:
(1) Because ofpotential impediments under State law relating to stockholder rights,
an alleged power on the part of the foundation to recapitalize SSE after D's death
and convert all nonvoting shares to voting shares is an insufficient basis on which
to conclude, as a matter of law, that the value of the stock must necessarily be
identical for gross estate and charitable deduction purposes.
(2) D's voting and nonvoting shares in SSE must be valued for gross estate
purposes as a unitary, two-thirds interest, unrestricted by the terms of the
redemption agreement. The requirement under D's estate plan that the SSE shares
be distributed to the foundation, and that certain shares be redeemed by SSE, did
not affect the value of the shares in the gross estate.
(3) The redemption agreement is ambiguous as to whether it required redemption
ofonly the voting shares, as opposed to both the voting and nonvoting stock.
(4) The charitable deduction available to D's estate must be reduced by the burden
of taxes and administrative expenses, and a bonus received by the estate after D's
death cannot be taken into account in calculating such tax and expense burden.
Where assets pass to charity the effect ofa discrepancy between gross estate value and deduction value must
be considered. The simplest example would be that a farm valued at 100 in an estate would not, if left halfto the spouse
and half to charity, create 100 of deduction.
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In Estate ofH. A. True, Jr. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-167, the court determined that certain buy-sell
agreements were not controlling for estate or gift tax purposes. Section 2703 was not involved. The opinion states:
The True family buy-sell agreements do not satisfy the Lauder II test, because they
are substitutes for testamentary dispositions. As a result, under section 2031 and
the related regulations, the tax book value buy-sell agreement price does not control
estate tax values of interests in the True companies at issue in the estate tax case.
Petitioners cite Estate ofHall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312 (1989), in support of
their position that the buy-sell agreement price should control estate tax value. In
Estate of Hall, the estate of Joyce C. Hall, the founder of Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
reported the-value ofhis Hallmark shares for estate tax purposes at "adjusted book
value", as petennined under various buy-sell and option agreements. We did not
decide whether the price determined under the adjusted book value fonnula in
those agreements was dispositive for estate tax valuation purposes; instead, we
held, after careful review of the experts' reports, that the actual date of death fair
market value ofthe shares did not exceed the price determined under the adjusted
book value formula, as reported on the estate tax return. In so doing, we did two
things: (I) We found no evidence to support respondent's intimations that the
agreements "were merely estate planning devices [that served] no bona fide
business purpose"; and (2) we concluded that "the transfer restrictions * * * and
the prices set in the buy-sell and option agreements" could not be ignored in
arriving at value because, among other things, "there [was] no persuasive evidence
to support a fmding that the restrictions, or the offers to sell set forth in the
agreements, were not susceptible of enforcement or would not be enforced by
persons entitled to purchase under them." Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, supra
at 334- 335.
The differences between the cases at hand and Estate of Hall are significant and
substantial. In these cases we have found the buy-sell agreements to be
testamentary devices, .notwithstanding that they also·· served valid business
purposes. As a result, the depressing effect on value that the buy-sell agreements
may have had in these cases is to be ignored, rather than taken into account and
given some effect, as in Estate of Han. See infra p. 153.
An important factor that supports our conclusion in these cases and distinguishes
Estate ofHall is the profound difference between the tax book value formula in the
True family buy-sell agreements and the adjusted book value formula in Estate of
Hall. Book value in the cases at hand is income tax basis book value, which gives
effect to the income tax subsidies for the oil and gas and cattle industries, and
accelerated depreciation, which have the effectofsubstantially reducingbook value
as compared with book value determined under generally accepted accounting
principles. "Adjusted book value" in Estate ofHall was book value using fmancial
statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
adjusted to reflect the value of intangibles arising from above-average earnings. In
contrast, the tax basis book value formula in the True family buy-sell agreements
ignores all intangibles, which, Lauder II indicated, suggests that an unadjusted
book value formula has a testamentary purpose. It ignores the current "discovery
value" of proven reserves, which would increase the price that a well-informed
buyer would be willing to pay. It even ignores historic actually paid for costs, such
as drilling costs and exploration expenditures attributable to proven reserves, and
feed expense and other costs of homeraised calves that would enter into cost of
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goods on hand under generally accepted accounting principles, as well as the basis
reductions associated with accelerated depreciation for income tax purposes.
Petitioners' opening brief says: "Under the facts in this case, there is no reason to
believe that any buyer of an interest in the True companies would pay more than
the book value price ofsuch interest", preceded by a quote from Estate ofHall v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. at 337, that "there was [not] even a remote possibility that
any investor, including a permitted transferee, would purchase Hallmark shares at
a price higher than adjusted book value." This is just not true in the cases at hand.
There were instances ofsales ofhigher than book value for profit sharing purposes
and by unrelated parties. In any event, even i~ as could have been expected, all of
the sales in the transactions at issue between family members were at tax basis
book value in accordance with the provision in the buy-sell agreements, there is no
reason to believe~ if the buy-sell agreements are disregarded, as they must be as a
result ofour testamentary device fmding, that a hypothetical buyer would not have
been willing to payhigherprices than the tax basis book values at which the subject
interests changed hands between members of the True family.
The reference to Lauder II is to Estate ofLauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-736. The court reached
the same result wi~ respect to the effect on gift tax value.
G. SECTION 2032 - ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A. - SPECIAL USE
VALUATION
No developments.
H. SECTIONS 2035-2038 -- RETAINED INTERESTS
1. Retained Interest in Residence. Clients often want to make gifts of interests in a residence while
continuing to live in the residence. In general, it is prudent to avoid doing so.
The issue arose in Estate ofRebecca A. Wineman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-193, and was resolved
favorably for the taxpayer. The opinion states:
The frrst issue for decision is whether decedent retained a life interest in the partial
interests in her homestead property that she gave to her children. Respondent
increased decedent's gross estate by the value of a life estate in the aggregate 24-
percent interest of her homestead property (parcel 3) that decedent gave to her
children. Respondent asserts that the value of that interest is properly includable
in decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a) because she retained a life
estate in that interest. Petitioner does not dispute respondent's· valuation of the
purported life estate but contends that decedent retained no such interest in her
homestead property. Petitioner bears the burden ofproof. See Rule 142(a); Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
In support of it~ contention that decedent retained no life estate in the children's
partial interests, petitioner points out that decedent used much less than 76 percent
of parcel 3 and the main house. Petitioner also points to Dean's [one of the
decedent's children] testimony to the effect that no agreement existed, implied or
otherwise, for decedent to retain the possession and enjoyment of the partial
interests at the time she transferred those interests to her children. Respondent .
argues that Dean's testimony is self-serving and contrary to the objective facts and
circumstances. Although Dean's testimony was clearly self-serving, we disagree
with the assertion that the testimony was contrary to the objective facts and
A-53
-..
circumstances, and we ultimately agree with petitioner that decedent did not retain
a life estate includable in her gross estate under section 2036.
A decedent's reservation ofa life interest need not be provided for expressly in the
instrumentoftransfer or enforceable under local law to be includable under section
2036. See Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1179 (1958), affd. 265
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959). An implied agreement at the time of transfer for the
decedent to continue possession or enjoyment ofthe property is sufficient and may
be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the transfer. See Guynn v.
United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971). In determining whether an
implied agreement existed, "all facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer
and subsequent use of the property must be considered." Estate of Rapelje v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 86 (1979); sec. 20.2036-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.
Decedent gave her children, collectively, a 24-percent interest in parcel 3. Parcel
3 consisted ofjust over 10 acres and had two houses, two large barns, a small barn,
a granary, a fann shop, cattle scales and corrals, two garages, and a small orchard.
Pursuant to its leases ofdecedent's properties, Coastal Ranches stored hay in the
barns, used the corrals and fann shop, and kept vehicles in a garage and one ofthe
big barns. Decedent occupied the larger house, although Dean kept his desk and
bookkeeping papers in one of the bedrooms and used it as an office. Another
bedroom was used primarily by Marian when she visited from Montana.· Coastal
Ranches used an office in the main house. Dean resided in the smaller house on the
homestead property. Other than the main house, decedent's personal use ofparcel
3 was limited to the garden and small orchard next to the main house.
Decedent's limited personal use of the property does not prove the absence ofan
implied agreement. In fact, the record is silent as to whether decedent could
designate who might enjoy the property. See sec. 2036(a)(2); see also United States
v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 145 (1972) (possession and enjoyment are synonymous
with substantial present economic .benefit). The fact that decedent personally
usedless than all ofthe property does not demonstrate that she did not possess and
enjoy the entire property.
In contrast, where a decedent continues exclusive possession and continues to pay
taxes and other property expenses after the transfer and the owner of record title
neither charges rent nor takes possession of the property, these facts are highly
indicative of an implied agreement. See Guynn v. United States, supra at 1150;
Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, supra at 87. Here, however, decedent shared
the property with Dean and his wife and rented the property at a below-market rent
(discussed in more detail infra sec. II) to Coastal Ranches. Pursuant to its leases,
Coastal Ranches paid the taxes and other property expenses associated with parcel
3. These facts do not of themselves prove the absence of an implied agreement.
On balance, the objective facts convince us that an implied agreement giving
decedent continuing possession and enjoyment ofthe entire homestead property did
not exist. Unlike the authority that has been cited in respondent's brief, this case
involves a transfer of less than a fee simple interest in property. The majority
owner's continued use and possession of real property following transfer of a
minority interest is not unusual. Cf. Gutchess v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 554, 557
(1966) (where a husband transferred his entire interest in a homestead property to
his wife, who then allowed him to live in the house without charge, the donor's
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continued use and enjoyment is a natural use which does not diminish the wife's
enjoyment and possession). In this case, decedent's continued use and possession
of parcel 3, of which she owned a controlling interest, is natural in light of the
children's minority ownership. It is not surprising that the children did not seek to
partition the property, since they also used the property regularly and they had only
a minority interest in the property.
In addition to the objective facts, our decision rests heavily on Dean's testimony
that there was no understanding between decedent and her children. While his
testimony was clearly self- serving, Dean's testimony was straightfolWard,
unequivocal, and credible. Respondent's counsel chose not to cross-examine him
on this point. Because we credit his testimony, we hold that petitioner has carried
its burden of proving that there was no implied agreement. Cf. Hendry v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 861, 872 (1974).
In re Estate ofGrace Fracasso, 2000 WL 1262639 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2000) (an unpublished decision) the
grantor gave her residence to her three children as tenants in common but lived there rent free. The court did not apply
an Ohio estate tax statute that is similar to section 2036. The court attached great significance to the children paying
all the expenses an~ taxes on the property and that they leased a portion to third parties. An earlier case, Estate of
Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993), was decided against the taxpayer.
More recently, the Tax Court in Estate of Eleanor T.R. Trotter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-250, 82
T.e.M. (CCH) 633, also decided against the taxpayer. In December, 1993 Mrs. Trotter gave her condominium to a
Crummey trust for the benefit of her grandchildren with her daughter as trustee. The trust also provided for Mrs.
Trotter's husband to live there rent-free for one year after Mrs. Trotter's death ifhe paid the expenses. Mr. Trotter could
rent or buy the condominium after that. The opinion described subsequent events:
Following the trust's creation, none of the beneficiaries attempted to exercise a
right of withdrawal. Decedent and Mr. Trotter continued to live in the
condominium as their primary residence until decedent's death on January 31,
1996. No rental payments were made by decedent and/or Mr. Trotter to the trust
from December 17, 1993, to January 31, 1996. During this period, decedent paid
all occupancy expenses related to the condominium, including maintenance
expenses, utilities, property taxes, condominium fees, and premiums for insurance
coverage. No bank account was maintained by or for the. trust, and, with the
exceptionofthe above-referenced transfer oftitle to the condominium, the trust did
not receive or distribute any cash or other property during this time.
As previously indicated, decedent died on January 31, 1996. Thereafter, for a
period of3 months, Mr. Trotter continued to reside in the condominium. He made
no rental payments to the trust with respect to his occupancy. During this period,
and until at least June of 1996, the trust expended no funds for maintenance,
utilities, taxes, or fees; received no further cash or property; and distributed no
assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
On July 12, 1996, the condominium was sold for a purchase price ofS155,000. The
proceeds ofthe sale were distributed by the closing agent to the beneficiaries ofthe
trust, and the trust was terminated.
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The court looked to the absence ofrent and the fact that occupancy expenses were paid as indicia ofa section
2036 retained interest. The opinion goes on to state:
Furthermore, we fmd the particular terms ofthe trust instrument at issue here to be
highly supportive ofan implied arrangelnent that decedent would retain possession
of the condominium. Specifically, we emphasize that the express terms of the
agreement granted Mr. Trotter a right to possess the property for a period following
decedent's death. We believe that there would have been little, if any, reason to
include such language absent an understanding that decedent and her husband
would be living in the home at the time of her death.
Moreover, we are satisfied that the logical conclusion to be drawn from these terms
is not negated by the withdrawal provisions upon which the estate so heavily relies.
The numerous indicia discussed above are equally supportive of an implied
understanding that the withdrawal rights would not be exercised, an interpretation
buttressed by the awareness that the beneficiaries were decedent's grandchildren
(and three ofthe five were minors). We cannot blind ourselves to the reality ofthe
family relationships involved, and the estate has failed to show that the withdrawal
rights were anything more than a paper fonnality without intended economic
s~bstance. In addition, such construction is strengthened still further by fact that
the trust's having been funded solely with a single piece of real estate would have
made any attempt to effectuate a withdrawal complex and burdensome at best.
While it is not entirely clear from the document how the provision would operate
in this circumstance, we doubt that any beneficiary would seriously have
contemplated forcing the trustee to sell the home so that he or she could collect
$10,000.
2. Inclusion of GRAT in Estate. If the grantor/annuitant dies during the ORAT term, how much is
included in his or her estate? In TAM 200210009 the grantor died in year six and subsequent payments were made to
his estate. The charitable, remainder annuity trust rule includes only part ofthe assets. The TAM describes that rule:
Section 2036(a) provides that the value of the gross estate shall include the value
ofall property to the extent ofany interest therein ofwhich the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in the case ofa bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or othetWise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his deat~, (1) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income from the property.
In Rev. Rut 82-105, 1982-1 C.B. 133, the decedent, prior ~o his death, created a
charitable remainder annuity trust, pursuant to which the decedent retained the right
to receive an annuity of 12x dollars for life. The ruling concludes that the
decedent's retained annuity represents the retained right to receive all ofthe income
from all or a specific portion ofthe trust for purposes ofsection 2036. Under Rev.
Rut 82-105, the amount ofthe corpus with respect to which the decedent retained
the income is that amount of corpus that'would be sufficient to yield the annual
annuity based on the assumed rate of return prescribed by the regulations as ofthe
applicable valuation date. The revenue ruling prescribes the following formula for
this determination:
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(Annual Annuity) / (Assumed Rate of Return) = Amount Includible
T:at portion ofthe trust corpus with respect to which the decedent retained a right
to receive all of the income, as determined under the formula, is includible in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)( I). The ruling states that the holding
applies only to the portion ofthe value ofa charitable remainder annuity trust that
is includible in the gross estate under §§ 2036. The ruling expressly does not
consider the amount, if any, that may be includible in the gross estate under any
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Here, however, the TAM goes on to apply section 2039 to include all of the GRAT:
We also believe that, under § 2039(a), 100 percent of the value of the GRAT
corpus on Decedent's date ofdeath is includible in the gross estate. In this case, the
annuity payable to the Decedent, and the payments to be made after Decedent's
death, are all payable under the terms of a trust instrument, which constitutes a
contract or agreement, as required under § 2039(a). Further, the annuity was paid
to Decedent for a period that did not in fact end before his death. Finally, under the
terms ofthe GRAT, the annuity and other payments receivable by the estate (and,
thus, the estate beneficiaries) and the remainder beneficiaries of the GRAT, are
r~ceivableby reason ofsurviving the Decedent. Decedent's estate contends that this
fmal requirement is not satisfied in this case because, under the terms of the
ORAT, Daughter, or any successoralternative remainder beneficiary, mustsurvive
the term of the ORAT in order to receive the remainder interest. Thus, the
remainder interest is not receivable by any person by reason of surviving the
Decedent. Rather, because an annuity is frrst payable to the estate for the balance
of the ORAT term, the remainder interest will be receivable by Daughter (or the
.alternative successor beneficiaries) only by reason ofsurviving the 10 year term of
theORAT.
However, we disagree that §2039(a) is not applicable to the entire GRAT corpus
in this case merely because the annuity or other payment is fIrSt payable to the
Decedent's estate for a term ofyears and then to the remainder beneficiaries, ifthey
are then living. For example, assume payments are to be made to a decedent for 10
years or his prior death, ~d on the earlier of the decedent's death or the expiration
of the 10 year period, the payments are to be made to the decedent's child (or the
child's issue if the child is not then living) for 15 years. It seems clear that if the
decedent died within the initial 10 year term and the payments continued to the
child, the survivor payments would be subject to inclusion under § 2039(a). The
payments to the child (or the child's issue) are receivable because ofthe decedent's
death, and because the child (or issue) survived the decedent. See, C. Lowndes, R.
Kramer, J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, §§IO.6 (3rd ed. 1974). The
result should be the same if the payments commencing after the decedent's death
are fIrst payable to the decedent's estate (and through the estate to the estate
beneficiaries) for a term of years and then to the child. The annuity and other
payments, whether payable initially to the estate beneficiaries and then to the child,
or initially to the child, commence by reason of the decedent's death and will be
received by the ultimate beneficiaries because they survived the decedent. The fact
that the total benefit payable after the decedent's death is divided between several
beneficiaries on a temporal basis should have no effect on the application of §§
2039(a). See also, Rev. Rut. 76-404, 1976-2 C.B. 294, in which a nonqualified
pension plan provides for a payment to the surviving spouse until death or
remarriage. Ifthe spouse dies or remarries, the annuity is payable to the decedent's
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child under age 21 until they attain age 21. The primary focus ofthe revenue ruling
is whether the spouse's interest qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction.
However, the ruling states that the value ofthe annuity payments receivable by the
spouse and the child are includible under § 2039(a). Thus, the child's annuity is
viewed as receivable by reason ofsurviving the decedent, even though additional
conditions were imposed on the child's receipt of the annuity; that is, the child
could only receive the annuity if the spouse died or remarried before the child
attained age 21.
We believe this position is consistent with Congressional intent in enacting §
2039(a) and (b).. Prior to the enactment of§ 2039, courts had repeatedly concluded
that a commercial survivor annuity payable after the death of the primary
annuitant/purchaserwas includible in the primaryannuitant/purchaser's gross estate
under the predecessor statutes to § 2036. See, e.,g., Commissioner v. elise, 122
F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941). See also, Rev. Rut. 55-302, 1955-1 C.B. 446. Section
2039 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1954 to
codify this result and to provide rules for the estate taxation ofsurvivor annuities
payable under employee pension plans. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. 123
(June 18, 1954).
lit enacting § 2039(a) and (b), Congress borrowed many aspects of § 2036 and its
predecessors, which had previously been held applicable to survivor annuities. For
example, § 2036 applies ifthe decedent retained an interest in transferred property
for life or for a period not ascertainable without reference to death or for a period
that did not in fact end before death. Section 2039(a) applies if the decedent
received payments under a contract or agreement for these same periods. Section
2036 does not apply to transfers prior to March 4, 1931. Similarly, § 2039(a)
contains the identical effective date. Thus, it is clear that, in enacting §2039(a) and
(b), Congress incorporated the operating rules for § 2036. Clearly, § 2036 applies
where the decedent's retained interest in property, in fact, terminates at death and
the benefit of the property passes to others. Section 2039 applies under the same
circumstances; that is, where the decedent's annuity, in fact, tenninates at death and
the benefits payable under the contract or agreement pass on to the survivors. As
is the case under § 2036, it should make no difference that, after the decedent's
death, the benefits are first payable to the decedent's estate for a tenn ofyears and
then to specified designated beneficiaries if they are then living.
3. Application to Family Limited Partnership. The case of Estate of Morton B. Hamer v.
Commissioner, T.~. Memo. 2002-121, is a difficult one for taxpayers. The decedent, Mr.. Harper, and his children
formed a limited partnership using the assets in Mr. Harper's living trust. The particular facts are important:
At a time not entirely clear from the record, decedent made the decision to form a
limited partnership and to contribute thereto the majority of his assets. An
Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial Company, L. P. (HFLP),
was prepared and sets forth the governing provisions for the entity. The document
begins with language stating that the Agreement was made "as of the 1st day of
January, 1994", but later recites that the partnership shall commence its existence
upon the date a certificate of limited partnership is duly filed with the California
Secretary of State. The primary purpose for HFLP's fonnation, according to the
Agreement, was as follows:
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The acquisition, including by purchase of, sale of, management of,
holding, investing in and reinvesting in stocks (both common and
preferred), options with respect thereto, bonds, mutual funds, debt
instruments, money market funds, notes and deeds of trust and similar
instruments and investments (the "Portfolio").
Michael and Lynn were named as the general partners ofHFLP and the Trust as the
sole limited partner, with interests of .4 percent, .6 percent, and 99 percent,
respectively. Michael was also designated to serve as the managing general partner.
As regards his authority, the Agreement provides:
Subject to the provisions ofParagraph 7.3, the Managing General Partner
shall have the full, exclusive and complete authority and discretion in the
management and control of the business of the Partnership for the
purposes stated herein and shall have the right to make any and all
decisions affecting the business of the Partnership. Subject to the
provisions of this Agreement, the Managing General Partner shall have
full and exclusive authority with respect to the Portfolio, including rights
of sale, reinvesting and voting. * * *
The referenced Paragraph 7.3 then specifies the following limitations:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Paragraph 7, neither General Partner shall
have any right, power or authority to:
(a) Do any act in contravention ofthis Agreement, without first obtaining
the written consent thereto of a "Majority in Interest of the Limited
Partners" * * * [defined as limited partners holding more than 50 percent
of the interest in the ordinary income of the partnership held by limited
partners].
(b) Do any act * * * which would (i) make it impossible to carry on the
ordinary business of the Partnership, or (ii) change the nature of the
Partnership's business, without first obtaining the written consent thereto
of a Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(c) Confess ajudgment against t~e Partnership, without frrst obtaining the
written consent thereto of a Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(d) Possess Partnership property, or assign the Partnership's right in such
property, for other than a Partnership purpose without fIrst obtaining the
written consent thereto of a Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(e) Admit a person as a limited partner, otherwise than as permitted by
this Agreement, without first obtaining the written consent thereto of a
Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(t) Elect to dissolve and wind up the Partnership, without first obtaining
the written consent thereto of a Majority in Interest of the Limited
Partners.
(g) Sell or reinvest 5% or more ofthe Portfolio (based on their fair market
value) in a single transaction or in a related series of transactions, other
A-59
..
than in the ordinary course ofbusiness, without frrst obtaining the written
consent thereto ofa Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(h) Issue or sell new interests in the Partnership (or admit new partners in
connection therewith) or pennit the contribution of new capital to the
Partnership, without fIrSt obtaining the written consent thereto of a
Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(i) Enter into any transactions, other than those transactions contemplated
by Paragraph 7, in which a General Partner has an actual or potential
conflict of interest· with the Trust or the Partnership, without first
obtaining the written consent thereto of a Majority in Interest of the
Limited Partners.
(j) Admit a person as a general partner, without frrst obtaining the written
consent thereto, and to any related transactions with such person, of a
Majority in Interest of the Limited Partners.
(k) Amend this Agreement, without fIrSt obtaining the written consent
thereto ofa Majority in Interest ofthe Limited Partners.
In addition, Paragraph 12.5 provides explicitly that ttThe Trust isentitled-to vote,
prior to any such action being taken toft approve any of the above-enumerated
actions.
***
Although "the Portfolio" is not defined in the Agreement, there appears to be no
dispute between the parties that it consisted of: (1) Securities held in a brokerage
account at M. L. Stern & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam Investments
account, (3) securities held in.two.Franklin·Fund accounts, (4)·2,500 shares of
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from Jack
P. Marsh. The parties value·· these assets· at between SI.6 and SI.7·· million
(rounded), an amount representing approximately 94 percent of decedent's total
assets. The Trust's capital account in HFLP was credited with 99 percent of the
value of the property contributed. Decedent retained, personally or through the
Trust, his personal effects, a checking account, an automobile, and his Palm
Springs condominium~-
***
The Agreement was signed by decedent on behalfofthe Trust, by Michael, and by
Lynn. Although the signatures are undated, the document was executed by Michael
in Mayor June of 1994. Lynn could not remember when she signed the Agreement
and did not read it prior to signing. A certificate of limited partnership was filed on
behalfof HFLP with the California Secretary of State on June 14, 1994.
From June 17 to June 20, 1994, decedent was hospitalized in Palm Springs.
Medical records prepared at that time contain the explanation set forth below:
This is one of multiple Desert Hospital admissions for this 85-year-old
Caucasian who is well known to have metastatic colonic carcinoma and
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prostatic carcinoma and admitted at the present time for poor oral intake,
poor fluid intake, dehydration and for further rehydration, close
observation, nutrition support, etc.
After his release, decedent went to Oregon, where he resided until his death. He
frrst stayed with Michael for approximately a month and then moved into a nearby
Oregon retirement facility known as Cannen Oaks. Carmen Oaks served
independent individuals and was not a nursing center.
Thereafter, by a document entitled Assignment of Partnership Interest and
Amendment No. 1 to Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial
Company, L. P., dated and made effective as ofJuly 1, 1994, the Trust transferred
to Michael and Lynn 60 percent of the Trust's partnership interest. As a result,
Michael and Lynn became holders of 24-and 36-percent limited partnership
interests, respectively, and were given corresponding percentages of the Trust's
capital account balance. The limitedpartnership interests held by Michael and Lynn
were designated as "Class B Limited Partnership Interest[s]" and were entitled to
60 percent of the income and loss of the entity, with 40 percent thereof going to
Michael and 60 percent to Lynn.
The Amendment also reclassified the Trust's remaining 39- percent limited
partnership interest as a "Class A Limited Partnership Interest" which was entitled
to 39 percent of the entity's income and losses and to a "Guaranteed Payment" of
"4.25% annually of its Capital Account balance on the Effective Date, payable
quarterly no later than twenty (20) days after the close ofany such calendar quarter
(or sooner, ifcash flow permits)." Decedent, as trustee of the Trust, Michael, and
Lynn signed the document.
On July 26, 1994, decedent commenced the process of transferring the Trust's
portfolio to the partnership, which process continued for approximately the next 4
months. On July 26, 1994, decedent executed as trustee an allonge endorsement
assigning to HFLP the Trust's interest in the Marsh note. A collateral assignment
of the Trust's interest in property securing the note was also signed on that date.
Then, on August 28, 1994, a letter agreement confrrming and/or finalizing the
transfer was executed by or on behalf ofMr. Marsh, the'Trust, and HFLP.
Next, a letter dated September 29, 1994, was sent by decedent to M. L. Stem & Co.
confmning instructions for ( 1) the·sale ofall securities held in the Trust's account
and (2) the use ofthe proceeds for the immediate repurchase ofthe same securities
for an account established on behalf of the partnership. Michael, as managing
general partner, completed the requisite form opening a new account with M. L.
Stem & Co. for the partnership. The form designated Michael as the "individual
* * * authorized to enter orders on behalf of customer". Neil Hattem served as
decedent's broker and subsequently as the broker on the HFLP account.
Letters dated September 30, 1994, were then sent by decedent to Putnam Investor
Services and to Franklin Templeton requesting transfer of the respective Putnam
and Franklin Fund accounts to HFLP. Lastly, by a letter dated November 22, 1994,
decedent requested transfer ofthe Trustts stock in Rockefeller Center Properties to
the partnership.
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During this period, on September 23, 1994, Michael opened a checking account at
Bank of America in the name·of the partnership with a $200 deposit. Thereafter,
the fIrSt activity in the account, other than the debiting ofa monthly service charge,
was a deposit on October 13,1994, ofS3,750 representing interest paid on the
Marsh note.
The Tax Court concluded that the fonn of the partnership was not respected. Again, the facts are instructive:
As previously indicated, section 2036 mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained, by express or
implied agreement, possession, control, enjoyment, or the right to income. The
focus here is on whether there existed an implicit agreement that decedent would
retain control or enjoyment, i.e., economic benefit, of the assets he transferred to
HFLP.
Respondent avers that section 2036's applicability is established on these facts,
emphasizing in particular actual conduct with respect to partnership funds.
Respondent further maintains that this case is indistinguishable from the situations
presented in Estate· of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242. The estate, on the other
h.and, discounts the evidence and cases relied on by respondent, emphasizing
instead the formal terms of the partnership arrangement and the accounting
treatment of entity assets.
In Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 147-148, the decedent formed a
family limited partnership, the general partner of which was a revocable trust
created on the same date. The decedent and his two children were named as
cotrustees, but only the decedent perfonned any meaningful functions as trustee.
ld at 147, 152. He was the only trustee to sign the articles of limited partnership,
to open brokerage accounts, or to sign partnership checks. ld at 152. He
transferred his residence and all ofhis other property (except for his car, personal
effects, and a small amount ofcash in his checking account) to the partnership and
subsequently gave his two children limited partnership interests. ld at 148-149,
152-153. The decedent deposited partnership income in his personal account, used
the partnership checking account as his personal account, and lived at his residence
without paying rent to the partnership. ld at 152. Based on these facts, we
concluded that nothing but legal title changed in the decedent's relationship to his
assets after he transferred them to the partnership./d at 152-153.
In Estate ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, the decedent formed three
limited partnerships. The decedent and one ofher three children were named as the
general partners of each partnership, with the decedent's being designated as the
managing partner. Id The decedent transferred business assets, including real
estate, partnership interests, and notes receivable, to the partnerships in undivided
one-third shares. Id Limited partnership interests in these entities were given to
family members. Id Partnership bank accounts were opened, but the decedent
deposited the income earned by the partnerships into the account she used as her
personal checking account, where it was commingled with funds from other
sources. Id Checks were then written from this account to pay both personal and
partnership expenses. Id The decedent's children later acknowledged at trial that
formation of the partnerships was merely a way to enable the decedent to assign
interests in the partnership assets to family members, with the assets to be managed
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by the decedent exactly as in the past. ld We therefore found the assets includable
under section 2036(a). ld
We agree with respondent that the circumstances before us bear many similarities
to those in Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), and Estate
ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, and are convinced that a like result
should obtain. We focus particularly on the commingling of funds, the history of
disproportionate distributions, and the testamentary characteristics of the
arrangement in support ofour conclusion that there existed an implied agreement
that decedent would retain the economic benefit ofthe assets transferred to HFLP.
As regards commingling of funds, we note that this fact was one of the most
heavily relied upon in both Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 152, and
Estate ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra. We find the disregard here for
partnership form to be equally egregious. The Agreement specified: "All funds of
the Partnership shall be deposited in a separate bank account or accounts". Yet no
such account was even opened for HFLP until September 23, 1994, more than 3
months after the entity began its legal existence. Prior to that time, partnership
income was deposited in the Trust's account, resulting in an unavoidable
commingling of funds.
Michael testified concerning this delay as follows:
Inadvertently, either my account or I failed to apply timely for any - an
employee [sic] identification number. That is required before a checking
account is open. So I just made the detennination that without a checking
account and I wanted the flow of cash, what we would do is use the
Morton B. Harper Trust account as a holding account, and then I
instructed the accountant to properly credit and account for those funds.
***
This explanation, however, seems to beg the question. Had Michael sought
promptly upon HFLP's creation to establish a bank account, he would have been
immediately alerted to the need for an EIN. Hence, he either neglected to attempt
opening and/or using an account or allowed the lack of an EIN to continue for
several months after having been reminded of its necessity. Both reflect at best a
less than orderly approach to the fonnal partnership structure so pressed by the
estate.
Moreover, we fmd Michael's reliance on post mortem accounting manipulations to
be especially unavailing. Michael and Mr. Blankstein, HFLP's accountant, each
testified that no moneys actually changed hands in connection with the adjustments.
In response to similar contentions in Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, supra
at 154-155, we stated:
The 1993 yearend and 1994 post mortem adjusting entries made by
Hannah's fmn were a belated attempt to undo decedent's commingling of
partnership and personal accounts. There is no ~vidence that the
partnership or decedent transferred any funds to the other as a result ofthe
adjusting entries. After-the- fact paperwork by decedent's C. P. A. does
not refute that decedent and his children had agreed that decedent could
continue to use and control the property during his life. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
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Here Michael did not even hire Mr. Blankstein until after decedent's death,
strengthening the inference that the partners had little concern for establishing any
precise demarcation between partnership and other funds during decedent's life.
Closely related to the delay in opening the partnership bank account and
consequent commingling of income is the delay in fonnally transferring the
underlying portfolio assets to HFLP. No attempt was made to begin the process of
title transfer until July 26, 1994, when decedent executed an allonge endorsement
assigning the Marsh note to HFLP. No action was taken with respect to any ofthe
other securities until September 29 and 30, 1994, when letters addressing transfer
of the M. L. Stem & Co., Putnam, and Franklin accounts were drafted and an
account with M. L. Stem & Co. was opened on behalfofHFLP. A letter requesting
transfer of the Rockefeller Center Properties stock was not prepared until
November 22, 1994.
When Michael was asked on cross-examination to explain this delay between the
effective date ofthe partnership and the formal transfer ofassets into the entity, he
replied: tfprobably for different reasons, some mechanical delays and who we're
dealing with, but generally,. there was no rush to do it. We were just doing it in an
orderly fashion. tf Next, in response to a further question asking why there was no
~sh, he continued: tfThere was no rush. I mean, we werejust handling the business
in an orderly fashion. There wasn't any deadline or urgency to do it and get it
done. tf The following colloquy then ensued:
QNow let's talk for a moment about the income from the portfolio assets.
Before the title to the assets was transferred to the partnership, your father
or his trust continued to receive the income from those assets. Isn't that
right?
A Would you restate that? I'm lost.
Q Okay. At a certain point in time the assets were contributed to the
partnership, correct?
A Yes.
QOkay. Before that happened, your father's trust continued to receive the
income from those assets, correct?
A Probably.
Q Well, why isn't it Yes?
A Well, before he contributed it, he was in control of that. Who else
would get it? [ say probably.
Hence, we are again met with an example of indifference by those involved toward
the formal structure of the partnership arrangement and, as a corollary, toward the
degree of separation that the Agreement facially purports to establish. Moreover,
until title to the assets was transferred to HFLP, decedent would not have forfeited
the control over the underlying securities that he through the Trust possessed as
legal holder. Thus, at the time ofthe June 14, 1994, creation ofHFLP and for some
months following, decedent's Trust retained title to the underlying assets and was
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issued the dividends and interest generated thereby. In addition, according to
Michael's own testimony, the partners were in no hurry to alter this state ofaffairs.
This speaks volumes concerning how little the partners understood to have ch;'1ged
in decedent's relationship to his assets as a result of the entity's fonnation.
Turning to facts regarding distribution of partnership funds, we find equally
compelling indicia of an implied understanding or agreement that the partnership
arrangement would not curtail decedent's ability to enjoy the economic benefit of
assets contributed to HFLP. In addition to the deemed distributions engendered by
the comminglingdiscussed above, even the distributions made by Michael from the
partnership checking account are heavily weighted in favor ofdecedent. The check
register indicates that during the period extending from September 0 f 1994 through
early November t995, partnership funds were distributed for the benefitofMichael
and Lynn in the amounts of $5,800 and $8,700, respectively. These distributions
occurred on November 9, t994,December 19, 1994, and January 10,1995. During
that same time frame, partnership checks totaling $231,820, were remitted to the
Trust, with the last being written on October 30, 1995. Only then did distributions
to Michael and Lynn resume with checks drawn on November 15, 1995, in the
amounts of$4,800 and $7,200, respectively. Given this pattern, we would be hard
pressed to conclude other than that the partnership arrangement did little to curtail
the access of decedent or his estate to the economic benefit of the contributed
property.
Similarly significant is the evidence that certain of the distributions to the Trust
were linked to a contemporaneous expense ofdecedent personally or ofhis estate.
These amounts, variously labeled by Michael "additional distribution", "return of
capital", or "capital return", totaled $220,520 and even included $4,000 to enable
decedent to complete a gift 2 days before he died. This evidence buttresses the
inference that decedent and his estate had ready access to partnership cash when
needed.
The estate also argued that the partnership units were consideration sufficient to move the transaction out of
section 2036. The court rejected the contention:
Having decided that decedent retained enjoyment of the transferred assets for
purposes of section 2036(a), we tum to the question whether the statute's
application may nonetheless be avoided on the basis ofthe parenthetical exception
for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth". The estate contends:
The primary reason why tR.C. 2036 does not apply to Petitioner is that
the Trust's transfer of the Portfolio to the Partnership in exchange for a
credit to its capital account for 99% of the fair market value of the
Portfolio assets and a 99% interest in profits and losses is a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 1t
***
We, however, disagree on the ground that the estate's position fails to take into
account significant aspects of the jurisprudence addressing this exclusionary
language. The phrase, as used in a predecessor statute, was explained in early
caselaw of this Court, as follows:
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Accordingly, the exemption from tax is limited to those transfers of
property where the transferor or donor has received benefit in full
consideration in a genuine arm's length transaction; and the exemption is
not to be allowed in a case where there is only contractual consideration
but not "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." *
* * [Estate ofGoetchius v. Commissioner, 17 T.e. 495, 503 (1951).]
***
On the facts before us, HFLP's formation at a minimum falls short of meeting the
bona fide sale requirement. Decedent, independently of any other anticipated
interest-holder, detennined how HFLP was to be structured and operated, decided
what property would be contributed to capitalize the entity, and declared what
interest the Trust would receive therein. He essentially stood on both sides of the
transaction and conducted the partnership's formation in absence ofany bargaining
or negotiating whatsoever. It would be an oxymoron to say that one can engage in
an ann's-length transaction with oneself, and we simply are unable to find any other
independent party involved in the creation ofHFLP.
~urthermore, lack ofa bona fide sale aside, we believe that to call what occurred
here a transfer for consideration within the meaning ofsection 2036(a), much less
a transfer for an adequate and full consideration, would stretch the exception far
beyond its intended scope. In actuality, all decedent did was to change the fonn in
which he held his beneficial interest in the contributed property. We see little
practical difference in whether the Trust held the property directly or as a 99-
percent partner (and entitled to a commensurate 99-percent share of profits) in a
partnership holding the property. Essentially, the value of the partnership interest
the Trust received derived solely from the assets the Trust had just contributed.
Without any change whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or prospect for
profit, as, for example, where others make contributions ofproperty or services in
the interest of true joint ownership or enterprise, there exists nothing but a
circuitous "recyclingtt of value. We are satisfied that such instances of pure
recycling do not rise to the level ofa payment ofconsideration. To hold otherwise
would open section 2036 to a myriad of abuses engendered by unilateral paper
transformations.
We note that the foregoing interpretation is supported by our holdings in both
Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 +T.C. 144 (2000), and, by implication,
Estate ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242. In Estate of
Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 155-156, the taxpayer contended that the
parenthetical exception should apply. We, however, rejected this argument,
observing that neither did the decedent's children give anything to him or to the
partnership at the time he contributed his assets nor did he sell the transferred
property to the entity. Id In Estate ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, the
contributed assets were included in the decedent's gross estate under section
2036(a) without discussion of the exception, leading to the inference that it would
not apply in such circumstances.
We further are convinced that the cases cited by the estate do not require a contrary
conclusion. The estate points in particular to Estate ofJones v. Commissioner, 116
T.e. 121 (2001); Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000);
Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), affd. 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.
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2002); Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-8; and Church v.
United States, 85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC par. 60,369 (W. D. Tex.
2000), affd. without published opinion 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001). The estate
apparently argues that thejust-cited cases establish that a proportionate partnership
interest constitutes per se adequate and full consideration for contributed assets.
We believe, however, that any such global fonnulation would overreach what can
be drawn from the decisions.
First, with respect to Estate ofJones v. Commissioner, supra, Estate ofStrangi v.
Commissioner, supra, and Shepherd v. Commissioner, supra, none of these
opinions involved section 2036. Rather, they considered whether gifts were made
at the inception of family limited partnership arrangements. Estate ofJones v.
Commissioner, supra at 127-128; Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner, supraat489-
490; Shepherd v. Commissioner, supra at 384-389. The cases therefore do not
control interpretation of the requirements of section 2036. Furthermore, while
section 2512(b) describes a gift as a transfer ofproperty "for less than an adequate
,.. and full consideration in money or money's worth", there exists an equally
fundamental principle that a gift requires a donee -- some other individual must be
enriched. In this connection, we note that Estate ofJones v. Commissioner, supra
at 127-128, and Estate o/Strangi v. Commissioner, supra at 489-490, which find
no gift at inception, say nothing explicit about adequate and full consideration but
do refer to enhancement, or lack thereof, ofother partners' interests. Hence, even
if relevant here, we would be unable to conclude that these rulings resolve the
question of whether a proportionate entity interest, in and of itself, constitutes
adequate and full consideration for contributed assets.
Second, although Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra, and Church v.
United States, supra, do address section 2036, there exist significant differences
between these cases, on the one hand, and Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner,
supra, and Estate o/Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, on the other, which
distinguish the two groups. In both Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, supra, and
Church v. United States, supra, the other partners made contributions at the
fonnation ofthe entity which were not de minimis in nature. The partnership entity
thus served as the vehicle for a genuine pooling of interests. The court in each case
then went on to conclude that the partnerships had been created for a business
purpose. Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra; Church v. United States,
supra.
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that a genuine pooling for business
purposes injects something different into the adequate and full consideration
calculus than does mere, unilateral value "recycling" as seen in Estate ofReichardt
v. Commissioner, supra, Estate ofSchauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, and the
present matter. In the former situation, there is at least the potential that intangibles
stemming from a pooling for joint enterprise might support a ruling ofadequate and
full consideration. We also note that section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs., specifies
that transfers "made in the ordinary course ofbusiness (a transaction which is bona
fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
We therefore hold that where a transaction involves only the genre of value
"recycling" described above and does not appear to be motivated primarily by
legitimate business concerns, no transfer for consideration within the meaning of
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section 2036(a) has taken place. Hence, the exception provided in that statute is
inapplicable. Furthermore, although section 2043 can entitle taxpayers to an offset
for partial consideration in cases where a transfer is otherwise subject to section
2036, this section, too, is inapplicable where, as here, there has been only a
recycling of value and not a transfer for consideration.
The conclusion is that the fonn of partnerships must be respected by taxpayer.
I. SECTION 2040 - JOINT INTERESTS
1. IRS Acquiesces in Case on 50 Percent Inclusion Rule for Joint Interests. The Service has
acquiesced in Hahn v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 1040 (1998), in which the Tax Court held that the "50 percent inclusion"
rule ofsection 2040(b)(1) does not apply to joint interests created before 1977. Other cases on the issue are:
Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029 (4th Cir. 1997); Gallenstein v. United
States, 975 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992); Baszto v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17992 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Wilburn v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17003 (D. Md. 1997); Anderson v. United States, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7713 (D.
Md. 1996).
J. SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 -- GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
No developments.
K. SECTIONS 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE
1. Interim Guidance on Split-Dollar Life Insurance; Notice 2002-8. TAM 9604001 stated that ifthe
cash surrender value ofa policy exceeded the premiums paid by the employer, section 83 would cause the excess to be
treated as income. Following much consternation, nothing else was heard from the IRS for five years on this issue until
IRS Notice 2001-10,2001-5 IRB 459, which set forth various issues and potential IRS approaches. That Notice set
forth the background and existing authority on the split-dollar issue:
II. BACKGROUND
Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, and Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12,
addressed the Federal income tax treatment of split- dollar arrangements under
which an employer and employee join in the purchase ofa life insurance contract
on the life of the employee subject toa contractual allocation of policy benefits
between the employer and employee. The rulings described two contractual forms:
(1) the endorsement method, under which the employer is formally designated as
the owner of the contract, and the employer endorses the contract to specify the
portion ofthe proceeds payable to the employee's beneficiary; and (2) the collateral
assignment method, under which the employee is formally designated as the owner
of the contract, the employer's premium payments are characterized as loans from
the employer to the employee, and the employer's interest in the proceeds of the
contract is designated as collateral security for its loans.
These rulings conclude that all economic benefits conferred on an employee under
such an arrangement, excluding economic benefits attributable to the employee's
own premium payments, constitute gross income to the employee. See also
Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). Under the rationale ofthese rulings, the determination ofan employee's
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gross income is unaffected by whether the endorsement method or the collateral
assignment method is used.
Under the specific split-dollar arrangement addressed in Rev. Rut 64-328, all
amounts credited to the cash surrender value of the life insurance contract inured
to the benefit of the employer. Thus, the only economic benefit inuring to the
employee was the value ofthe insurance protection attributable to the portion ofthe
contract's death benefit payable to the employee's beneficiary. Rev. Rut. 64-328
holds that, in such a case, the employee's gross income in any year includes the
value ofthe life insurance protection provided to the employee in that year, less any
amount actually paid by the employee.
Rev. Rut. 66-110 amplified Rev. RuI. 64-328 by holding that the value of any
economic benefits in addition to current insurance protection that are provided to
an employee under a split- dollar arrangement are also includible in the employee's
gross income. More specifically, Rev. Rut. 66-110 held that an employee has
additional gross income equal to the amount of any policyholder dividends
distributed to the employee or applied to provide additional insurance for the
exclusive benefit ofthe employee. Thus, where the employer has no interest in the
dividend applied to provide paid-up additional insurance, the taxable economic
benefit is the dividend itself, not the value of the insurance protection resulting
from the dividend.
Rev. Rut. 64-328 and Rev. Rut 66-110 each addressed a situation in which the
employer possessed all beneficial interest in the cash surrender value of the life
insurance contract (exclusive of any separate cash surrender value of paid-up
additions attributable to dividends 1), and the employee was entitled only to certain
other economic benefits generated by the employer's investment in the contract,
specifically, current insurance protection or dividends. Consistent with that, Rev.
Rut 64-328 revoked Rev. Rut. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23, which had treated a split-
dollar arrangement similar to that addressed in Rev. Rut 64-328 as a secured loan
from the employer to the employee. In rejecting the loan characterization, Rev. Rut
64-328 stated that the substance ofthe split-dollar arrangement differed from that
ofa loan because the employee was not expected to make repayment except out of
the cash surrender value or proceeds of the life insurance contract. But see
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983)(lfwe read [Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 u.S. 1 (1947)] to have approved t~e Commissioner's decision
to treat a nonrecourse loan in this context as a true loan. If).
Rev. Rut. 64-328 held that the table of one-year premium rates set forth in Rev.
Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, commonly referred to as the "P.S. 58" rates, may be
used to determine the value of the current life insurance protection provided to an
employee under a split-dollar arrangement. Rev. Rut. 66-110 amplified Rev. Rul.
64-328 in this respect by holding that the insurer's published premium rates for
one-year term insurance may be used to measure the value ofthe current insurance
protection if those rates are lower than the P.S. 58 rates and available to all
standard risks. Rev. Rul. 67-154,1967-1 C.B. 11, modified Rev. Rul. 66-110 by
holding that an insurer's published tenn rates must be available for initial issue
insurance (as distinguished from rates for dividend options) in order to be
substituted for the P.S. 58 rates set forth in Rev. Rul. 55-747.
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Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the economic benefit inuring to a third-party donee
under an employer-employee split- dollar arrangement or to a shareholder under a
corporation- shareholder split-dollar arrangement is to be determined under the
principles and valuation methods set forth in Rev. Rut. 64-328, as amplified by
Rev. Rul. 66-110. See Rev. Rut. 78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67; Rev. Rut 79-50, 1979-1
C.B. 138. Also, the same premium rate alternatives may be relied upon to measure
the value of current life insurance protection provided to an employee under a
qualified retirement plan. See Rev. Rut. 55-747, supra.
In Notice 2002-8, 2002-4 IRB I, the IRS revoked Notice 2001-10. The Notice also:
o Announces that the Treasury and the Service intend to publish proposed
regulations providing comprehensive guidance regarding the Federal tax treatment
of split-dollar life insurance arrangements;
o Outlines rules expected to be included in the forthcoming proposed regulations
and the expected effective date of those regulations; and
o Provides guidance regarding the valuation of current life insurance protection
under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement, under qualified retirement plans and
u.nder employee annuity contracts.
The Notice states that the proposed regulations will provide for taxation ofsplit-dollar arrangements either as
transfers or loans to the benefitted party:
The proposed regulations are expected to provide that, in an employment-related
split-dollar life insurance arrangement, ifthe employer is formally designated as the
owner of the life insurance contract, then the benefits provided to the employee
under the arrangement are subject to tax under the frrst regime. Under this regime,
the employer is treated for Federal tax purposes as the owner ofthe life insurance
contract prior to termination ofthe arrangement, and is treated as providing current
life insurance protection and other economic benefits to the employee, which are
taxable under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. A transfer of the life
insurance contract to the employee is taxed under section 83. The proposed
regulations will not treat an employer as having made a transfer ofa portion ofthe
cash surrender value of a life insurance contract to an employee for purposes of
section 83 solely because the interest or other earnings credited to the cash
surrender value ofthe contract cause the cash surrender value to exceed the portion
thereof payable to the employer.
The proposed regulations are expected to provide that if the employee is formally
designated as the owner of the life insurance contract under a split-dollar
arrangement, then the premiums paid by the employer are treated as a series of
loans by the employer to the employee if the employee is obligated to repay the
employer, whether out of contract proceeds or otherwise. Under this second
regime, the loans are subject to the principles, where applicable, ofsections 1271-
1275 (regarding the taxation of original issue discount) and section 7872 (in the
case ofa compensation- related below-market loan, section 7872 deems an interest
payment by the employee to the employer, which is funded by deemed additional
c~mpensation paid by the employer to the employee). If the employee is not.
obligated to repay the premiums paid by the employer, then such amounts are
treated as compensation income to the employee at the time the premiums are paid
by the employer.
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The same principles are expected to govern the Federal tax treatment ofsplit-dollar
life insurance arrangements in other contexts, including arrangements that provide
benefits in gift and corporation-shareholder contexts.
Ofgreat importance to the life insurance industry has been the effective date ofthe proposed regulations. The
Notice states that the proposed regulations will be effective for "arrangements" entered into after the date ofpublication
offmal regulations. However, that does not protect all such arrangements. Four "safe-harbors" are created, as is a catch
all safe-harbor.
I. Economic Benefit Safe-Harbor.
For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of fmal regulations, in cases where the value ofcurrent life insurance
protection is treated as an economic benefit provided by a sponsor to a benefited
person under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement, the Service will not treat the
arrangement as having been terminated (and thus will not assert that there has been
a transfer of property to the benefited person by reason of termination of the
arrangement) for so long as the parties to the arrangement continue to treat and
report the value of the life insurance protection as an economic benefit provided
to the benefited person. This treatment will be accepted without regard to the level
of the remaining economic interest that the sponsor has in the. life insurance
contract.
2. Loan Safe-Harbor.
For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of fmal regulations, the parties to the arrangement may treat premium
or other payments by the sponsor as loans. In such cases, the Service will not
challenge reasonable efforts to comply with the requirements of sections 1271-
1275 and section 7872. All payments by the sponsor from the inception of the
arrangement (reduced by any repayments to the sponsor) before the first taxable
year in which such payments are treated as loans for Federal tax purposes must be
treated as loans entered into at the beginning of that first year in which such
payments are treated as loans.
3. Termination Before January 1,2004
and
4. Loan After January I, 1004 Safe-Harbors
For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before January 28, 2002
underwhich a sponsor has made premium or other payments under the arrangement
and has received or is entitled to receive full repayment ofall of its payments, the
Service will not assert that there has been a taxable transfer of property to a
benefited person upon termination of the arrangement if (i) the arrangement is
tenninated before January 1, 2004, or (ii) for all periods beginning on or after
January 1, 2004, all payments by the sponsor from inception of the arrangement
(reduced by any repayments to the sponsor) are treated as loans for Federal tax
purposes, and the parties to the arrangement report the tax treatment in a manner
consistent with this loan treatment, includingsections 1271-1275 and section 7872.
Any such payments by the sponsor before the frrst taxable year in which such
payments are treated as loans for Federal tax purposes must be treated as loans
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entered into at the beginning of that frrst year in which such payments are treated
as loans.
5. Potential Catch-All Safe-Harbor
Except for Part III (Revised Standards for Valuing Current Life Insurance
Protection), no inference should be drawn from this notice regarding the
appropriate Federal income, employment and gift tax treatment ofsplit-dollar life
insurance arrangements entered into before the date of publication of fmal
regulations. However, taxpayers may rely on this notice (including a reasonable
application of the rules to be proposed as described in Part II) or Notice 2001- 10
for split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of fmal regulations.
[Categories are the authors; the descriptions are from the Notice.]
The 2002 Notice changes both the old P.S. 58 Tables and the provisions set forth by the 2001 Notice. The new
Notice states:
III. REVISED STANDARDS FOR VALUING CURRENT LIFE
INSURANCE PROTECTION
Pending the consideration of comments and publication of further guidance, the
following interim guidance is provided on the valuation of current life insurance
protection:
1. Rev. Rut. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, remains revoked, as
provided in and with the transitional relief for 200 I described in Part
IV.B.I ofNotice 2001-10. Notwithstanding such revocation, for a split-
dollar life insurance arrangement entered into before January 28,2002, in
which a contractual arrangement between an employer and employee
provides that the P.S. 58 rates will be used to determine the value of
current life insurance protection provided to the employee (or to the
employee" and one or more additional persons), the employer and
employee may continue to use the P.S. 58 rates set forth in Rev. Rut. 55-
747 to determine the value ofcurrent life insurance protection.
2. For arrangements entered into before the effective date offuture
guidance, taxpayers may use the premium rate table set forth at the end of
this notice to determine the value of current life insurance protection on
a single life that is provided under a split- dollar life insurance
arrangement, in a qualified retirement plan, or under employee annuity
contracts. (This table is captioned as Table 2001 and was originally
published in Notice 2001-10.) Taxpayers should make appropriate
adjustments to these premium rates ifthe life insurance protection covers
more than one life.
3. For arrangements entered into before the effective date offuture
guidance, to the extent provided by Rev. Rut. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12, as
amplified by Rev. Rut. 67-154~ 1967-1 C.B. II, taxpayers may continue
to determine the value of current life insurance protection by using the
insurer's lower published premium rates that are available to all standard
risks for initial issue one-year term insurance. However, for arrangements
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entered into after January 28, 2002, and before the effective date offuture
guidance, for periods after December 31, 2003, the Service will not
consider an insurer's published premium rates to be available to all
standard risks who apply for term insurance unless (i) the insurer
generally makes the availability ofsuch rates known to persons who apply
for term insurance coverage from the insurer, and (ii) the insurer regularly
sells term insurance at such rates to individuals who apply for term
insurance coverage through the insurer's normal distribution channels.
TABLE 2001
INTERIM TABLE OF ONE-YEAR TERM PREMIUMS
FOR $1,000 OF LIFE INSURANCE PROTECTION
Section 79 Section 79 Section 79
Extended Extended Extended
and and and
Interpolated Interpolated Interpolated
Attained Annual Attained Annual Attained Annual
Age Rates Age Rates Age Rates
0 $0.70 35 $0.99 70 $ 20.62
I SO.41 36 $ 1.01 71 $ 22.72
2 $0.27 37 $1.04 72 $ 25.07
3 $ 0.19 38 $ 1.06 73 $ 27.57
4 $ 0.13 39 $ 1.07 74 $30.18
5 $ 0.13 40 $ 1.10 75 $ 33.05
6 $ 0.14 41 $ 1.13 76 $ 36.33
7 $ 0.15 42 $ 1.20 77 $ 40.17
8 $ 0.16 43 $ 1.29 78 $ 44.33
9 $ 0.16 44 $ 1.40 79 $ 49.23
10 $ 0.16 45 $ 1.53 80 $ 54.56
11 $ 0.19 46 $ 1.67 81 $ 60.51
12 $0.24 47 $ 1.83 82 $ 66.74
13 $0.28 48 $ 1.98 83 $ 73.07
14 $0.33 49 $ 2.13 84 $ 80.35
15 $ 0.38 50 $2.30 85 $ 88.76
16 $ 0.52 51 $ 2.52 86 $ 99.16
17 $ 0.57 52 $ 2.81 87 $ 110.40
18 SO.59 53 $ 3.20 88 $ 121.85
19 $0.61 54 $ 3.65 89 $ 133.40
20 $0.62 55 $ 4.15 90 $ 144.30
21 $0.62 56 $4.68 91 $ 155.80
22 $0.64 57 $ 5.20 92 $ 168.75
23 $0.66 58 $ 5.66 93 $ 186.44
24 $0.68 59 $6.06 94 $ 206.70
25 $ 0.71 60 $ 6.51 95 $ 228.35
26 $0.73 61 $ 7.11 96 $ 250.01
27 $0.76 62 $ 7.96 97 $ 265.09
28 $0.80 63 $ 9.08 98 $ 270.11
29 $ 0.83 64 $ 10.41 99 $ 281.05
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30
31
32
33
34
$0.87
$0.90
$0.93
$0.96
$0.98
65
66
67
68
69
$ 11.90
$ 13.51
$ 15.20
$ 16.92
$ 18.70
2. No Inclusion Where Trustee May Pay Estate Tax. PLR 200147039 dealt with unusual facts.
Husband and wife created an irrevocable life insurance trust ("Trust 2") to hold ajoint life policy. The ruling describes
a certain provision of Trust 2 as follows:
Paragraph 5.019 of Trust 2 provides that the trustee is not required to pay any
amounts to the estate of either or both of Husband and/or Wife in satisfaction of
Husband and/or Wife's debts or liabilities ofany kind. Additionally, the trustee of
Trust 2 may, in its sole discretion, pay the estate tax, inheritance tax, or any other
tax or expense due by reason of Husband and/or Wife's death, but shall be under
no compulsion to do so.
The IRS detennined that the proceeds would not be includable in the survivor's estate:
Section 20.2042-I(b) sets forth the meaning of the term "receivable by the
executor" under section 2042(1): Section 2042 requires the inclusion in the gross
eState ofthe proceeds ofinsurance on the decedent's life receivable by the executor
or administrator, or payable to the decedent's estate. It makes no difference whether
or not the estate is specifically named as the beneficiary under the tenns of the
policy. Thus, ifunder the terms ofan insurance policy the proceeds are receivable
by another beneficiary but are subject to an obligation, legally binding upon the
other beneficiary, to pay taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable against the
estate, then the amount of such proceeds required for the payment in full (to the
extent of the beneficiary's obligation) of such taxes, debts, or other charges is
includible in the gross estate.
In the present case, State law does not require or direct the trusteeto use the life
insurance proceeds held by Trust 2 to pay the estate's obligations, including the
Wife's federal estate tax.
Upon the death ofthe survivor ofHusband and Wife, the proceeds ofthe joint life
insurance policy on the joint lives Husband and Wife held by Trust 2 became
payable to the trust. Under the terms of the trust, the Trustee is not required or
obligated to pay any amounts to either Husband's and/or Wife's estate in
satisfaction of their debts or liabilities ofany kind. The Trustee may, however, in
his/her sole discretion, pay the estate tax, inheritance tax, or any other tax or
expense due by reason ofthe death ofthe second spouse to die, but shall be under
no compulsion to do [sic]. Accordingly, the life insurance proceeds receivable by
the trustee are not subject to an obligation, legally binding upon the trustee, to pay
taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable against the Wife's estate within the
meaning of §§ 20.2042-I(b).
The ruling does not discuss the identity of the trustee.
3. No Inclusion in Partner's Estate. PLR 200214028 is a nice refresher on the question of"incidents
of ownership" possessed by a partner:
The question ofwhether incidents ofownership held by a partnership with respect
to a policy insuring a partner's life should be attributed to the insured partner is
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considered in Rev. Rut. 83-147, 1983-2 C.B. 158. In that ruling, a general
partnership owned a life insurance policy on the life of the decedent, a one-third
partner, and made the premium payments in partial satisfaction of the decedent's
distributive share of partnership income. The decedent's son was designated the
sole beneficiary ofthe policy. The revenue ruling holds that for purposes ofsection
2042(2) ofthe Code, when a partnership owns a life insurance policy on a partner's
life and the proceeds are payable other than to or for the benefit ofthe partnership,
the insured partner possesses incidents of ownership in the policy exercisable in
conjunction with the otherpartners, such that the value ofthe proceeds is includible
in the insured partner's gross estate.
In this case, the assets of Partnership consisted primarily of real estate that was
leased to Corporation and used in Corporation's active retail business. The life
insurance policies were maintained by Partnership and the proceeds were paid to
Partnership as required under the tenns ofthe Partnership Agreement. The policies
facilitated the satisfaction ofPartnership's obligation to purchase the interest ofa
deceased partner, while avoiding liquidation ofthe real property that was essential
to the operation of Corporation's retail business. The other partners in the
Partnership were Decedent's brother andan unrelated third party. We concludethat,
under the facts presented, the proceeds of the life insurance policies held by
P'artnership on Decedent's life were payable to or for the benefit, ofthe Partnership.
Accordingly, under Rev. Rut. 83-147, the proceeds ofthe-lifeinsurance policies
held by Partnership on Decedent's life that were receivable by Partnership are not
includible in Decedent's gross estate under section 2042.
L. SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
1. Deduction for An Uncertain Amount. In Estate ofMcMorris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-
82, the court detennined that where a decedent took an estate tax deduction for income taxes which were owed, and
subsequent developments produced an income tax refund, the estate tax deduction must also be reduced. In April 1990,
Donn McMorris died and a few months later Evelyn McMorris received a partial distribution of certain closely-held
stock from his estate which was redeemed in September, 1990~ Evelyn"McMorris died in March, 1991 and a deduction
was taken on her estate tax return for a significant income tax. A significant part ofthe income was gain resulting from
the redemption ofstock because it was redeemed at considerably more than the value placed on it in Donn McMorris'
estate. Subsequently, the Donn McMorris estate and the IRS reached a settlement which increased the value Jfthe stock
in his estate, which in turn increased the basis ofEvelyn McMorris in the stock and eliminated the income. Whereupon,
she filed a claim for an income tax refund.
The issue was whether the original estate tax deduction in the Evelyn McMorris estate should be adjusted. The
court determined that it should be because:
a claim that is valid and enforceable at the date of a decedent's death must remain
enforceable in order for the estate to deduct the claim. Technical claims that
disappear in the light of subsequent circumstances should not be allowed. Thus,
postdeath events must be taken into consideration in determining the enforceability
of a claim that a creditor fails to make and preserve within the time allowed by
local law.
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The court distinguished Estate ofSachs v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 769 (1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.
1988), which dealt with a post-death, retroactive, change in the tax laws.
The case was appealed and the question before the Tenth Circuit in Estate ofEvelvn M. McMonis, 87 AFTR2d
Par. 2001-668 (2001), was whether the section 2053 deduction in Evelyn's estate should be reduced. The Tax Court
said yes. The opinion relies on Ithaca Trust:
Neither section 2053(a)(3) nor the tax regulations clearly indicate whether events
that occur after a decedent's death are relevant in calculating a deduction for a
claim against the estate. The statute is silent on this issue. The regulations, on the
other hand, contain language which arguably supports the positions ofboth parties.
For instance, one regulation cited by the estate provides: "The amounts that may
be deducted as claims against a decedent's estate are such only as represent
personal obligations ofthe decedent existing at the time ofhis death." Treas. Reg.
section 20.2053-4. But, another regulation relied upon by the Commissioner
permits estates to deduct a decedent's tax liabilities as a claim against the estate
even if the exact amount is not known, as long as the deduction "is ascertainable
with reasonable certainty, and will be paid." Treas. Reg. section 20.2053-I(bX3).
In light of these apparent inconsistencies, the most we can discern "from these
Regulations is that the situation we now face is not expressly contemplated." Estate
of Smith v. Comm'r, 198 F.3d SIS, 521 (5th Cir. 1999).
We therefore begin our analysis with the leading case on this issue, Ithaca Trust
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). In Ithaca Trust, the decedent left the
residue ofhis estate to his wife for life, with the remainder to certain charities. To
ascertain the amount ofthe charitable deduction for estate tax purposes, the wife's
residual was calculated with a mortality table and subtracted from the principal of
the estate. However, the wife died much sooner than expected. The question for the
Court was whether the value of the estate's deduction should be calculated
according to the wife's life expectancy as of the date of the testator's death or by
applying the wifets actual date ofdeath. In a unanimous opinion, the Court adopted
a date-of-death valuation rule: ttThe estate so far as may be is settled as ofthe date
of the testator's death." Id. at 155. The Court acknowledged that tt[t]he fITSt
impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know
the fact,tt but it stated that ttthe value ofthe thing to be taxed must be estimated as
ofthe time when the act is done," i.e., the passing ofthe decedent's estate at death.
Id. The Court therefore concluded by stating that, as "[t]empting as it is to correct
uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are ofopinion that it cannot be
done." Id.
Several courts have relied on the date-of-death valuation rule announced in Ithaca
Trust to hold that events occurring after a decedent's death are irrelevant in valuing
an estate's deduction under section 2053(a)(3). See Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at
520-26 (allowing estate to deduct date-of-death value of claim against it even
though estate later settled for lesser amount); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d
1248,1253-56 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Estate of Van Home v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.
728, 732-39 (1982) (same), affd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9thCir. 1983); Greenev. United
States, 447 F. SUppa 885, 892-95 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (declining to consider creditor's
failure to comply with statute of limitations for filing claim after decedent's death
in allowing estate's deduction for claim); Russell v. United States, 260 F. SUppa
493,499-500 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (same); Winer v. United States, 153 F. SUppa 941,
943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same). 10 While most of these courts acknowledged that
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Ithaca Trust involved a different section of the federal· estate tax statute, i.e.~
charitable bequest deductions under the precursor to 26 U.S.C. section 2055, they
interpreted the opinion as announcing a broad principle that the value ofa taxable
estate should be determined as closely as possible to the date of the decedent's
death.
Other courts, however~have refused to extend the principle ofIthaca Trust beyond
charitable bequest deductions, holding that postmortem events may properly be
considered in calculating the value of a claim against the estate deduction. See
Estate of Sachs v. Comm'r, 856 F.2d 1158, 1160-63 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Commissioner could rely on retroactive tax forgiveness legislation enacted four
years after decedent's death in disallowing estate deduction for paying those taxes);
Comm'r v. Estate ofShively~ 276 F.2d 372, 373-75 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that
decedent's estate could not deduct full date-of-death value of spousal support
obligations because ex-wife re-married before estate filed return); Jacobs, 34 F.2d
at 235-36 (holding that husband's estate could not deduct amount ofclaim against
it arising from antenuptial agreement as a result of wife's waiver of claim after
husband's death); Estate of Kyle v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 829, 848-51 (1990)
(disallowing estate's deduction for date-of-death value of litigation claim against
it because case was resolved in estate's favor six years after decedent's death);
Estate ofHagmann v. Comm'r, 60 T.e. 465, 466-69 (1973) (refusing to allow estate
to deduct valid claims against it because creditors never filed those claims after
decedent's death), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974). II Although these
courts have offered a variety of reasons why Ithaca Trust should be limited to
charitable bequests, three recurring themes emerge.
One explanation for not extending Ithaca Trust to claims against the estate is that
the congressional purpose underlying that deduction is different from that of
deductions for charitable bequests. According to this rationale, the date-of-death
valuation rule does not apply to section 2053(a)(3) because the purpose of that
deduction is to appraise the decedent's actual net worth at death, while the purpose
of section 2055 is to encourage charitable bequests by ensuring that if a testator
makes a charitable gift in a prescribed form, a deduction will be allowed in a
specified amount. See, e.g., Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1162 (tlthere is no legislative
interest behind the section 2053(a)(3) deduction in encouraging claims against the
estate in the same way that date-of-death valuation encourages charitable
bequests").
Another justification for not applying Ithaca Trust to section 2053(a)(3) is based
on the other deductions in the section. This approach places heavy reliance on the
fact that section 2053(a) allows a deduction not only for claims against the estate
but also for funeral and estate administration expenses. Under this view, since these
expenses are calculated after death, Congress must also have intended that claims
against the estate be ascertained by post- mortem events. See, e.g.~ Jacobs, 34 F.2d
at 236 ("funeral expenses, administration expenses, and claims against the estate,
under this paragraph, were intended by Congress to be detennined in the course of
an orderly administration of the estate").
*****
Sound policy reasons support our adoption ofthe date-of- death valuation principle
for section 2053(a)(3) deductions. Specifically, this principle provides a bright line
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rule which alleviates the uncertainty and delay in estate administration which may
result if events occurring months or even years after a decedent's death could be
considered in valuing a claim against the estate. See Appellant's Opening B". at 22
(ttThis uncertainty would make estate administrators -- who are personally liable
for the estate tax -- more reluctant to satisfy estate obligations and distribute estate
assets.tt); Robert C. Jones, Note, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate
and Events Subsequent to Date ofDeath, 22 V.C.L.A. L. Rev. 654,680 (1975) (ttA
large part of the delay involved in the probate of estates is attributable to a final
determination oftax liabilities.... [A]Uowing postmortem events occurring dwing
the administration of the estate to govem~ contributes to probate delay. tt). Our
holding resolves theseproblems by bringing morecertainty to estate administration,
an ideal which has long been promoted by judge and commentator alike. See
Shively, 276 F.2d at 376 (Moore, J., dissenting) (ttIn the field of estate tax law it
is particularly important that there be as much certainty as possible.tt); Jones~ Estate
and Income Tax, supra, at 681 (ttthe current approach to timing the valuation of
claims must be made more certain and consistenttt ).
IRS has non-acquiesced in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'g, 108 T.C.
412 (1997), cited above in McMorris, and distinguished. The conflict in the circuits may require a Supreme Court
resolution. The IRS notice states:
Decedent died on November 16, 1990. At her death, Exxon had a claim against the
estate that was being adjudicated in a United States District Court. In February
1991, the court ruled in favor of Exxon and referred the case to a Special Master
to detennine the amount of the liability. In April 1991, Exxon presented to the
estate its $2,482,719 damages calculation. The executors deducted that amount on
the estate tax return, which was filed in July 1991. On February 10, 1992, the estate
settled the claim for $681,840 and paid this amount on or about March 10, 1992.
The Commissioner determined that the estate was only entitled to a deduction for
the amount actually paid, and the estate filed a petition in the United States Tax
Court.
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination that the claim against the
estate should be limited to the amount actually paid. The Tax Court held that,
U[w]here a claim is disputed, contingent, or uncertain as of the date of the
decedent's death, the estate is not entitled to a deduction until the claim is resolved
and it is determined what amount, if any, will be paid. It is this latter amount that
is allowed as a deduction~tI 108 T.C. at 419.
The United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
amount deductible was the fair market value of the claim on the date of death,
rather than the amount paid to settle the claim as argued by the government, or the
full amount of the claim as argued by the estate. The Fifth Circuit relied on the
decision in Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929). In that case,
the Supreme Court concluded that a post-death event (the premature death of the
life tenant of a charitable remainder trust) should not be taken into account in
determining the amount of the charitable deduction allowable under the
predecessor to section 2055. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court
to detennine the value of the claim at the date ofdeath with the instruction that the
court was "neither to admit nor consider evidence ofpost-death occurrences when
determining the date-of-death value of Exxon's claim.tt 198 F.3d at 526.
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y'~ disagree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and conclusion. Because the section
2055 deduction involves different concerns, we do not believe that Ithaca Trust
precludes consideration ofpost-death events in determining the amount deductible
under section 2053 for claims against the estate. The Fifth Circuit's reliance on
Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, (9th Cir. 1982), and Estate ofVan Home
v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), affg, 78 T.C. 728, 734 (1982),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984) was also misplaced. Propstra and Van Home
involved claims that were certain and enforceable at death, and in both cases, the
Ninth Circuit limited its holding to "certain and enforceable" claims, noting that
"[t]he law is clear that post-death events are relevant when computing the
deduction to be taken for disputed or contingent claims." Propstra, 680 F.2d at
1253.
Every court, except the Fifth Circuit, that has addressed the section 2053(a)(3)
issue where the claim is contest~ contingent, or unenforceable on the date of
death, has considered post-death events in determining the allowable deduction.
Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.1963), affg sub nom., Taylor v.
Gommissioner, 39 T.C. 371 (1962); Estate ofJacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d233
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929); Estate ofCourtney v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 317 (1974); Estate ofCafaro v. Commissioner, T.C~Memo. 1989~J48. See
also Estate of Van Home, 720 F.2d 1114 and Propstra, 680 F.2d 1248. But cf.,
Commissioner v. Strauss, 77 F.2d 401 (7th eir. 1935).
M. SECTIONS 2056, 2056A AND 2519- MARITAL DEDUCTION
I. Joint Revocable Trust. In a very interesting ruling, PLR 20010102, the Service has determined that
a joint revocable trust works to achieve a double basis step-up. The facts were:
The facts and representations submitted are summarized as follows: Grantor A and
Grantor B,who are husband and wife, propose to create a joint trust ("Trust").
Grantor A will be the initial trustee of Trust. The Grantors will fund Trust with
assets that they own as tenants by the entireties having a value ofapproximately $x.
Under the terms of Trust, during the joint lives of the Grantors, the trustee may
apply income and principal ofTrust as the trustee deems advisable for the comfort,
support, maintenance, health and general welfare ofthe Grantors. The trustee may
also pay additional sums to·either or both of the Grantors or to a third person for
the benefit of either or both Grantors as Grantor A directs, or if he is not capable
of this decision, then as Grantor B directs. While both Grantors are living, either
one may tenninate Trust by written notice to the other Grantor. If Trust is
tenninated, the trustee will deliver the trust property to the Grantors in both their
names as tenants in common. Either Grantor may also amend the trust while both
grantors are living by delivering to the other Grantor the amendment in writing at
least 90 days before the effective date of the amendment
Upon the death of the first Grantor to die, he or she possesses a testamentary
general power ofappointment, exercisable alone and in all events, to appoint part
or all of the assets ofTrust, free of trust, to such deceased Grantor's estate or to or
for the benefit ofone or more persons or entities, in such proportions, outright, in
trust, or otherwise as the deceased Grantor may direct in his or her will.
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If the first Grantor to die fails to fully exercise his or her testamentary general
power of appointment, and providing the surviving Grantor survives the frrst
Grantor to die by at least six months, an amount of Trust property sufficient to
equal the largest amount that can pass free of federal estate tax by reason of the
unified credit, is to be transferred to an irrevocable Credit Shelter Trust. Any
amount in excess of the amount needed to fully fund the Credit Shelter Trust that
has not been appointed by the deceased Grantor will pass outright to the surviving
Grantor.
The rulings were:
RULING #1. Grantor A and Grantor B propose to transfer property held as tenants
by the entireties to Trust. The Grantors will each retain the power to terminate
Trust by written notice to the other Grantor. IfTrust is tenninated, the trustee will
deliver the trust property to the Grantors in both their names as tenants in common.
We conclude that the initial contribution of assets to Trust as proposed will not
constitute a completedgift by eitherGrantor under section 25.2511-2(c), since each
will retain the right, exercisable unilaterally, to revoke their respective transfer, and
revest title in themselves.
~ULING #2. Ifeither Grantor exercises the right to tenninate Trust, each Grantor
will receive an undivided 50% interest in the remaining balance of the Trust
corpus, as a tenant in common. Therefore, distributions ofTrust property to either
Grantor during their joint lives will constitute a gift by the other Grantor to the
extent of500~ ofthe value ofTrust assets distributed. The gift will qualify for the
gift tax marital deduction under section 2523.
RULING #3 AND #4. Upon the death of the frrst Grantor to die, he or she will
possess a testamentary power exercisable alone and in all events, to appoint part
or all of the assets of the Trust, free of trust, to such deceased Grantor's estate or
to or for the benefit of one or more persons or entities, in such proportions,
outright, in trust, orotherwise as the deceased Grantormay direct in his or her will.
We conclude that, on the death of the frrst Grantor to die, the portion of the Trust
property attributable to the property the deceased Grantor transferred to Trust will
be includible in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under section 2038. The
balance of the property attributable to the property the surviving Grantor
contributed to Trust will be includible in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under
section 2041.
Further, on the death ofthe frrst deceasing Grantor, the surviving Grantor is treated
as relinquishing his or her dominion and control over the surviving Grantor's one-
half interest in Trust. Accordingly, on the death ofthe frrst deceasing Grantor, the
surviving Grantor will make a completed gift under section 2501 of the surviving
Grantor's entire interest in Trust. This gift will qualify for the marital deduction
under section 2523.
In addition, section 1014(e) will apply to any Trust property includible in the
deceased Grantor's gross estate that is attributable to the surviving Grantor's
contribution to Trust and that is acquired by the surviving Grantor, either directly
or indirectly, pursuant to the deceased Grantor's exercise, or failure to exercise, the
general power ofappointment. See, H.R. Rept. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (July
24, 1981).
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RULINGS #5 AND #6. As discussed above, the surviving Grantor is treated as
making a completed gift of his or her interest in Trust on the death of the fIrSt
deceasing Grantor. Also, as discussed above, a portion of the Trust property will
be subject to inclusion in the deceased Grantor's gross estate under section 2038,
and a portion will be subject to inclusion under section 2041. Accordingly, to the
extent the Credit Shelter Trust is funded, property passing to the trust is treated as
passing from the deceased Grantor, and not from the surviving Grantor.
The fIrSt ruling is the crucial one -- that there was no gift when the trust was funded.
In PLR 200210051 spouses created a trust and funded it, both with joint and individual assets. The ruling
described the trust as follows:
Article VI of Trust provides that the Trust may be altered or amended by either
Donor with the consent ofthe trustee(s) while both Husband and Wife are living.
Article VI further provides that during the joint lives of Husband and Wife, the
Trust may be revoked by either ofthe Donors, in whole or in part, and the trustee(s)
shall, if so directed, transfer and convey in accordance with the direction of the
Donors, any or all of the Trust property then held. Upon the death of either
Husband or Wife, the Trust will become irrevocable.
Article XVIII provides that during the joint lives ofthe Donors, the trustee(s) shall
pay all of the net income to the Donors, unless the Donors request in writing that
a portion ofsuch income be added to the principal. Article XVIII further provides
that the trustee(s) shall pay to the Donors, or in accordance with their instructions,
so much of the principal as the Donors, or either Donor, may request.
Article XIX provides for division ofTrust upon the death ofthe frrst ofthe Donors
to die.
Article XIX, Paragraph A provides that an amount of Trust property equal to the
maximum marital deduction allowable to the deceased spouse's gross estate
reduced by the amount necessary to create the largest taxable estate,-which after
utilizing the Unified credit, will result in no tax due is to be transferred to a Marital
Trust. During the life of the surviving spouse, the trustee(s) shall pay the net
income to the surviving spouse atleast quarter-annually, and such amounts of
principal as the surviving spouse may direct. Upon the death of the surviving
spouse, the trustee(s) shall pay over any remaining principal to such persons that
the surviving spouse shall appoint by his or her Last Will.
Article XIX, Paragraph B provides that the remaining balance ofTrust property is
to be placed in a Family Trust. During the life of the surviving spouse, the
trustee(s) is to pay all the net income to the surviving spouse. The trustee(s) may
also pay so much principal allocated to the Family Trust to or for the benefit of
surviving spouse and the issue of both Donors, as the trustee(s) shall deem
advisable for their health, support, maintenance, or education. Upon the death of
the surviving spouse, the remaining income and principal in the Family Trust shall
be distributed to the Donorts living issue per stirpes.
Article XXVII ofTrust provides that the following persons will act as trustee(s) in
the following order of succession: .1) Husband and Wife shall act as co-trustees
during their joint lives, 2) the surviving Donor, 3) the living children ofthe Donors
jointly or the survivor(s) ofDonors' children, 4) trustee(s) chosen by a majority of
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the beneficiaries, and 5) additional or successor trustees may be appointed by the
trustees then serving.
The Service granted the following rulings:
1. The value of the entire Trust will be includible in the gross estate of the first
spouse to die.
2. On the death of the frrst spouse, the surviving spouse will be treated as making
a gift that qualifies for the marital deduction to the deceased spouse with respect
to the portion of the Trust property that is attributable to the surviving spouse's
contributions to the Trust.
3~ To the extent that the Family Trust is funded, any portion of the property that
passes to the Family Trust that originated with the surviving spouse will not
constitute a gift by such spouse.
4. Future payments from the Family Trust to beneficiaries other than the surviving
spouse will not constitute a gift from the surviving spouse to these beneficiaries,
and none of the property attributable to the surviving spouse held in the Family
~rust will be includible in the estate of the surviving spouse.
With respect to the second and third rulings, the Service stated:
In this case, the surviving Donor will relinquish dominion and control over his or
her interests in the Trust property on the death of the fIrSt Donor. Accordingly, on
the death ofthe frrst Donor, the surviving Donor will make a completed gift under
section 2501 ofthe surviving Donor's entire interest in Trust. This gift will qualify
for the marital deduction under section 2523.
***
As discussed above, the surviving Donor is treated as making a completed gift of
his or her interest in Trust on the death of the first deceasing Donor. Also, as
discussed above, a portion of Trust property will be subject to inclusion in the
deceased Donor's gross estate under section 2038, and a portion will be subject to
inclusion under section 2041. Accordingly, to the extent the Family Trust is
funded, property passing to the Family Trust is treated as passing from the
deceased Donor, and not from the surviving Donor.
2. Division of Trust for Section 2519 Purposes. PLR 200116006 determined that where a spouse
renounced the income interest in a part ofa QTIP trust that had been divided, the spouse would not be treated as having
disposed of an income interest under section 2519 in the other part of the trust. See also PLR 200137022. Where
section 2519 does apply the IRS ruling position is that the gift tax is calculated on a net gift basis. See, e.g., 200022031.
N. SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
1. Reciprocal Gifts. In Estate of Robert V. Schuler v. Commissioner, _
(2002),the Eighth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's extensionofthe reciprocal gift doctrine to transfers ofdifferent assets.
The facts were:
Two brothers, Robert Schuler (Robert) and George Schuler, Jr. (George), owned
interests in two family operated companies -Minn- Kota Ag Products, Inc. (Minn-
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Kota) and Sigco Sunplant, Inc. (Sigco). Prior to the stock transfers at issue,
George's son, Jody, owned all Minn-Kota Class A voting common stock, and
Robert's son, Jay, George, and Jody owned all the restricted Class B common
stock. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George.
Before Robert's death, he and George had discussed with their insurance agent their
desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The brothers told their
insurance agent they wanted Robert's family to control Sigco and George's family
to control Minn-Kota. Together, with assistance from the insurance agent, Robert
and George devised two three-step plans to transfer divided ownership of Minn-
Kota and Sigco to each other's family and to employ section 2503(b) ofthe Internal
Revenue Code to exclude the transfers from estate taxes.
The first step for gaining family control of Sigco required Robert and his wife to
make joint gifts of Sigco stock equal to approximately $20,000 each to their
children, their spouses and grandchildren and to lody, his wife and son during
December 1994 and January 1995. The second step required George and his wife
to makejoint transfers ofstock equal to approximately $20,000 to each ofRobert's
children and their spouses. The third step required several of Robert's children to
~sfer their shares to four siblings, including Jay and his children.
Similarly, the flfSt step for gaining family control of Minn-Kota required George
and his wife to make joint gifts of Minn- Kota stock valued at approximately
$20,000 to each oftheir children and grandchildren in December 1994 and January
1995. The second step required Robert and his wife to transfer approximately
$20,000 ofMinn-Kota stock each to George, his wife and their children. The third
step required some ofGeorge's children and their spouses to transfer stock valued
at approximately $10,000 each to Jody, his wife, and their children.
Between December 1994 and January 1995, Robert transferred stock valued at
$440,467.20 to George's family, and George transferred stock valued at $382,1"40
to Robert's family. After these stock transfers, Robert's family owned nearly 80
percent ofSigco, George's family owned nearly 68 percentofMinn-Kota, and Jody
retained ownership of all Minn-Kota voting common stock.
Robert and George separately filed Fonn 709s2 for the years 1994 ~d 1995. On
both Form 709s Robert and his wife claimed twelve gift tax exclusions for gifts
made to George's family along with additional exclusions for gifts made to their
own family members. On both Form 709s George and his wife claimed nine gift
tax exclusions.for gifts made to Robert's family along with additional exclusions
for gifts made to their own family members.
In October 1995, Robert died. His sons, Jay and Thomas Schuler, filed a Fonn 7063
excluding gifts of Sigco and Minn-Kota stock made in 1994 and 1995 from their
deceased father's taxable gifts. Thereafter, on December 18, 1996, January 2, 1997,
and January 2, 1998, George and his wife made transfers ofMinn-Kota stock, each
valued at $19,926, to Robert's son, Jay. The aggregate value of these three
subsequent stock transfers totaled $59,778, which, when added to the value of
George's 1994-95 stock transfers, amounted to $441,918, orjust $1,451 more than
the value of stock Robert had transferred to George's family in 1994 and 1995.
The opinion states:
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We have jurisdiction over appeals from the tax court pursuant to 26 U. S. c. §§
7482. We review the tax court's factual fmdings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Bean v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2001).
ItWhethera transaction lacks economic substance, and whether several transactions
should be considered integrated steps of a single transaction, are both fact
questions which we review for clear error. f ' Sather v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d
1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
For purposes of this appeal, we must detennine whether the gifts at issue, similar
stock transfers made by Robert and George to each other's children, were reciprocal
cross gifts, that is, indirect gifts to each donor's own children. In doing so, we are
guided by our recent decision in Sather. Id. at 1173-76 (applying the reciprocal
trust doctrine4 in a gift tax context to determine the economic substance of gift
transfers).
We explained in Sather that the reciprocal trust doctrine is a variation of the
substance over fonn concept which developed in the trust context "to prevent
taxpayers from transferring similar property in trust to each other as life tenants,
thus removing the property from the settlor's estate and avoiding estate taxes, while
receiving identical property for their lifetime enjoyment that would likewise not be
mcluded in their estate.tt Id. at 1173 (citing Estate ofGrace, 395 U. S. at 320). The
application ofthe reciprocal trust doctrine is not limited only toidentifying the true
transferor or transferee, but also applies to detennining the nature of the property
transferred. Sather, 251 F.3d at 1174. The doctrine applies to multiple transactions
which are interrelated and which, "to the extent of mutual value, leave . . . the
settlors in approximately the same economic position as they would have been in
had they created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries.,t Id. at 1173-74
(quoting Estate ofGrace, 395 U. S. at 324).
Applying these trust principles to gifts in Sather, we ruled the gifts were part ofa
jointly designed and executed plan devised for the purpose· of benefitting each
brother's own children. Id. at 1174-75. The Sather case involved three brothers,
each ofwhom had three children. The Sather brothers made identical gifts ofstock
in a family-owned corporation on the same date to each of their children and to
each oftheir six nieces and nephews for a total ofnine gifts. A fourth, unmarried
brother also made identical gifts of stock on the same date to his nine nieces and
nephews. Id. at 1170-71.
Subsequent to the stock transfers, each child (transferee) was left in the same
economic position as ifhis father had given the stock directly to him. Id. at 1174-
75. We deemed as immaterial the fact that the brothers circuitously routed the gifts
to their own children through their nieces and nephews, and we upheld the tax
court's ruling that each brother was entitled to only three annual exclusions. We
also concluded that the result was not affected by the fact the fourth, unmarried
brother had made gifts of stock to his nieces and nephews which resulted in a net
decrease in his economic value. The effect of uncrossing the reciprocal transfers
left each ofthe transferors (except the unmarried brother) with children in the same
economic position as if he had made stock transfers only to his own children. Id.
at 1175.
Applying the reciprocal trust doctrine to this case, we cannot say the tax court was
clearly erroneous in fmding the gifts ofstocks were interrelated. Robert andGeorge
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Schuler jointly sought the advice of their insurance agent on how to have their
children succeed them in the family-owned businesses. With their insurance agent's
assistance, they devised a plan whereby Robert's family would increase its interest
in Sigco while George's family would increase its interest in Minn-Kota. The 1994
and 1995 reciprocal transfers of stock were identical in type and amount and
occurred on the same days. Similar to the Sather brothers, the Schuler brothers
received no direct economic benefit from the stock transfers, but they received an
economic benefit indirectly by benefitting their children as successors to the
family-controlled businesses.
The Schulers contendtheir case is distinguishable from Estate ofGrace and Sather,
inter alia, because those cases involved transfers ofidentical property. In contrast,
Schulers argue this case involves transfers of stock in two distinct companies
whose assets, businesses, and management are different. We fmd such distinctions
immaterial. Certainly, the three-part plans jointly executed in this case were more
complicated than the transfers in Sather. However, the net effect was the same -
simultaneous cross transfers ofstock amounting to transfers ofeach brother's stock
to his own children.
Nor are we persuaded the tax court was clearly wrong in fmding inter-relatedness
when Robert and George had a business purpose in separating the ownership ofthe
two businesses between the children of the two Schuler families. Intrafamily
transfers demand close scrutiny "precisely because the genuineness of the
transaction cannot reasonably be inferred" from assurances of business purpose.
Kincaidv. United States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fehrs v.
United States, 620 F.2d 255, 260 (Ct. CI. 1980». In this case, the tax court flatly
rejected the assertion that business purpose was the primary motivation for making
the reciprocal stock transfers. Instead, the tax court reached the "inescapable
conclusion that decedent and his brother made the circuitous transfers for the
primary purpose ofincreasing the number ofexclusions under section 2503(b) that
otherwise would have been available to them."
After uncrossing the gifts to discern the taxability ofthe transactions, the tax court
found Robert's children received stock from George of approximately the same
economic value as they would have received by direct transfers from Robert. The
tax court rested its fmding on the fact that the difference in the value of the 1994
and 1995 cross stock transfers, which amounted to $58,327.20, was all but
eliminated by George's transfers of stock valued at $59,778 to Robert's son in the
three years following Robert's death.
The Schulers contend the tax court ignored the substantial changes in ownership
and control that resulted from the reciprocal transfers. After the stock transfers, the
Schulers claim Robert's family interest in Sigco increased from 75 percent to 80
percent.s In analyzing the effect ofthe stock transfers, the tax court recognized the
stock transfers resulted in a small shift in Sigco ownership from 75 percent to
almost 80 percent. Before the transfers, Robert owned 25 percent ofSigco shares
outstanding and his son, Jay, owned 50 percent; together they owned a 75 percent
majority. Before and after the transfers, George's son, Jody, owed 100 percent of
the Minn-Kota voting stock. Thus, the tax court found that acquiring control ofthe
family business was not the purpose of the transfers.
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2. Relation-Back Doesn't Apoly to Non-Charitable Gifts. In Robert Rosana v. United States, 87
AFTR2d Par. 2001-766 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the relation-back
doctrine does not apply to non-charitable gifts:
Other courts have refused to apply the doctrine when the decedent died prior to
payment ofanon-charitable gift. McCarthy v. United States, 806 F.2d 129, 131-33
(7th Cir. 1986); Newman v. Commissioner, III T.C. 81 (1998). In McCarthy, the
court offered two reasons for its refusal to extend the doctrine of relation-back.
First, a rationale for applying the doctrine in the charitable context was not present
in the non-charitable context. Checks delivered by the decedent to a charity but not
paid until after the decedent's death, if included in the estate, would generate a
deduction for the estate. This deduction would result in a "wash" for estate tax
purposes, meaning that the estate would obtain the benefit of the charitable
deduction whether or not the doctrine ofrelation- back was applied. For practical
purposes, it makes more sense to consider the checks as outside the estate. "No
such practical considerationextends to noncharitablegifts. No offsettingdeduction
exists for gifts made to noncharitable donees." McCarthy, 806 F.2d at 132. Second,
the court thought that extending the doctrine would allow for improper tax
avoidance: "By issuing a check to a noncharitable donee with the understanding
that it not be cashed until after his death, a decedent may effectively bequest up to
$10,000 per donee, thus avoiding the estate tax consequences normally attending
such transactions." Id. Accord Metzger, 38 F.3d at 122.
We agree with the policy concerns expressed by the McCarthy and Metzger courts.
Thus, we will not apply the doctrine where gifts are made to a non-charitable donee
and the donor died prior·to the date of payment. We express no opinion as to
whether we would apply the doctrine where there is a non-charitable donee and the
donor is alive on the date of payment.
3. Effect of Defined Value Clauses. In FSA 200122011 a family limited partnership was formed
between parents and sons. Parents then transferred limited interests to the sons, trusts for the sons, and charities
pursuant to a transfer document that·allocated certain specific dollar amounts to the sons and trusts with the charities
receiving the remainder. The sons bought out the charities six months later. The interests were appraised when the
charities received the interests ~ndwere bought out. In the buy-out the charities acknowledged payment in full for their
interests.
The IRS audited, adjusted the value ofthe gifts and denied an increase in the charitable deduction. The Service
had three theories. First, that the step-transaction doctrine made the charities' right to receive increased value illusory.
Second, that the buy-out cut-offthe charities' rights so they would not actually receive any increase in value if the IRS
audited. Third, that the clause's primary purposes was to defeat the gift tax and thus it violated public policy, relying
on the doctrine of Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
Ifthe transfer to charity had been pursuant to a directive in a trust, the Service's argument would appear to be
weaker. Such a clause might state:
Upon receipt of assets by gift in 1998, Trustee will allocate the frrst $ _
to the trust administered by Article _ and will allocate any additional assets to the
WORTHY CHARITY, INC., to be added to the Mr. and Mrs. Donor fund created
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thereunder (or, if such organization is not in existence or is not described in
sections 170(b)(I)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a) ofthe Internal Revenue Code,
at ~uch time to another organization which is so described selected by Trustee
within 60 days of such allocation). The allocation will be made as a fractional
share of all assets added to the Trust by gift and Trustee may make a preliminary
allocation with subsequent adjustment if desirable.
4. Crummey Trusts and Split-Gifts. In PLR 200130030, the wife created a Crummey trust in which
husband was trustee and husband plus wife's children were beneficiaries. the ruling describes the dispositive provisions
of the trust as follows:
Under Article 4 ofTrust, the trustee has the discretion to distribute to Husband as
much of the trust income and principal as the trustee deems necessary for
Husband's "healthand maintenance in reasonable comfort. It The trustee also has the
discretion to make discretionary distributions of income and principal to Wife's
descendants for their "health, education (including, but not limited to, primary,
secondary, vocational, collegiate and postgraduate, which may include room,
board, tuition and books), and maintenance in reasonable comfort. tt The trustee is
prohibited from making any distribution that would have the effect ofdischarging
a legal obligation of Wife or Husband. Any discretionary distributions made by
Husband, serving in the capacity as trustee, to himselfmust be made in a fiduciary
capacity. The trust will tenninate upon the death ofthe last to die of Husband and
Wife, provided all the children of Husband and Wife are over 25 at that time.
Husband has the testamentary power to appoint the corpus to one or more
descendant of Wife but, if he fails to do so, the trust will be separated into three
equal shares, one for each of Child I, Child 2, and Child 3 (or the issue of any
predeceased child). The shares are to be held in separate trusts. Each child will
receive, in the trustee's discretion, distributions for that child's "health, maintenance
in reasonable comfort and education." Each child has a testamentary special power
to appoint the corpus of their respective trust to one or more descendants of Wife
(other than that child). Any trust corpus not appointed by the child will pass in trust
for the benefit of that child's descendants under similar dispositive provisions.
The ruling states that wife may make a gift to the trust and split it with husband for gift tax purposes, which
each being a transferor ofhalf the gift for GST purposes. (See also TAM 200147021 which detennined that splitting
gifts for gift tax purposes requires splitting gifts for GST purposes.) The trust assets will not be included in either
spouses' estate:
In the present case, it is represented that only Wife will transfer property to Trust.
Although Wife and Husband will consent under section 2513 to treat the gifts to
Trust made by Wife as if made one-half by Wife and one-half by Husband, Wife
will be treated as the transferor ofthe entire value ofthe gifts to Trust for purposes
of sections 2036 through 2038. Sections 2036 through 2038 do not apply to
property interests that the decedent did not actually own and thus did not transfer.
Accordingly, assuming only Wife makes transfers to Trust, Husband will not be the
transferor of property to Trust for purposes of sections 2036 through 2038.
Therefore, no portion of the value of Trust will be includible in Husband's gross
estate under sections 2036 through 2038. See Rev. Rut 82-198, 1982-2 C.B. 206;
Rev. Rut. 74-556,1974-2 C.B. 300; Rev. Rut. 54-246,1954-1 C.B. 179.
Husband's power, set forth in Article 4 ofTrust, to make discretionary distributions
to himselfof as much of the trust income and principal as he deems necessary for
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his own "health and maintenance in reasonable comfort" is limited by an
ascertainable standard relating to Husband's health, maintenance and support. In
addition, Husband, in the capacity as Trustee~ is prohibited from making any
distribution that would have the effect of discharging any legal obligations. In
addition, the Husband's testamentary power to appoint the corpus to one or more
descendant of Wife is not a power that is exercisable in favor of Husband, his
estate, Husbandfs creditors, or the creditors ofhis estate. Consequently~ Husband's
power, exercisable in his capacity as trustee of Trust, to make discretionary
distributions to himselfor for his benefit and Husband's testamentary power are not
general powers of appointment over the income or corpus of Trust. Accordingly,
upon Husband's death, no portion of the value of Trust will be includible in
Husband's gross estate under section 2041(a)(2).
5. LLC Gifts as Gifts ofaPresent Interest. In a very important case, Christine M. Hackl, et vir v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. __ (2002), the Tax C0ut1 held that LLC gifts were not gifts of a present interest that
qualified for the annual exclusion. The case has been appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The opinion sets forth its
understanding ofthe law regarding present interests:
For example, in Fondren v. Commissioner, supra at 20-21, the Court explains the
meaning of future versus present interest in general terms, stating:
it is not enough to bring the exclusion into force that the donee has vested
rights. In addition he must have the right presently to use, possess or
enjoy the property. These tenns are not words ofart, like "fee" in the law
of seizin * * *, but connote the right to substantial present economic
benefit. The question is oftime, not when title vests, but when enjoyment
begins. Whatever puts the barrier ofa substantial period between the will
of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and
that enjoyment makes the gift one ofa future interest within the meaning
ofthe regulation.
The Court thus says that the terms "use, possess or enjoy" connote the right to
substantial present economic benefit. This phraseology is broad and is in no way
limited to the factual context presented. It defmes the root words ofthe regulatory
standard which no party disputes is a generally applicable and valid interpretation
ofsection 2503(b). See sec. 25.2503-3, Gift Tax Regs. We therefore would be hard
pressed to construe ttuse, possession, or enjoyment" as meaning something
different or less than substantial present economic benefit simply because ofa shift
in the factual scenario or form of gift to which the test is being applied.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that section 2503(b), regardless of whether a gift is
direct or indirect, is concerned with and requires meaningful economic, rather than
merely paper, rights.
Furthermore, this idea is buttressed by recognition that in an earlier case we quoted
the very language from Fondren v. Commissioner, supra, set forth above in a
context that involved outright gifts. In Estate ofHolland v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1997-302, we quoted the Fondren text en route to concluding that outright
gifts in the form of $10,000 checks, which had been properly endorsed and
deposited, were gifts of a present interest.
In a similar vein, previous caselaw from this Court reveals that the principles
established in United States v. Pelzer, supra at 403-404, and Ryerson v. United
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States, supra at 408, regarding contingency and joint action are not restricted in
their applicability to indirect gift situations. In Skouras v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.
523, 524-525 (1950), affd. 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951), the taxpayer assigned
outright all incidents ofownership in several insurance policies on his life to his
five childrenjointly and continued to pay the premiums thereon. Given these facts,
we, citing United States v. Pelzer, supra, stated broadly that ftwhere the use,
possession, or enjoyment .of the donee is postponed to the happening of future
uncertain events the interest ofthe donee is a future interest within the meaning of
the statute." Id. at 533. Then, relying on Ryerson v. United States, supra, and in
spite of the taxpayer's argument that "there was not a grant to trust as in the
Ryerson case", we ruled that the taxpayer, by "making the assignments to his five
children jointly, had postponed the possession and enjoyment of the rights and
interests in and to the policies or the proceeds thereof until his death or until such
time as the children, actingjointly, might change or negative the action he had thus
taken." Id. at 534.
In sum, we reject petitioners' contention that when a gift takes the fonn of an
outright transfer ofan equity interest in a business or property, UNo further analysis
is needed or justified." To do so would be to sanction exclusions for gifts based
purely on conveyancing form without probing whether the donees in fact received
fIghts differing in any meaningful way from those that would have flowed from a
traditional trust arrangement.
Petitioners' advocated approach could also lead to situations where gift tax
consequences turned entirely upon distinctions in the ordering of transactions,
rather than in their substance. For example, while petitioners contributed property
to an LLC and then gifted ownership units to their children and grandchildren, a
similar result could have been achieved by fIrst transferring ownership units and
then making contributions. to the entity. Yet petitioners would apparently have us
decide that the latter scenario falls within the rubric ofestablished precedent while
the former is independent thereof. We decline to take such an artificial view.
We are equally unconvinced by petitioners' attempts to avoid the principles
discussed above with the assertion that the postponement question deals with rights
to present use, possession or enjoyment of the transferred property, not the
likelihood of the actual use, possession, or enjoyment of the property. See, Estate
ofCristofaniv. Comm'r, 97T.C. 74(1991); Crummeyv. Comm'r, 397F.2d82(9th
Cir. 1968); Kieckhefer v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951); Gilmore v.
Comm'r, 213 F.2d 520, 522 (6th eire 1954) * * *
Each ofthe above-cited cases involved trusts in which beneficiaries were given an
absolute right to demand distributions and have not been interpreted to establish a
rule inconsistent with those enunciated by the Supreme Court. See Rassas v.
Commissioner, 196 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1952) (distinguishing Kieckhefer v.
Commissioner, supra), affg. 17 T.C. 160 (1951). Thus, instead of adopting an
approach which would undermine the purpose and integrity ofthe section 2503(b)
exclusion, we for the reasons explained above conclude that petitioners are not by
virtue of making outright gifts relieved of showing that such gifts in actuality
involved rights consistent with the standards for a present interest set forth in
regulations and existing caselaw.
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To recapitulate then, the referenced authorities require a taxpayer claiming an
annual exclusion to establish that the transfer in dispute conferred on the donee an
unrestricted and noncontingent right to the immediate use, possession, or
enjoyment (1) of property or (2) of income from property, both of which
alternatives in turn demand that such immediate use, possession, or enjoyment be
ofa nature that substantial economic benefit is derived therefrom. In other words,
petitioners must prove from all the facts and circumstances that in receiving the
Treeco units, the donees thereby obtained use, possession, or enjoyment of the
units or income from the units within the above-described meaning of section
2503(b).
The interests given were LLC interests in Treeco which owned land and a tree-farming business. The Tax
Court concluded the donees received insignificant rights:
Beginning with the property itself, we reiterate that the donees in these cases did
receive, at least in the sense of title, outright possession of the Treeco units.
Nonetheless, as previously explained, the simple expedient ofpaper title does not
in and of itselfcreate a present interest for purposes of section 2503(b) unless all
the facts and circumstances establish that such possession renders an economic
benefit presently reachable by the donees. It therefore is incumbent upon
petitioners to show the present (not postponed) economic benefit imparted to the
donees as a consequence of their receipt of the Treeco units.
In considering this issue, we fIrst address the role of the Treeco Operating
Agreement in our analysis. Petitioners state that each gifted Treeco unit
"represented a significant bundle of legal rights in the venture, rights which are
defined by the Operating Agreement, Treeco's Articles of Organization, and
Indiana statutory and common law". At the same time, petitioners aver: "The
postponement question is not concerned with contractual rights inherent in the
transferred property, but rather in whether, in the transfer of the property, the
transferor imposed limitations or restrictions on the present enjoyment of the
property. tt They then go on to quote the language from section 25.2503-3(a), Gift
Tax Regs., which references contractual rights in a bond, note, or insurance policy
that do not result in a future interest characterization. Hence, while petitioners seem
to acknowledge that the Operating Agreement in large part defmes the nature ofthe
property received by the donees, they also apparently would have us ignore any
provisions of the Agreement which limited the ability of the donees to presently
recognize economic value as akin to the contractual rights mentioned in the
regulation.
However, petitionerst reliance on section 25.2503-3(a), Gift Tax Regs., is
misplaced. This Court has previously taken a much narrower view of the cited
regulatory language. In Estate of Vose v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1959-175,
vacated and remanded on another issue 284 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1960), we opined that
the regulations were "designed to cover notes and bonds which, although perhaps
not containing all ofthe attributes ofnegotiable instruments, are at least defmitely
enforceable legal obligations payable on a day certain and immediately disposable
by the obligee. '1 LLC units hardly fall within these parameters, and we observe that
the quoted reasoning is consistent with our focus on requiring some presently
reachable economic benefit.
Furthermore, petitioners' attempts to find in these regulations support for a
distinction between limitations contractually inherent in the transferred property
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and restrictions imposed upon transfer are not well taken. All facts and
circumstances must be examined to detennine whether a gift is ofa present interest
within the meaning ofsection 2503(b), and this will be true only where all involved
rights and restrictions, wherever contained, reveal a presently reachable economic
benefit. Since here the primary source ofsuch rights and restrictions is the Treeco
Operating Agreement, its provisions, in their cumulative entirety, must largely
dictate whether the units at issue conferred the requisite benefit. Accordingly, we
now tum to the Operating Agreement to flesh out the nature ofthe property rights
transferred to the donees at the time oftheir receipt ofthe Treeco units and whether
such rights rose to the level of a present interest on account of either the units
themselves (considered in this section) or the income therefrom (considered in
section IV. C., infra).
Petitioners offer the following summary of the rights inuring to the donees upon
their receipt of the LLC units:
Upon transfer the Donees acquired membership rights and obligations in
the gifted Treeco units which were identical to those which Petitioners
had in the Treeco units they retained, including the rights under the
Treeco Operating Agreement to have all net income or capital gains
allocated, all cash distributions made, and net loss allocated (subject to an
allocation of losses to A.J. Hackl for a period which was designed to
ensure the current deductibility of Treeco losses for federal income tax
purposes) based on the number of units held in relation to the total
number of units, the right to have capital accounts established and
maintained on behalf of each member in the manner provided by Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.704- 1(b)(2)(iv), the right to offer units for sale to Treeco, or to
sell their units to third parties (subject to manager approval), the rights
(voting members) to remove the manager, amend Treeco's organizational
documents, dissolve Treeco, approve salaries or bonuses paid to any
manager, etc., all ofwhich rights are entitled to court enforcement. * * *
At the outset, we note thatpetitioners' repeated assertions that the rights conferred
on the donees were identical to those retained by the donors have little bearing on
our analysis. A similar fact did not dissuade us from fmding only a future interest
in Blasdel v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 1014 (1972), and we are satisfied that it
should be given no more weight here.
The taxpayers in Blasdel v. Commissioner, supra at 1015-1016, 1018, created a
trust, named themselves as 2 of the trust's beneficiaries~ and conveyed beneficial
interests to 18 other family members. Although we explicitly observed that "the
donees acquired their fractional beneficial interests subject to the same terms and
limitations as petitioners held theirs", we nonetheless based our decision on the
nature ofthose terms, without regard to any identity of rights between donors and
donees.ld. at 1018- 1020; see also Hamilton v. UnitedStates, 553 F.2d 1216, 1218
(9th Cir. 1977). In addition, given the authority granted here to A.J. Hackl as
manager, we observe that the alleged equality, when viewed from a practical
standpoint, is less than petitioners would have us believe.
Concerning the specific rights granted in the Operating Agreement, we are unable
to conclude that these afforded a substantial economic benefit ofthe type necessary
to qualify for the annual exclusion. While we are aware ofpetitioners' contentions
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and the parties' rather conclusory stipulations that Treeco was a legitimate
operating business entity and that restrictive provisions in the Agreement are
common in closely held enterprises and in the timber industry, such circumstances
(whether or not true) do not alter the criteria for a present interest or excuse the
failure here to meet those criteria.
As we consider potential benefits inuring to the donees from their receipt of the
Treeco units themselves, we fmd that the tennsofthe Treeco Operating Agreement
foreclosed the ability of the donees presently to access any substantial economic
or fmancial benefit that might be represented by the ownership units. For instance,
while an ability on the part of a donee unilaterally to withdraw his or her capital
account might weigh in favor of fmding a present interest, here no such right
existed. According to the Agreement, capital contributions could not be demanded
or received by a member without the manager's consent. Similarly, a member
desiring to withdraw could only offer his or her units for sale to the company; the
manager was then given exclusive authority to accept or reject the offer and to
negotiate terms. Hence some contingency stood between any individual member
and his or her receipt from the company ofeconomic value for units held, either in
the form ofapproval from the current manager or perhaps in the form of removal
of that manager by joint majority action, followed by the appointment of and
approval from a more compliant manager. Likewise, while a dissolution could
entitle members to liquidatingdistributions in proportion to positive capital account
balances, no donee acting alone could effectuate a dissolution.
Moreover, in addition to preventing a donee from unilaterally obtaining the value
of his or her units from the LLC, the Operating Agreement also foreclosed the
avenue of transfer or sale to third parties. The Agreement specified that "No
Member shall be entitled to transfer, assign, convey, sell, encumber or in any way
alienate all or any part of the Member's Interest except with the prior written
consent of the Manager, which consent may be given or withheld, conditioned or
delayed as the Manager may determine inthe Manager's sole discretion." Hence,
to the extent that marketability might be relevant in these circumstances, as
potentially distinguishable on this point from those in indirect gift cases such as
Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d at 977, and Blasdel v. Commissioner, supra at
1021-1022 (both dismissing marketability as insufficient to create a present interest
where the allegedly marketable property, an entity or trust interest, differed from
the underlying gifted property), the Agreement, for all practical purposes, bars
alienation as a means for presently reaching economic value. Transfers subject to
the contingency of manager approval cannot support a present interest
characterizatio~ and the possibility of making sales in violation thereof, to a
transferee who would then have no right to become a member or to participate in
the business, can hardly be seen as a sufficient source of substantial economic
benefit. We therefore conclude that receipt ofthe property itself, the Treeco units,
did not confer upon the donees use, possession, or enjoyment of property within
the meaning ofsection 2503(b).
6. Indirect Gifts Via Partnersbip. In TAM 200212006 the IRS applied a Shepherd based analysis (see
discussion under sections 2701-2704, application to family partnerships) where assets were added to a family
partnership. The facts were:
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On July 1, 1996, Taxpayer transferred a * * * % limited partnership interest in P
to Child 1 and a * **% limited partnership interest to Child 2. I After the transfers,
the partnership interests of Taxpayer, Child 1 and Child 2 were as follows:
Taxpayer
Child I
Child 2
General Partnership
Percentage Interests
%
%
%
%
Limited Partnership
Percentage Interests
%
%
%
%
On * * ., Taxpayer transferred publicly traded municipal bonds valued at $* * *
to P. On a statement attached to the Fonn 709 (United States Gift and (Generation-
skipping Transfer) Tax Return filed by Taxpayer for * * * Taxpayer reported that
she had gifted the securities to P on * * *, and identified Child I and Child 2 as
each * * * having a * * *% limited interest and a * * *% general interest in P. As
reported on the statement, the value of the gift was determined as follows:
Value of gifted securities
Partnership interests not owned
by the Donor
Less: 45% combined discount
based on [Company Xl
report attached hereto
Value of gifts to donees
$
x
$
(
$
%
)
The statement identified Child 1 and Child 2 as the donees. The Company X report
referenced on the statement was prepared in 1996 for the purpose of valuing
Taxpayer's 1996 gifts of P limited partnership interest to Child 1 and Child 2.
Taxpayer's representative maintains that on the partnership books, the amount of
Taxpayer's contribution was initially allocated to Taxpayer's capital account. The
amount contributed was then treated as withdrawn from her capital account and
one-halfofthe contribution was then allocated to each ofthe other partners' capital
accounts. Taxpayer has not submitted any partnership books or records.2 However,
on the * * * Schedule K-I (Form 1065) issued by P to Taxpayer, $* • * is reflected
in Section J (Analysis of Partner's Capital Account) in box (b) as capital
contributed during the year, and in box (c) as a withdrawaVdistribution during the
year. On the * * * Schedule K-l issued to Child 1 and to Trust3, * * * % of this
amount ($* * *) was reflected in Section J, box (b) as capital contributed during the
year.
The TAM concluded:
In the case at hand, Taxpayer transferred the bonds to the P partnership, and the
entire amount of the contribution was allocated to the capital accounts of Child 1
and Child 2. The assets possessed and transferred by Taxpayer were the municipal
bonds. Under §§25.2511-1(h)(1), Shepherd, and the decisions cited above,
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Taxpayer's transfer is properly characterized as an indirect gift of the municipal
bonds to Child 1 and Child 2.
The result would be the same even if Taxpayer's contribution were initially
allocated to Taxpayer's capital account, and then reallocated to the capital accounts
of the other partners. It is well established that where the steps of a donative
transaction have no independent significance, the courts will collapse the individual
steps in detennining the substance ofthe transaction. Heyen v. United States, 945
F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (characterizing a transfer to third party who then
retransferred to son as a transfer to son); Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp.2d
700 (W.O. Tex. 1998) (holding that a transfer to spouse who subsequently
retransferred the property to a child was in substance a transfer to child by the
original transferor); Estate of Bies v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-338
(holding that a mother's transfers to daughters-in-law who immediately
retransferred property to sons were indirect gifts to the sons); Estate ofCidulka v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149 (fmding that a transfer to daughter-in-law
who retransferred to son was in substance a transfer to son by the original
transferor). In this case, the transitory allocation to Taxpayer's capital account, if
such allocation even occurred at all, was merely a step in an integrated transaction
intended to pass Taxpayer's contribution to Child 1and Child 2. Taxpayer's capital
aCcount acted as a conduit for the transfer. Accordingly, the transaction is properly
treated as an immediate allocation to the capital accounts of Child 1 and Child 2.
This treatment is consistent with the substance of the transaction.
The IRS in the TAM refused to allow any discount:
Taxpayer argues that in Shepherd, the court characterized the donor's transfers as
indirect gifts to each of the other partners of undivided 25% interests in the land
and bank stock, and allowed a 15% discount in valuing these interests. Taxpayer
concludes, therefore, that even assuming the transfers in this case are properly
characterized as gifts of municipal bonds to Child 1 and Child 2, at least a 15%
discount should be allowed·in valuing the transferred municipal bonds~
However, the bank stock at issue in Shepherd was closely held stock. It is well
established that in valuing minority interests in closely held stock, valuation
discounts may be appropriate in certain circumstances to reflect the fact that the
shares may not be readily marketable and that the hypothetical willing purchaser
would not be able to control the entity. See Rev. Rul 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
Similarly, the court inShepherdallowed a discount in valuing the fractional interest
in the land to reflect lack ofcontrol, possible disagreement among the owners, and
potential partition costs (considered a "fairly minor factor"). Shepherd v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 401-402. However, the municipal bonds at issue in this
case are readily marketable publicly traded securities that could be easily divided
among the donees. Based on the facts presented, the bonds should be valued in
accordance with §§25.2512-2(b)(1) and no discount is allowable in valuing the
interest in these bonds. See Stinson Estate, supra (decedent's cancellation of
indebtedness constituted a gift ofcash to the other shareholders and therefore under
§§ 25.2511- 2(a) ofthe Gift Tax Regulations the value ofthe property passing from
the donor is the value of the gift without reduction for minority and marketability
discounts).
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o. SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMERS
1. Disclaimer 0(2207A Waiver. In PLR 200127027 the IRS confronted a Will which waived the right
ofdecedent's estate to be reimbw-sed under section 2207A for taxes incurred on account ofQTIP trusts being included
in the estate. The children and grandchildren who would have benefitted desired to disclaim the waiver. The IRS
granted the ruling:
We must address whether the benefit conferred by a waiver of the section 2207A
right of recovery of estate tax attributable to the inclusion of QTIP property in a
gross estate is an interest in property. The nature of legal rights and interests in
property is a matter of state law. It is federal law, however, that determines the
manner in which the rights or interests so created shall be taxed. Morgan v.
Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940); Estate ofBoyd v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d
170, 172 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Pennsylvania disclaimer provisions state that "any interest in, to, or over real
or personal property held or owned outright, or in trust, or in any other manner
which is reserved or given to any person by deed, will, or otherwise" may be
disclaimed. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 6103 (2000); see also 20 Pa. Cons. Stat
section 6203 (2000). One purpose ofthe disclaimer provisions "is to liberalize the
property law requirements for disclaimer[s] so that legitimate attempts to avoid
taxes on unwanted gifts will not be frustrated by property law provisions that are
stricter than those required for tax purposes." 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. sections 6103 et
seq., Official Comment (1976). Thus, Pennsylvania statutory provisions do not
specifically address the question whether the benefit conferred by a decedent's
waiver of the section 2207A right of recovery is an interest in property. Pursuant
to Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1957), therefore, we must determine
what the law of the state is likely to be. If there is no pertinent decision by the
highest court of the state, we apply what we determine to be state law after giving
"proper regard" to relevant rulings of the Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 465.
Although the. Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has not ruled specifically on the
issue of this ruling request, it recognizes that a legatee receiving a bequest free of
state inheritance tax receives an economic benefit. See, e.g., Neamand Estate, 318
A.2d 730, 735 (1974). That court also equates in some instances the receipt of a
tax-free bequest to a debt in the amount of the tax on the bequest. Morell Estate,
318 A.2d 727, 729 (1974). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
addressed an analogous question dealing with Wisconsin state law and a disclaimer
ofa waiver of the benefit conferred by the section 2206 right to recover the estate
tax attributable to inclusion of life insurance proceeds in a gross estate. That court
determined in Estate of Boyd v. Commissioner that the waiver of a section 2206
right of recovery confers an economic benefit because it is an additional bequest
or is analogous to the forgiveness of a debt, and concluded that this benefit
constitutes a property interest that may be disclaimed under section 2518. Supra,
819 F.2d at 173; but see Loeb Estate, 162 A.2d 207, 211 (1960) (recognizing the
economic benefit conferred by a "tax-free" clause but, for purposes of the state
inheritance tax, concluding that the benefit is not an additional bequest).
Our examination of Pennsylvania statutes and their legislative history, together
with relevant Pennsylvania case law, leads us to conclude that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would, if presented with the issue, hold that the benefit conferred
by Decedent's waiver of the section 2207A right of recovery is an interest in
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property. We further conclude that, assuming that the requirements of section
2518(b) and the regulations thereunder will be satisfied as has been represented,
the proposed disclaimers will constitute qualified disclaimers within the meaning
of section 2518.
The result was that more went to a Foundation which increased the estate's charitable deduction:
Pennsylvania law provides, in pertinent part, that a disclaimer shall be binding
upon the disclaimant and all persons claiming through or under him, and that the
disclaimer shall, for purposes of detennining the rights of other parties, be
equivalent to the disclaimant's having died before the decedent. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat.
section 6205(A), (B) (2000). Children and Grandchildren are filing a petition
requesting a determination by Court that the proposed disclaimers, when executed,
will have the effect of increasing the interest received by Foundation. As stated
above, it is represented that Children, as co-trustees of the Marital Trusts, rather
than Foundation, will pay the estate tax attributable to inclusion of the Marital
Trusts in Decedent's gross estate. Ifthe corresponding proposed disclaimers ofthe
benefit conferred by Decedent's waiver ofthe section 2207A right to recover such
estate tax from the Marital Trusts have the effect under Pennsylvania law of
entirely removing such· interests from the Marital Trusts and passing the interests
thereby to Foundation, the resulting increase in the interest received by Foundation
will qualify for a charitable deduction under section 2055(a). See Treas. Reg.
section 20,,2055-2(c)(I).
P. SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
I. Automatic Extension ofTime to File Reverse OTIP Election Does Not Extend Time to Allocate
GST Exemption. PLR 200208018 states that the automatic allocation rules apply.
2. EffectofGPOA on Grandfathered Trust. The generation-skippingtransfer tax enacted on October
22, 1986 does not apply to "any generation-skipping transfer under a trust which was irrevocable on September 24,
1985, but only to the extent that such transfer is not made out ofcorpus added to the trust after September 25, 1985."
§1433(b) ofthe Tax Reform Act of 1986. In E. Norman Peterson Marital Trustv. Commissioner, 78F.3d 795 (2d. Cir.
1996) the Second Circuit considered a case in which the general power ofappointment had lapsed and concluded that
the lapse was an addition to the trust, on the basis of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(I)(u)(A).
In Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th eire 1999), the decedent had exercised the power and the Eighth
Circuit concluded that there was no addition to the trust, and that the trust was irrevocable, thus the GST did not apply.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit has followed Simpson in Robert H. Bachler, et at. V. United States,
__________, (2002). The short opinion states:
The trust for his wife established by the will of Martin H. Wunderlich became
irrevocable with his death on May 20, 1976. No corpus was added after September
25, 1985. His wife exercised the general power ofappointment that she possessed
under his will. The property thereby transferred to her grandchildren exactly meets
the description of a transfer excepted from the GST by §§ 1433(b)(2)(A).
This straightforward reading ofthe statute is disputed by the government. It argues
that §§ 1433(b)(2)(A)" was never intended to provide an exemption from the GST
tax in these circumstances," i.e., where the holder of the general power of
appointment was not locked into a situation where the GST was inescapable. The
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government adds that a general power ofappointment is substantially the same as
outright ownership and so is generally treated as part ofa decedent's estate, while
release of an inter vivos power of appointment is treated as a gift under I.R.C. §§
2514. The government admonishes us to read §§ 1433(b)(2)(A) in context with the
rest of the Internal Revenue Code, as all parts 'of a statute should be read in the
context of the whole statutory scheme, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
More particularly, the government refers to the other two exceptions made in §§
1433(b)(2). One exempts a transfer made by a decedent who could not escape the
1986 tax because he was mentally incompetent at the time of the 1986 laws
enactment. §§ 1433(b)(2)(C). The other exempts a generation-skipping transfer
made under a will executed before the date of the enactment of the tax act, if the
decedent died within two months of the Act's enactment. §§ 1433(b)(2)(B). The
government argues that the narrowness of these exceptions should narrow the
construction of §§ 1433(b)(2)(A).
The government fmds stronger support by way of analogy with E. Norman
Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795 (2d eir. 1996). In this case
Peterson died in 1974, leaving his wife the life beneficiary ofa trust with a general
testamentary power ofappointment and a provision that, ifshe did not exercise the
power, the remainder was to go to the grandchildren. She died in 1987, not having
exercised the power. Seeking to sustain the GST on the transfer to the
grandchildren, the government relied on Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 26.2601-
l(b)(I)(v)(A), which defmed the lapse of a general power of appointment as an
addition of corpus to the trust. Judge Calabresi in a thoughtful opinion sustained
the regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute so that, by the statute's
own terms, the transfer did not qualify as an 'exception. But that case is not ours.
Here nothing was added to the corpus.
Our case, rather, is the same as Simpsonv. United States~-183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir.
1999), where, on facts substantially similar to ours, Judge Richard Arnold ruled
that the exercise ofa general power ofappointment created by a trust was entitled
to the exception explicitly created by §§ 1433(b)(2)(A). The transfer there, as here,
was "under" the trust. The transfer could not have been effected if it had not been
under the trust. The exception in the statute, as Judge Arnold observed, is not for
a transfer which was irrevocable at the time or'enactment of the statute but for a
transfer under a "trust which was irrevocable.tt·Id. at 814. The frrst place tofmd the
purpose ofa statute, as Judge Arnold also remarked, is in its words. Id. The statute
creating the exception, carefully drafted to exclude additions to the trust corpus,
makes no exclusion for the exercise of a general power of appointment. Acting
under the trust created by her husband, Murielle Wunderlich fitted her gifts to her
grandchildren so that they fell within the exact wording of §§ 1433(b)(2)(A).
The Treasury Regulations have been amended since Simpson to try and reverse the result. The Bachler court
specifically stated it was not considering the effect of the new regulations.
3. Transfer ofCLAT Remainder Does Not Shift Transferor. In PLR 200107015 the question was
whether the transfer ofa remainder interest in a CLAT by a child ofthe CLAT to the child's children would cause the
child to become the transferor. Such a result would be desirable because the interest ofthe child would be zero, or close
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to it, upon the transfer. The ruling point out that CLATs have great potential for abuse of the generation skipping tax
rules. Thus:
Congress remedied this situation by the enactmentof§2642(e). Under this special
role for charitable lead annuity trusts, the numerator ofthe applicable fraction is the
adjusted GST exemption and the denominator is the value of all property in the
trust immediately after termination of the charitable lead interest. The adjusted
GST exemption is the GST exemption allocated to the trust increased by the
interest rate used in determining the charitable deduction for federal gift or estate
tax purposes for the actual period of the charitable lead annuity.
In light of § 2642(e), all generation-skipping transfers made with respect to a
charitable lead annuity trust will be subject to the GST tax if no GST exemption
is allocated to the trust. Even ifGST exemption is allocated to a trust, there is no
way to guarantee that it will be sufficient to ensure that the trust is exempt from
GSTtax.
The series of transactions proposed in the ruling request have the effect of
circumventing the rules of § 2642(e) using the same type of leveraging that
prompted Congress to enact § 2642(e). The tnIsteespropose to designate Child A
as the beneficial)' ofone-sixth ofthe remainder interest in Trust. Child A will then
assign Child A's one-sixth remainder interest to Child A's children in a transaction
that is subject to gift tax.
Based on the above, we conclude that for GST tax purposes, and consistent with
the purpose of § 2642(e), there will be two transferors with respect to the trust
assets in Trust as of the date of the assignment. Child A will be considered the
transferor with respect to the portion of the trust assets equal to the present value
of the one-sixth remainder interest on the date of the gift. The Decedent will
remain the transferor with respect to the balance of the Trust.
Apparently concerned that the basis of the ruling might be too narrow, the Service goes on to state:
We also note that under the facts presented in the ruling request, the form of the
transaction might be disregarded and the series of transactions viewed as the
designation by the Trustee ofChild A's childrenas remainder beneficiaries. Under
this analysis, Decedent would be treated as the transferor of the entire Trust estate
for GST tax purposes. See Estate of HIes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.. 200-388;
Estate of Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149; Griffin v. United
States, 42 F.Supp.2d 700 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
If the transfer were separated from the creation of the CLAT by a year would there be a gift? Are ORATs
subject to the same concern and analysis?
4. Rule Against Perpetuities. A number ofstates have repealed their rule against perpetuities. Among
them are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin. The Florida statute imposes a 360 year statute; the purpose of the limit, rather than simple
repeal, is to avoid the so-called Delaware Tax Trap.
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Q. SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
1. Application to Family Limited Partnerships. In Blaine P. Kerr, et UK. v. Commissioner, 113 T.e.
No. 30 (1999), the Tax Court considered the application ofthe statute to the transfer of interests in a family partnership
to ORATs, KFLP was created under the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA). The court described the
taxpayer's position:
Petitioners contend that section 2704(b) does not apply to the KFLP interests that
they transferred to the ORA1"s trustees because those interests were merely
assignee interests under State law. TRLPA section 7.02(a)(2) provides that an
assignment of a partnership interest does not dissolve a limited partnership or
entitle the assignee to become or exercise the rights or powers ofa partner. TRLPA
section 7.02(aX3) and (4) provides that an assignee is allocated the income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit to which the assignor was entitled, and, until the assignee
becomes a partner, the assignor continues to be a partner and to have the power to
exercise any rights or powers ofa partner. TRLPA section 7.04(a) provides that an
assignee ofa partnership interest may become a limited partner ifand to the extent
that the partnership agreement provides for such a transition or on the consent of
all partners. Relying on the defmition of an applicable restriction contained in
section 25.2704-2(b), Gift Tax Regs., petitioners maintain that an assignee's
inability to force KFLP to liquidate under the KFLP partnership agreement imposes
no greater restriction than those imposed upon assignees under TRLPA.
Petitioners' contention that the partnership interests they transferred to the GRAT's
trustees were assignee interests as opposed to limited partnership interests is based
on a strict construction ofthe KFLP partnership agreement. In particular, although
petitioners made the transfers to themselves as GRAT's trustees, petitioners
nonetheless maintain that their children, as KFLP general partners, had to consent
to the admission ofthe GRAT's trustees as limited partners pursuant to section 3.06
of the KFLP partnership agreement.
The taxpayer's argument was rejected because the court found that the interests transferred were limited
partnership interests not assignee interests. The opinion states:
Read as a whole, the language used in the "Assignment of Partnership
Interest" establishes that petitioners transferred limited partnership
interests to themselves as the GRAT's trustees. Although the docurI1~nts
refer to the ORA1"s trustees as assignees, the description ofthe assigned
interests contained in Schedule I clearly states that the assignees will hold
class B limited partnership interests in KFLP. Equally important, the
"Assignment of Partnership Interest" states that petitioners had obtained
all necessary consents to effect the conveyance. Because the GRAT's
trustees qualified as permitted assignees within the meaning of section
8.03 of the partnership agreement, and petitioners were not required to
obtain any consents to transfer an assignee interest to a permitted
assignee, the inclusion of the statement that aU necessary consents had
been obtained also indicates that petitioners were transferring limited
partnership interests to the GRAT's trustees. Further, the statement that all
necessary consents had been obtained contradicts the testimony of the
Kerr children that petitioners never requested that they consent to the
transfers to the GRA1"s trustees.
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C. OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The objective economic realities underlying the transfers to the GRAT's
trustees do not support petitioners' position that the transferred interests
should be considered assignee interests. First, and perhaps most
importantly, there were no significant differences under the KFLP
partnership agreement between the rights of limited partners and
assignees. Petitioners were vested with managerial responsibilities for
KFLP; neither limited partners nor assignees had any managerial rights.
In addition, limited partners and assignees enjoyed equivalent rights to
information concerning the partnership's business affairs, and they shared
the same interests in the partnership's distributable cash. Finally, while
limited partners were pennitted to put or sell their interests to the
partnership under section 9.02 of the partnership agreement, assignees
were given a substantially equivalent right to offer their interests to the
partnership under sections 8.04 and 8.21 of the partnership agreement.
The only relevant difference between the rights of limited partners and
assignees relates to a limited partner's right to vote on major decisions --
a right not extended to assignees. However, given the rare and
extraordinary nature of the matters qualifying as a major decision, such
as the filing ofa bankruptcy petition or approving an act in contravention
ofthe partnership agreement, we do not consider a limited partner's right
to vote on such matters to be significant for purposes of deciding the
question presented.
We further note that petitioners retained the right to vote the limited
partnership interests and petitioners and the Kerr children had the ability
to convert the purported assignee interests to full limited partnership
interests or liquidate the partnership at will. To characterize the interests
that petitioners transferred ,to the GRAT's trustees as assignee interests'·
ignores the objective economic reality that there was no meaningful
difference between the transfer of an assignee interest as opposed to a
limited partnership interest.
D. TAX MOTIVATION
The record shows that -Eastland structured petitioners' transfers to the
GRAT's trustees primarily to avoid the special valuation rules set forth in
section 2704(b). Eastland's writings on the subject of family limited
partnerships disclose his belief that the transfer of an assignee interest
from one family member to another would serve to circumvent section
2704(b). Accepting petitioner's testimony that he did not considerwhether
he was transferring a limited partnership interest as opposed to an
assignee interest to his GRATs, it appears that Eastland made a conscious
decision not to raise the subject with his clients.
Consistent with the foregoing, we conclude that petitioners transferred
limited partnership interests to the ORAT's trustees in substance as in
fonn.
A - 100
Having decided that partnership interests were transferred the court determined that section 2704 did not apply:
Section 2704(b)(2)(A) broadly defmes an applicable restriction as "any restriction
which effectively limits the ability of the corporation or partnership to liquidate".
However, section 2704(b)(3)(B) excepts from the definition of an applicable
restriction "any restriction on liquidation imposed, or required to be imposed, by
any Federal or State law".
In what we view as an expansion of the exception contained in section
2704(b)(3XB), the Secretary promulgated section 25.2704- 2(b), Gift Tax Regs.,
which states in pertinent part: "An applicable restriction is a limitation on the
ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part) that is more restrictive than the
limitations that would apply under the State law generally applicable to the entity
in the absence ofthe restriction." Thus, the question arises whether the partnership
agreements involved herein impose greater restrictions on the liquidation ofKFLP
and KILP than the limitations that generally would apply to the partnerships under
State law.
Section 10.01 of the partnership agreements states in pertinent part th~t the
partnerships shall dissolve and liquidate upon the earlier ofDecember 31,2043, or
by agreement ofall the partners. Petitioners direct our attention to TRLPA section
8.01, which provides that a Texas limited partnership shall be dissolved on the
earlier of: (1) The occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement to
cause dissolution; (2) the written consent of all partners to dissolution; (3) the
withdrawal of a general partner; or (4) entry of a decree ofjudicial dissolution.
TRLPA section 8.04 provides that, following the dissolution of a limited
partnership, the partnership's affairs shall be wound up (including the liquidation
of partnership assets) as soon as reasonably practicable.
On the basis ofa comparison of section 10.01 of the partnership agreements and
TRLPA section 8.01, we conclude that section 10.01 ofthe partnership agreements
does not contain restrictions on liquidation that constitute applicable restrictions
within the meaning of section 2704(b). We reach this conclusion because Texas
law provides for the dissolution and liquidation of a limited partnership pursuant
to the occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement or upon the
written consent ofall the partners, and the restrictions contained in section 10.01
of the partnership agreements are no more restrictive than the limitations that
generally would apply to the partnerships under Texas law. Consequently, these
provisions are excepted from the definition ofan applicable restriction pursuant to
section 2704(b)(3)(B) and section 25.2704-2(b), Gift Tax Regs.
Kerr was cited favorably in Estate ofMorton B. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-202, which held
that section 2704(b) did not apply to a California limited partnership.
In Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), the Court disregarded a death-bed partnership
because, the Court found, the decedent had retained, by implied agreement, use of the partnership units he had given
away. The Court determined that the form of the partnership was not respected by the parties. In particular, he
continued to live rent-free in a house owned by the partnership and opened no partnership bank accounts.
In three cases between October 26 and November 30, 2000, the Tax Court clarified the rules it sees as
applicable to family limited partnerships. The three decisions, each en banc, were J.C. Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115
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T.C. No. 30 (2000); Ina F. Knight v. Commissioner, et vir v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 36 (2000); and Estate of
Albert Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 35 (2000). The opinions should be read in their entirety. Three general
conclusions follow from all the opinions. First, the most effective attack appears that it might be substance over fonn,
including the step-transaction doctrine. Second, where the Tax Court can find an "understanding" that a partnership
will continue for the benefit ofa decedent it will be sympathetic to a section 2036 argument. Third, case must be given
to avoid a gift on formation.
Shepherd involved the transfer of timberland subject to a lease to a partnership owned 50% by the taxpayer
(father) and 25% by each oftwo sons, followed several weeks later by a gift of bank stock to the same partnership. At
issue was whether the gifts were to be valued as gifts ofproperty to one entity -- the partnership, or gifts to two people --
the sons, or gifts ofpartnership interests. The majority opinion valued the gifts as if they were made to the sons, rather
than as gifts of partnership units:
2. DID PETITIONER MAKE DIRECT GIFTS TO HIS SONS?
Petitioner deeded the leased land and bank stock to the partnership. Whatever
iBterests his sons acquired in this property they obtained by virtue oftheir status as
partners in the partnership. Clearly, then, contrary to one ofrespondent's alternative
arguments, petitioner did not make direct gifts of these properties to his sons. Cf.
LeFrak v. Commissioner, supra (transfer by donor-father of buildings to himself
and his children as tenants in common, "d.b.a." (doing business as) one ofvarious
partnerships fonned later the same day to hold the particular building conveyed,
represented direct gifts to the children of the father's interest in the buildings).
3. DID PETITIONER MAKE INDIRECT GIFTS TO HIS SONS?
A gift may be direct or indirect. See sec. 25.2511-1(a), Gift Tax Regs. The
regulations provide the following example of a transfer that results in an indirect
taxable gift, assuming that the transfer is not made for adequate and full
consideration: "A transfer of property by B to a corporation generally represents
gifts by B to the other individual shareholders of the corporation to the extent of
their proportionate interests in the corporation." Sec. 25.2511- l(h)(I), Gift Tax
Regs.
Application of this general rule is well established in case law. For instance, in
Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d at 1225, the taxpayer transferred her ranch to
a newly formed corporation in which she and her two sons owned all the voting
stock. In exchange for the ranch, the taxpayer received additional shares of the
corporation's stock. The stock was determined to be less valuable than the ranch.
The court concluded that the difference between what she gave and what she got
represented a gift to the shareholders. Noting that the taxpayer could not make a
gift to herself, the court held that she made a gift to each of her sons of one-third
of the total gift amount. See also Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149, 151
(9th Cir. 1956) (transfers offann lands to a family corporation of which donors
were 40-percent owners represented gifts to other shareholders of60 percent ofthe
fair market value ofthe fann lands), modifying and remanding 21 T.C. 607 (1954);
CTUW Georgia Ketteman Hollingsworth v. Commissioner, 86 T.e. 91 (1986)
(mother's transfer to closely held corporation of property in exchange for note of
lesser value represented gifts to the other five shareholders of five-sixths the
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difference in values ofthe property transferred and the note the mother received);
Estate of Hitchon v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 96 (1965) (father's transfer of stock
to a family corporation for no consideration constituted gift by father of one-
quarter interest to each of three shareholder-sons); Estate of Bosca v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-251 (father's transfer to a family corporation of
voting common stock in exchange for nonvoting common stock represented gifts
to each ofhis two shareholder-sons of50 percent ofthe difference in the values of
the stock the father transferred and of the stock he received); cf. Chanin v. United
States, 183 Ct. Cl. 745, 393 F.2d 972 (1968) (two brothers' transfers of stock in
their wholly owned corporation to the subsidiary of another family corporation
constituted gifts to the other shareholders ofthe family corporation, reduced by the
portion attributable to the brothers' own ownership interests in the family
corporation).
Likewise, a transfer to a partnership for less than full and adequate consideration
may represent an indirect gift to the other partners. See Gross v. Commissioner, 7 .
T.C. 837 (1946) (taxpayer's and spouse's transfer of business assets into a newly
fonned partnership among themselves, their daughter, and son-in-law resulted in
taxable gifts to the daughter and son-in-law). Obviously, not every capital
contribution to a partnership results in a gift to the other partners, particularly
where the contributing partner's capital account is increased by the amount of his
contribution, thus entitling him to recoup the same amount upon liquidation ofthe
partnership. In the instant case, however, petitioner's contributions of the leased
land and bank stock were allocated to his and his sons' capital accounts according
to their respective partnership shares. Under the partnership agreement, each son
was entitled to receive distribution of any part of his capital account with prior
consent of the other partners (i.e., his father and brother), and was entitled to sell
his partnership interest after granting his father and brother the first option to
purchase his interest at fair market value. Upon dissolution ofthe partnership, each
son was entitled to receive payment of the balance in his capital account.
In these circumstances, we conclude and hold that petitioner's transfers to the
partnership represent indirect gifts to each of his sons,. John and William, of
undivided 25-percent interests in the leased land and in the bank stock. In reaching
this conclusion, we have effectively aggregated petitioner's two separate, same-day
transfers to the partnership of undivided 50-percent interests in the leased land to
reflect the economic substance ofpetitioner's conveyance to the partnership ofhis
entire interest in the leased land. We have not, however, aggregated the separate,
indirect gifts to his sons, John and William. See Estate ofBosca v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1998-251 (for purposes of the gift tax, each separate gift must be
valued separately), and cases cited therein; cf. Estate of Bright v. United States,
658 F.2d999 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting family attribution in valuing stock for estate
tax purposes).
Judge Ruwe and 2 judges would have held that the gift was to the partnership:
I agree with the majority opinion except for its allowance ofa 15- percent
valuation discount with respect to what the majority describes as "indirect
gifts [by petitioner] to each of his sons, John and William, of undivided
25-percent interests in the leased land". Majority Ope p. 22. In my opinion,
no such discount is appropriate because undivided interests in the leased
land were never transferred to petitioner's sons. The transfer in question
was a transfer of petitioner's entire interest in the leased land to the
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partnership. This transfer was to a partnership in which petitioner held a
50-percent interest. Except for enhancing the value of petitioner's 50-
percent partnership interest, he received no other consideration for the
transfer.
Section 2512(b) provides:
SEC. 2512. Valuation of Gifts.
(b) Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the
value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of gifts
made during the calendar year.
The Supreme Court has described previous versions ofthe gift tax statutes (section
501 imposing the tax on gifts and section 503 which is virtually identical to present
section 2512(b)) in the following terms:
Sections SOland 503 are not disparate provisions. Congress directed
them to the same purpose, and they should not be separated in application.
Had Congress taxed ttgifts" simpliciter, it would be appropriate to assume
that the term was used in its colloquial sense, and a search for "donative
intent" would be indicated. But Congress intended to use the term "gifts"
in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. H. Rep. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., p.27; S.Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p.39; cf.
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 u.S. 176; Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S.
184. Congress chose not to require an ascertainment ofwhat too often is
an elusive state ofmind. For purposes ofthe gift tax it not only dispensed
with the test of "donative intent." It formulated a much more workable
external test, that where "property is transferred for less than an-adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth," the excess in such
money value "shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title, be
deemed a gift..." And Treasury Regulations have emphasized that
common law considerations were not embodied in the gift tax.
[Commissionerv. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303,306 (1945); fo. ref. omitted.]
The Supreme Court described the objective ofthese statutoryprovisions as follows:
The section taxing as gifts transfers that are not made for "adequate and
full [money] considerationtt aims to reach those transfers which are
withdrawn from the donor's estate. * * * [Id. at 307.]
Under the applicable statutory provisions, it is unnecessary to consider the value
of what petitioner's sons received in order to determine the value of the property
that was transferred. Indeed, the regulations provide that it is not even necessary
to identify the donee. The regulations provide that the gift tax is the primary and
personal liability of the donor, that the gift is to be measured by the value of the
property passing from the donor, and that the tax applies regardless ofthe fact that
the identity of the donee may not be presently known or ascertainable. See sec.
25.2511- 2(a), Gift Tax Regs.
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The majority correctly states the formula for valuing transfers ofproperty:
If property is transferred for less than adequate and full consideration,
then the excess of the value of the property transferred over the
consideration received is generally deemed a gift. See sec. 2512(b). The
gift is measured by the value of the property passing from the donor,
rather than by the property received by the donee or upon the measure of
enrichment to the donee. See sec. 25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax Regs. [Majority
Ope pp. 11-12.]
This is exactly the formula used in the cases on which the majority relies
for the proposition that a gift was made. See Kincaid v. United States, 682
F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982); Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1956); Ketteman Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.. 91 (1986). In each
ofthese cases, property was transferred to a corporation for less than full
consideration. All or part ofthe stock ofthe transferee corporations was
owned by persons other than the transferor. In each case, the value of the
gift was found to be the fair market value of the property transferred to
the corporation, minus anyconsideration received by the transferor. None
ofthese cases allowed a discount based upon a hypothetical assumption
that fractionalized interests in the transferred property were given to the
individual shareholders ofthe transferee corporations. Unfortunately, the
majority does not follow its own fonnula, as quoted above, or the above-
cited cases.
Presumably Judge Ruwe would have reduced the value ofthe gift for the father's 50% interest; whether that
reduction would be discounted is not discussed directly but the answer would appear to be no.
Judge Beghe would have applied an estate depletion theory:
With all the woofmg these days about using family partnerships to generate big
discounts, the majority- opinion provides salutary reminders that the "gift is
measured by the value of the property passing from the donor, rather than by the
property received by the donee or upon the measure ofenrichment of the donee",
majority Ope pp. 11-12, and that "How petitioner's transfers ofthe leased land and
bank stock may have enhanced the sons' partnership interests is immaterial, for the
gift tax is imposed on the value of what the donor transfers, not what the donee
receives", majority Ope p. 16 (citing section 25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax Regs., Robinette
v. Helvering,318 U.S. 184, 186 (1943), and other cases therein); see also sec.
25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs.
This is the "estate depletion" theory ofthe gift tax, given its most cogent expression
by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303,307-308 (1945):
The section taxing as gifts transfers that are not made for "adequate and
full [money] consideration" aims to reach those transfers that are
withdrawn from the donor's estate. To allow detriment to the donee to
satisfy the requirement of"adequate and full consideration" would violate
the purpose of the statute and open wide the door for evasion of the gift
tax. See 2 Paul, supra [Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1942)] at 1114.
The logic and the sense of the estate depletion theory require that a donor's
simultaneous or contemporaneous gifts to or for the objects of his bounty be
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unitized fOf the purpose of valuing the transfers under section 2511(a). After all,
the gift tax was enacted to protect the estate tax, and the two taxes are to be
construed in pari materia. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945). The estate
and gift taxes are different from an inheritance tax, which focuses on what the
individual donee-beneficiaries receive; the estate and gift taxes are taxes whose
base is measured by the value of what passes from the transferor.
I would hold, contrary to the majority and the approach of Estate of Bosea v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-251, that the gross value of what petitioner
transferred in the case at hand is to be measured by including the value ofhis entire
interest in the leased land. I would then value the net gifts by subtracting from the
gross value so arrived at the value, at the end of the figurative day, of the
partnership interest that petitioner received back and retained, sec. 2512(b), not 50
percent of the value of the leased land that he transferred to the partnership.
The Eleventh Circuit affmned the Tax Court at (2002), in a 2-1 decision. The
majority opinion states:
We agree with the Tax Court that the gift in this case was an indirect gift of land,
and not partnership interests, for several reasons. First, the taxpayer himself
initially reported the gift as one of land.2 Shepherd's 1991 gift tax return listed the
gift as two undivided 25 percent interests in a "Leased Fee Estate" without
assigning any discount amount. His first petition for review in the Tax Court also
referred to the total gift as "an undivided one-half interest" in the acreage.
Second, and even more significantly, the Tax Court correctly interpreted the
undisputed sequence ofevents here to conclude that Shepherd's sons already held
their partnership interests when their father's deed of land became effective.
Initially, Shepherd owned more than 9,000 acres of land subject to a long-term
timber lease. On August 1, 1991, he executed an agreement intended to create the
Shepherd Family Partnership, ofwhich he would be the managing partner and 50
percent owner. Each son would have a 25 percent ownership interest. On August
1, Shepherd and his wife3 also executed two deeds transferring 100 percent oftheir
interest in the land to this partnership. Shepherd's sons did not sign the partnership
agreement until August 2.
As the Tax Court correctly observed, the Shepherd Family Partnership did not
come into existence under Alabama law until August 2 when Shepherd's sons
signed the partnership agreement. See Ala. Code §§ 10-8-2 (1994) (recognizing
only "association oftwo or more persons" as valid partnership). Until that signing,
there could be no "donee capable of taking the gift" or "acceptance of the gift by
the donee," both of which must occur for a gift to be legally complete. Estate of
Whitt v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 1548, 1560-61 (11th eire 1985). Thus, the deed
of land to the partnership dated August I was not effective until after the
partnership had sprung to life on August 2.
Because the creation ofthe partnership (and its interests) necessarily preceded the
effectiveness of the deed, "[w]hatever interests [Shepherd's] sons acquired in this
property they obtained by virtue oftheir status as partners in the partnership." 115
T.e. at 387. And gifts to a partnership, like gifts to a corporation, are deemed to be
indirect gifts to the stakeholders "to the extent of their proportionate interests" in
the entity. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 25.2511-1(h)(I). Thus, instead ofcompleting a gift of
land to a preexisting partnership in which the sons were not partners and then
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units:
establishing:"the partnership interests ofhis sons (which would result in a gift ofa
partnership interest), Shepherd created a partnership in which his sons held
established shares4 and then gave the partnership a taxable gift of land (making it
an indirect gift of land to his sons).
Third, the dissent, while not disputing these facts, contends that (I) ttShepherd's
intent was to give his sons a partnership interest in family property," (2) he simply
"utilized fewer steps in his attempt to create his sons' partnership interests" than if
he had created a valid partnership with a second partner and then transferred the
shares of the partnership to his sons, and (3) elevating form over substance here
would compel "the unnecessary resort to the advise of tax lawyers prior to
effectuating a simple transaction."
These arguments ignore that Shepherd himself reported the gift as land and also
misperceive the crucial import offacts in both tax planning and the adjudication of
tax disputes. See Frank Lyon Co. v. UnitedStates, 435 U.S. 561,576 (1978) ("[Als
the Court has said in the past, a transaction must be given its effect in accord with
what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred.tt); Don
E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569,579-80 (1977) (stating that "while
a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having
done so, he must accept the tax consequences ofhis choice, whether contemplated
or not, ... and may not enjoy the benefit ofsome other route he mighlhave chosen
to follow but did not" and finding that clear facts prevented taxpayer's
recharacterization of the events for tax purposes and request to "indulge in
speculating how the transaction might have been recast with a different tax resulttt )
(quoting Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 149
(1974)).
The dissent makes the point that the majority likely would have agreed with the taxpayer had the gifts been by
First, I find fault in the Tax Court's classification of Mr. Shepherd's gifts.
Accepting the Tax Court's classification of the gifts elevates fonn over substance.
Mr. Shepherd's intent was to give his sons a partnership interest in family property.
The parties agree that if Mr. Shepherd originally created the partnership with his
wife, conveyed the family property to the partnership (a tax-exempt transaction),
and then gave his partnership interest to his sons and had his wife give her
partnership interest back to him, the sons would receive gifts ofpartnership interest
in the family property, the valuation of which would take into account the
stipulated impact ofthe partnership. 15 However, since Mr. Shepherd utilized fewer
steps in his attempt to create his sons' partnership interests in the family property,
the gifts to the sons are classified as indirect gifts whose value does not take into
account the effect of the partnership but do take into account the discount for the
minority interests. Such an elevation of form over substance compels the
unnecessary resort to the advise of tax lawyers prior to effectuating a simple
transaction. See United States v. Heller, 866 F.2d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 1989)
(stating that n[t]ederal tax law is concerned with the economic substance of the
transaction under scrutiny and not the form by which it is masked.tt); Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (stating that n[t]he incidence of
taxation depends upon the·substance ofa transaction ... [t]o pennit the true nature
ofa transaction to be disguised by mere fonnalisms, which exist solely to alter tax
liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration ofthe tax policies of
Congress."); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (fmding the
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economic substance of the transaction to be controlling and stating "[t]o hold
othetwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory
provision in question of all serious purpose.ft).
Furthennore, accepting the Tax Court's classification, as pointed out by Judge
Foley, runs contrary to Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220 (Sth Cir. 1982).
The Kincaid Court found that an unequal exchange in which a mother gave
property to a closely-held corporation in exchange for stock resulted in a gift to the
other stockholders, her sons, of enhancement in the value of their stock. See 682
F.2d at 1226. Although Kincaid raises the possibility ofclassifying Mr. Shepherd's
gifts as enhancements in the sons' partnership interests, nothing in the Tax Court
opinion addresses this possibility or attempts to distinguish the classification ofthe
Mr. Shepherd's gifts from the classification of the gift in Kincaid.
In Knight a majority of the Tax Court explicitly rejected the IRS argument that the form of the partnership
should be disregarded. Judge Beghe dissented as in Shepherd. The facts were:
On December 6, 1994, petitioner opened an investment account at Broadway
National Bank in the name of petitioners' family limited partnership, the Herbert
D. Knight limited partnership (created on December28, 1994, as described below),
and transferred Treasury notes to it. On December 12, 1994, petitioners opened a
checking account for their partnership at Broadway National Bank and transferred
$10,000 to it from their personal account. On December IS, 1994, petitioners
transferred$S58,939.43 worth ofa USAA municipal bond fund from their personal
investment account to the partnership.
On December 28, 1994, the following occurred:
a. Petitioners signed documents which created the partnership, consisting of
100 units of ownership. The steps followed in the creation of the partnership
satisfied all requirements under Texas law to create a limited partnership.
b. Petitioners conveyed the ranch and the realproperty at 6219 Dilbeck and
14827 Chancey to the partnership.
c. Petitioners created the Knight Management Trust (management trust). The
steps followed in the creation of the management trust satisfied all requirements
under Texas law to create a trust. The management trust was the partnership's
general partner.
d. Petitioners each transferred a one-half unit of the partnership to the
management trust. That unit is the only asset held by the management trust.
Petitioners each owned a 49.5-percent interest in the partnership as limited
partners.
e. Petitioners created trusts for Mmy Knight and Douglas Knight (the
children's trusts). The documents petitioners executed were sufficient under Texas
law to create the children's trusts. Douglas Knight and Mary Knight were each the
benefic.iary and trustee of the children's trust bearing their name.
f. Petitioners each signed codicils to their wills in which they changed the
bequests to their children to bequests to the children's trusts.
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g. Petitioners each transferred a 22.3-percent interest in the partnership to
each ofthe children's trusts. After those transfers, petitioners each retained a 4.9-
percent interest in the partnership as limited partners.
The opinion states:
Respondent contends that the partnership lacks economic substance and fails to
qualify as a partnership under Federal law. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson,
337 U.S. 733, 740 (1949); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946);
Merryman v. Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879, 882-883 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1988-72. Petitioners contend that their rights and legal relationships and
those of their children changed significantly when petitioners formed the
partnership, transferred assets to it, and transferred interests in the partnership to
their children's trusts, and that we must recognize the partnership for Federal gift
tax valuation purposes. We agree with petitioners.
State law determines the nature ofproperty rights, and Federal law determines the
appropriate tax treatment of those rights. See United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722(1985); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677,683
(1983); Aquilino v. United States, 363 u.s. 509, 513 (1960). The parties stipulated
that the steps followed in the creation ofthe partnership satisfied all requirements
under Texas law, and that the partnership has been a limited partnership under
Texas law since it was created. Thus, the transferred interests are interests in a
partnership under Texas law. Petitioners have burdened the partnership with
restrictions that apparently are valid and enforceable under Texas law. The amount
of tax for Federal estate and gift tax purposes is based on the· fair market value of
the property transferred. See sees. 2502, 2503. The fair market value of property
is "the price at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer
and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both
having reasonable knowledge ofrelevant facts. tt See sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax
Regs.; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs. We apply the willing buyer, willing seller
test to value the interests in the partnership that petitioners transferred under Texas
law. We do not disregard the partnership because we have no reason to conclude
from this record that a hypothetical buyer or seller would disregard it.
Respondent relies on several income tax economic substance cases. See, e.g., Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583- 584 (1978); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361,366 (1960); ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner,
201 F.3d 505, 511-516 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-305; ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231,248 (3d Cir. 1998), affg. in part and
revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1997-115; Merryman v. Commissioner, supra; Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.e. 254,278 (1999). We disagree that
those cases require that we disregard the partnership here because the issue here is
what is the value of the gift. See secs.'2501, 2503; sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax
Regs.; sec. 25.2512- 1, Gift Tax Regs.
Respondent points out that in several transfer tax cases we and other courts have
valued a transfer based on its substance instead of its form. See, e.g., Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991); Schultz v. United States, 493
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1974); Estate ofMurphy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-
472; Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (W.O. Tex. 1998). Our
holding is in accord with those cases because we believe the form ofthe transaction
here (the creation of the partnership) would be taken into account by a willing
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buyer; thus the substance and form of the transaction are not at odds for gift tax
valuation purposes. Respondent agrees that petitioners created and operated a
partnership as required under Texas law and gave interests in that partners!_~p to
their children's trusts. Those rights are apparently enforceable under Texas law.
The good news were the legal holdings. On the other hand the Tax Court allowed only a 15% discount:
D. PETITIONERS' CONTENTION THAT A PORTFOLIO DISCOUNT AND
MINORITY AND LACK OF MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS TOTALING 44
PERCENT APPLY
Petitioners' expert, Robert K. Conklin (Conklin), estimated that, ifwe recognize the
partnership for Federal tax purposes, a 10-percent portfolio discount and discounts
of 10 percent for minority interest and 30 percent for lack ofmarketability apply,
for an aggregate discount of44 percent.
I. PORTFOLIO DISCOUNT
Conklin concluded that a 10-percent portfolio discount applies based on the
assumption that it is unlikely that a buyer could be found who·would want to buy
all of the Knight family partnership's assets. He provided no evidence to support
that assumption, see Rule 143(f)(1); Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 386, 401
(1987), affd. 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989); Compaq Computet Corp. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-220.
To estimate the amount ofthe portfolio discount, Conklin relied on a report stating
that conglomerate public companies tend to sell at a discount of about 10 to 15
percent from their breakup value. However, the Knight family partnership is not a
conglomerate public company.
Conklin cites Shannon Pratt's defmition of a portfolio discount in estimating the
portfolio discount to apply to the assets of the partnership. A portfolio discount
applies to a company that owns two or more operations or assets, the combination
of which would not be" particularly attractive to a buyer. See Estate of Piper v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062, 1082 (1979). The partnership held real estate and
marketable securities. Conklin gave no convincing reason why the partnership's
mix ofassets would be unattractive to a b~yer. We apply no portfolio discount to
the assets of the partnership.
2. LACK OF CONTROL AND MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS
Conklin concluded that a lack of control discount applies. He speculated that,
because the partnership invested a large part of its assets in bonds, and investors
in the bond fund could not influence investment policy, the partnership "could be
similar to a closed-end bond fund". He estimated that a lack ofcontrol discount of
10 percent applies by evaluating the difference between the trading value and the
net asset values on October 21, 1994, of 10 publicly traded closed-end bond funds.
The 10 funds that Conklin chose are not comparable to the Knight family
partnership. We fmd unconvincing his use ofdata from noncomparable entities to
increase the discount. However, on this recor<L we believe some discount is
appropriate based on an analogy to a closed-end fund.
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Conklin cited seven studies of sales of restricted stocks from 1969 to 1984 to
support his estimate that a 30-percent discount for lack ofmarketability applies. He
us~rl a table summarizing initial public offerings of common stock from 1985 to
1993. However, he did not show that the companies in the studies or the table were
comparable to the partnership, or explain how he used this data to estimate the
discount for lack ofmarketability. See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 434-
435 (7th Cir. 1964), affg. T.C. Memo. 1963-244; Rose v. Commissioner, supra;
Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722, 734-735 (1985). He also listed seven reasons
why a discount for lack ofmarketability applies, but he did not explain how those
reasons affect the amount of the discount for lack of marketability.
3. CONKLIN'S FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS
Conklin listed 19 purported business reasons for which he said the partnership was
fonned. Petitioners claimed to have had only 5 of those 19 reasons. Conklin also
said: "The compensation and reimbursement paid to the general partner reduce the
income available to limited partners or assignees. It His statement is inapplicable
because the general partner received no compensation and incurred no expenses.
We have rejected expert opinion based on conclusions which are unexplained or
contrary to the evidence. See Rose v. Commissioner, supra; Compaq Computer
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. An expert fails to assist the trier of fact ifhe or she
assumes the position of advocate. See Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.
570, 577 (1990); Laureys v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 101, 122-129 (1989).
Conklin's erroneous factual assumptions cast doubt on his objectivity.
4. CONCLUSION
The parties stipulated that the net asset value ofthe partnership was $2,081,323 on
December 28, 1994. Each petitioner gave each trust a 22.3-percent interest in the
partnership; 44.6 percent of $2,081 ,323 is $928,270.
We conclude that Conklin was acting as an advocate and that his testimony was not
objective. However, despite the flaws in petitioners' expert's testimony, we believe
that some discount is proper, in part to take into account material in the record
relating to closed-end bond funds. We hold that the fair market value ofan interest
in the Knight family partnership is the pro rata net asset value of the partnership
less a discount totaling 15 percent for minority interest and lack ofmarketability.
Thus, on December 28, 1994, each petitioner made taxable gifts of$789,030 (44.6
percent of$2,081,323, reduced by 15 percent).
The court also commented on an attempt to cap the amount of the gifts:
C. WHETHER THE VALUE OF PETITIONERS' FOUR GIFTS IS
LIMITED TO $300,000 EACH
The transfer document through which petitioners made the gifts at issue states that
each petitioner transferred to each of their children's trusts the number of limited
partnership units which equals $300,000 in value. Petitioners contend that this bars
respondent from asserting that the value of each partnership interest exceeds
$300,000.
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Respondent 'contends that the transfer document makes a formula gift that is void
as against public policy. Respondent relies on Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d
824 (4th Cir. 1944), and Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 109-116 (1986). In
Procter, the transfer document provided that, ifa court decided a value that would
cause a part ofthe transfer to be taxable, that part ofthe transfer would revert to the
donor. The u.s. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit described this provision
as a condition subsequent, and held that it was void as against public policy. See
Commissioner v. Procter, supra at 827.
We need not decide whether Procter and Ward control here because we disregard
the stated $300,000 gift value for other reasons. First, petitioners reported on their
gift tax returns that they each gave two 22.3-percent interests in the partnership.
Contrary to the transfer document, they did not report that they had given
partnership interests worth $300,000. We believe this shows their disregard for the
transfer document, and that they intended to give 22.3-percent interests in the
partnership. .
Second, even though petitioners contend that respondent is limited to the $300,000
amount, i.e~, that the gifts were for $300,000 and thus cannot be worth more than
$300,000, petitioners contend that the gifts are each worth less than $300,000. In
fact, petitioners offered expert testimony to show that each gift was worth only
$263,165. We fmd petitioners' contentions to be at best inconsistent. We treat
petitioners' contention and offer of evidence that the gifts were worth less than
$300,000 as opening the door to our consideration of respondent's argument that
the gifts were worth more than $300,000.
Clearly the court was not sympathetic to the taxpayer but it did not squarely confront this issue.
In Strangi the decedent's attorney-in-fact formed the partnership two month's before the decedent's death. The
decedent retained a 99% limited interest and a 47% interest in the 1% corporate general partner. The decedent's
children paid for the other shares in the general partner. Over 75% of the partnerships' assets were marketable
securities.
The Tax Court first determined that the "business purposes" for the partnership were bogus but that the
partnership would be respected anyway:
We 'must decide whether the existence of SFLP [Strangi Family Limited
Partnership] will be recognized for Federal estate tax purposes. Respondent argues
that, under the business purpose and economic substance doctrines, SFLP should
be disregarded in valuing the assets in decedentts estate. Petitioner contends that
the business purpose and economic substance doctrines do not apply to transfer tax
cases and that SFLP had economic substance and business purpose.
Taxpayers are generally free to structure transactions as they please, even if
motivated by tax-avoidance considerations. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465,469 (1935); Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988), affg.
Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986). However, the tax effects of a
particular transaction are detennined by the substance ofthe transaction rather than
by its form. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-584 (1978), the
Supreme Court stated that "a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance * * * compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, * * *
imbued with taX-independent considerations, and * * * not shaped solely by tax
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avoidance features" should be respected for tax purposes. "(T]ransactions which
have no economic purpose or substance other than the avoidance of taxes will be
disregarded." Gregory v. Helvering, supra at 469-470; see also Menyman v.
Commissioner, 873 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-72.
Family partnerships must be closely scrutinized by the courts because the family
relationship "so readily lends itself to paper arrangements having little or no
relationship to reality." Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 1962); accord
Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554, 561 (1992); Harwood v. Commissioner, 82
T.C. 239, 258 (1984), affd. without published opinion 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir.
1986); Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, 63 T.e. 321, 325 (1974); Estate of
Tiffany v. Commissioner, 47 T.e. 491,499 (1967); see also Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 336-337 (1940). Family partnerships have long been recognized
where there is a bona fide business carried on after the partnership is fonned. See,
e.g., Drew v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 5, 12-13 (1949). Mere suspicion and
speculation about a decedent's estate planning and testamentary objectives are not
sufficient to disregard an agreement in the absence ofpersuasive evidence that the
agreement is not susceptible of enforcement or would not be enforced by parties
to the agreement. Cf. Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.e. 312, 335 (1989).
The estate contends that there were "clear and compelling" nontax motives for
creating SFLP, including the provision ofa flexible and efficient means by which
to manage and protect decedent's assets. Specifically, the estate argues that its
business purposes for forming SFLP were (I) to reduce executor and attorney's
fees payable at the death ofdecedent, (2) to insulate decedent from an anticipated
tort claim and the estate from a will contest (by creating another layer through
which creditors must go to reach assets conveyed to the partnership), and (3) to
provide a joint investment vehicle for management ofdecedent's assets. We agree
with respondent that there are reasons to be skeptical about the nontax motives for
fonning SFLP.
******
We also do not believe that a ''joint investment vehicle" was the purpose of the
partnership. Mr. Gulig [the attorney-in-fact] took over control ofdecedent's affairs
in September 1993, under the 1988 power ofattorney, and Mr. Gulig continued to
manage decedent's assets through his management responsibilities in Stranco.
Petitioner concedes, in disputing respondent's alternative claim ofgift tax liability,
that "directly or indirectly, the Decedent ended up with 99.47% ofthe Partnership,
having put in essentially 99.47% of the capital."
The formation and subsequent control of SFLP were orchestrated by Mr. Gulig
without regard to "joint enterprise". He formed the partnership and the corporation
and then invited Mrs. Gulig's siblings, funded by her, to invest in the corporation.
The Strangi children shared in managing the assets only after and to the extent that
the Merrill Lynch account was fragmented in accordance with their respective
beneficial interests.
The nature ofthe assets that were contributed to SFLP supports the conclusion that
management ofthose assets was not the purpose ofSFLP. There were no operating
business assets contributed to SFLP. Decedent transferred cash, securities, life
insurance policies, annuities, real estate, and partnership interests to SFLP. The
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cash and securities approximated 75 percent of the value ofthe assets transferred.
No active business was conducted by SFLP following its formation.
******
SFLP was validly formed under State law. The formalities were followed, and the
proverbial "i's were dotted" and "t's were crossed". The partnership, as a legal
matter, changed the relationships between decedent and his heirs and decedent and
actual and potential creditors. Regardless ofsubjective intentions, the partnership
had sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its existence would not
be disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets, and we do not
disregard it in this case.
The court then rejected the applicability of section 2703:
Respondent next argues that the term "property" in section 2703(a)(2)
means the underlying assets in the partnership and that the partnership
form is the restriction that must be disregarded. Unfortunately for
respondent's position, neither the language ofthe statute nor the language
ofthe regulation supports respondent's interpretation. Absent application
ofsome other provision, the property included in decedent's estate is the
limited partnership interest and decedent's interest in Stranco.
In Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), the Court dealt with a similar issue
with respect to interpretation of section 2704(b). Sections 2703 and 2704 were
enacted as part ofchapter 14, I.R.C., in 1990. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. However, as we indicated in Kerr
v. Commissioner, supra at 470-471, and as respondent acknowledges in the portion
ofhis brief quoted above, the new statute was intended to be a targeted substitute
for the complexity, breadth, and vagueness ofprior section 2036(c); and Congress
"wanted to value property interests more accurately when they were transferred,
instead ofincluding previously transferred property inthe transferor's gross estate."
Treating the partnership assets, rather than decedent's interest in the partnership,
as the "property" to which section 2703(a) applies in this case would raise anew the
difficulties that Congress sought to avoid by repealing section 2036(c) and
replacing it with chapter 14. We conclude that Congress did not intend, by the
enactment of section 2703, to treat partnership assets as if they were assets of the
estate where the legal interest owned by the decedent at the time of death was a
limited partnership or corporate interest. See'also Estate ofChurch v. United States,
85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC par. 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000). Thus, we
need not address whether the partnership agreement satisfies the safe harbor
provisions ofsection 2703(b). Respondent did not argue separately that the Stranco
shareholders' agreement should be disregarded for lack of economic substance or
under section 2703(a).
_More interesting is the court's discussion of the gift on formation argument The court rejects the argument:
Respondent determined in the statutory notice and argues in the alternative that, if
the partnership is recognized for estate tax purposes, decedent made a gift when he
transferred property to the partnership and received in return a limited partnership
interest of lesser value. Using the value reported by petitioner on the estate tax
return, if decedent gave up property worth in excess of$IO million and received
back a limited partnership interest worth approximately $6.5 million, he appears to
have made a gift equal to the loss in value. (Petitioner now claims a greater
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discount, aS~discussedbelow.) In analogous circumstances involving a transfer to
a corporation, the Court ofAppeals in Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220 (5th
Cir. 1982), held that there was a taxable gift and awarded summaryjudgment to the
Government. The Court ofAppeals rejected the discounts claimed by the taxpayer,
stating that no business person ttwould have entered into this transaction, * * *
[thus] the 'moving impulse for the * * * transaction was a desire to pass the family
fortune on to others"'. Id. at 1225 (quoting Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184,
187-188 (1943». The Court ofAppeals in Kincaid concluded that, while there may
have been business reasons for the taxpayer to transfer land to a family corporation
in exchange for stock, "there was no business purpose, only a donative one, for
Mrs. Kincaid to accept less value in return than she gave Up.f' Id. at 1226.
In this case, the estate claims that the assets were transferred to SFLP for the
business purposes discussed above. Following the fonnation of SFLP, decedent
owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in SFLP and 47 percent of the
corporate general partner, Stranco. Even assuming arguendo that decedent's
asserted business purposes were real, we do not believe that decedent would give
up over $3 million in value to achieve those business purposes.
Nonetheless, in this case, because we do not believe that decedent gave up control
over the assets, his beneficial interest in them exceeded 99 percent, and his
contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the instinctive reaction that
there was a gift at the inception ofthe partnership does not lead to a determination
ofgift tax liability. In a situation such as that in Kincaid, where other shareholders
or partners have a significant interest in an entity that is enhanced as a result of a
transfer to the entity, or in a situation such as Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
_, _ (2000) (slip. Ope at 21), where contributions of a taxpayer are allocated to
the capital accounts of other partners, there is a gift. However, in view of
decedent's continuing interest in SFLP and the reflection ofthe contributions in his
own capital account, he did not transfer more than a minuscule proportion of the
value that would be "lost" on the conveyance of his assets to the partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest. See Kincaid v. United States, supra at 1224.
Realistically, in this case, the disparity between the value ofthe assets in the hands
of decedent and the alleged value of his partnership interest reflects on the
credibility ofthe claimed discount applicable to the partnership interest. It does not
reflect a taxable gift.
Clearly the court thought another theory should be asserted, but was not -- section 2036:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because respondent
asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly before trial.
Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it was untimely.
Applying the economic substance doctrine in this case on the basis of decedent's
continuing control would be equivalent to applying section 2036(a) and including
the transferred assets in decedent's estate. As discussed below, absent application
of section 2036, Congress has adopted an alternative approach to perceived
valuation abuses.
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The IRS expert allowed a 31% discount which the court, reluctantly, accepted:
Both petitioner's expert and respondent's expert determined that a 25-percent lack
of marketability discount was appropriate. Only respondent's expert, however,
considered decedent's ownership ofStranco stock. We agree with respondent that
the relationship between the limited partnership interest and the interest in Stranco
cannot be disregarded. The entities were created as a unit and operated as a unit
and were functionally inseparable.
In valuing decedent's 99-percent limited partnership interest on the date ofdeath,
respondent's expert applied an 8- percent minority interest discount and a 25-
percent marketability discount, to reach a combined (rounded) discount of 31
percent. Respondent's expert valued decedent's 47-percent interest in Stranco by
applying a 5-percent minority interest discount and a 15-percent marketability
discount, to reach a combined (rounded) discount of 19 percent. Petitioner's expert
applied a 25-percent minority interest discount and a 25-percent marketability
discount, resulting in an effective total discount of43.75 percent to the partnership.
He did not value petitioner's interest in Stranco because he believed that the
relationship was irrelevant. In our view, his result is unreasonable and must be
rejected.
Respondent's expert selected the lower minority interest discount after considering
the effective control of the limited partnership interest and the interest in Stranco
and considering the detailed provisions of the partnership agreement and the
shareholders' agreement. He examined closed-end funds, many ofwhich are traded
on major exchanges, and detennined the range ofdiscounts from net asset value for
those funds. He selected a discount toward the lower end ofthe range. His analysis
was well documented and persuasive. As respondent notes, normally a control
premium would apply to an interest having effective control of an entity.
Petitioner argues that consideration of the stock interest in Stranco in valuing the
limited partnership interest is erroneous because the shareholders' agreement
granted the corporation and the other shareholders the right to purchase- a selling
shareholder's stock. While the shareholders' agreement may be a factor to be
considered in determining fair market value, it does not persuade us that a
hypothetical seller would not market the interest in the limited partnership and the
interest in the corporation as a unit or that a transaction would actually take place
in which only the partnership interest or the stock interest was transferred. Under
the circumstances, the shareholders' agreement is merely a factor to be taken into
account but not to be given conclusive weight. Cf. Estate ofHall v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 312, 335 (1989); Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-
527.
In view of our rejection of respondent's belated attempt to raise section 2036 and
respondent's request that we disregard the partnership agreement altogether, we are
constrained to accept the evidence concerning discounts applicable to decedent's
interest in the partnership and in Stranco as of the date of death. We believe that
the result ofrespondent's expert's discounts may still be overgent-rous to petitioner,
but that result is the one that we must reach under the evidence and under the
applicable statutes.
Again, there were concurrences and dissents, in line with Shepherd and Knight. Judge Ruwe makes the point
that a 31% discount ought to mean a gift on formation based on the majority opinion:
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This case involves an attempt by a dying man (or his attorney) to transfer property
to a partnership in consideration for a 99-percent partnership interest that would be
valued at substantially less than the value of the assets transferred to the
partnership, while at the same time assuring that 100 percent of the value of the
transferred assets would be passed to decedent's beneficiaries. Assuming, as the
majority has found, that decedent's partnership interest was worth less than the
property he transferred, section 2512(b) should be applied. Pursuant to that section
the excess ofthe value ofthe property decedent transferred to the partnership over
the value ofthe consideration he received is "deemed a gift" subject to the gift tax.
By failing to apply section 2512(b) in this case, the majority thwarts the purpose
of section 2512(b) which the Supreme Court described as "the evident desire of
Congress to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that
are not business transactions". Commissioner .v. Wemyss, supra at 306.
The majority's allowance ofa 3 I~percent discount is in stark contrast to its rejection
of respondent's gift argument on the ground that decedent did not give up control
of the assets when he transferred them to the partnership. See majority Ope p. 21.
While the basis for fmding that decedent did not give up control ofthe assets is not
fully explained, it appears not to be based on the literal terms of the partnership
agreement which gave control to Stranco, the corporate general partner. Decedent
oWned only 47 percent of the Stranco stock. Since the majority also rejects
respondent's economic substance argument, the only other conceivable basis for
concluding that decedent retained control over the assets that he contributed to the
partnership is that the partnership arrangement was a factual sham. Ifthat were the
case, the partnership arrangement itselfwould be "mere window dressing" masking
the true facts and the terms ofthe partnership arrangement should be disregarded.
In an analogous situation the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disregarded
the written terms ofa transfer document as fraudulent. See Heyen v. United States,
945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991).
Judge Beghe would have applied substance over fonn to negate the benefit of the transaction:
I support the use of substance over form analysis to decide whether a transaction
qualifies for the tax-law defined status its form suggests. A formally correct
transaction without a business purpose may not be a "reorganization", and a title
holder of property without an economic interest may not be the tax "owner".
However, I share the majority's concerns about using substance over form analysis
to alter the .conclusion about a real-world fact, such as the fair market value of
property, which the law tells us is,the price at which the property actually could be
sold.
Although my approach to the case at hand employs a step- transaction· analysis,
which is a variant of substance over form, I do not use that analysis to conclude
anything about fair market value. Instead, I use it to identify the property whose
transfer is subject to tax. Step-transaction analysis has often been used in transfer
tax cases to identify the transferor or the property transferred.
The step-transaction doctrine is a judicially created concept that treats a series of
formally separate "steps" as a single transaction if those steps are "in substance
integrated, interdependent and focused toward a particular end result." Penrod v.
Commissioner, 88 T.e. 1415, 1428 (1987). The most far-reaching version of the
step-transaction doctrine, the end-result test, applies if it appears that a series of
fonnally separate steps are really prearranged parts ofa single transaction that are
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intended from the outset to reach the ultimate result. See Penrod v. Commissioner,
88 T.C. at 1429, 1430 (citing Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315
U.S. 179 (1942); South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1°65);
Morgan Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1941); Heintz
v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 132 (1955); Ericsson Screw Machine Prods. Co., v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 757 (1950); King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 189 Ct. CI.
466,475,418 F.2d 511,516 (1969». The end- result test is flexible and grounds
tax consequences on what actually happened, not on formalisms chosen by the
participants. See Penrod v. Commissioner, supra.
The sole purpose of the transactions orchestrated by Mr. and Mrs. Gulig was to
reduce Federal transfer taxes by depressing the value ofMr. Strangi's assets as they
passed through his gross estate, to his children, via the partnership. The
arrangement merely operated to convey the assets to the same individuals who
would have received the assets in any event under Mr. Strangi's will. Nothing of
substance was intended to change as a result of the transactions and, indeed, the
transactions did nothing to affect Mr. Strangi's or his children's interests in the
underlying assets except to evidence an effort to reduce Federal transfer taxes. The
control exercised by Mr. Strangi and his children over the assets did not change at
all as a result of the transactions. For instance, shortly after Mr. Strangi's death
SFLP made substantial distributions to the children, the Merrill Lynch account was
divided into 4 separate accounts to allow each child to control·· his or her
proportionate share of SFLP assets, and distributions were made to the estate to
enable it to pay death taxes and post a bond. Mr. Strangi's testamentary objectives
are further evidenced by his practical incompetency and failing health at formation
and funding of SFLP and Stranco and the short time between the partnership
transactions and Mr. Strangi's death.
The estate asserts that property with a stated value of $9,876,929, in the form of
cash and securities, when funneled through the partnership, took on a reduced
value of $6,560,730. It is inconceivable that Mr. Strangi would have accepted, if
dealing at arm's length, a partnership interest purportedly worth only two- thirds of
the value ofthe assets he transferred. This is especially the case given Mr. Strangi's
age and health, because it would have been impossible for him ever to recoup this
immediate loss.
It is also inconceivable that Mr. Strangi (or his representatives) would transfer the
bulk ofhis liquid assets to a partnership, in exchange for a limited interest (plus a
minority interest in the corporate general partner) that would terminate his control
over the assets and their income streams, if the other partners had not been family
members. See Estate ofTrenchard v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1995-121; there
the Court found "incredible" the assertion of the executrix that the decedent's
transfer of property to a family corporation in exchange for stock was in the
ordinary course ofbusiness. It is clear that the sole purpose ofSFLP was to depress
the value of Mr. Strangi's assets artificially for a brief time as the assets passed
through his estate to his children. See Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1990-472, in which this Court denied decedent's estate a minority discount
on a 49.65-percent stock interest because the prior inter vivos transfer of a 1.76-
percent interest did "not appreciably affect decedent's beneficial interest except to
reduce Federal transfer taxes." Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, supra, 60
T.e.M. (CCH) 645, 661, 1990 T.e.M. (RIA) par. 90,472, at 90-2261.
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Thus, under:the end-result test, the formally separate steps of the transaction (the
creation and funding ofthe partnership within 2 months ofMr. Strangi's death, the
su'-'stantial outright distributions to the estate and to the children, and the carving
up of the Merrill Lynch account) that were employed to achieve Mr. Strangi's
testamentary objectives should be collapsed and viewed as a single integrated
transaction: the transfer at Mr. Strangi's death of the underlying assets.
In many cases courts have collapsed multistep transactions or recast them to
identify the parties (usually the donor or donee) or the property to be valued for
transfer tax purposes. See, e.g., Estate ofBies v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-
338 (identifying transferors for purposes ofgift tax annual exclusions); Estate of
Cidulka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149 (donor's gift of minority stock
interests to shareholders followed by a redemption of donor's remaining shares
treated as single transfer of a controlling interest); Estate of Murphy v.
Commissioner, supra (decedent's inter vivos transferofa minority interest followed
by a testamentary transfer of her remaining shares treated as an integrated plan to
transfer control to decedent's children); Griffin v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700
(W.O. Tex. 1998) (transfer of 45 percent of donor's stock to donor's spouse
followed by a transfer by spouse and donor of all their stock to a trust for the
b~nefit of their child treated as one gift by donor of the entire block).
The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has affmned the district court in Elsie J. Church v. United States,
88 AFTR2d '2001-5142. On October 22, 1993 Mrs. Church and her sons signed a limited partnership into which they
intended to transfer a ranch, and she also intended to transfer $1,000,000 in securities. There was to be a corporate
general partner. On October 24, 1993 Mrs. Church died. The Fifth Circuit stated:
The judgment of the district court is afftrmed for the following reasons. The only
issue ofthe estate's valuation is whether the transfer of the assets was restricted at
the time of Church's death. Different legal theories have been argued during the
course of this proceeding, but that has always been the dispositive question -- as
it was the basis for the different valuations given the assets by the appraiser (not
now questioned). Reg~rdless of the status of the limited partnership due to the
certificate not being filed on that date, the documents that Church had signed
imposed restrictions on the assets that necessarily caused their value to be
discounted even if no limited partnership was then formed. We reject the
government's argument that the 1999 revision of the Texas statute made the filing
of the certificate an absolute prerequisite to the creation of a limited partnership
and rendered an agreement between the parties unenforceable until the time of
filing. A Texas court has held that a written partnership agreement constitutes an
enforceable contract and governs the rights of the parties. 773 S.W.2d 740, 742-
43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ). Further, the liar [sic] Committee's
commentary to the 1999 revision of section 2.01 states that the revision was not
meant to overturn Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.), which held that an entity could operate as a limited partnership before
filing a certificate. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-l section 2.01, Source and
Comment-Bar Committee (Vernon Supp. 2001). The estate stated in its pleadings
that the discounts for lack of control applied without the formation of a limited
partnership, and in its refund claim it stated at it was entitled to a "discount for lack
of control and marketability. It The IRS was apprised of the nature of the refund
claim.
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The corporate general partner had not been formed as ofdate ofdeath either. The case obviously stands for
the proposition that there is no negative consequence to taking an aggressive position.
Estate of W. W. Jones, II v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 11 (2001) is another opinion favorable to the
taxpayer. The court summarized its holding:
D [WeW. Jones, II] fonned a family limited partnership (JBLP) with his son and
transferred assets including real property, to JBLP in exchange for a 95.5389-
percent limited partnership interest. D also fonned a family limited partnership
(AVLP) with his four daughters and transferred real property to AVLP in exchange
for an 88. I78-percent limited partnership interest. D's son contributed real property
in exchange for general and limited partnership interests in JBLP, and the
daughters contributed real property in exchange for general and limited partnership
interests in AVLP. All of the contributions·were properly reflected in the capital
accounts of the contributing partners. Immediately after formation of the
partnerships, D transferred by gift an' 83.08-percent limited partnership interest in
JBLP to his son and a 16.915-percent limited partnership interest in AVLP to each
of his daughters.
~ELD: The transfers of property to the partnerships were not taxable gifts. See
Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478-(2000).
HELD, FURTHER, sec. 2704(b), tR.C., does not apply to this transaction. See
Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999).
HELD, FURTHER, the value of D's gift to his son was 83.08-percent ofthe value
ofthe underlying assets ofJBLP, reduced by a lack-of-marketability (8%) discount.
The value of D's gift to each ofhis daughters was 16.915 percent of the value of
the underlying assets of AVLP, reduced by secondary market (40%) and
lack-of-marketability (8.%) discounts.
HELD, FURTHER, the gifts of limited partnership interests are not subject to
additionallack-of-marketabilitydiscounts for built-in capital gains. Estate ofDavis
v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998), distinguished.
Most recently, the Tax Court allowed a combined 40°A, minority and marketability discount in Estate of Elma
M. Dailey, et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-263, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710. The FLP transaction was
straightforWard:
On October 20, 1992, Mrs. Dailey executed a will, a Revocable Living Trust
(Trust), and an Agreement ofLimited Partnership (Agreement) ofElma Middleton
Dailey FLP. The will provided that Mrs. Dailey's residuary estate would pass to the
Trust, from which her son would receive the corpus outright.
Upon execution ofthe Agreement, Mrs. Dailey took a 1- percent general and a 98-
percent limited partnership interest, and Mr. Dailey [her son] received a I-percent
limited partnership interest. On November 13, 1992, Mrs. Dailey contributed, to
the FLP, 400 AT&T, 20,000 Exxon, and 895 Bell South Corp. shares. Mr. Dailey
did not contribute any assets to the FLP. On December 4, 1992, the Texas
Secretary of State filed the FLP's Certificate of Limited Partnership.
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On December 8, 1992, Mrs. Dailey signed a letter which stated that by "the tenns
of the Elma Middleton Dailey Family Limited Partnership, this letter shall be
sufficient evidence ofmy transfer and conveyance to you ofthe following limited
partnership interest", giving 45-, 15-, and 38-percent interests to Mr. Dailey, his
wife, and the Trust, respectively.
******
On March 16; 1995, Mrs. Dailey appointed Mr. Dailey as the FLP managing
. partner. On July 26, 1995, he replaced her as the trustee of the Trust and FLP
general partner, and her I-percent general partnership interest became a limited
one.
Mrs. Dailey died on January 10, 1997.
The opinion first discusses whether the FLP should be respected for valuation purposes. The entire discussion
is as follows:
The FLP was validly formed pursuant to Texas law, and we do not disregard it for
tax purposes. See Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 487 (2000);
~ight v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. 506, 513-515 (2000).
The court declined to value the interests as assignee interests and went on to discuss the discount issue:
Mrs. Dailey gave Mr. Dailey a I-percent limited partnership interest on formation,
but the FLP had no assets on that date. Mrs. Dailey made gifts of 45- and 15-
percent limited parblership interests to her son and daughter-in-law, respectively,
and thus retained 39 percent in the trust at death. The parties stipulated, however,
that Mrs. Dailey retained 40 percent. Respondent inexplicably does not contend
that the initial I-percent limited partnership interest transferred to Mr. Dailey had
gift tax consequences at formation or funding.
Both parties agree that the given and retained interests were, on December 8, 1992,
and January 10, 1997, worth· their proportionate share of the NAV of$I,267,619
and $1,047,603 for gift and estate tax purposes, respectively. They diSagree,
however, about the size of the minority and marketability discounts. Both parties'
experts compared the FLP to closed-end mutual funds, which trade at a discount
to NAV, but disagreed on the amounts of the discounts. Petitioners' expert, citing
published data, opined that the aggregate discount is 40 percent for lack of
marketability, control, and liquidity and testified that he considered the significant
amount of unrealized capital gains relating to the Exxon stock.
Respondent's expert, on the other hand, relied in part on an unpublished study that
he coauthored and, in a revised report submitted at trial, increased the marketability
discount purportedly substantiated by his unpublished study from 12.5 percent to
14.1 percent. Respondent's expert opined that an aggregate discount of 15.72
percent on December 8,1992, and 13.51 percent on January 10, 1997, should be
applied. At trial, respondent's expert testified that he could not recall reviewing the
Agreement and, although hebelieved that unrealized capital gains are "an important
source ofdiscountsIt, he did not review the documents to determine ifthe FLP had
anysuch gains. Respondent's expert's testimony was contradictory, unsupported by
the data, and inapplicable to the facts.
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2. Valuing Annuity Interest in GRAT. Two Tax Court cases have clarified what are, and are not,
qualified interests for purposes ofsection 2702. In William A. Cook, et ux. v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. No.2 (2000),
the Tax Court held that a spousal interest that took effect after the grantor's death was not a qualified interest. The
opinion states:
Respondent agrees that each grantor's retained annuity to the extent it is for a term
ofyears or the grantor's earlier death constitutes a qualified interest. Respondent,
however, challenges the provision ofeach trust which continues the annuity for the
spouse, if the spouse survives the grantor, for the remaining tenn of the trust or
until the spouse's earlier death.
We agree with respondent that as to each trust, the interest retained in favor ofthe
grantor's spouse, whether viewed as an independent interest or as an expansion of
the grantor's interest, is not qualified and therefore must be valued at zero. Thus,
we reject petitioners' contention ·that they are entitled to value each grantor's
retained interest as an annuity based on two lives.
We first consider the nature ofthe spousal interests themselves. In the trusts before
~, the spousal· interests are contingent upon surviving the grantor, so they may
never take effect. We, however, do not believe section 2702 permits a transferor
to reduce the value ofa remainder interest by the simple expedient ofassigning· a
value to a retained interest which may, in fact, 'never take effect.
As indicated above, the regulations provide that· "The governing instrument must
fix the tenn of the annuity or unitrust interest. It Sec. 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs. We construe this language to require that the term be fixed and ascertainable
at the creation of the trust. The regulations contain two examples which illustrate
this requirement, as follows:
EXAMPLE 5. A transfers property to an irrevocable trust, retaining the
right to receive 5 percent ofthe net fair market value ofthe trust property,
valued annually, for 10 years. If A dies within the to-year tenn, the
unitrust amount is to be paid to A's estate for the balance ofthe tenn. A's
interest is a qualified unitrust interest to the extent of the right to receive
the unitrust payment for 10 years or until A's pri~r death.
EXAMPLE 6. The facts are the same as in Example 5, except that if A
dies within the 10-year term the unitrust amount will be paid to A's estate
for an additional 35 years. The result is the same as in Example 5, because
the lO-year term is the only term that is fixed and ascertainable at the
creation ofthe interest. [Sec. 25.2702-3(e), Example (5) and Example (6),
Gift Tax Regs.]
In each of these examples, only the retained interest for the shorter of a term of
years or the transferor's life is fixed and ascertainable at the creation ofthe interest,
and is therefore a qualified interest under section 2702. In Example (5) and
Example (6) above, the unitrust interests that may be paid to A's estate are both
contingent upon A's death before the completion ofthe 10-year fixed term, and are
therefore not qualified interests. In the trusts before us, the spousal interests are not
fixed and ascertainable at the creation of the trusts but, rather, are contingent in
each case upon the spouse's surviving the grantor. For this reason, the spousal
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interests are~not qualified interests and therefore must be valued as zero under
section 2702(a)(2)(A).
Legislative history reflects that Congress was fIconcerned about potential estate and
gift tax valuation abuses", specifically, "undervaluation ofgifts valued pursuant to
Treasury tables." 136 Congo Rec. 815629, 815680-815681 (dailyed. Oct. 18,
1990). As explained by the lawmakers in the context oftrusts and term interests in
property: "Because the taxpayer decides what property to give, when to give it, and
often controls the return on the property, use of Treasury tables undervalues the
transferred interests in the aggregate, more often than not. It Id. at 815681. Hence,
a statute was enacted which Congress intended would "deter abuse by making
unfavorable assumptions regarding certain retained rights." Id. at 815680.
This congressional purpose is advanced by a rule which ensures that only value that
is fixed and ascertainable at the creation of the trust, and therefore is not
contingent, may reduce the value of the gift of the remainder. In contrast, ifgifts
in trust may be reduced by the value ofspousal interests which are contingent and
which in fact never take effect, the retained interests have the potential for
overvaluation and the giftofthe remainder for undervaluation. We are satisfied that
s~chwould be contrary to the intent of section 2702.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the spousal interests here, standing
alone, were qualified, the retained annuities to the extent based on two lives would
fail to achieve qualified status for an additional reason. As previously noted, the
regulations provide that retention ofa power to revoke a qualified annuity interest
(or unitrust interest) of the transferor's spouse is treated as the retention of a
qualified annuity interest (or unitrust interest). See sec. 25.2702-2(aX5), Gift Tax
Regs. In each of the trusts under scrutiny, however, if the interest over which the
grantor has retained a power to revoke is treated as an interest retained by the
grantor, the requirement of section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax Regs., that the term
ofthe annuity must be the lesser ofa term ofyears or the life ofthe tenn holder has
not been met. Under the trust terms the spousal interests create the possibility that
the retained annuity will-extend beyond the tife ofthe term holder; ie., the grantor.
Section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax Regs., precludes this result.
The Tax Court followed its decision in Cook in Patricia A. Schott, et vir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-
110; Schott is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit has affrrmed Cook. 88 AFTR 2d ~ 2001-5448
(2001r
On the other hand, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, has agreed that payments to a decedent's estate are
qualified interests. Audrey J. Walton v. Commissioner, It5 T.e. No. 41 (2000). There were two ORATs involved:
According to the provisions of each ORAT, petitioner was to receive an annuity
amount equal to 49.35 percent ofthe initial trust value for the frrst 12-month period
of the trust term and 59.22 percent of such initial value for the second 12-month
period of the trust term. In the event that petitioner's death intervened, the annuity
amounts were to be paid to her estate. The sums were payable on December 31 of
each taxable year but could be paid up through the date by which the Federal
income tax return for the trust was required to be filed. The payments were to be
made from income and, to the extent income was not sufficient, from principal.
Any excess income was to be added to principal.
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Upon completion of the 2-year trust term, the remaining balance was to be
distributed to the designated remainder beneficiary.
The opinion describes the issue as follows:
Respondent contends that in establishing each GRAT, petitioner created three
separate and distinct interests: (1) The annuity payable to her dwingher lifetime,
(2) the "contingent" interest of her estate to receive the annuity payments in the
event ofher death prior to expiration ofthe 2-year trust term, and (3) the remainder
interest granted to her daughter. Ofthese three, it is respondent's position that only
the fIrst interest, but not the second, constitutes a qualified retained interest within
the meaning of section 2702 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Respondent particularly relies upon section 25.2702-3(e), Example (5), Gift Tax
Regs. (hereinafter Example 5), as a valid interpretation of the statute and as
governing the issues involved in this case.
Hence, according to respondent, only the value of an annuity payable for the
shorter of 2 years or the period ending upon petitioner's death may be subtracted
from the fair market value of the stock in calculating the value of the taxable gift
made by reason of petitioner's establishment of the ORAT's.
******
Conversely, petitioner maintains that for valuation purposes under section 2702,
each ORAT is properly characterized as creating only two separate interests: (1)
A retained annuity payable for a fixed term of2 years, and (2) a remainder interest
in favor ofher daughter. Petitioner further asserts that the former, in its entirety, is
a qualified interest within the meaning ofthe statute. Accordingly, it is petitioner's
position that the retained interest to be subtracted in computing the amount of the
taxable ·gift occasioned by each ORAT is to be valued as a simple 2-year term
annuity, without regard to any mortality factor.
The IRS relied on Example 5 for its position; the taxpayer argued that Example 5 was an invalid interpretation
of section 2702.
Overturning a regulation is hard. The court described the standard of review in this way:
The regulations at i~sue here are interpretative regulations promulgated under the
general authority vested in the Secretary by section 7805(a). Hence, while entitled
toconsiderable·weight, they are accorded less deference than would be legislative
regulations issued under a specific grant ofauthority to address a matter raised by
the pertinent statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) (Chevron); United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). A legislative regulation is to be upheld
unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra at 843-844.
With respect to interpretative regulations, the appropriate standard is whether the
provision tttimplement[s] the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.ut
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at 24 (quoting United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)). In applying this test, we look to the following two-part
analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court:
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Wlien a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent ofCongress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent ofCongress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence ofan administrative interpretation. Rather, ifthe statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., supra at 842-843; fn. refs. omitted.]
A challenged regulation is not considered such a permissible construction or
reasonable interpretation unless it harmonizes both with the statutory language and
with the statute's origin and purpose. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
supra at 25-26; National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S.
472,477 (1979) (National Muffler).
We pause to note that before the Chevron standard ofreview was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, the traditional standard was simply "whether the regulation
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose", as
prescribed by the Supreme Court in National Muffler Dealers Associationv.
United States, supra at 477. As we have observed in a previous case, the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Chevron failed to cite National Muffler and may have
established a different formulation ofthe standard ofreview. See Central Pa. Sav.
Association v. Commissioner, 104 T.e. 384,390-391 (1995). In the case before us,
we conclude that it is unnecessary to parse the semantics ofthe two tests to discern
any substantive difference between them, because the result here would be the
same under either.
The IRS argument was that an annuity paid to an estate is essentially a contingent reversion, which is not a
qualified interest.
Respondent alleges that Congress sought to curb the then- current practice of
bifurcating trusts into numerous interests and selectively retaining interests based
on mortality, such as reversions. Respondent points out the. common estate
planning device ofcreating a trust, with a term short enough that the grantor's risk
ofdying during the term would be minimal, in which the grantor retained both an
income interest and a contingent reversion in the trust corpus to take effect in the
event ofhis or her death during the tenn. The value ofthe gift to the remaindermen
would then be calculated by subtracting actuarial amounts for each of these
interests, despite the negligible chance that the reversion would become operative.
Respondent then goes on to frame the annuities payable to petitioner's estate as no
different in substance from such reversions. Respondent's position is that both
represent separate rights to receive property contingent upon the grantor's death
during the trust term. Because contingent rights, not fixed or ascertainable at the
creation of the trust, do not fall within any of the three forms defmed as qualified
in section 2702(b), respondent maintains that both are properly valued at zero. On
this basis, respondent argues that Example 5 is consistent not only with the purpose
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of section 2702 but also with other regulations which deal with post- death
interests, particularly section 25,,2702-3(e), Example (1), Gift Tax Regs.
Respondent further contends that Congress' reference to a trust consisting only of
a fIXed-term annuity and a noncontingent remainder was describing a situation
different from that of petitioner here. Respondent avers that the scenario
contemplated by the lawmakers was one in which the donor transferred the lead
annuity to an entity with perpetual life and retained a noncontingent remainder.
According to respondent, only in that context is it possible for a donor to create
strictly an annuity for a term ofyears and a noncontingent remainder. Hence, it is
only that kind of situation which respondent claims is sanctioned by the mention
ofan annuity "for a specified term ofyears" in section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs., with the result that there exists no inconsistency between Example 5 and
such regulatory section.
The court rejected the IRS argument:
With respect to the text itself, the short answer is that an annuity for a specified
term of years is consistent with the section 2702(b) definition of a qualified
interest; a contingent reversion is not.
As regards policy, permitting reduction to gift value for reversionary interests was
resulting in arbitrary and abusive elimination ofvalue which was intended to, and
typically did, pass to the donee. Donors were subtracting the full actuarial value of
a reversionary interest in the trust corpus and were not merely treating their
retained interests as an annuity for a fixed term ofyears. Although we acknowledge
that, in the case of a reversion, at least the equivalent of the tenn annuity's value
would be payable to the grantor or the grantor's estate in all events, Congress was
entitled to require that interests be cast in one of three specified forms to receive
the favorable treatment afforded qualified interests. Accordingly, the
Commissioner is equallyjustified in assigning a zero value to reversionary interests
outside the scope ofthe statutory defmition and refusing to consider whether such
interests can have the practical effect ofa different form ofinterest not chosen by
the grantor. See sec~25.2702-3(e),Example (1), Gifl Tax Regs.
In contrast, there exists no rationale for refusing to take into account for valuation
purposes a retained interest of which both the form and the effect are consistent
with the statute. We further observe that respondent's attempts to equate the estate's
rights here with other contingent, post-death interests are premised on the
bifurcation ofthe estate's interest from that ofpetitioner. Yet, given the historical
unity between an individual and his or her estate, we believe such separation is
unwarranted where the trust is drafted in the fonn of a specified interest retained
by the grantor, with the estate designated only as the alternate payee ofthat precise
interest. This is the result that would obtain if the governing instrument were
simply silent as to the disposition ofthe annuity in the event ofthe grantor's death
during the trust term. Additionally, any other construction would effectively
eliminate the qualified term-of-years annuity, a result not contemplated by
Congress.
Moreover, we note in this connection that the Commissioner has defined
noncontingent for purposes of determining a qualified remainder interest as
follows: "an interest is non-contingent only ifit is payable to the beneficiary or the
beneficiary's estate in all events." Sec. 25.2702-3(f)(1)(iii), Gift Tax Regs. We are
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satisfied that this principle is equally applicable in the circumstances at bar. For
similar reasons, we decline respondent's invitation to treat term annuities payable
to ~ grantor or the grantor's estate as having two separate "holders" for purposes of
the regulatory requirement of section 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i), Gift Tax Regs., that the
annuity amount "be payable to (or for the benefit of) the holder of the annuity
interest for each taxable year of the term."
Lastly, we observe that the legislative history indicates section 2702 was to draw
upon the rules for valuing split-interest gifts to charity under section 664. Section
664 deals with charitable remainder annuity trusts and unitrusts for which a tax
deduction is available. Yet under this statute, respondent apparently acknowledges
that an annuity payable for a term ofyears to an individual or the individual's estate
is valued as a fixed-term interest. Section 1.664-2(c), Income Tax Regs., provides
that the present value of an annuity is to be computed in accordance with
regulations promulgated under section 2031. Such regulations, in tum, contain the
following example:
EXAMPLE 4. ANNUITY PAYABLE FOR A TERM OF YEARS.
The decedent, or the decedent's estate, was entitled to receive an annuity
of $10,000 a year payable in equal quarterly installments at the end of
each quarter throughout a term certain. At the time of the decedent's
death, the section 7520 rate was 9.8 percent. A quarterly payment hadjust
been made prior to the decedent's death and payments were to continue
for 5 more years. Under Table B in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) for the
interest rate of9.8 percent, the factor for the present value ofa remainder
interest due after a term of5 years is .626597. Converting the factor to an
annuity factor, as described in paragraph (d)(2)(iv)(A) ofthis section, the
factor for the present value ofan annuity for a term of 5 years is 3.8102.
The adjustmentfactor from Table K in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) at an
interest rate of9.8 percent for quarterly annuity payments made at the end
of the period is 1.0360. The present value of the annuity is, therefore,
$39,473.67 ($10,000 x 3.8102 x 1.0360).
[Sec. 20.2031-7T(d)(5), Example (4), Temporary Estate Tax Regs.,64
Fed. Reg. 23214 (April 30, 1999); see also pre-1999 sec.20.2031-7(d)(5),
Example (4), Estate Tax Regs.]
It strikes us as incongruous that respondent is willing to recognize the full value of
a term annuity, whether payable to a taxpayer or to the taxpayer's estate, when to
do so will reduce the amount of a charitable deduction, but refutes this approach
when it will decrease the amount of a taxable gift.
Walton's significance is that it allows a ORAT to be created with a zero remainder interest. The government
did not appeal Walton.
3. Joint Purchase of Residence. PLR 200112023 deals with a trust into which parents contributed
enough cash to purchase the life interest in a residence and son contributed the amount ofthe remainder interest. Parents
could live in the residence until the death of the second of them and the residence would not be included in either of
their estates.
A - 127
R. SECTION 6166 -- EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX
1. Transfer of Sole Proprietorship Assets to LLC. In PLR 200043030 the Service approved the
reorganization of business assets. Specifically approved were:
(I) The distribution of excess capital held in the name of the Sole
Proprietorship to Decedent's estate will not constitute a disposition as defined
under section 6166(g).
(2) The conversion ofthe Sole Proprietorship into an LLC and the dissolution
of the Corporation will not be treated as dispositions under section 6 I66(g).
(3) The distribution of fannIand from Decedent's estate to Daughter's estate
is not a disposition under section 6166(g).
(4) The farmland leased by Daughter's estate to the LLC remains active, and
entering into the lease is not a disposition under section 6166(g).
(5) The distribution ofprofits ofthe LLC and the Quany LLC to Decedent's
estate is not a disposition under section 6166(g).
The third and fifth rulings are interesting:
Section 6166(g)(1)(A)(i) provides that ifany portion ofan interest in a closely held
business which qualifies under section 6166(a)( I) is distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of, or money and other property attributable to such an
interest is withdrawn from such trade or business, and (ii) the aggregate of such
distributions, sales, exchanges, or other dispositions and withdrawal equals or
exceeds 50 percent of the value of such interest, then the extension of time for
payment of tax provided in subsection (a) shall cease to apply, and the unpaid
portion of the tax payable in installments shall be paid upon notice and demand
from the Secretary.
Section 61 66(g)(1)(D) provides that section 6166(g)(1)(A)(i) does not apply to a
transfer ofproperty ofthe decedent to a person entitled by reason ofthe decedent's
death to receive the property under the decedent's will, the applicable law of
descent and distribution, or a trust created by the decedent. A similar rule applies
in the case ofa series ofsubsequent transfers ofthe property by reason ofdeath so
long as each transfer is to a member of the family (within the meaning. of section
267(c)(4) of the transferor in such transfer.
Section 20.6 I66A-3(e)( I) provides, in pertinent part, that a transfer by the executor
of an interest in a closely held business to a beneficiary or trustee named in the
decedent's will, or an heir who is entitled to receive the interest under the
applicable intestacy law, does not constitute a distribution thereof for purposes of
detennining whether 50 percent or more of an interest in a closely held business
has been distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of.
In this case, pursuant to Article IV of Decedent's will, the residue of Decedent's
estate (including the farmland) passes outright to Daughter. Accordingly, the
transfer ofthe fannland by Decedent's estate to Daughter's estate (the estate ofthe
person entitled by reason of Decedent's death to receive the property under
Decedent's will) in order to limit Decedent's estate's potential liability from third-
parties who could be injured by the continued farming operations will not
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constitute a distribution thereof for purposes ofdetermining whether 50 percent or
more ofan interest in a closely held business has been distributed, sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of.
According to the tenns of Daughter's will, the residue of Daughter's estate passes
to Trust. Therefore, the executor ofDaughter's estate will distribute the residue of
Daughter's estate, including the farmland received as part of Decedent's residuary
bequest to Daughter, to Trust.
It is represented that the farming business will be operated through the LLC.
Although the core of the farming operation is conducted through the LLC, the
farmland constitutes a fundamental part of the overall farming operation and will
continue to be utilized in the farming operation. Thus, the transfer ofthe farmland
by Daughter's estate to Trust pursuant to the terms ofDaughter's will not constitute
a distribution thereof for purposes of determining whether 50 percent or more of
an interest in a closely held business has been distributed, sold, exchanged, or
otherwise disposed of.
******
S'ection 20.6166A-3(d)( I) provides that in any case where money or other property
is withdrawn from the trade or business and the aggregate withdrawals of money
or other property equal or exceed 50 percent ofthe value ofthe trade or business,
the privilege of paying the tax in installments terminates and the whole of the
unpaid portion of the tax which is payable in installments becomes due and shall
be paid upon notice and demand from the District Director. A withdrawal will
trigger this acceleration provision only if the withdrawn money or other property
constitutes "included property" within the meaning ofthat term as used in section
20.2032-1(d). Section 20.2032-1(d) defmes included property as all property
interests existing at the decedent's death which form a part ofthe gross estate. The
provisions of section 20.6166A-3(d)(I) do not apply to the withdrawal of money
or other property which constitutes "excluded property." Section 20.2032-1(d)
defmes excluded property as property earned or accrued after the date ofdecedent's
death.
The profits earned by the LLC and the Quarry LILC after the date of Decedent's
death are excluded property under section 20.2032-1(d), and as such, would not
constitute a withdrawal of money or other property from a closely held·business
within the meaning ofsection 6166(g). Accordingly, the withdrawal ofcurrent and
future profits from the ILLC and the Quarry ILLC will not be considered a
disposition or a withdrawal of funds from the closely held business for purposes
of section 6166(g)(I)(A)(i). However, withdrawal of any included property (as
defined under section 20.2032-I(d)) from the closely held business will be
considered a disposition for purposes of section 6166(g).
In PLR 200129018 a business owned by a QTIP trust over which spouse had no power ofappointment could
be transferred to an LLC without acceleration under section 6166(g).
s. T AX ADMINISTRATION
1. Collateral Estoppel Prevents Estate From Excluding Ranch. In Estate of Theodore C.
Chemodurow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-14 (2001), the Tax Court held that the estate was precluded from
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arguing that a ranch and is equipment had been sold to the decedent's dau~hter because in two actions in Montana state
court this had been determined that the sale was invalid. The applicable law was set forth by the court as follows:
The doctrine ofissue preclusio~or collateral estoppel, provides that, once an issue
of fact or law is "actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation." Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 0.5 (1979». Issue preclusion is ajudiciallycreated equitable doctrine
the purposes of which are to protect parties from unnecessary and redundant
litigation, to conserve judicial resources, and to foster certainty in and reliance on
judicial action. See, e.g., ide at 153-154; United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627
F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980). In Peck v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 162, 166-167
(1988), affd. 904 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1990), we set forth the following five
conditions that must be satisfied prior to application of issue preclusion in the
context ofa factual dispute (the Peck requirements):
( 1) The issue in the second suit must be identical in all respects with
the one decided in the first suit.
(2) There must be a final j udgment rendered by a court ofcompetent
jurisdiction.
(3) Collateral estoppel may be invoked against parties and their
privies to the prior judgment.
(4) The parties must actually have litigated the issues and the
resolution of these issues must have been essential to the prior decision.
(5) The controlling facts and applicable legal rules must remain
unchanged from those in the prior litigation. [Citations omitted.]
Even ifthe Peck requirements are satisfied, however, we have broad discretion to
determine when issue preclusion should apply, and we may refuse to apply it
where, for instance, it is to be applied offensively, and the party against whom it
is to be applied had little incentive to defend in the frrst action or where the second
action affords the party procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that
could readily cause a different result. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322,330-331 (1979); see also McQuade v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 137, 143
(1985).
In considering respondent's position that preclusive effect attaches to the fmdings
of the State court, we inquire whether the courts of Montana would accord such
findings preclusive effect. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1738 (2000) (the records andjudicial
proceedings ofa State shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States as they have in the courts ofthe State from which they are taken);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982) ("Congress has
specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court
judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged
would do sott, quoting Allen v. McCurrey, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Bertoli v.
Commissioner, 103 T.e. 501, 508 (1994). The doctrine of collateral estoppel is
recognized in the courts of Montana. E.g., Rafanelli v. Dale, 971 P.2d 371, 373
A - 130
(Mont. 1998) ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a party against whom the
claim is asserted or a party in privity with the earlier party, from relitigating an
issue which has been decided in a different cause ofaction.If). The Supreme Court
ofMontana applies a three-part test to detennine whether collateral estoppel bars
litigation: (I) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a fmaljudgment on the merits?
(3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party in privity with a party
to the prior litigation? See id. at 373-374. Although the three-part test applied by
the Supreme Court ofMontana does not specifically recognize the fourth and fifth
Peck requirements. (actual litigation of an issue whose resolution was essential to
prior case and no change in controlling facts and applicable legal rules), we believe
that those requirements are inherent in Montana's three-part test. Since the parties
have couched their arguments in terms ofthe Peck requirements, we shall respond
accordingly.
2. Refund Suit Under Section 6166. In Hansen v. United States, 87 AFTR2d, 2001-846 (April 2001),
the Eighth Circuit held that the district court had no jurisdiction in a refund case if the estate had elected to make
payments under section 6166 but was behind in the payments.
T. MISCELLANEOUS
:
1. Family-Owned Bank as Independent Trustee. In PLR 200125038 the National Office ruled that
a trust company controlled by a family was nonetheless an independent trustee that is not a related or subordinate party
as defmed in section 672(c). The trust company bylaws prohibited any officer or director from being present during
discussion of, or voting on, the exercise of any discretionary power (except over investments) in a trust if the officer
or director, or a spouse of the officer or director, is a grantor or beneficiary of the trust, or a descendant (or spouse or
fonner spouse of a descendant) of certain family members. An officer or director was prohibited from exercising
incidents of ownership on a life insurance policy on the officer of director's life.
Sections 2036, 2038, 2041 and 2042 would not be implicated nor would a trust lose its GST grandfathering
by having the trust company be trustee.
2. IRS Summons Ouashed. In Segerstrom v. United States, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-1153 (N.D. Cal.
2001), the court quashed an IRS summons on the grounds of attomey-client privilege. The question was whether the
documents requested involved business advice or tax advice. The court described these facts:
Henry T. Segerstrom ("Segerstrom") filed an Estate Tax Return on February 27,
1998 to settle tax liability on his late mother's estate, the Estate of Nellie Ruth
Segerstrom ("Mrs.Segerstrom") Amended Petition to Quash~ 11. Part ofthe estate
included Segerstrom Properties LLC ("Segerstrom, Properties"), of which
Segerstrom is a co-trustee./d. On August 15,2000, pursuant to an examination of
the tax return, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued four summonses to
Robert Sullivan ("Sullivan") and George Montgomery ("Montgomery") to produce
documents relating to the fonnation, operation, or valuation of Segerstrom
Properties. Motion to Enforce 4. Sullivan and Montgomery were attorneys at the
law fll1l1 Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro ("Pillsbury"), Which represented Mrs.
Segerstrom and members of her family, including petitioner, for estate planning
purposes. Declaration of Robert E. Sullivan ("Sullivan Decl.") (Mar.2000) 1f 2.
Pillsbury rendered services "in connection with the fonnation of limited liability
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companies to hold assets previously held by the Segerstroms." Id. The frrm also
represented the companies that were fonned. Id.
Sullivan and Montgomery refused to produce certain documents to the IRS,
claiming the protection ofthe attorney-client privilege. Ten documents are at issue,
numbered 42,51, 59,66,69, 74, 78, 80, 81, and 84 on a privilege log provided by
the attorneys. See Sullivan Decl. (J8O.2001) fJf fJf 4-11. Segerstrom has filed a
petition before this Court to quash the IRS summonses, and the government has
filed a motion to enforce the summonses.
The court found that the documents were part of legal advice:
Sullivanand Montgomery represented petitioner and his mother for estate planning
purposes, which included helping the Segerstroms fonn Segerstrom Properties and
representing it thereafter. Sullivan Decl. (Mar.2000) fJf 1f 2 and 4(a) (recounting
Segerstrom's request on September 28, 1995 for "legal advice concerning; limited
liability companies, partnerships andestate planningft). Bycontrast, the government
stated only that it "believe[d] that the 10 documents sought in the summonses relate
to business not legal advice." Motion to Enforce 8.
Upon review of Sullivan's declaration describing the ten documents at issue, the
Court finds that all the documents fall within the Pillsbury firm's representation of
the Segerstroms for purposes of rendering legal advice and assistance in estate
planning. The government's argument that these documents relate to business
advice fails on the facts presented.
The court rejected claims that the presence ofvarious accountants and in-house fmancial assistants waived the
privilege. The court also rejected the IRS claim that certain documents contained non-privileged facts:
The government argues that the documents it seeks are not covered under
attorney-client privilege because they contain valuations and fmancial information
concerning assets owned by Segerstrom Properties. Reply 2. The attorney-client
privilege does not extend beyond the substance of the client's confidential
communications. In re Fischel, 557 F.2d at 211. Thus, the privilege does not
protect communications that ttreport or commenton informationcoming from [third
parties] or from public documents, or are summaries of conferences held with or
in the presence of others. tt Carey-Canada, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., tt8
F.R.D. 242,248 & n.15 (D.C.C.1986). For example, an attorney's summary of a
client's business transactions with third parties is generally not privileged. See In
re Fischel, 557 F.2d at 212. However, the privilege does apply where, in addition
to reflecting facts received from third parties, the communication is "so interwoven
with the privileged communications that disclosure of the former leads to
disclosure of the latter. tt Id.; see also Western Trails, 139 F.R.D. at 10.
Here, all the documents at issue involve communications between the attorneys, the
clients, or their agents. No third parties were involved. The Court therefore shall
focus on the nature of the information contained in the documents.
1) Absence ofNon-Privileged Facts
Document 42 is a summary of a telephone conversation between Sullivan, Mrs.
Segerstrom, and her agent. Sullivan Decl. (Mar.2000) ~ 4(~ lee). Document 80
contains an attorney's comments on various legal documents for Segerstrom
Properties. Id. at 4 ~ (bbbb). Document 84 includes documents that Heim revised
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based on and reflecting legal advice given by an attorney. Id. at -U 4(ffft). None of
these documents appears to contain non-privileged facts. These documents are
therefore privileged.
2) Non-Privileged Facts Mixed with Legal Advice
Document 59 contains "draft legal documentsft relating to contributions by Mrs.
Segerstrom to Segerstrom Properties. Id. at , 4(ggg). Similarly, document 8
contains comments made by Sullivan concerning several charts showing the
ownership of properties held by the Segerstrom family. Id. at' 4(zzz). Document
8/ is a letter requesting legal advice on, "revised calculationsft of the ownership
interests in various Segerstrom business entities. Id. at -U 4(cccc). Standing alone,
the contributions, charts, and revised calculations of ownership interests may be
non-privileged information relating to the clients or their business dealings.
However, the contributions appear in draft legal documents prepared by an
attorney, the charts are the subject ofan attorney's legal comments, and the revised
calculations accompanied a request for legal advice. Documents 59, 78, and 81, and
the information contained therein, are privileged because privileged
communications are so interwoven with noo- privileged information that disclosure
o.fthe latter necessarily discloses the fonner. See In re Fischel, 557 F.2d at 212.
3) Estimates and Calculations
Document 5/ is a series of charts showing transfers of assets to Segerstrom
Properties and related fmancial information. Sullivan Decl. (Mar.2000) 1f 4(yy).
Document 66contains valuation ofassets contributed to Segerstrom Properties. Id
at -U 4(nnn). Document 74 contains estimates of the value of certain assets
contributed to Segerstrom Properties and a schedule ofassets transferred to Henry
T. Segerstrom Properties, LLC. Id. at , 4(vvv). According to Sullivan, these
documents contain or consist of financial calculations or estimates that were done
by agents of the Segerstroms, at the request ofSullivan to assist him in rendering
legal advice. Suppl. Sullivan Decl. ~ 3. These documents are therefore privileged
because they contain information about the client that was transmitted in
confidence by agents of the clients for the purpose ofobtaining legal advice.
3. Florida Intangibles Tax. A revocable trust that is irrevocable by its terms for a limited period no
longer suffices to avoid the Florida intangibles tax. Florida Technical Assistance Advisement No. 01C2-001. Thus,
an actual irrevocable trust must exist even the grantor can receive assets for a non-ascertainable standard so long as
someone other than the grantor is trustee -- even a Florida resident. The grantor should retain a testamentary power of
appointment as well. .
4. Reduction of IRA Value by Income Taxes. The Tax Court ofNew Jersey rejected the argument in
Carlin v. Director, 2001 WL 1677449 (N.J. Tax):
New Jersey Transfer Inheritance Tax is computed "upon the clear market value of
the property transferred" subject to certain specific deductions, none of which
expressly includes income tax liability, ftandno others." N.J.S.A. 54:34-5. Plaintiff
contends that his claimed reduction in the taxable value of the IRA is not a *547
deduction under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5. He characterizes the reduction as a discount in
value resulting from the income tax liability inherent in the IRA. Defendant
responds that plaintiffs attempt to reduce the taxable value of the IRA represents
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an effort to' take a deduction not pennitted by N.J.S.A. 54:34-5 and further
contends that, even ifthe reduction in taxable value is treated as a discount to clear
market value, the discount is not allowable under In re Estate ofRornnes, sr!'ra 79
N.J. 139, 398 A.2d 543.
The Rornnes decision is critical to the detennination of this appeal. Accordingly,
a detailed explanation and analysis of that decision is warranted. There, the
executors of the estate of Haakon I. Romnes sought a reduction, based on income
tax liability, in the value for Transfer Inheritance Tax purposes of an annuity
providing annual fixed income payments to the decedent's widow for the duration
of her life. The fund from which the annuity was to be paid was accumulated
during the decedent's lifetime from contributions to a pension plan by his employer.
Income taxes on contributions to the fund were deferred, and, as a result, the
annual annuity payments to Mrs. Romnes were subject to federal income tax. The
estate argued that, as ofthe date ofdeath, the deferred tax obligation was a burden
upon the annuity payments to be received by Mrs. Romnes, and reduced their
value. "Otherwise expressed, it is argued that since Mrs. Romnes will never enjoy
in a beneficial sense that portion of her annuity payments that must be devoted to
paying income taxes, she should not now be required to pay an inheritance tax upon
what she will never beneficially receive." Id. at 143, 398 A.2d 543. The estate
sought a value discount equal to the taxes payable by Mrs. Romnes with respect to
the annuity payments, assuming each payment was added to her other income.
In analyzing the estate's argument, the Supreme Court defmed "clearmarket value"
under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5 as the equivalent of fair market value, that is, the price
which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller when neither is under
compulsion to buy or sell and both parties have reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts. Id. at 144-45, 398 A.2d 543. The Court commented that, in
determining the clear market value ofassets for which there is not an active market,
a court must "create a hypothetical buyer and a hypothetical seller, whom we then
place in a hypothetical market place. We attribute to each of these persons all
infonnation which might affect value, and then, weighing all relevant factors,
decide how they would reach a price satisfactory to each." Id. at 145, 398 A.2d
543. This price or value must be determined objectively without consideration of
any factors personal to either the hypothetical buyer or the hypothetical seller. "The
use ofan objective standard necessarily precludes resort to any factors personal to
the seller or the buyer. Courts have consistently so held." Id. at 147,398 A:2d 543.
In applying these principles to the annuity in question, the Supreme Court
concluded that neither a hypothetical seller nor a hypothetical buyer would be
concerned with Mrs. Romnes' tax liability.
A hypothetical purchaser ofsuch an income interest as this annuity would
be interested in the annuitant's health, in her life style, and in the solvency
of the payor.... He would be utterly unconcerned with the annuitant's
personal income tax picture.
Nor would a hypothetical seller, about to divest himself of the income
interest, be concerned in any way with a presumptive future liability he
would never be called upon to meet. As soon as he divested himselfofthe
interest, the prospective future liability would cease to exist. The same
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would be true if Mrs. Romnes herself is thought of as the seller. She
would have no interest in a prospective liability that was about to end.
Finally, is there any even remote possibility that Mrs. Romnes would
accept as the purchase price ofher annuity the amount ofmoney that she
asks the State of New Jersey to accept as being the value of this asset?
There is of course no such possibility.
[Id. at 148-49, 398 A.2d 543.]
The Court also noted that the result of permitting a valuation discount calculated
in the manner suggested by the estate would be that the wealthier the recipient, the
greater the tax liability attributable to the annuity (because of the graduated tax
rates under the Internal Revenue Code) and, therefore, the greater the discount in
value which would be claimed.
Thus it would follow that the rich would pay a smaller [transfer
inheritance] tax than the less affluent and the very rich less than the rich.
This rather startling result must again rest upon presumed legislative
intent. But of course neither this nor any other tax statute has ever been
intentionally drafted to classify taxpayers according to wealth and then
impose graduated taxes in such a way that the richest pay the least.
[Id. at 153, 398 A.2d 543.]
***
The law is well established that each taxpayer should pay his or her fair share of
taxes. See Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc. v. Director, Div. ofTaxation, 8 N.J.Tax
354,358-59 (1986). IfTransfer Inheritance Taxes are reduced on a purely artificial
or hypothetical basis, without taking into account the actual amount that will be
received by the beneficiary, then the beneficiary may pay less than his or her fair
share oftaxes, or may pay excessive taxes. Calculating a proper valuation discount,
therefore, must involve consideration of the actual tax circumstances of the
beneficiary. However, consideration of those circumstances results in a deviation
from the objective standard of value applicable for purposes of determining
Transfer Inheritance Tax. In re Estate of Romnes, supra, 79 N.J. at 147, 398 A.2d
543.
Plaintiff is correct in asserting that, without a discount in the value ofthe IRA, he
will pay Transfer Inheritance Tax on a portion of the IRA which must be used to
pay federal and New Jersey income taxes. There appears to be some degree of
unfairness in this result. But, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, allowing a
discount based on income tax liability is not appropriate for two reasons: 1)
determining the proper discount requires abandonment ofthe objective standard of
value, because calculating income tax liability without regard to the actual tax
circumstances of the beneficiary could result in an excessive or inadequate
discount, and 2) the Romnes decision precludes such a discount.
A - 135
u. H.R. 1836 - THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001
1. Explanation of New Law.
A. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Provisions That Are Effective Immediately.
1. Conservation Easements. With respect to decedents dying after December3 I, 2000
the requirement that land eligible for a qualified conservation easement be within a certain distance from a metropolitan
area, national park, wilderness area, or Urban National Forest is eliminated. Although most areas ofthe country were
already covered, this reduces the complexity of a very useful planning technique.
2. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Rules. The Act contains a number of"savings"
provisions related to the GST. The provisions were advocated primarily by the accounting profession in order to ward
ofmalpractice claims by fIXing certain kinds ofproblems -- e.g. failure to allocate exemption on a timely filed fonn 709
- - and by making it possible to fix certain problems after the fact.
a. DeemedAllocations. GSTexemption will be deemedallocated to"indirect
skips", which are transfers to a "GST trust," to the extent necessary to produce an inclusion ratio of zero, unless the
transferor elects not to have the deemed allocation rules apply by gift tax return filed for the period in which the transfer
is made or deemed to be made. A GST trust is defined by the statute as a trust that could have a generation-skipping
transfer with respect to the transferor unless:
(i) the trust instrument provides that more than 25 percent of the
trust corpus must be distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or more individuals
who are non-skip persons --
(I) before the date that the individual attains age 46,
(II) on or before one or more <4J,tes specified in the trust
instrument that will occur before the date that such individual attains age 46, or
(III) upon the occurrence ofan event that, inaccordance with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, may reasonably be expected to occur
before the date that such individua~ attains age 46,
(ii) the trustinstrument provides that more than 25
percent of the trust corpus must be distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or
more individuals who are non-skip persons and who are living on the date ofdeath
of another person identified in the instrument (by name or by class) who is more
than 10 years older than such individuals,
(iii) the trust instrument provides that, if one or
more individuals ·who are non-skip persons die on or before a date or event
described in clause (i) or (ii), more than 25 percent ofthe trust corpus either must
be distributed to the estate or estates of one or more of such individuals or is
subject to a general power of appointment exercisable by one or more of such
individuals,
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(iv) the trust is a trust any portion ofwhich would
be included in the gross estate of a non-skip person (other than the transferor) if
such person died immediately after the transfer,
(v) the trust is a charitable lead annuity trust
(within the meaning of section 2642(e)(3)(A)) or a charitable remainder annuity
trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (within the meaning ofsection 664(d)), or
(vi) the trust is a trust with respect to which a
deduction was allowed under section 2522 for the amount ofan interest in the fonn
ofthe right to receive annual payments ofa fixed percentage ofthe net fair market
value of the trust property (determined yearly) and which is required to pay
principal to a non-skip person ifsuch person is alive when the yearly payments for
which the deduction was allowed terminate. For purposes ofthis subparagraph, the
value of transferred property shall not be considered to be includible in the gross
estate of a non-skip person or subject to a right of withdrawal by reason of such
person holding a right to withdraw so much ofsuch property as does not exceed the
amount referred to in section 2503(b) with respect to any transferor, and it shall be
assumed that powers of appointment held by non-skip persons will not be
exercised.
In general it remains more advisable to allocate GST exemption on a timely filed gift tax return to avoid
confusion. Allocations should always be made by fonnula to reduce the chances that insufficient exemption will be
allocated and to cover the risk that the automatic allocation rules will have inadvertently used exemption not leaving
enough to cover a subsequent transfer.
b. Retroactive Allocations. In certain instances retroactive allocations of GST
exemption will be allowed. In general this will occur where a transfer is made to a trust which has a non-skip person
as a beneficial)' and the non-skip person dies prior to the transferor. The statute provides as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. -- If--
(A) a non-skip person has an interest or a future interest in a trust to
which any transfer has been made,
(B) such person--
(i) is a lineal descendant ofa grandparent ofthe transferor
or of a grandparent of the transferor's spouse or former spouse, and
(ii) is assigned to a generation below the generation
assignment of the transferor, and
(C) such person predeceases the transferor, then the transferor may
make an allocation of any of such transferor's unused GST exemption to any
previous transfer or transfers to the trust on a chronological basis.
(2) SPECIAL RULES. -- If the allocation under paragraph (1) by the
transferor is made on a gift tax return filed on or before the date prescribed by
section 6075(b) for gifts made within the calendar year within which the non-skip
person's death occurred--
A - 137
(A) the value of such transfer or transfers for purposes of section
2642(a) shall be determined as if such allocation had been made on a timely filed
gift tax return for each calendar year within which each transfer was made,
(B) such allocation shall be effective immediately before such death,
and
(C) the amount of the transferor's unused GST exemption available
to be allocated shall be determined immediately before such death.
(3) FUTURE INTEREST. -- For purposes of this subsection, a person has a
future interest in a trust ifthe trust may permit income or corpus to be paid to such
person on a date or dates in the future."
The operation ofthis provision in certain situations is not entirely clear. For instance, suppose a trust has only
one beneficiary, a skip person who also has a special power ofappointment. The skip person adds a non-skip person
as a beneficiary, and the non-skip person dies. Is there a retroactive allocation?
c. Severance OfTrusts With Inclusion Ratios Greater Than Zero. The Act
allows trusts with inclusion ratios ofother than zero to be severed into two trusts ifdone on a fractional basis, one with
an inclusion ratio ofone and the other with an inclusion ratio of zero. The severance must be done under the terms of
the governing instrument or under applicable state law. The statute also allows the severance ofother trusts as follows:
IN GENERAL. -- The tenn 'qualified severancet means the division ofa single trust
and the creation (by any means available under the governing instrument or under
local law) of two or more trusts if--
(I) the single trust was divided on a fractional basis, and
(II) the terms of the new trusts, in the aggregate, provide for the same succession
of interests of beneficiaries as are provided in the original trust.
d. Valuation Rules. New rules are added to say that the value of GST
transfers will be the same as determined for gift or estate tax purposes as the case may be as of the time of the transfer
or the close of the estate tax inclusion period (ifapplicable). This is helpful in certain instances, such as the treatment
of split-dollar.life insurance.
e. Relief from Late Elections and Substantial Compliance. Treasury is
directed to issue regulations allowing relief from late elections where there has been substantial compliance.
B. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Provisions That Are Effective Between 2001 and
1. Change in Rates and Applicable Credit Amounts. As explained by The Joint
Committee on Taxation Summary of the Act:
Under the conference agreement, in 2002, the 5-percent surtax (which phases out
the benefit of the graduated rates) and the rates in excess of 50 percent are
repealed. In addition, in 2002, the unified credit effective exemption amount (for
both estate and gift tax purposes) is increased to $1 million.
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In 2003, the"estate and gift tax rates in excess of49 percent are repealed.
In 2004, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of48 percent are repealed, and the
unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes is increased to
$1.5 million. (The unified credit effective exemption amount for gift tax purposes
remains at $1 million as increased in 2002.) In addition, in 2004, the family-owned
business deduction is repealed.
In 2005, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of47 percent are repealed.
In 2006, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of46 percent are repealed, and the
unified credit effective exemption amount for estate tax purposes is increased to $2
million.
In 2007, the estate and gift tax rates in excess of45 percent are repealed.
In 2009, the unified credit effective exemption amount is increased to $3.5 million.
The GST exemption remains at $1,060,000 adjusted for inflation until 2004 when
i~ increases to $1,500,000 and thereafter it is the same as the estate tax exemption.
2. State Death Tax Credit. The Act makes significant changes in the state death tax
credit. The credit remains the same through the end of 2001.
In 2002 the credit is 75% ofthe amount allowed by section 2011(b), in 2003 it is
50%, in 2004 it is 25%.
For decedent's dying after December 31, 2004, the state death tax credit is repealed
and replaced with a deduction equal to "the amount of any estate, inheritance,
legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State or the District ofColumbia,
in respect ofany property included in the gross estate (not including any such taxes
paid with respect to the estate of a person other than the decedent)."
What does the parenthetical mean? Does it apply to section 2044 property?
Most states with estate taxes equal to the amount ofthe state death tax credit will need to amend their statutes
if they want to continue to generate revenue because after 2004 there will be no such credit. If some states elect not to
impose anew estate tax that will create a substantial benefit for those dying residents of such states.
.Depending on the amount ofany new state estate taxes decedent's dying in 2005 and thereafter may be subject
to a higher rate of tax than they would have been before refonn. For instance, in 2005 the maximum estate tax rate is
47%. If a state imposed an estate tax with a top rate of 16% that would net to 8.48% after deducting it on the federal
return. The total tax, therefore would be 55.48%.
There are certain limitations described by the Statement of Managers as follows:
Such State taxes must have been paid and claimed before the later of: (1) four years
after the filing ofthe estate tax return; or (2) (a) 60 days after a decision ofthe U.S.
Tax Court detennining the estate tax liability becomes fmal, (b) the expiration of
the period ofextension to pay estate taxes over time under section 6166, or (c) the
expiration ofthe period of limitations in which to file a claim for refund or 60 days
after a decision of a court in which such refund suit has become fmal.
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3. Expansion of section 6166. The number of partners and shareholders
permitted for section 6166 property is increased from 15 to 45. An additional provision is added for certain lending and
fmance businesses. These provisions are effective for decedents dying after December 31., 200 I.
4. Estate Tax Recapture from Cash Rents of section 2032A property. The
Joint Committee Summary provides:
The conference agreement provides that, ifon the date ofenactment or at any time
within one year after the date of enactment, a claim for refund or credit of any
overpayment of tax resulting from the application ofnet cash lease provisions for
spouses and lineal descendants (sec. 2032A(c)(7XE» is barred by operation oflaw
or rule of law, then the refund or credit ofsuch overpayment shall, nonetheless, be
allowed if a claim therefore is filed before the date that is one year after the date
of enactment. This provision is effective for refund claims filed prior to the date
that is one year after the date ofenactment.
5. Repeal of section 2057. Effective for decedents dying after December
31,2003. The net effect ofthis repeal, and the increase in the exemption, is a slight benefit for owners ofclosely-held
businesses.
C. Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Provisions That Are Effective After 2009.
1. Repeal of the Estate Tax. The estate tax is repealed for decedents dying after
December 31, 2009.
2. Continuation and Modification ofthe Gift Tax. The gift tax continues with thetop
tax rate being the highest individual income tax rate (35%). The $1,000,000 lifetime exemption continues as does the
$10,000 annual exclusion.
Except as Treaswy may provide in regulations, a transfer in trust will be treated as a taxable gift under section
2503 unless the trust is treated as wholly owned by the donor or the donor's spouse under subpart E of part I of
subchapter J of chapter I. That is, transfers to grantor trusts are not treated as taxable gifts. The purpose of this
provision is presumably to ensure that a transfer is either taxed for income tax purposes or remains as a part of the
income base ofthe donor. The provision is unclear in a number of respects. For instance, what are the consequences
oftransfers from the grantor trust? Will that be gift? If so, then will use of assets by trust beneficiaries be deemed to
be a gift, for instance?
3. Elimination ofthe Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax. The GST is eliminated for
transfers after December 31, 2009.
4. Changes in Basis. The step-up in basis rules of section 1014 are repealed for
decedents dying after December 31, 2009.
Assets acquired from a decedent will have as basis the lower of fair market value as of the date ofdeath and
the decedent's adjusted basis, plus (I) up to $1,300,000 in the aggregate (limited by unused built-in losses and loss
carryovers), and (2) up to $3,000,000 ifacquired by a surviving spouse, ofadditional basis may be allocated to property
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owned by the decedent(but not in excess of the fair market value of the assets). These amounts will be adjusted for
inflation after 2009. The specifics of the latter provision are as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL. --In the case ofproperty to which this subsection applies
and which is qualified spousal property, the basis of such property under
subsection (a) (as increased under subsection (b» shall be increased by its spousal
property basis increase.
(2) SPOUSAL PROPERTY BASIS INCREASE. -- For purposes of this
subsection --
(A) IN GENERAL. -- The spousal property basis increase for
property referred to in paragraph (1) is the portion of the aggregate spousal
property basis increase which is allocated to the property pursuant to this section.
(B) AGGREGATE SPOUSAL PROPERTY BASIS INCREASE.--
In the case of any estate, the aggregate spousal property basis increase is
$3,000,000.
(~) QUALIFIED SPOUSAL PROPERTY. - For purposes ofthis subsection,
the term 'qualified spousal property' means --
(A) outright transfer property, and
(B) qualified terminable interest property.
(4) OUTRIGHTTRANSFERPROPERTY.-Forpurposesofthissubsection
(A) IN GENERAL. -- The tenn 'outright transfer property' means any
interest in property acquired from the decedent by the decedent's surviving spouse.
(B) EXCEPTION.--Subparagraph(A)shallnotapplywh"ere,on the
lapse oftime, on the occurrence ofan event or contingency, or on the failure ofan
event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving spouse will
terminate or fail --
(i) (I) if an interest in such property passes or has passed
(for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from
the decedent to any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate ofsuch
spouse), and
(II) if by reason of such passing such person (or his
heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such property after such
tennination or failure of the interest so passing to the surviving spouse, or
(ii) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse,
pursuant to directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust.
For purposes ofthis subparagraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest
which will tenninate or fail merely because it is the ownership ofa bond, note, or
similar contractual obligation, the discharge ofwhich would not have the effect of
an annuity for life or for a term.
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(C) INTEREST OF SPOUSE CONDITIONAL ON SURVIVAL
FOR LIMITED PERIOD. -- For purposes of this paragraph, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse shall not be considered as an interest which will tennin~teor
fail on the death of such spouse if-
(i) such death will cause a tennination or failure of such
interest only ifit occurs within a period not exceeding 6 months after the decedent's
death, or only if it occurs as a result ofa common disaster resulting in the death of
the decedent and the surviving spouse, or only if it occurs in the case ofeither such
event, and
(ii) such termination or failure does not in fact occur.
(5) QUALIFIED TERMINABLE INTEREST PROPERTY. For purposes of
this subsection --
(A) IN GENERAL. -- The term 'qualified terminable interest
property' means property --
(i) which passes from the decedent, and
(ii) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income
interest for life.
(B) QUALIFYING INCOME INTEREST FOR LIFE. The surviving
spouse has a qualifying income interest for life if --
(i) the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income from
the property, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, or has a usufruct
interest for life in the property, and
(ii) no person has a power to appoint any part of the
property to any person- other than the surviving spouse.
Clause (ii) shall not apply to a power exercisable only at or after the death of the
surviving spouse. To the extent provided in regulations, an annuity shall be treated
in a manner similar to an income interest in property (regardless of whether the
property from which the annuity is payable can be separately identified).
(C) PROPERTY INCLUDES INTEREST THEREIN. The term
'property' includes an interest in property.
(D) SPECIFIC PORTION TREATED AS SEPARATE PROPERTY.
-- A specific portion ofproperty shall be treated as separate property. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the term 'specific portion' only includes a portion
detennined on a fractional or percentage' basis.
There are various special rules. With respect to joint property, so long as only the decedent and the ~urviving
spouse are joint tenants or tenants by the entirety the decedent will be treated as owning only 50% of the property but
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if otherwise then it is a consideration test. Community property is treated as being owned entirely by the decedent
spouse.
A decedent is treated as owning the property in a revocable trust (as defmed in section 645(b)(1». A decedent
is not treated as owning property by reason of a power of appointment; however, property transferred to a trust with
respect to which the decedent reserved the right to make any change in the enjoyment thereof through the exercise of
a power to alter, amend, or terminate the trust. In addition, other property passing from a decedent by reason ofdeath
to the extent it passes without consideration may have additional basis allocated to it.
Property acquired by a decedent by gift or inter vivos transfer for less than full and adequate consideration
within three years of death is not eligible for the allocation of additional basis. This limit does not apply to property
acquired from a spouse unless the spouse acquired the property within three years by gift or inter vivos transf~r for less
than full consideration.
Section 691 property (income in respect ofa decedent property) is not eligible for additional basis allocations.
Beneficiaries other than tax-exempt entities will not recognize gain upon receipt of property from an estate
where the liabilities exceed basis (so-called negative basis property).
Section 101 dealing with life insurance is unaffected.
Section 121 will be amended to allow an estate, a revocable trust, or heirs, to exclude gain on the sale of a
principal residence to the same extent the decedent could have.
The Section allows a $250,000 exclusion ($500,000 for married taxpayers filingjointly) ofgain on a principal
residence used as such for two ofthe preceding five years.
Various rules dealing with foreign entities are included and the estate of a nonresident alien will be allowed
a $60,000 aggregate basis increase.
5. Returns for Large Transfers. Insteadofestate and gifttax returns there will be other
returns required for transfers in excess of $1,300,000.
6. Distributions from Qualifying Domestic Trusts. Distributions from QDOTs will
continue to be taxed as they are under current law through December 31, 2020. However, QDOTs will not be taxed
at death in the estate of the surviving spouse after December 31, 2009.
2. Planning in View of H.R. 1836.
A. General Comments.
1. Repeal will not exist for only one year. Reasonable people refuse to believe that
the tax act will be allowed to apply literally. It is simply unbelievable that the estate tax would disappear in 20 10 only
for the system we have today to reappear in 201 1.
2. Thus, the law must be changed. How can it be changed? In at least three ways:
(a) repeal can be made permanent, (2) the 2009 regime can be made permanent, or (3) an"entirely new approach (e.g.
a capital gains tax at death) can be imposed.
A - 143
Ifthe repeal is made permanent we can assume that many ofthe glitches, loopholes, and inconsistencies in the
cany-over basis regime will be fixed between now and then. Thus we should consider what will happen with carry-over
basis but we should not be too concerned with many of the specifics.
If the 2009 regime - - i.e., the current estate tax system with increases in the amount of the exemption - - is
maintained we should expect certain glitches and loopholes to be fIXed over time. An example might be the limiting
of valuation discounts.
We cannot reasonably speculate on the effects ofan entirely different system that might replace the estate tax.
3. What factors affect how the law is changed? One is the ongoing budget battle --
the tension between those who want to limit spending by depriving the federal government of revenue (because that is
more politically palatable than actually opposing spending) and those who want to do things with the revenue (whether
it be spend it, pay down debt with it, apply it to "fix" Medicare or Social Secwity, or whatever) will continue. Crucial
is whether deficits or surpluses are projected; surpluses were projected because economic growth was projected to
continue at, more or less, 3.1% annually adjusted for inflation, but if that had dropped to 2.7% the projections would
change to a substantial deficit. Ofcourse, an economic downturn, rebuilding after September 11, and the war against
terrorism have pushed surpluses off for an undetermined number of years.
A related factor includes control ofCongress and the Presidency over the next decade. One way to look at this
is that with a President who campaigned to eliminate the estate tax and a Congress that was largely in favor ofdoing
so~ all that could be accomplished was repeal for one year. On the other han~ another way to look at it is that a future
Congress will be very reluctant to reimpose what has been described as repealed. Reinstatement of a tax, as a public
relations matter, is surely more difficult than raising rates (as with the income tax).
Some experts argue that by the latter part ofthe decade there will be other problems that will occupy Congress.
For instance, ever increasing numbers of taxpayers will be subject to the AMT. Reforming that system will reduce tax
revenues; if revenues need to be increased then the estate tax is a possible target.
Campaign finance reform is another factor. One driving force for repeal are taxpayers who have more than
any reasonable exemption amount would protect but not enough that they can leave virtually any amount to descendants
regardless ofthe amount oftax. Those taxpayers contribute heavily to political campaigns, directly and indirectly, and
they want repeal. If their contributions are reduced somewhat then perhaps their influence will be as well.
A final factor is the predilections ofthe early and mid-generation baby boomers. On the one hand, in 10 years
the earliest boomers will be ready to retire and will want, it is said, Social Security on a sound footing. The same is said
to be true for those boomers who are a bit younger, being born through the early 1950s.
On the other han~ some of those boomers will be looking to an elderly surviving parent and the amount they
receive by inheritance will depend directly on the operation of the estate tax. If Social Security and Medicare are
"fIXed," whatever that may mean at that time, these boomers - - affluent~ well-educated, used to being listened to - - can
be expected to be a potent force in favor of permanent repeal.
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4. In talking to clients, that repeal must be reinstated in order to be effective after2010
has great psychological importance. Many of our wealthier clients will not want to rely on one or more future
Congresses (and Presidents) reinstating repeal and will conclude that it is more prudent to assume that repeal will not
be reinstated. This should open the door to continue most ofthe planning that has been available. Clients who are likely
to fall within the increased exemptions may want to wait and see what happens in the next few years before going
beyond basic marital deduction/exemption equivalent planning.
B. Use Exemption Now.
I. Make gifts to grantor trusts with broad standards and beneficiaries, including
the grantor's spouse. This preserves maximum flexibility whether the estate tax is repealed or not. Income and
appreciation may be removed from the grantor's estate. Further distributions may be made if income shifting
becomes desirable. Grantor trust status enables the grantor to "switch" assets with the trust should estate tax repeal
and carryover basis be implemented.
2. Use the most leveraged transaction with which the client is comfortable. There
are not good policy arguments for maintaining discounts outside of operating businesses and it is always possible
that Congress will act to eliminate them.
If a client wants to go slowly and create virtually no audit risk, give $675,000 away today, taking a high
discount and fully disclosing that on the gift tax return. If the gift is adjusted nothing has been lost and if, more
likely, there is no adjustment, in three years additional gifts may be made.
If the client is likely to die more than three years after a transaction, but before December 31, 2009, paying
gift tax may continue to be a very good idea. Otherwise it would not be. Similarly, paying estate tax in the estate of
the frrst spouse to die continues to be a good idea but only so long as the spouse is likely to die before repeal
becomes effective.
3. For elderly clients, arrangements like partnerships that create the possibility of
discounts have no downside in today's environment. The worst that happens is that they do not work and the
client's estate pays the same estate tax that would have been paid ordinarily.
C. Review Your Formula Divisions Now.
1. Begin with the stereotype: husband has two children by his frrst marriage,
remarries and has two children with his second wife. He has an estate of $6,000,000 let's suppose and second wife
has $1,000,000. Husband is 55, his children by his first marriage are 31 and 29. Second wife is 45 and his children
with her are 10 and 8.
Husband realized several years ago that he should give something to his older children at his death because
his second wife is 10 years younger and is likely to survive him by close to 20 years. Husband decides to leave the
maximwn amount he can without creating estate tax to his older children - - $600,000 at the time. The division was
written as a formula with no caps or minimums.
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If husband dies today the older children will receive $675,000 rather than $600,000. If husband dies with
the same fonnula in place the amount the older children will receive increases to $3,500,000. That is probably not
what husband had in mind, but who is to say. Litigation may result.
2. Let's suppose now that we have husband and wife, each with $3,500,000, frrst
marriage, and everyone gets along. Under a traditional fonnula, when the fIrSt spouse dies evelything will be added
to a trust for the benefit of spouse and descendants. What sort, if any, instructions should be given to the trustee
about making distributions among the spouse and descendants? Is a boilerplate statement that spouse is the primary
beneficiary but her taxable estate should be considered good enough?
Consider the effect if spouse survives past repeal. Spouse has no taxable estate. Does that mean that
spouse should receive more from the trust, and what does "more" mean if the trust has standards like health,
maintenance, and support?
3. More spouses may be tempted to elect to take against the Will, depending on
the terms of the credit shelter and marital disposition. This possibility may pose additional ethical issues when
representing both husband and wife. In addition, more postnuptial agreements may be required.
D. Review Your Estate Plans Generally.
I. Charitable Beneficiaries. Where plans have charity in as a beneficiary either
because of, or the amount is because of, the estate tax the plan needs to be revisited. That can work in favor ofor
against charitable bequests.
Suppose, for instance, elderly parent has no spouse and a $3,000,000 estate. Parent has decided that each
oftwo children should receive $1,000,000; the estate tax would be a little over $1,000,000, and so there is nothing
left over for charity, despite what parent would like to do. If parent lives until 2006 parent can leave $1,000,000 to
each child without estate tax. What does that mean parent would like to do?
Suppose parent has looked at the assets of children and grandchildren and has decided that they have
"enough" and that it is too expensive to give them more. With the change in the law, especially repeal of the estate
and generation-skipping tax, that may change. What does parent want to do?
In general we know that parents want their children to get more than 50% (more or less) of their estates,
otherwise they would not pay estate planners to plan. Does that mean that parents want their descendants to get
100% of their estates?
2. Trust Provisions. Trusts continue to be an excellent planning device. They may
help avoid creditors, they may limit property subject to division in divorce, and they may enable income shifting as
years pass. Trusts need to be drafted as flexibly as possible. The interests of the beneficiaries other than taxes need
to be considered. The power of independent trustees to create new trusts and divide trusts should be given.
Beneficiaries should be given broad special powers of appointment in most instances.
3. Exit Strategies. If you have GRATs, Sales to Grantor Trusts, QPRTs~ and the
like in existence that will continue after the repeal of the estate tax consider whether an exit strategy is desirable
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and, if so, what it might be. The gift tax persists after the estate tax is repealed other than for gifts to grantor trusts.
There may be reasons to try and collapse transactions if repeal become imminent to ensure that grantors who are the
most likely to die have sufficient property to which to allocate basis.
4. Reverse Exit Strategies. Discounts will not necessarily be a good thing after
repeal in a canyover basis regime. Thus, ensuring that the decedent has control ofentities will become important.
How is that control to be obtained? Perhaps through gifts from the younger generations or purchases by the older
generation. Ensuring that those transactions can occur easily becomes an important part of planning.
5. Life Insurance. Because of the special treatment of life insurance under section
101, appreciation inside a life insurance policy will receive, in effect, a basis step-up. Assuming the law does not
change on this point, life insurance becomes a desirable asset to own. Insurance should be held in a trust to avoid
estate tax should death occur prior to repeal.
6. Tax Increase for Smaller Estates. The beneficiaries ofan estate ofa single
person worth $3,000,000 may actually be worse off after repeal than before. Before repeal, in 2009, the estate
would pay no estate tax and the assets would pass to the beneficiaries with a full basis step-up. After repeal, in
2010, the estate would pay no estate tax but the basis step-up would be limited to the basis of the assets plus
$1,300,000. Stated differently, if the decedent had an adjusted basis of less than $1,700,000 in the example the
beneficiaries would be worse off. Clients and beneficiaries will need to be made aware of such oddities because
they may affect a client's decisions.
E. Choice of Jurisdiction.
1. Rule Against Perpetuities. States continue to repeal the rule against
perpetuities. Those states will become increasingly desirable places to situate trusts ifthe generation-skipping tax is
repealed.
2. State Income Taxes. State income taxes cannot be forgotten by planners.
Existing trusts which are not grantor trusts with respect to any of the beneficiaries in many instances may be moved
from state to state to avoid or minimize state income taxes.
3. State Inheritance or Estate Taxes. If some states impose an estate or inheritance
tax after the state death tax credit is repealed other states that have no such taxes will become more desirable places
in which to be domiciled at death. Florida, for instance, receives only about 2% of its revenues from it pick-up tax
and may decide to forgo that revenue in favor of being a "tax-haven" for the elderly.
4. Other State Law Changes. Some states may pass statutes allowing for trusts to
be modified to take into consideration changing tax laws.
F. Drafting To Direct Allocation of Basis.
In addition to the fonnula clause drafting issues that arise, the question of directing the
personal representative how to allocate basis increases becomes important. Many estate plans contain provisions
that allow a personal representative or trustee to ignore basis in allocating assets; generally that is because all assets,
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other than IRD, are assumed to have a stepped-up basis as ofdate of death. That will no longer be the case and
such directions will probably be inappropriate.
How basis is to be allocated among beneficiaries is not obvious in many instances. For instance, suppose
the family farm, with improvements, is passing to one beneficiary who is n~t going to sell it. Does that mean neither
the fann nor the improvements should receive additional basis? What about depreciation? The same issue arises
for many business interests.
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SECTION "B"
7. Payments from CRT to Disability Trust. In Rev. Rut. 2002-20,2002-17 I.R.B. 794, the IRS set
forth three situations in which payments from a charitable remainder trust may be made for the life ofa person who is
"fmancially disabled" to a trust for such person. Previously, such arrangements had been limited to term of years
charitable remainder trusts, thus this is a helpful change. The situations are:
An individual concurrently creates Trust A, a trust that otherwise qualifies as a
charitable remainder unitrust, and a separate trust, Trust B. Under the governing
instrument of Trust A, annual unitrust amounts will be paid to Trust B for the life
of C. C is an individual who is financially disabled, that is, C is unable to manage
C's own financial affairs by reason ofa medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
Situation 1. Under the governing instrument ofTrust B, a designated portion ofthe
amount it receives from Trust A will be paid to C each month. If, at any time in the
sole judgment of the trustee, the monthly payment to C is insufficient to provide
adequately for the care, support, and maintenance of C, or is insufficient for the
needs of C for any reason, additional amounts will be paid as needed to or on
behalf of C from Trust B. Upon C's death, the balance remaining in Trust B will
be distributed to C's estate.
Situation 2. Under the governing instrument of Trust B, the trustee may make
distributions of income and principal, as determined in the trustee's sole and
absolute discretion, for the financial aid and best interests of C in a manner that
supplements but does not supplant any governmental benefits otherwise available
to C. Upon C's death, the balance remaining in Trust B will be distributed to C's
estate.
Situation 3. Under the governing instrument of Trust B, the trustee may make
distributions of income and principal, as determined in the trustee's sole and
absolute discretion, for the financial aid and best interests of C in a manner that
supplements but does not supplant any governmental benefits otherwise available
to C. Upon C's death, the governing instrument requires the trustee to reimburse the
state for the total costs of medical assistance provided to C under the state's
Medicaid plan. C is given a testamentary general power of appointment over the
balance remaining in Trust B. If C fails to exercise the power, the balance will be
distributed, in equal shares, to C's sister and to X a charitable organization.
In each situation the disabled person will have the assets included in his estate for estate tax purposes, and in
each instance creditors at death would be able to collect to the extent assets remained in Trust B.
8. Meaning of "Qualified Appreciated Stock" Contribution to a Private Foundation. Section
170(e) allows only a deduction for basis when making contributions to a private foundation. Section 170(e)(5) contains
an exception which allows a fair market value deduction for "qualified appreciated stock" which the statute states is any
corporate stock:
(i) for which (as ofthe date ofthe contribution) market quotations are readily
available on an established securities market, and
(ii) which is capital gain property (as defined in subsection (b)(I)(C)(iv)).
At issue in John C. Todd, et ux. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 19, was whether certain securities were
publicly traded. The opinion discussed the securities:
Bancom and the Bank
On the transfer date, Bancorp was a bank holding company, owning all of the
issued and outstanding shares ofstock ofUnion Colony Bank, Greeley, Colorado,
a state-chartered Colorado bank (the bank). On that date, shares ofBancorp were
not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or any
city or any regional stock exchange, nor were the shares regularly traded in the
national or any regional over-the-counter (OTC) market for which published
quotations are available. The shares were not shares of an open-end investment
company (commonly know as a mutual fund), as provided in section 1.170A-
13(c)(7)(xi)(A)(3), Income Tax Regs.
Procedure for Purchase or Sale of Shares of Bancom
Before and throughout 1994, the procedure for someone wishing to purchase or sell
shares of Bancorp was to contact an officer of the bank or a local stockbroker
specializing in the shares of Bancorp. The bank or broker would try to match a
potential seller with a potential buyer. That could prove difficult, since Bancorp
shares were not frequently sold. The bank maintained a numerical list, by certificate
number, ofall share transactions (the bank's list). The bank's list showed the date,
seller, buyer, number of shares, share cost (if available), and certificate number.
Gill & Associates, Inc. (Gill & Associates), a member ofthe National Association
of Securities Dealers since 1984, acted as a placement agent or "matchmaker" for
certain ofthe sales ofthe shares. As a matchmaker, Gill & Associates maintained
a list of individuals wishing to purchase shares and contacted these individuals
when approached by others interested in selling shares. In order to quote a price to
an interested purchaser, a representative from Gill & Associates would call the
bank to obtain the net asset value on the books of the corporation. Gill &
Associates believed the book value was a fair value for the stock ofBancorp, and
it used the book value to compute what it believed was a fair price for a share of
Bancorp. Gill & Associates did not have access to the bank's list. Although Gill &
Associates could readily quote to an interested buyer what it believed to be a fair
price for Bancorp shares, Bancorp shares were not necessarily then available for
sale. If no shares were available, Gill & Associates would put the interested
person's name on a list and contact that person when shares became available. On
six to eight occasions during the 10-year period from 1984 through 1994, when
Bancorp shares became available for sale, Gill & Associates would place an
advertisement, for a briefperiod, in the local newspaper. Gill & Associates charged
a fee of 25 cents for each share placed, and acted as placement agent as an
accommodation to the bank, to encourage its business relationship with the bank.
On December 1, 1994, eight individuals, including petitioner, owned or controlled
50.5 percent ofthe issued and outstanding shares ofBancorp. Petitioner owned or
controlled 7 percent of those shares.
The court concluded that a market maker did not make the stock publicly-traded:
2. Market Quotations Requirement
In general, if a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the
amount ofthe contribution is the fair market value ofthe property at the time ofthe
contribution. Sec. 1.170A-1 (c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Fair market value is the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Sec. 1.170A- 1(c)(2), Income Tax
Regs. The fair market value ofa share ofstock or a security is not necessarily equal
to its market quotation. See sec. 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(D), Income Tax Regs.
Nevertheless, we assume that Congress believed that the existence of readily
available market quotations would substantially assist in, if not determine, fair
market valuation (and discourage overvaluation). We do not agree with petitioners
that the market quotations requirement was met because Bancorp shares were
occasionally traded by Gill & Associates, who could provide a suggested share
price based on the net asset value ofthe bank. Such share price did not necessarily
reflect a price that any willing buyer or seller had accepted or would accept. Gill
& Associates charged a flat fee of 25 cents for each share traded, and acted as a
placement agent as an accommodation to the bank, to encourage its business
relationship with the bank. We do not accept Gill & Associates' procedures for
quoting prices as a reliable proxy for fair market valuation. The intendment of the
market quotations requirement would not be served by accepting procedures such
as those followed by Gill & Associates with respect to Bancorp shares as satisfying
the requirement.
3. Section 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs.
Section 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., describes circumstances in
which the market quotations requirement is met for purposes of exempting
contributions of certain publicly traded securities from the substantiation
requirements. See sec. 1.170A-13(c)(I)(i), Income Tax Regs. Section 1.170A-
13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., does not purport to be applicable to the
interpretation of the term "qualified appreciated stock". Nevertheless, given our
conclusion as to the consistent meaning of the market quotations requirement, we
believe that section 1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., also describes
circumstances in which the market quotations requirement is met for the purpose
of determining whether the shares constituted qualified appreciated stock.
In the petition, petitioners aver that the market quotations requirement was satisfied
by virtue of the Bancorp shares' satisfying either subdivision (1) or (2) of section
1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs. During the trial ofthis case, however,
petitioners conceded that, on the transfer date, the Bancorp shares did not satisfy
any of the subdivisions of section 1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners rely on their plain language reading of the market quotations
requirement and argue that the regulation is invalid because inconsistent with that
reading. Since we reject petitioners' plain language reading, we reject petitioners'
argument based on that reading, that the regulation is invalid.
Petitioners have failed to satisfy the market quotations requirement for purposes of
determining whether the shares were (1) publicly traded so as to be exempt from
the substantiation requirements and (2) qualified appreciated stock.
9. Recission ofCRT. PLR 200219012 allowed the recission ofa CRT where the donors were misled,
had obtained no benefit from the gift, filed amended income tax returns, and had a court approve the recission. The
ruling states:
In the instant case, based on the representations made and statements contained in
the pleadings submitted to the court, the Donors were misinformed regarding the
operation of Charitable Trust as drafted and the requirement that the unitrust
amount became payable immediately upon execution ofCharitable Trust. In view
of the nature of the assets transferred to Charitable Trust (non-income producing
stock) and Donor's understanding that no unitrust payment would be made until the
stock was sold, it appears that the scrivener intended to draft and the Donors
intended to execute a charitable remainder trust described in §§ 664(d)(3), rather
than one described in §§ 664(d)(2). Further, Donors were incorrectly informed
regarding the tax consequences if Charitable Trust distributed assets in kind in
satisfaction of the unitrust amount.
As noted above, in an attempt to reverse the income tax charitable deductions
claimed by the Donors on the original income tax returns, Donors filed amended
income tax returns on Date 6 and paid the additional tax due. However, also as
noted above, because the period of limitations on assessment for Donors' income
tax return filed on Date 2 has expired, the Donors made a statutory overpayment
for the year in which Charitable Trust was created and funded and the Donors may
make a claim for a refund of the additional tax paid for that year. The remaining
assets of Charitable Trust were returned to Donors pursuant to the court order
issued on Date 5. Traditionally, the tax benefit rule requires taxpayers to recognize
income when the taxpayers "recover" an item or amount deducted in a previous tax
year. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The rule is
also applicable in cases involving charitable deductions and provides that if a
taxpayer receives a deduction for a charitable contribution in one taxable year and
recoups that donation in a later year, the value ofthe contribution, up to the amount
of the charitable contribution previously taken, is treated as income in the year in
which it was recouped. Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1980),
anffg 71 T.C. 226 (1978). It is irrelevant that the deduction taken in the prior year
may have been improper or that the period oflimitations on assessment has expired
for the year in which the deduction was claimed. Unvert v. Commissioner, 656
F.2d483 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the amount ofthe charitable deduction, $B, claimed
by Donors on their income tax return filed on Date 2, for the present value of the
remainder interest in the stock ofCorporation transferred to Charitable Trust, will
be includible in the Donors income for the year in which the remaining assets of
Charitable Trust were returned to the Donors. Donors have represented that they
will timely file an amended United States Individual Income Tax Return, Form
1040X, for that year reporting the value of the stock up to $B, the value of the
contribution claimed by Donors on their income tax return filed on Date 2.
However, the amended income tax return filed for the year following the year of
the transfer, in which the excess charitable deduction was claimed and the
additional tax was paid, was filed within three years after Date 3, the date of the
original return. Thus, the additional tax was paid for that year, which negated the
charitable deduction claimed in that year for the transfer to Charitable Trust and,
as to that year, the parties are in the same position that they would have been in if
Charitable Trust had never been created.
Because ofthe application ofthe tax benefit rule for the year in which the transfer
was made to Charitable Trust, the filing of the amended tax income return and
payment ofadditional tax for the year following the transfer to Charitable Trust and
the fact that Charitable Trust had no income, either ordinary or capital gains, and
the Corporation paid no dividends from Date 1 until the date of the court order
granting rescission, all parties are in the same position that they would have been
in if Charitable Trust had never been created. Further, the court order rescinding
Charitable Trust is consistent with applicable state law.
Accordingly, we conclude that the rescission will be recognized for federal tax
purposes as effective as of the date Charitable Trust was created.
10. No Deduction for Charitable Split-Dollar Life Insurance Premiums. In Charles H. Addis, et ux.
v. Commissioner, T.C. (2002), the court denied a deduction for "charitable contributions" that the charity used to pay
insurance premiums.
A. Substantiation Requirement Under Section 170(0(8)
A taxpayer may not deduct any contribution of $250 or more unless he or she
substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written acknowledgment of
the contribution by the donee organization that meets the requirements of section
170(t)(8)(B).7 Sec. 170(f)(8)(A). The donee's written acknowledgment must state
the amount of cash and describe other property contributed, indicate whether the
donee organization provided any goods or services in consideration for the
contribution, and provide a description and good faith estimate ofthe value ofany
goods or services8 provided by the donee organization. Sec. 170(f)(8)(B).
B. Defmition ofConsideration Under Section 1.170A-13(O(6)' Income Tax
Regs.
Petitioners contend that they did not receive consideration for, Le., that they did not
receive goods or services in exchange for, their $36,000 payments to NHF because
NHF was not required to use those payments to pay the premiums on the life
insurance policy. Petitioners contend that the fact that they expected NHF to invest
in the life insurance policy was not consideration for purposes ofsection 170(f)(8).
We disagree.
***
NHF used petitioners' $36,000 payments to pay the premiums on the life insurance
policy, $434,509 (or 44 percent of the death benefits) ofwhich petitioners' family
trust was entitled to receive as beneficiary.
Petitioners point out that NHF was not required, and did not promise, to use their
contributions to pay the premiums on the insurance policy on the life of Mrs.
Addis. However, NHF provided consideration for petitioners' payments because,
at the time petitioners made payments to NHF, they expected to receive 44 percent
of the death benefit under the policy. Petitioners expected NHF to use their
$36,000 contributions to pay NHF's portion of the premiums on the life insurance
policy in 1997 and 1998. Sec. 1.170A-13(f)(6), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners'
expectation that NHF would pay the premiums on the life insurance policy was
reasonable because it was in NHF's fmancial interest to pay premiums on
petitioners' life insurance policy in return for a guaranteed death benefit of
$557,280.
C. Whether NHF's Receipts for Petitioners' Payments Comply With Section
170(0(8) and Section 1. 170A-13(O(6), Income Tax Regs.
* * *
NHF did not state in its receipts that NHF paid premiums for the insurance policy
on the life ofMrs. Addis under which petitioners would receive 44 percent of the
death benefits. NHF failed to make a good faith estimate of the value of those
benefits as required by section 170(f)(8)(B)(iii).
* * *
Petitioners and NHF designed a scheme purporting to provide no benefits to
petitioners in exchange (or consideration) for petitioners' payments. However,
petitioners received substantial benefits from NHF under the life insurance policy.
In the documents structuring this transaction, petitioners and NHF avoided stating
any obligation ofNHF and made it appear that petitioners made an outright gift to
NHF with no quid pro quo. However, petitioners expected, and they told NHF that
they expected, NHF to use their contributions for both their and NHF's benefit.
Petitioners and NHF both had incentives to proceed under this scheme; with the pot
sweetened by charitable contribution deductions, it was in both parties' interests (1)
for NHF to continue to pay the insurance premiums, and (2) for petitioners to
continue to make payments to NHF. NHF would be entitled to the $557,000 death
benefit only if it paid the premiums for the life insurance policy. We conclude that
the NHF receipts do not comply with the substantiation requirement of section
170(f)(8) and section 1.170A- 13(f)(6), Income Tax Regs., because NHF
incorrectly stated in the receipts that petitioners received no consideration for their
payments.
SECTION "C"
3. Postnuptial Agreement Division ofIRA. PLR200215061 statedthat a postnuptial agreement which
provided that upon divorce the IRA would be divided between the spouses would not violate the section 4975(c)
prohibited transaction rules.
SECTION "E"
at the end ofE-2 (Final ESBT Regulations):
A trust containing a presently exercisable power of appointment, general or special, may not be an ESBT if
the power may be exercised, to appoint, for instance, to more than 75 persons, to a non-U.S. citizen, to a corporation,
to a non-S corporation qualifying trust. Where such powers are given, an S corporation savings provision should be
considered.
SECTION "F"
at end ofF-4 (Effect of Post-Death Events):
In FSA 200217022 the Service determined that an estate can deduct the entire amount it paid to settle a
wrongful death action. The Service stated:
With respect to whether post-death events may be considered in determining the
amount ofa deduction under §§ 2053(a)(3), the Eleventh Circuit noted recently in
Estate of0 'Neal v. Commissioner, 258 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001), that this
area oflaw is generally governed by "two distinct and irreconcilable lines ofcases"
namely, the cases that follow Ithaca Trust, and the cases that follow Jacobs. The
Commissioner's published position is that post-death events are controlling in
determining the amount that may be deducted as a claim against the estate whether
or not the claim is contested or contingent. Revenue Ruling 77-274 states that
where the right to claim an amount is not fixed by the deadline for filing the estate
tax return, the taxpayer can protect his right to claim the deduction by filing a
protective claim on Form 843. Rev. Rul. 77-274, 1977-2 C.B. 326. The Service has
also ruled that regardless of the nature of the claim, no deduction will be allowed
for claims against the estate which have not been paid or will not be paid because
the creditor waives payment, fails to file his claim within the prescribed time limit
and under the conditions prescribed by applicable local law, or otherwise fails to
enforce payment. See Rev. Rul. 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272 (denying a deduction for
an otherwise valid claim which became void and uncollectible after the date of
death by virtue of noncompliance with a state statute of limitations on filing
probate claims). See also Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975 C.B. 306, and Rev. Rul. 75-177,
1975-1 C.B. 307.
Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have either held or noted that where the
claim is contested, contingent, or unenforceable on the date of death, post death
events are considered in determining the allowable deduction. Propstra v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The law is clear that post-death
events are relevant when computing the deduction to be taken for disputed or
contingent claims."), Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963), in
Taylor v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 371 (1962) (denying a deduction for a contested
claim for a marital settlement rendered unenforceable by a spouse's remarriage);
Estate of Van Horne v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 734 (1982), affd, 720 F.2d
1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984) (noting in dicta that post-
death events are relevant in cases where the claims are potential, unmatured,
contingent, or contested at the date ofdeath); Estate ofCourtney v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 317 (1974) (denying a deduction for mortgages that were never presented
to the estate); Estate ofCafaro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-348 (limiting
deductions for contested business debts existing at the date of death to amounts
actually paid).
The Ninth Circuit decision in Propstra involved lien claims against an estate that
had been compromised for a lesser amount. Although the government argued to the
contrary, the court found that at the date of death, the estate had no colorable
defense to the claims, and the claimant did not have the ability to compromise the
claim. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1254. The court, citing Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-
1(b)(3), stated that the preliminary determination to be made was the nature oflien
claims against the estate. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1253. The court then held that "as
a matter of law, when claims are for sums certain and are legally enforceable as of
the date of death, post-death events are not relevant in computing the permissible
deduction." Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1254. However, the court noted in dicta that
"[t]he law is clear that post-death events are relevant when computing the
deduction to be taken for disputed and contingent claims." Id. at 1253. Based upon
the facts, the court determined that the lien claims were certain and enforceable at
the time ofdeath, and therefore the post-death compromise of the claim could not
be considered in determining the amount of the deduction.
Estate 01Van Horne involved an undisputed spousal support obligation calculated
by using actuarial tables. The obligation was terminated after four monthly
payments when the recipient died. In Van Horne the Ninth Circuit makes clear that
its holding is limited to "certain and enforceable" claims. The government argued
that the spousal support obligations were not a "sum certain" and therefore should
not be governed by the rule enunciated in Propstra. The court disagreed and held
that, "legally enforceable claims valued by reference to an actuarial table meet the
test of certainty for estate tax purposes." Van Horne, 720 F.2d at 1117.
In the present case, appeal will lie to the Ninth Circuit. The claims filed by Wife,
Daughter and Son with the executor ofDecedent's estate were denied by the estate.
In addition, the estate actively contested the subsequent litigation. The estate
appears to have had affIrmative defenses to the suit filed by Family. We believe
that, based upon the Ninth Circuit's dicta in Propstra and Van Horne, the Ninth
Circuit would hold in this case that post-death events are relevant in computing the
permissible §§ 2053(a)(3) deduction because the claims in this case were disputed
and contingent. Based upon published Service position and the Ninth Circuit's
guidance in this area, the estate's deduction should be limited to the amounts
eventually paid in settlement ofthe claims. The estate, accordingly, may deduct $w
as a claim against the estate under §§ 2053(a)(3).
SECTION "M"
M-2. (Division of Trust for Section 2519 Purposes):
At the end, add a reference to PLR 200223047 - dealing with a net gift.
3. IRS Refuses to Accept "Scrivener's Error". PLR 200222024 dealt with an attempt to save the
following clause in a "Management Trust" so that it would qualify for QTIP:
4.8 Marital Trust. The trust estate of the Marital Trust shall be held,
administered and distributed as follows:
4.8.1 Distributions to Surviving Spouse. Duringthe surviving Spouse's lifetime,
Trustee shall not pay any of the income of the Trust to the surviving Spouse. The
Trustee may pay any or all ofthe income to the deceased Grantor's descendants as
may be necessary to maintain their accustomed standard ofliving for said deceased
Grantors descendants and to provide for their health, education, maintenance and
support in any manner with periodic installments not less frequently than annually.
In addition the Surviving Spouse shall have the right to use any tangible assets held
by the Trustee under these trusts, including personal property, real property, etc.
as provided in Section 3.7, above, and shall not sell any part of said real estate or
tangible personal property until after the death ofmy Spouse, unless necessary to
pay debts or taxes ofmy estate. In addition, Trustee shall distribute to the deceased
Grantors descendants so much ofthe principal of the trust as Trustee, in Trustee's
sole discretion, deems appropriate for their health, education, maintenance and
support. In exercising this discretion, Trustee shall consider other income and
resources available to the Grantor's descendants.
4.8.2 Statement of Intent. It is the deceased Grantors intent that the marital
deduction gift and the trust estate of the Marital Trust will not qualify for the
marital deduction allowed by the federal estate tax law applicable to the deceased
Grantor's estate except as to the portion ofthe Marital Trust the Executor does not
elect to treat as qualified terminable interest property. All questions applicable to
the marital deduction gift and to the Marital Trust shall be resolved accordingly.
The powers and discretions of Trustee with respect to the administration of this
trust during the surviving Spouse's lifetime shall not be exercised or exercisable
except in a manner consistent with the deceased Grantors intent as expressed in this
Section.
The ruling reviews the efforts to correct the problems:
On Date 5, Spouse, individually, as a beneficiary ofthe Marital Trust, as trustee of
the Marital Trust, as successor trustee of the Management Trust, and as
independent executor of the Decedent's estate, filed a petition with Court "to
correct mistakes made by the scrivener" of the Management Trust and to reform,
inter alia, Articles 3.2,4.8.1 and 4.8.2 ofthe Marital Trust in order to conform the
provisions with Decedent's intent that the Marital Trust qualify for the marital
deduction under section 2056. Decedent's adult childrenjoined in the petition, and
Decedent's two minor grandchildren, represented by their father as next friend, also
joined in the petition.
On Date 6, Court entered a final judgment, ordering the reformation of Articles
3.2,4.8.1 and 4.8.2, retroactive to Date 2, in order to correct the scrivener's errors,
to correct certain ambiguities, and to properly reflect the intentions of Decedent.
On Date 7, which is within 9 months ofDecedent's death, Spouse, in his individual
capacity as a beneficiary of the Management Trust, executed a valid disclaimer
under State law of the limited power given to him under the terms of the Marital
Trust to appoint any property comprising a part of the Marital Trust to Decedent's
children or their descendants. Also within 9 months ofDecedent's death, her two
adult children and two minor grandchildren (represented by their temporary
guardian) executed valid disclaimers under State law of any rights given to them
under the terms of the Marital Trust to distributions of income or principal from
that trust during the lifetime of Decedent's Spouse.
SECTION "N"
7. Gifts by Attorney-in-Fact. KRS 386.093 specifically authorizes a principal to grant the attorney-in-
fact the power to make gifts, including to the attorney-in-fact. Writing in the Florida Bar Journal (July/August 2002),
Peter B. Tieman, a Florida practitioner, states that Florida law does not allow such gifts. The writer's suggestion is that
a special attorney-in-fact be appointed to make gifts to the primary attorney-in-fact.
SECTION "0"
2. Disclaimer of Remainder Interests. In Thomas J. Walshire, et at v. United States,
________(8th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity ofthe Treasury Regulations under section
2518 which prohibit the disclaimer of a remainder interest while keeping the life interest. The opinion states:
Walshire attempted to disclaim a portion ofthe property he was entitled to receive
from his brother by dividing it horizontally, that is, by disclaiming the remainder
interest but retaining the right to the income and use of the property during his
lifetime, or the life estate. The regulation at issue in this case requires that the
undivided portion"consist ofa fraction or percentage ofeach and every substantial
interest or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must extend over
the entire term of the disclaimant's interest in such property and in other property
into which such property is converted." Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518- 3(b). In other
words, the regulation requires a vertical division of the property. The regulation
specifically excludes the disclaimer attempted by Walshire. See ide ("Thus, for
example, a disclaimer made by the devisee ofa fee simple interest in Blackacre is
not a qualified disclaimer if the disclaimant disclaims a remainder interest in
Blackacre but retains a life estate.")
The executors argue that the regulation is contrary to the plain language of §§
2518(a), which allows the disclaimer of "any interest in property." The executors
argue that a remainder interest is "any interest in property" as that phrase is used
in §§ 2518(a) and that Walshire did not partition the remainder interest but
disclaimed all of it, so that we need not even look at §§2518(c). This construction
interprets subsection (a) in isolation. Congress specifically enacted subsection (c)
as a limitation on subsection (a). See I.R.C. §§ 2518(c) ("For purposes of
subsection (a) ....It). To allow the disclaimant to partition the interest bequeathed
to him in any manner he chooses as "any interest in property" under §§ 2518(a)
ignores the requirement in §§ 2518(c) that only an "undivided portion" of an
interest may be disclaimed and violates a fundamental rule of statutory
interpretation to give effect to all words and phrases used in the statute. See
Hermanv. AssociatedElec. Co-op., Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999). We
therefore must construe subsection (a) in light of subsection (c) since Walshire
attempted to disclaim only a portion of what he was entitled to receive under his
brother's will.
The executors argue that even under subsection (c), a remainder interest falls
within the clear and unambiguous meaning ofan "undividedportion ofan interest."
I.R.C. §§ 2518(c). The statute does not define "undivided portion of an interest"
as that term is used in §§ 2518(c) and we fmd the term to be, at best, ambiguous.
Because "the statute is silent ... with respect to the specific issue" of whether a
horizontal division of property could be considered an undivided portion of an
interest, we must determine "whether the agency's [regulation] is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Miller, 65 F.3d 690 (internal quotations
omitted) (construing the failure to defme a term as "an implicit legislative
delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify" the undefined term).
The term "undivided" in its common usage means "not separated out into parts or
shares." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2492 (1986). We are most
familiar with the concept of undivided interests in the context of a tenancy in
common, which is "[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal
undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the whole property."
Black's Law Dictionary 1478 (17th ed. 1999). "'The central characteristic of a
tenancy in common is simply that each tenant is deemed to own by himself, with
most ofthe attributes of independent ownership, a physically undivided part ofthe
entire parcel.'" Id. (quoting Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates
in Land and Future Interests 54 (2d ed. 1984)). From these uses of the term
"undivided," we discern that an undivided portion of an interest is a portion that
does not separate out the bundle of rights associated with the interest being
apportioned. Thus, if a disclaimant is bequeathed a fee interest, as was Walshire,
an undivided portion of that interest would have to include all of the rights
associated with the fee. Apportioning a fee into a life estate and a remainder
interest does not give the remainder interest all of the rights associated with a fee
because the remainderman is not entitled to immediate possession, a fundamental
right ofa fee holder. A remainder interest simply is not an undivided portion ofthe
fee. See Estate of Brock v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 368, 369 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1980)
(addressing similar terminology under I.R.C. §§ 170(t)(3)(B), which allows a
charitable deduction for a contribution of "an undivided portion ofthe decedent's
entire interest in property," and noting that "it cannot be contended seriously that
the church received an undivided interest in the property" where decedent left a life
estate to his wife and a remainder interest to the church). We do not believe it was
unreasonable for the Secretary to determine that such a division does not meet the
definition of an undivided portion when it promulgated the regulation that allows
only vertical divisions of an interest, as opposed to horizontal divisions, to come
within the purview of §§ 2518.
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1. Partnerships' Liquidation Restrictions Not Applicable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Kerr,
________ (5th Cir. 2002), and determined that section 2704(b) did not apply:
The three defining features ofan "applicable restriction" pertinent to this appeal are
that it a) effectively limits the ability ofthe partnership to liquidate, b) lapses or can
be removed by the family after the transfer, and c) is more restrictive than State
law. I.R.C. §§ 2704(b)(2)(A), (2)(B), & (3)(B); Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2704-2(b).
Because all three features listed above are required, the absence ofanyone ofthem
is dispositive. We first address the question whether the restrictions lapse or can
be removed by the family after the transfer. Since lapsing is not a consideration, the
only issue under §§ 2704«b)(2)(B) is removability. The Tax Court did not reach
this issue. When reviewing an order granting summaryjudgment, this Court is not
limited to the trial court's conclusion, but can affIrm a trial court's judgment on any
ground supported by the summaryjudgmentrecord. Cabrol v. Town ofYoungsville,
106 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Hoyt R. Matise Co. v. Zurn, 754 F.2d
560,565 n.5. (5th Cir. 1985) (applying similar rule for judgment entered in a bench
trial).
The Commissioner argues that the restrictions in the agreements were removable
by the family, because there is evidence that UT, the only non-family partner,
would not oppose their removal if proposed by the Kerr family.7 The parties have
stipulated that UT would convert its interests into cash as soon as possible, so long
as it believed the transaction to be in its best interest and that it would receive fair
market value for its interest. The Commissioner argues that, because UT would
have no reason to oppose their removal, the partnership restrictions should be
treated as capable of being removed by the Kerr family after the-transfers.
We disagree. For a restriction to be considered removable by the family, the Code
specifies that"[t]he transferor or any member ofthe transferor's family, either alone
or collectively," must have the right to remove the restriction. I.R.C. §§
2704(b)(2)(B)(ii). The Code provides no exception allowing us to disregard non-
family partners who have stipulated their probable consent to a removal of the
restriction. The probable consent of UT, a non-family partner, cannot fulfill the
requirement that the family be able to remove the restrictions on its own.
Our holding precludes the restrictions from falling within the definition of
"applicable restrictions" because of §§ 2704(b)(2)(B). These partnership
agreements contain restrictions both on liquidation of the entire partnership (§§
10.01) and on the right of a partner to withdraw from the partnership (§§ 9.02) as
noted above. We need not answer the question whether restrictions on a partner's
right to withdraw should properly be considered a limitation on the ability to
liquidate (under §§ 2704(b)(2)(A)). Additionally, it matters not whether the
restrictions are more restrictive than State law (under §§ 2704(b)(3)(B) and the
related regulation). Because those restrictions do not meet the removability
requirement, they cannot fall within the definition of "applicable restrictions"
regardless.
2. The Strangi Appeal: A Win, A Loss, and A Lesson. Yesterday the Fifth Circuit ruled on the appeal
from the Tax Court in the Strangi case dealing with family limited partnerships. There is good news and bad news.
The good news is that the Fifth Circuit upheld the Tax Court on all ofthe issues presented: section 2703 does
not apply, there was no "gift on formation," a 31% discount was appropriate, the partnership would not be disregarded
for a lack of economic substance.
You may remember, however, that the Tax Court had complained that the government had not raised the issue
ofwhether the limited partnership units should be included in the decedent's estate under section 2036 until it was too
late for the Tax Court to consider the argument. The Fifth Circuit reversed on that issue and held that the Tax Court
SHOULD consider the section 2036 issue. Based on the Tax Court opinion you would conclude that the estate will
ultimately lose on the section 2036 issue.
Let's review what happened in Strangi. The decedent formed a family limited partnership (SFLP), kept the
limited interests, and created a corporate general partner (Stranco) ofwhich he owned 47%. Various children owned
the rest. Thus, in effect, the decedent died with almost all ofthe "equity" in the partnership and still claimed a discount.
The actual work was done by the decedent's son-in-law, Mr. Gulig, as attorney-in-fact.
With respect to the section 2036 issue, the Tax Court stated:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because respondent
asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly before trial.
Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it was untimely.
What do we learn from this?
Form matters. Ifyou want to discount the assets held in a decedent's estate you must ensure that the decedent
(1) does not control the assets and (2) does not benefit from the assets other than as a limited partner. For safety's sake,
income distributions from the partnership should be made sparingly. Further, in creating the partnership you must
ensure that the decedent has control of the partnership initially - - to avoid a gift on formation - - and then disperses
control. If done properly the government is reduced to two arguments, neither of which have yet been successful.
The fIrst argument is over the value ofcontrolling interests that are dispersed. Call that the Simplot argument,
and as we know Simplot was reversed on appeal. The force of the argument is reduced if the controlling units are
divided among several donees or purchasers.
The second argument is step-transaction. To illustrate, suppose the client creates on July 1 a family partnership
and takes back 100 general partner units and 9801 limited partner units in exchange for $990,000 ofsecurities. Client's
three children, Tom, Harry and Sue each contribute $3,333 to the partnership and receive 33 limited units. Some time
there after client gives or sells the 100 general partner units to Tom, Harry, and Sue. The question is, can the
government collapse that into one transaction. To date the government has been unsuccessful in doing so where the
work is done carefully and the steps are separated by more than hours.
The Strangi appeal should not cause you to doubt the benefits of partnerships, even death-bed partnerships.
Properly formed they will work just fine under current law and there is no downside to engaging in the exercise.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
A. Overview of Rules.
1. Transfer Tax.
The repeal of the estate tax and generation-
skipping tax is scheduled to occur at the
beginning of 2010. The restoration of these
taxes is scheduled to occur at the beginning
of 2011, "as if, according to the sunset
provision, the provisions and amendments of
EGTRRA had never been enacted." Meanwhile,
in phases, EGTRRA reduces transfer tax rates
and increases the estate tax and generation-
skipping tax exemptions.
2. Income Tax.
A regime of carryover basis, modified to
include limited amounts of bases increases
for certain assets transferred at death, is
scheduled to coincide with the repeal of the
estate tax and generation-skipping tax.
According to Code section 1022(b), bases
increases of at least $1,300,000 are
available to the extent that appreciated
property passes from a decedent, regardless
of the format of the estate plan. According
to Code section 1022(c), bases increases of
at least an additional $3,000,000 are
available to the extent that appreciated
property passes from a decedent to or in a
QTIP-style trust for the surviving spouse of
the decedent.
*Copyright 2002. Jerold I. Horn. All rights reserved.
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including, without limitation, of merchantability and fitness for any
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B. Method of Analysis.
Classification of the changes based upon three
periods of time might facilitate planning.
1. The first is the period during which estate
tax and generation-skipping tax exemptions
will increase and transfer tax rates will
decline. Generally, sUbject to increased
vigilance to prevent inadvertent shifting of
beneficial enjoyment, the planning strategies
that appear appropriate during the first
period are those which were appropriate
before EGTRRA.
2. The second is the period during which the
estate tax and the generation-skipping tax
will not be in effect, a modified system of
carryover basis will be in effect and limited
amounts of bases improvements will be
available for certain assets transferred at
death. A principal purpose of planning for
the second period is to tend to maximize both
(i) bases increases and (ii) sheltering of
assets transferred at death.
3. The third is the period of sunset or
restoration during which the regimes of the
estate tax, the generation-skipping tax and
new bases at death will reappear. Planning
strategies that were appropriate for the
first period will tend to be appropriate also
for the third period. However, a principal
purpose of planning during the first and
second periods will be to produce optimal
results during the third period as well.
II. MEANING OF SUNSET.
Although the prospect of sunset looms heavily upon planning,
the sunset provision is egregiously unclear in its
application to the transfer taxes.
A. Effect Upon Exempt Property.
Literally, but nevertheless incredibly, the sunset
provision could undo some or all of the exemptions
that, immediately before the restoration of the
estate tax and the generation-skipping tax,
shelter assets from the estate tax, and from the
generation-skipping tax, in by-pass-type trusts.
1. Literally, for example, the sunset provision
could subject to estate tax some of the
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assets that because of an exemption passed
free of tax to an exemption-shelter trust and
that repose in the trust upon restoration of
the estate tax before the death of a
surviving spouse to whom the assets would
have passed, outright or in a QTIP trust, if
the exemption had not existed.
2. Similarly, for example, the sunset provision
literally could sUbject to generation-
skipping tax property that, at the time of
restoration before the occurrence of a
generation-skipping transfer, reposes in a
by-pass-type trust which has an inclusion
ratio of zero because of an increase in GST
exemption that occurred after the enactment
of EGTRRA.
3. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the expansive
language of the sunset provision, assets that
are sheltered, in whole or (in some QTIPs and
some generation-skipping trusts) in part, by
exemptions that apply before the sunset
probably will remain sheltered, to the same
extent, after the sunset.
B. Effect Upon Nonexempt Property~
How will the sunset provision apply to the
nonexempt portion of "mid-stream" situations?
1. Specifically, how will the sunset provision
apply, upon the death of the surviving
spouse, to the portion of a QTIP trust with
respect to which a QTIP election was made, in
whole or in part, upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse?
a. The surviving spouse will not own QTIP
assets or, in the case of a QTIP that
only can qualify for the marital
deduction according to Code section
2056(b) (7), possess a general power to
appoint them.
b. Thus, unless the sunset provision will
treat a QTIP election, previously made,
as ownership for purposes of the
restored tax, the surviving spouse will
have no nexus that will include the
property in the gross estate of the
surviving spouse or otherwise subject
the property to the restored tax.
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2. Similarly, how will the sunset provision
apply, upon the occurrence of a generation-
skipping transfer, to a generation-skipping
trust that, before the repeal of the
generation-skipping tax, had an inclusion
ratio of more than zero?
3. The likely answer is that the sunset will
reach the nonexempt portions of these
arrangements.
4. However, if the restoration of the taxes were
to result from a repeal of the sunset
provision followed by a reenactment of the
repealed taxes, rather than from the sunset
provision, per se, the restoration might
grandfather situations that were in midstream
at the time of the reenactment, and not
subject them to the restored taxes.
c. Is Property Transferred During Repeal "Exempt" or
"NonExempt?"
A restoration of the taxes by means of a sunset of
repeal probably will not apply to assets that an
owner transferred and attempted to shelter, by
means of by-pass-type trusts, during repeal before
the sunset.
1. These assets should have the same status as
assets that are sheltered because of
exemptions.
2. According to EGTRRA, the exemptions increase
greatly, in stages, until upon repeal they
effectively become unlimited.
a. Literal statement of this result in
terms of unlimited exemptions would have
required indefinite retention of the
structures of the effectively repealed
taxes.
b. Any argument that sheltering which is
based upon repeal of the estate tax and
the generatiQn-skipping tax is
different, somehow, from sheltering
which is based upon exemptions would
seem to rely upon a distinction without
a difference.
c. Arguably, the distinction would violate
requirements of substantive due process
of law.
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III. CONTINUATION OF BY-PASS-TRUST SHELTERING
UNTIL, AND EVEN AFTER, REPEAL.
The tax advisability of using by-pass-type trusts to shelter
exempt transfers of a property owner from estate tax and
generation-skipping tax is a function of the extent to which
the addition of the transfers to the property of a
beneficiary would cause the transfers of the beneficiary to
exceed the exemptions of the beneficiary.
A. Risk of Restoration of Taxes.
The statutory environment is unsettled and
unstable. A not-unlikely scenario is that year-
by-year Congress might defer the sunset, by means
of a series of one-year extensions of repeal and,
with or without any deferral, Congress might
modify the sunset to include "permanent"
reductions in rates and permanent increases in
exemptions.
1. The unstable environment poses at least a tax
risk, and possibly a tax catastrophe, to
those who fail to shelter exemptions
(including those of a possibly temporary
repeal that might exist for one or more
years) by means of by-pass-type trusts to
such extent (if any) as is necessary to
immunize the assets from estate tax, gift tax
and generation-skipping tax.
2. The stakes are high, as tax rates will remain
high even as exemptions increase greatly.
3. If, as the writer argues below, the costs of
a shelter trust are relatively small compared
to the tax savings that a shelter trust might
generate, an owner of wealth that according
to any reasonably likely scenario can
generate liability for transfer tax should
consider indulging the conservative
assumption that the addition of any of the
estate of the owner to the estate of a
descendant might generate transfer tax at the
level of the generation of the descendant.
B. Risk of Retention in Trust.
The property owner must weigh the tax and nontax
benefits of by-pass-type trusts against the tax
and nontax disadvantages. The thesis of the
writer is that the advantages are relatively large
and the disadvantages are relatively small.
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1. The typical client for whom the writer drafts
multigenerational trusts is an individual
who, but for his or her di~logue with the
writer, probably would choose not to use
shelter-type trusts.
2. Rather, the client probably would choose at
the death of the survivor of the client and
the client's spouse to leave his or her
estate outright to his or her surviving
descendants, per stirpes, subject to
provision of management until one or more
stated ages at which the primary beneficiary
is able to manage for himself or herself.
3. Most of the by-pass-type trusts that the
writer creates are intended to confer upon
the primary beneficiary powers and interests
that are as close to outright ownership as
possible without attracting tax burdens of
ownership.
4. The trust is designed, to the extent
possible, to permit the primary beneficiary
to manage, use, consume and control the
property similarly to how the primary
beneficiary could manage, use, consume and
control the property if the primary
beneficiary were to own the property
outright, without owning for tax purposes any
of the property that the primary beneficiary
does not consume.
s. Often, the client does not care whether
anything remains for subsequent generations
but only cares that what (if anything) does
remain should pass free of transfer tax.
6. The configuration that the writer has
described is quite different from a
configuration which mandates payment of all
income, or a unitrust amount, and which is
calculated to provide only such benefits as
can permit the trust to provide the same
benefits for each generation, sequentially,
in perpetuity.
7. The writer often uses the following features
to accomplish the purpose:
(i) a Give-Me-Five withdrawable percentage
unitrust (i.e., a right-to-withdraw
unitrust percentage of five percent
keyed to Code section 2041(b) (2)),
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(ii) ascertainable-standard-limited powers of
the primary beneficiary to pay the trust
estate to himself or herself,
(iii)a broadest form of nongeneral power of
the primary beneficiary to appoint
during life,
(iv) a broadest form of nongeneral power of
the primary beneficiary to appoint at
death,
(v) an ability to add an independent trustee
that, if added, can distribute any or
all of the trust estate to the primary
beneficiary for any purpose (even to the
extent of terminating the trust) and
(vi) the ability of the primary beneficiary
to serve as the trustee.
8. The purpose that the writer has posed enables
the writer to avoid agonizing about the
propriety of the unitrust percentage, i.e.,
five percent, being greater than the after-
inflation productivity of a balanced
portfolio.
9. It also enables the writer to avoid worrying
about whether the production and payment of
even a relatively modest stream of
distributions (achieved with even a
relatively high component of equity) will
tend to erode the value of the trust estate.
10. The view of the writer about the "real"
purpose of many clients probably relates not
only to trusts of which the primary
beneficiary can serve as trustee solely by
himself or herself.
11. Rather, it tends to apply as well, but to a
lesser extent, to many wide-open,
discretionary arrangements that permit
distributions to more than one person at a
time.
c. The View of the Writer.
The experience of the writer is that most clients
and advisers wrongly believe that by-pass-type
trusts inherently constrain the primary objects of
bounty from controlling the management and
enjoyment of the property, and from enjoying the
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property, similarly, as a practical matter, to how
the primary objects could control the management
and enjoyment, and could enjoy the property, if
the primary objects were to own the property
outright.
1. Indeed, the writer would argue that, as a
practical matter, the only inherent
differences, if any, between outright
ownership and ownership in a flexible, by-
pass-type trust are complexity and an
increase in involvement with lawyers and
accountants.
2. The writer believes that a properly-
conceived, by-pass type of trust is a modest
price to pay for tax savings, actual or
potential.
3. At least when the shelter of a by-pass-type
trust is reasonably likely to reduce tax, the
writer presently intends to use extremely
flexible, by-pass-type trusts (or, by means
of disclaimer procedures, by-pass-type trusts
that are as flexible as possible) to shelter
exempt amounts including amounts that
effectively are exempt because of repeal.
IV. INCREASE OF, BASIS DURING REPEAL.
During the repeal of the estate tax, Code section 1022 will
permit bases improvements.
A. Code Section 1022(b) Increase.
Code section 1022(b) will permit bases
improvements of $1,300,000 for property which
passes from a taxpayer at death. The chief
requirement is that the value of the property at
the death of the taxpayer must exceed the bases by
at least as much as the permissible increase,
i.e., $1,300,000.
B. Code Section 1022(c) Increase.
Code section 1022(c) will permit additional
improvements of $3,000,000 in bases for property
which passes from a taxpayer outright to, or in a
QTIP-style trust for the benefit of, the surviving
spouse of the taxpayer.
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C. Shades of Marital Deduction?
Bases improvements according to Code section
1022(c) might require that the disposition benefit
the surviving spouse similarly to how property
which qualif-ies for the marital deduction must
benefit a surviving spouse. Among other things,
this requirement might invoke revenue procedure
64-19.
D. Questionable Policy.
Bases improvements according to Code section
1022(c) appear to reflect highly questionable
policy.
1. The marital deduction tends to permit a
married person to defer tax.
2. The marital deduction also tends to permit a
married couple to use exemptions that, but
for the marriage, the less wealthy spouse
might have insufficient assets to use.
3. By contrast, the basis increase according to
Code section 1022(c) is a permanent saving of
tax and is available only for assets that
pass to, or in certain trusts for, the spouse
of a married person.
4. Therefore, marriage immediately before death
is the sine qua non of a very large and
permanent saving of tax.
E. Draft Now for Code section 1022.
In order to protect against incapacity, inertia
and (in plans in which the exemption shelter
benefits anyone other than the surviving spouse)
distortion, consider drafting all dispositive
documents to include mechanisms for bases
increases according to Code section 1022,
notwithstanding that the increases are available
only for taxpayers who die after 2009.
F. Code section 1022(b) is Preferable to Code
section 1022(c).
The dispositive instrument usually should fund
dispositions that use all of the 1022(b) increase
before the instrument funds any disposition that
uses any of the 1022(c) increase. Indeed, perhaps
the basis-increase QTIP should include a statement
to the effect, "The only reason that I created
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this trust, rather than allowed the value of this
trust to inure to the [residuary disposition] is
to obtain a basis increase according to Section
1022(c) of the Code. Accordingly, I ask (but do
not direct) the Trustee to minimize the value of
this trust to such extent as is consistent with my
purpose."
1. The basis increase according to Code section
1022(b) will not, but the basis increase
according to Code section 1022(c) will,
require a particular format for the
disposition.
2. The required format, consisting of an
outright gift or a QTIP-style trust,
inherently forces property into the hands of
the surviving' spouse and, therefore, is
inferior to other formats from the
perspective of efficiency of shelter of the
property for transfer tax purposes.
3. If the taxpayer has an insufficient amount of
appreciation to use both the 1022(c) increase
and the 1022(b) increase, use of formats that
produce Code section 1022(b) increases in
full before use of any format that is
necessary to produce Code section 1022(c)
increases at all (i) will minimize a
disposition the only reason for which is to
maximize increases in bases and (ii) will
maximize a disposition which is favored
dispositively.
v. ADJUSTING AMOUNTS AND METHODS OF SHELTER.
A. Allor Nothing at All.
Some practitioners apparently intend to use by-
pass-type trusts to shelter to the maximum extent
transfers that occur while the estate and
generation-skipping taxes exist and not to use at
all these types of trusts to shelter transfers
that occur after repeal.
1. These practitioners would create ever-larger
shelters until 2010, and no shelters Whatever
after 2009.
2. Unrefined versions of this planning appear to
present inconsistencies.
3. A first glance might suggest that consistency
requires either termination of all shelter
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vehicles at the time of repeal, or,
alternatively, that it requires continuation
of sheltering of all transfers that occur
while the estate and generation-skipping
taxes do not exist.
4. The first glance would appear incomplete, as
the variables have different implications for
different situations.
a. As seen from the perspective of a
possible restoration of the taxes after
repeal, repeal is simply the upper limit
of a progression of increases in
exemptions.
b. As seen from this perspective, the
planner would continue to use the
shelter possibilities of repeal, for the
same reason that the planner would use
the shelter possibilities of the
exemption increases that precede repeal.
B. A More Measured Approach.
Rejection of planning that would terminate all
shelters in all situations at the same time does
not necessarily imply rejection of planning that
would terminate some shelters in some situations
at some time.
1. If some level of exemption is sufficient, per
se, without the use of any trust, to shelter
all transfers from tax, the use of trusts to
supplement exemptions might become
unnecessary at some level of exemption.
a. Focusing solely upon estate tax at the
level of the generation of a property
owner and his or her spouse, if the
combined transfers that would be taxable
for estate tax purposes would be less
than the exemption, the predeceasing
spouse could transfer his or her
property any way he or she wished,
outright or otherwise, because no
sheltering by means of by-pass trusts
would be necessary to eliminate estate
tax at the level of his or her
generation.
b. Focusing again solely upon estate tax at
the level of the generation of a
property owner and his or her spouse, if
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the combined transfers that would be
taxable for estate tax purposes would be
between one and two times the exemption,
some use of by-pass-type trusts to
shelter the exemption would be indicated
upon the death of the predeceasing
spouse in order to eliminate estate tax
at the level of the generation of the
spouses.
i. The indicated shelter would range
from zero (at the level of combined
transfers equal to one exemption)
to the entire amount of the unused
exemption of the predeceasing
spouse (at the level of combined
transfers equal to two exemptions) .
ii. Planning for combined transfers of
more than one but less than two
times the exemption often follows a
pattern of using by-pass-type
trusts to shelter all of the
exemption of the predeceasing
spouse rather than using by-pass-
type trusts to shelter only so much
of the exemption as, if the exempt
transfers were added to the
property of the surviving spouse,
would exceed the unused exemption
of the survivor.
(a) Assume, for example, that the
exemption is $1,000,000, that
a husband has $1,050,000 and
that his wife has zero.
(i) The husband can eliminate
tax by using a by-pass-
type trust to shelter
only $50,000 of the
husband's exemption.
(ii) Thus, the husband can
make an outright
disposition of
$1,000,000.
(iii) However, "classical"
marital deduction
planning would use a by-
pass-type trust to
shelter $1,000,000 and
would include a
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disposition of only
$50,000 outright.
(b) Assume that the property of
the husband includes most of
the income-producing property
of the family, that the value
of this property approximates
the exemption and that the
nonincome-producing property
(consisting of a home and
tangibles) should pass
outright to the surviving
spouse.
(i) Is "classical" planning
appropriate?
(ii) Asked differently, is a
shelter trust an
appropriate vehicle for
most of the income-
producing property of the
family?
(iii)Because of possible
changes in values and
law, perhaps any other
planning is difficult to
monitor and control and,
therefore, risky.
c. Focusing yet again solely upon estate
tax at the level of the generation of a
property owner and his or her spouse, if
the combined transfers that would be
taxable for estate tax purposes would
exceed two times the exemption, use of a
by-pass-type trust would be indicated to
shelter all of the property of the
predeceasing spouse to the extent of the
unused exemption of the predeceasing
spouse.
d. The unknown variables are the amounts of
transfers and the amounts of exemptions
that will be available when the
transfers occur. These variables will
determine the extent to which shelter by
means of by-pass-type trusts is
necessary to avoid the taxes.
i. As concerns the amounts of
exemptions, the property owner
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might plan by assuming exemptions
equal to the exemptions that are in
place, or that shortly are to
become effective, as of the time of
the planning.
(a) A premise is that Congress
might repeal increases that
are scheduled for the future.
(b) Another premise is that
Congress will not repeal
increases that presently exist
or that are the first-
scheduled to occur.
ii. As concerns the amounts of
transfers, the planner might apply
procedures similar to those that
the planner used before EGTRRA to
determine the propriety of
sheltering by means of by-pass-type
trusts.
(a) The property owner might
project forward from the time
of the planning to the
scheduled time of repeal and,
on the basis of the owner's
view about the value of the
owner's property, the
likelihood of the occurrence
and continuation of repeal and
the amounts of exemptions that
likely will attend a
restoration of the taxes,
determine the extent (if any)
that shelter by means of a by-
pass-type trust is reasonably
likely to save tax.
(b) As a matter of principle, an
analysis that compares
exemptions and transfers under
the EGTRRA regime is quite
similar to, but much more
tenuous than, the type of
analysis that a property owner
often undertook before EGTRRA
to determine the advisability
of using by-pass-type trusts
to shelter exempt amounts.
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(i) A property owner in any
event might have little
ability to know whether
the shelter of a by-pass-
type trust is reasonably
likely to save tax.
(ii) Often, a property owner
will have little ability
to predict the net worth
of a descendant.
(iii)Among the unknowables are
the one or more marriages
of the descendant and the
one or more marriages of
each ancestor of the
descendant who also is a
descendant of the
property owner.
(c) Uncertainty about the rules
and about the time that
apparently must pass before a
by-pass-type trust can save
tax after repeal compound the
difficulty.
2. Repeal might prove, for many situations, a
convenient and otherwise appropriate juncture
at which to stop, or at least to reassess,
the use of trusts to supplement exemptions.
a. The propriety is attributable to the
probability that, even if the taxes are
restored, the exemptions greatly will
exceed the wealth of many, if not most,
individuals for whom sheltering by means
of by-pass-type trusts is standard fare.
b. The convenience is attributable to a
necessity, in any event, to change
dispositions, or at least the
description of dispositions, upon
repeal.
i. Standard formulae will tend to
function intelligibly, albeit in
some cases increasingly roughly,
until repeal.
ii. Any attempt at refinement by
terminating shelter at a particular
level of increased exemption would
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appear to present greater risks
than those that it would address.
3. A property owner who remains reluctant
entirely to forgo sheltering by means of by-
pass-type trusts might determine, at least,
that repeal is a convenient and appropriate
time to shift to the discretionary use of by-
pass-type trusts, by means of disclaimers,
and to stop the mandatory use of by-pass-type
trusts.
4. Similarly, a property owner might determine
that repeal is a convenient and appropriate
time to stop using by-pass-type trusts to
shelter future transfers but to continue to
use by-pass-type trusts to shelter prior
transfers.
5. Increases in bases according to Code section
l022(c) are available for dispositions that
are outright or in QTIP-style trusts.
a. Therefore, whether a property owner will
use the format of the QTIP-style trust
(i.e., a by-pass-type trust) can depend
solely on transfer tax and nontax,
rather than on income tax,
considerations.
b. A property owner whose wealth clearly
does not exceed the amount that the
restored taxes would exempt and who is
willing to use an outright transfer to a
surviving spouse to maximize bases
increases according to Code section
l022(c) might have no need for by-pass-
trust sheltering upon and after repeal.
6. Potentially troubling, the exemptions that
will be available before repeal will permit a
property owner to transfer assets to other
than a surviving spouse, but the effectively
unlimited exemptions that will be available
during repeal will tend to skew dispositions
solely to or for the spouse.
a. The reason is that repeal also will
carry with it an incentive to allocate
assets (consisting of such assets as are
sufficient to absorb bases increases of
three million dollars or more) in a
basis-increase type of trust for the
surviving spouse.
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b. The planning implications of this
diversion are startling.
c. Even in situations in which the
surviving spouse is wealthy and does
not, and persons other than the spouse
do, need the beneficial enjoyment of the
assets of the decedent, a decedent who
wants to maximize bases might have to
deploy most or all of his or her wealth
to or for his or her spouse.
7. Often, only a relatively small amount of
assets will remain for a basis increase
according to Code section l022(c) after the
amount necessary to maximize bases according
to Code section l022(b) is allocated to a
nonQTIP-style, by-pass-type trust.
a. A property owner who encounters this
situation and is willing to obtain the
Code section l022(c) increase by means
of an outright disposition but who wants
to mandate a shelter of so much as is
necessary to increase basis according to
Code section l022(b) can use a formula
to allocate to a nonQTIP-style, by-pass-
type trust the assets that are necessary
to maximize basis according to Code
section l022(b) and to allocate the
balance outright to the spouse or, to
such extent as the spouse disclaims in
order also to shelter some or all of the
excess, to a QTIP style of disclaimer
receptacle.
b. Alternatively, a property owner who
encounters this situation but who wants
to mandate a maximum shelter or, for
nontax reasons, does not want to use an
outright gift to a spouse, can allocate
all assets to a QTIP-style trust.
i. This configuration will sacrifice
some efficiency of shelter, as, of
course, it will force all income
into the hands of the surviving
spouse.
ii. Accordingly, the owner who uses
this type of vehicle will trade
some inefficiency of shelter for
some efficiency of administration.
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c. Again alternatively, a property owner
who encounters this situation can leave
all assets outright to the spouse or, to
such extent (if any) as the spouse
disclaims in order to shelter by means
of a by-pass-type trust, to a QTIP style
of disclaimer receptacle.
d. The property owner whose estate clearly
exceeds the amounts necessary to
increase bases according to Code section
1022 can use a formula to allocate to a
nonQTIP-style, by-pass-type trust the
assets that are necessary to increase
bases according to Code section 1022(b),
can use the same formula to allocate to
a QTIP-style trust the assets that are
necessary to increase bases according to
Code section 1022(c) and yet again can
use the formula to allocate the balance
of the assets to the nonQTIP-style, by-
pass-type trust.
VI. USE OF DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS TO AVOID GIFT TAX.
Although EGTRRA increases the exemption from the gift tax to
$1,000,000 and reduces the rates of the gift tax to the
nominal level of the rates of the estate tax, EGTRRA does
not provide for repeal of the gift tax.
A. Nevertheless, from and after his or her death
during repeal of the estate tax and the
generation-skipping tax, a property owner can
avoid all of the transfer taxes, including the
gift tax.
B. The decedent can use for this purpose a by-pass-
type trust which grants an independent trustee
unlimited discretion to make distributions not
only to a primary beneficiary but also to the
descendants of the primary beneficiary.
C. This technique also, of course, is available
before repeal but, however, at the cost of at
least one transfer tax.
VII. DRAFTING FOR BASES INCREASES.
The drafting of dispositions for the primary purpose of
facilitating bases increases is challenging. Perhaps the
first step is to abandon certain mindsets that accompany
drafting of formulae for the marital deduction.
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A. Specific Gift of Appreciated Assets.
Consider using a specific gift of assets that are
defined in the governing instrument as the
appreciated assets that in the aggregate have the
smallest value which can maximize the basis
increase.
1. The gift will not produce any gain upon
funding.
2. The gift will rise and fall in value.
3. Unlike a gift of a pecuniary amount, which
will define an amount but not assure that the
most appreciated property can satisfy it, and
unlike a gift of a fractional share, which
will tend not to use the property that as of
the death of the taxpayer was the most
appreciated, this type of gift will minimize
the probable value and also will maximize the
basis increase.
4. The great disadvantage of this type of gift
is that it appears quite inflexible.
B. Minimum-Worth Gift.
Perhaps a more attractive vehicle is a "minimum-
worth" gift, collective assets type, analogous in
some respects to a "New York style" of marital
formula.
1. This type of gift is more flexible than the
specific gift described above.
2. This type of gift will permit but not require
the least value that can maximize the basis
increase according to Code section 1022(c).
3. Compared to the specific gift described
above, this type of gift grants discretion to
a fiduciary to determine the assets to
allocate.
4. Therefore, by its terms, the gift might have
to require funding with assets that both (i)
enable the maximization of basis and (ii)
assure the surviving spouse a requisite
amount of value.
5. Arguably, no gain occurs upon funding.
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6. Loss appears reckoned only upon complete
funding.
7. This type of gift presents the problem of a
fiduciary's duty to limit value.
C. Do Not Use Pecuniary Gift.
Do not use a true pecuniary gift, i.e., a gift
that is expressed in terms of a number of dollars
and is satisfiable in kind at values current at
dates of satisfaction.
1. Indeed, a pecuniary gift in this context is
an apparent misnomer.
a. A basis increase according to Code
section 1022 requires that the "gift
consist solely of appreciated assets,
not, for example, cash.
b. Therefore, the pecuniary amount
determines only the value at the time of
allocation of the assets that are
allocated in kind.
2. More importantly, a true pecuniary gift
(i.e., a pecuniary gift which is satisfied in
kind at values current at dates of
distribution) appears incapable of assuring
both maximization of basis and the use of a
fixed amount of value to accomplish the
maximization.
a. If the assets that determine the
pecuniary amount depreciate after the
death of the taxpayer and before the
satisfaction of the pecuniary amount,
the assets that at the date of
allocation have the requisite
appreciation will not have sufficient
value to satisfy the pecuniary amount.
b. Therefore, the gift might require an
infusion of additional assets (but not
an infusion of an addition of pre-death
excess of value over basis) .
c. Contrariwise, if the assets that
determine the pecuniary amount
appreciate after the death of the
taxpayer and before the satisfaction of
the pecuniary amount, the assets that at
the date of allocation have the
requisite value will not have the
requisite appreciation.
d. Therefore, the assets that satisfy the
gift will not permit a maximum increase
in basis.
D. Tend Not to Use Fractional-Share Gift.
Tend not to fund a basis-increase disposition with
a fractional share of residue.
1. A fractional share does seem capable of
enabling a maximum increase in basis.
2. However, if, as generally is true, the
fraction applies to some assets that at the
death of the taxpayer had less excess of
value over basis than other assets, this
method will not minimize the value that is
allocable to this disposition.
VIII. DRAFTING FOR SHELTER.
certain principles of drafting can implement the principles
of planning.
A. Sheltering of Exemptions.
Tend to shelter exemptions (including those that
effectively will attend repeal) by means of by-
pass-type trusts that are extremely flexible, to
any extent that the sheltering is reasonably
likely to reduce transfer tax.
1. Tend to design the trusts to offer the
primary beneficiary the type of control and
enjoyment that the primary beneficiary could
have if the primary beneficiary were to own
the assets outright.
2. Use formulae to maximize the passage of
assets to by-pass-type trusts which are
exempt from estate tax (inclUding because of
repeal of the tax) .
a. Provide that if the estate tax is not in
effect at the death of the property
owner all of the assets shall pass to
the shelter-type trust.
b. However, avoid inadvertently diverting
beneficial enjoyment from the surviving
spouse.
B - 21
c. The diversion is particularly likely
when the settlor is married to a second
spouse, has children by a first marriage
and wants to benefit the children at his
or her death regardless of whether the
spouse survives.
d. The diversion also is particularly
likely when the settlor wants to leave a
significant amount to or for descendants
upon his or her death even if his or her
first, and only, spouse survives.
3. Draft the formulae to assure that if the
generation-skipping tax is not in effect at
the death of the property owner, all of the
assets that are earmarked, at least
eventually, for descendants pass to one or
more by-pass-type trusts that are extremely
flexible.
a. A subtle application of this principle
involves property in a QTIP trust with
respect to which the executor of the
predeceasing spouse made a QTIP
election, but not a reverse-QTIP
election, and which, but for the
nonexistence of the estate tax at the
death of the surviving spouse, would be
included in the gross estate of the
surviving spouse.
b. Except for the repeal of the estate tax
and the generation-skipping tax, the
surviving spouse would own this
property, in both an estate tax sense
and a generation-skipping tax sense, at
death.
c. Accordingly, if the surviving spouse
were to die during repeal, repeal
effectively should exempt the property
by creating an exemption that
effectively is unlimited.
d. This result would require the tax-
writing bodies of Congress to perceive
something that is relatively subtle,
i.e., that repeal effectively should
exempt not only property that a taxpayer
actually owns and property that a
taxpayer has a general power to appoint
but also property that, but for the
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repeal of the estate tax, Code section
2044 would deem the taxpayer to own.
e. Consider making available a procedure
that can permit the surviving spouse
actually to own the assets at his or her
death.
i. One alternative is to permit an
independent trustee to distribute
the assets from the QTIP trust to
the surviving spouse before the
death of the surviving spouse.
ii. Another alternative is mandatorily
to divide the marital trust into a
reverse-QTIP portion and an excess
portion and to give the surviving
spouse, if he or she survives by
fifteen months (i.e., the time at
which, as a practical matter, a
decision about a QTIP election is
necessary), a power to withdraw all
of the trust estate of the excess
marital trust.
B. Specific Provisions.
1. Tend to provide that if the united states
estate tax is not in effect at the death of a
settlor, all of the trust estate shall pass
to exemption-shelter trusts or other
exemption-shelter dispositions (~, gifts
directly to children or grandchildren) .
2. Tend to provide that if the united states
generation-skipping tax is not in effect at
the death of a settlor, all of the trust
estates of shelter trusts shall pass
eventually to one or more exempt-style
generation-skipping trusts for descendants.
3. Tend to provide that if the united states
generation-skipping tax is not in effect at
the death of the settlor, all of the trust
estate which upon the death of the settlor is
to benefit descendants shall pass to one or
more exempt-style, generation-skipping trusts
for descendants.
4. Tend to provide that if the united states
generation-skipping tax is in effect at the
death of a settlor but is not in effect at
the death of the surviving spouse, all of the
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trust estate of any marital trust which
qualified for the marital deduction upon the
death of the settlor and was not the subject
of a reverse-QTIP election according to Code
section 2652(a) (3) and that upon the death of
the surviving spouse is to benefit
descendants shall pass to one or more exempt-
style, generation-skipping trusts for
descendants.
C. Hedging Against Restoration of Taxes After Repeal
of Sunset.
If the taxpayer believes that restoration of the
estate tax and the generation-skipping tax will
result from reenactment of the taxes after a
repeal of the sunset provision, rather than result
from a sunset of the repeal of the taxes, consider
allocating all assets, exempt and nonexempt, to
by-pass-type trusts (i.e., QTIP trusts with no
rights to withdraw, in the case of marital-
deduction transfers, and GST-exempt-style trusts,
in the case of dispositions for descendants) .
D. Implications for Pecuniary Gifts and Fractional
Shares.
Consider (i) reducing the use of exemption-lead
arrangements that are expressed as true pecuniary
gifts and (ii) increasing the use of exemption
arrangements that are expressed as fractional
shares.
1. Phased increases in exemptions, resulting
ultimately in repeal and, therefore, in
effective exemptions of one hundred percent,
will tend to cause pecuniary gifts of exempt
amounts to force recognition of gain upon
funding.
2. A marital disposition that is expressed as a
pecuniary amount which is satisfiable in kind
at values at dates of distribution will tend
to force recognition of gain if the marital
disposition is large relative to the
exemption disposition.
a. The first-scheduled increases in
exemptions might not change a marital
disposition from being a larger
disposition, to being a smaller
disposition, relative to the exemption
disposition.
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b. Accordingly, if a pecuniary marital was
inappropriate before EGTRRA, it will
tend to remain inappropriate after
EGTRRA.
IX. OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS.
A. Transfer Tax.
Tend to counsel that, for purposes of maximizing
the shelter of assets from transfer taxes
regardless of which of two spouses dies first,
each of two spouses should own, outright or by
means of an interest in an inter vivos QTIP,
assets that are sufficient to use his or her
exemptions, greatly increased, if he or she dies
first.
1. Deemed ownership by means of an interest in
an inter vivos QTIP clearly is sufficient to
enable the owner to use his or her exemptions
from the estate tax and the generation-
skipping tax.
2. However, deemed ownership by means of an
interest in an inter vivos QTIP appears
insufficient for purposes of permitting a
basis increase according to Code section
1022.
B. Income Tax.
Tend to counsel that, for purposes of maximizing
bases for income tax purposes regardless of which
of two spouses dies first, each of two spouses
should own, outright, assets that are sufficient
to maximize increases in bases if either spouse
dies first (i.e., in 2010, assets that have
unrealized appreciation of $1,300,000 plus
$3,000,000 = $4,300,000) and that are sufficient
to maximize increases in bases if either spouse
survives the other spouse but the predeceasing
spouse uses a QTIP-style trust to accomplish the
spousal increase at his or her prior death (i.e.,
in 2010, assets that have unrealized appreciation
of $1,300,000).
X. CONCLUSION.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the writer believes
that EGTRRA has made estate planning more, rather than less,
tax-oriented, notwithstanding the irony that EGTRRA purports
to repeal the estate tax and the generation-skipping tax.
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EXHIBIT A
~asis-increase QTIP per 1022.
Jse A, B or C.
A
Jse if the assets needed to
naximize basis increase per
i1022(c) will leave small or no
'esidue or if Marital Trust is to
:onsist in any event of a fixed
fraction less than lIall. 1I
B
Specific gift determined by
formula. No capital gain upon
funding. Rises and falls in
value. Unlike pecuniary gift,
which defines amount but does not
assure that the most appreciated
property can satisfy it, and
unlike a fractional share which
tends not to use the property
that as of death is most
appreci~ted, this type of gift
both minimizes the probable value
and assures maximization of
basis.
BI and BII
Add to minimize this disposition
by passing the 1022(b) portion to
residue. Delete to cause Marital
Trust to serve as receptacle per
both 1022(c) and 1022(b).
C
IIMinimum-worth specific gift,
collective assets type, analogous
to IINew York style ll of marital
formula. More flexible than B.
Permits but does not require
minimization of value to assure
full use of §1022(c). If anyone
has any discretion (as here,
compare B) concerning which
assets to allocate, apparently
must consider both (i) amount by
which value exceeds basis at
death and (ii) value at
allocation (see §1022(c».
Arguably, no gain. Loss reckoned
onLy upon complete funding.
Presents problem of fiduciary's
duty to limit value.
CII, CIII and CIV
Add to minimize this disposition
by passing the described property
to residue." DeLete to cause
Marital Trust to serve as
receptacle per both 1022(c) and
1022(b).
o
Use if B or e is used.
01
Use if Bl or ell is used.
OJ I
Usable to exclude specific
assets.
OJ Ia
Use if 01 is used.
Basis-Increase QTIP per Code section 1022
If (i) my [F2] survives me or there is no
sufficient evidence that we died other than
simultaneously (in which event my [F2]
conclusively shall be presumed for purposes
of this section to have survived me) and (ii)
the united states estate tax is not in effect
at my death, the Trustee as of my death shall
set"apart, in a separate trust to be known as
the "Marital Trust" and to be administered as
provided in this Section, .
A [[F4] of the trust estate that remains after
satisfaction of all dispositions and payments
under prior provisions of this instrument.]
B [the Permissible Property that at my death
had the smallest value sufficient to maximize
the basis increase according to section 1022
BI [ (c) ]
of the Code because of my death
BII [, after excluding the Permissible Property
that at my death had the smallest value
sufficient to maximize the basis increase
according to section 1022(b) of the Code
because of my death] .]
C [Permissible Property which
CI [the Independent Trustee selects, which]
is sufficient to maximize the basis increase
according to section 1022
CI I [ (c) ]
of the Code because of my death and which at
the respective dates of distribution to the
Marital Trust has an aggregate value of no
less than, and to the extent practicable no
more than, the
elIl [amount (if any) by which (a) the]
value at my death of the Permissible Property
that at my death had the smallest value
sufficient to maximize the basis increase
according to section 1022 of the Code because
of my death .'
CIV [exceeds (b) the value at my death of the
Permissible Property that at my ~e~th had the
smallest value sufficient to max~m~ze the
basis increase according to section 1022 (b)
of the Code because of my death] .]
D ["Permissible Property" shall mean such
property (or its proceeds) in the trust
estate as is not specifically given according
to prior provisions and, if allocated to the
Marital Trust, would permit a basis increase
according to section 1022
DI [ (c) ]
of the Code
DII [but, except to such extent (if any) as is
necessary to enable an increase of basis
according to Section 1022
Dlla [(e)]
of the Code, shall not include [FS]].]
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EXHIBITB
Gifts during life of settlor, in
event of repeal of gift tax.
MARITAL TRUST
Add, to condition transfer tax
oriented trust upon existence of
estate tax.
Add, to create basis-increase
ClIP.
A
B 1
2
EGTRRA Drafting Checklist
(D) Termination. Unless sooner * * *
section 3.02. Marital Trust. If 'J'
my wife survives me or there is no sufficient
evidence that we died other than simultaneously
(in which event my wife conclusively shall be
presumed for purposes of this section to have
s u rv i v e d me !III;' tl:]f;~1t:::·:1!p"1W~~~:r;::~;:~~:~p~~~!:::::~:~;::::~r:1J«-~~r,
* * *
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Where independent trustee is
granted wide-open discretion 12
distribute, attempt to enhance
fLexibiLity by adding statement
of preference.
Add, to direct aLLocation to by-
pass-type trust after repeaL of
GST.
* * *
(A} Disposition During Life of My
Wife. During the life of my wife, the
Trust
* * *
(C) Marital Trusts 1 and 2.
Notwithstanding the preceding portion of
this section:
(1) creation.
(a)
* * *
Trust.
* * *
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Where independent trustee is
granted wide-open discretion 12
distribute, attempt to enhance
flexibility by adding statement
of preference.
(D) Disclaimer Trust.
* * *
Life of My
wife, the
MARITAL GIFT.
Add, to condition transfer tax
oriented gift upon existence of
estate tax.
Add, to create basis-increase
gift.
A
B 1
2
* * *
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REMAINDER TRUST.
Where independent trustee is
granted wide-open discretion to
distribute, attempt to enhance
flexibility by adding statement
of preference.
(A) Disposition During Life of My Wife.
During the life of my wife, the Trustee shall
* * *
(C) Remainder Trusts 1 and 2.
Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this
section:
(1) Creation.
* * *
_m
Add, to d;rect allocat;on to by-
pass-type trust after repeal of
GST.
FAMILY TRUST
Add, to d;rect allocat;on to by-
pass-type trust after repeal of
GST.
Where ;ndependent trustee ;s
granted w;de-open d;scret;on to
distr;bute, attempt to enhance
flex;b;l;ty by add;ng statement
of preference.
Cond;t;ons grant of gpoa ;n
nonexempt trust for descendant.
* * * death) of the trust
Remainder Trust.
* * *
* * *
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ADMINISTRATIVE
PROVISIONS
section 6.02. Limitations on Powers.
* * *
(A) certain Disposition[s] .
* * *
from qualifying for the marital deductionl
1_1-11~:--lllii~e-I:I-!]if~_III:IIIIII-III:il:jlilf:lljlill.III'llr!.~:~·: -'-.
under the Code
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VOLUME ONE: OVERVIEW OF OBJECTIVES AND DRAFTING
PART ONE: OBJECTIVES.
I. TAX - Prevent attribution of the property, for tax
purposes, to any person except to any extent that the
person becomes entitled to receive the property or to
exercise a general power, given to the person as a
beneficiary, to appoint it.
II. PROTECTION - Avoid claims of creditors and spouses, to
extent consistent with other objectives.
III. APPROACH OUTRIGHT OWNERSHIP (i.e., instill maximum
flexibility with respect to control and beneficial
enjoyment)
(1) If one or more beneficially interested persons
exclusively are to possess any nonfiduciary powers
and
(2) If
(a) One or more independent trustees exclusively
are to possess any fiduciary powers (see
VOLUME ONE, PART TWO, Col. A, below); or
(b) One or more beneficially interested persons
exclusively are to possess any fiduciary
powers (see VOLUME ONE, PART TWO, Col. B,
below); or
(c) One or more independent trustees exclusively
are to possess any fiduciary powers that
beneficially interested persons cannot
possess, and either
(i) One or more independent trustees and one
or more beneficially interested persons
are to share any fiduciary powers that
beneficially interested persons can
possess, or
*Copyright 2002. Jerold I. Horn. All rights reserved.
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Inurement
crop;
fruit;
use;
interest; and
dividend.
(ii) One or more beneficially interested
persons exclusively are to ~ossess any
fiduciary powers that benef1cially
interested persons can possess
(see VOLUME ONE, PART TWO, Col. C, below).
IV. ACCOMMODATE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
(1) Challenge to principal - income model
(a) Operation:
Capital
(i) Land
(ii) Tree
(iii) House
(iv) Bond
(v) Stock
(b) Propriety:
(i) Objectives
(A) Consumption
(B) Conservation
(C) Total return concepts of modern
portfolio theory
(ii) Inconsistency between objectives and
application of principal - income
model.
(2 ) Trust models
~ ~ g
Pay-AlI-Income Preferred-Tax- Total-Return
Trust Result Trust Trust
Principal 100,00-0* 100,000** 100,000***
Interest and 5,000 0 1,000
Dividends
Appreciation 0 5,000 5,000
Tax Rate 40% 20% 23+%
Ability to enjoy the tax results of B (or, better, the tax and
nontax results of C) rather than those of A depends on the
design of the trust. Hypothesis: Design the trust so that the
dispositive provisions provide for the desired beneficial
enjoyment without precluding the optimal method of investment.
* Invested to generate sufficient trust-accounting income.
** Invested to generate capital appreciation.
*** Invested to optimize total return.
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PART TWO: SUMMARY OF DRAFTING TO APPROACH BENEFITS
(BUT NOT BURDENS) OF OUTRIGHT OWNERSHIP.
A
Objectives are Ie II and
III (1) and (2) (a) (holder of
fiduciary powers is
independent trustee),
l.a.i. Mandatory
distribution
of all income to one
person (#1)
or
ii. Income per discretion
of independent
trustee, to one
person or spray
(#s 4 and 6)
b. Principal per discretion
of independent trustee,
to one person or spray
(#s 5 and 7)
c. Nonfiduciary 5 + 5 power
(#18)
or
2.a. Nonfiduciary power
to withdraw unitrust
percentage
(#42)
or
b. Mandatory distribution
of unitrust amount to
one person (first
paragraph of #35)
c. Additional payments
to unitrust recipient
per discretion
of independent
trustee (second
paragraph of #39)
B
Objectives are Ie II and
III (1) and (2) (b) (holder of
fiduciary powers is
beneficially interested
trustee)
l.a.i. Same as A.l.a.i.
or
ii. Income per
ascertainable
standard, to one
person, no spray
(#8)
b. Principal per ascertain-
able standard, to one
person, no spray
(#9)
c. Same as A.l.c.
or
2.a. Same as A.2.a.
or
b. Same as A.2.b.
c. Additional payments
to unitrust recipient
per ascertainable
standard (second
paragraph of #40)
C
Objectives are Ie II and
III (1) and (2) (c) (holder of
fiduciary powers is
beneficially interested
trustee and independent
trustee)
l.a.i. Same as A.l.a.i.
or
ii. Combination of
A.l.a.ii. (with one
distributee) and
B.l.a.ii. (#s 14 and
16)
b. Combination of A.l.b.
(with one distributee)
and B.l.b. (#s 15 and
17)
c. Same as A.l.c.
or
2.a. Same as A.2.a.
or
b. Same as A.2.b.
c. Combination of A.2.b.
and B.2.b. (second
paragraph of #41)
3.
4.
Nonfiduciary, inter
vivos, nongeneral power
of appointment (#43)
Nonfiduciary,
testamentary,
nongeneral power
of appointment (#44)
3.
4.
5.
Same as A.3.
Same as A.4.
"Back-up" systems:
3.
4.
5.
Same as A.3.
Same as A.4.
"Back-up" systems:
a. Diversion from
sensitive trustee
(#s 57 and 58)
b. Mandatory or discre-
tionary addition of
independent trustee
(#s 53 and 54)
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a. Same as B.5.a.
b. Same as B.5.b.
VOLUME TWO: DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
PART ONE: PAYMENTS TO PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES.
I. NO ONE POSSESSES ANY DISCRETION.
A. Mandatory Distribution of Income.
The trustee must pay all ordinary income currently
to (a) one person or (b) in fixed shares to more
than one person.
1. Examples:
a. Single distributee (Form #1) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay
the net income to my wife quarter-
annually.
b. Plural distributees (Form #2) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay
the net income quarter-annually to my
children, in equal shares.
2. Taxation of Ordinary Income.
All of the trust's ordinary income, to the
extent of distributable net income, is
includable in the gross income for income tax
purposes of the (a) distributee or (b)
distributees proportionately. Code §§651 and
652.
B. No Distribution Permitted of Principal.
1. Example (Form #3) :
(B) Principal. The Trustee shall not
distribute principal.
2. Taxation of Corpus Income.
Generally, none of the trust's corpus income
is deductible from the trust's gross income
for income tax purposes. Code §§641,
643 (a) (3), 651, 652, 661 and 662.
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II. DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE
POSSESSES DISCRETION.
A. Examples:
1. Single Permissible Distributee.
a. Income (Form #4) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the net
income as the Independent Trustee in its sole
and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any net
income that it does not pay.
b. Principal (Form #5) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of the
principal as the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
2. Plural Permissible Distributees.
a. Income (Form #6) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more of my wife and my
descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of the
net income as the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to t~e, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any net
income that it does not pay.
b. Principal (Form #7) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to anyone or more of my wife and my
descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of the
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principal as the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
B. Taxation of Ordinary Income.
1. A permissible distributee includes in his or
her gross income for income tax purposes only
such ordinary income of the trust as he or
she receives. Code §§661 and 662.
2. The balance of the ordinary income is not
deductible from the trust's gross income.
Code §§661 and 662.
C. Taxation of Corpus Income.
Generally, none of the trust's corpus income is
deductible from the trust's gross income for
income tax purposes. Code §§641, 643(a) (3), 661
and 662.
D. Drafting.
1. According to the forms, the trustee's
discretion is unlimited.
a. The trust does not contain any standard,
ascertainable or otherwise.
b. The trust does not contain any
specification of purpose.
2. Any limiting standard or specification of
purpose tends to impede flexibility.
a. The trustee can make such distributions
as it believes the grantor, if serving
as trustee, would make, including
distribution of the entire trust estate
and termination of the trust.
b. The trustee can include (or not include)
the trust estate in the gross estates of
one or more beneficiaries, to such
extent as the trustee believes
advisable, taking into account (i) the
portion of the trust that is exempt from
generation-skipping tax and (ii) the
transfer tax bases of the permissible
distributees.
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c. The trustee might be able to avoid
multiple incidence of the generation-
skipping tax by means of taxable
distributions before the occurrence of a
taxable termination.
III. DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: NONINDEPENDENT TRUSTEE
POSSESSES DISCRETION.
A. Examples:
1. Single Permissible Distributee.
a. Income (Form #8) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the net
income as the Trustee determines to be
necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for her health, education and support
in the manner of living to which accustomed.
The Trustee shall accumulate any net income
that it does not pay.
b. Principal (Form #9) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to my wife so much or all, if any, of the
principal as the Trustee determines to be
necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for her health, education and support
in the manner of living to which accustomed.
2. Plural Permissible Distributees.
a. Income (Form #10) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more of my wife and my
descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of the
net income as the Trustee determines to be
necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for their respective health,
education and support in the manner of living
to which accustomed. The Trustee shall
accumulate any net income that it does not
pay.
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b. Principal (Form #11) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay
to anyone or more of my wife and my
descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of the
principal as the Trustee determines to be
necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to
provide for their respective health,
education and support in the manner of living
to which accustomed.
B. Tax Problems.
1. Generally, aiperson is deemed, for income tax
purposes and transfer tax purposes, to own
all property that he or she can pay to
himself or herself, even if the power holder
does not exercise the power. Code
§ § 6 7 8 (a) (1), 2 04 1 (a) (2) and 2 514 (b) .
2. Further, even a nongeneral power of
appointment can cause the power holder to
make a taxable gift. If the exercise of a
nongeneral power has the effect of
transferring the beneficial interest of the
power holder, the exercise might produce a
taxable transfer of any enjoyment that the
power holder forgoes. Rev. Rul. 79-327,
1979-2 C.B. 342; Regester v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 1 (1984); contra James C. Self, Jr. v.
united States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (ct. CI.
1956), 56-2 USTC '11,613; cf. reg. §25.2511-
l(g) (2).
3. A person who can pay property to another, in
discharge of his or her legal obligation, is
regarded to that extent as being able to pay
the property to himself or herself and thus
as having a general power of appointment.
C. Solutions.
1. Preventing (i) ownership (for tax purposes)
due to powers to pay to self and (ii) gifts
due to powers to pay to others: ascertainable
standards.
Use of an ascertainable standard to limit the
power holder's power is a potential solution
to the first and second problems.
e-g
a. If the ascertainable standard is
described in Code sections 2041(b) (1) (A)
and 2514(c) (1), the power holder's power
to pay to himself or herself is not a
general power of appointment.
b. The power holder arguably will not be
treated as owning the subject income for
income tax purposes.
i. A jUdicial gloss supplies the
standard for purposes of Code
section 678 (a) (1) .
ii. See Casner, 3A ESTATE PLANNING
§12.9.2 (Little, Brown, Fifth
Edition, 1986) i Agnes R. May, 8
T.C. 860 (1947); Ruth w.
Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951) i
Townsend v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.
1380 (1945) i united states v.
DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir.
1960), 60-1 USTC ~9430 (involving a
legal life estate but decided under
Code §678(a) (1) and involving a
loosely-written standard including
even the life tenant's "comfort");
united states v. Smither, 205 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1953), 53-2 USTC
~9482 (also involving a standard
including the beneficiaries'
"comfort"); and Funk v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.
1950), 50-2 USTC ~9507 (involving
payment for the beneficiaries'
"needs." "ThUS, its use [i.e., the
use of the word 'needs'] confined
the trustee to limits objectively
determinable, and any conduct on
[the trustee's] part beyond those
limits would be unreasonable and a
breach of trust .... " 50-2 USTC
~9507). But see Falk v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.
1951), 51-1 USTC ~9337 cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 861, 72 S. ct. 89.
Cf. Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d
~(8th Cir. 1945), 45-1 USTC ~9134,
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871, 65 S.
ct. 1017.
c. If the power is a trustee's fiduciary
power that is limited by an
ascertainable standard described in
regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2), the
e-g
to
power holder's exercise of the power to
pay to other than himself or herself
property in which he or she has a
beneficial interest but no general power
of appointment is not a taxable gift.
i. This ascertainable standard relates
to one or more persons other than
the power holder.
ii. According to regulations section
25.2511-1(g) (2),
"If a trustee has a beneficial
interest in trust property, a
transfer of the property by the
trustee is not a taxable transfer
if it is made pursuant to a
fiduciary power the exercise or
nonexercise of which is limited by
a reasonably fixed or ascertainable
standard which is set forth in the
trust instrument . . . " [emphasis
supplied] .
d. While some of the important drafting
issues relate to how much discretion the
power holder can have consistently with
the exception, others relate to the
advisability, for nontax reasons, of
using ascertainable standards in
particular configurations.
i. First, the standard in the forms
requires the trustee to consider
the resources otherwise available
to the distributee.
(a) Required consideration of
other resources tends to limit
the power holder's ability to
distribute trust property.
(i) It tends to require the
distributee to exhaust
other resources,
including any source of
support from other than
the trust.
(ii) Therefore, it also tends
cause any distribution
that is made from the
trust not to discharge
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another person's
obligation to the
distributee.
(b) Conversely, required
nonconsideration of other
resources tends to limit the
ability of the power holder
not to distribute trust
property. The concerns that
this formulation presents are
whether it limits sufficiently
the access of the power holder
to the property and whether a
payment can discharge a legal
obligation of someone who is
not named as a beneficiary.
(c) The power holder has the
greatest discretion if he or
she may, but need not,
consider the resources
otherwise available to the
distributee. This formulation
broadens the realm within
which the power holder may,
but need not, distribute the
property. The additional
concern that it presents is
whether it complies with those
regulations sections (i.e.,
2 0 . 2 04 1 - 1 (c) (2) and 2 5 . 2 511 -
l(g) (2)) that require the
standard to limit both the
exercise and the nonexercise
of the power.
(d) Consideration of the other
resources of the distributee
should be optional for at
least some tax purposes.
(i) Whether the power holder
must take into account
the other "income" of the
distributee is
"immaterial" for purposes
of determining whether
the ascertainable
standard exception of
Code sections
2041 (b) (1) (A) and
2514(c) (1) is applicable.
Reg. § 2 0 . 2 04 1 - 1 (c) (2) .
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(ii) However, the regulation
is unclear whether
"income" is used
advisedly or whether it
crudely refers to
"resources" generally.
(e) However, the formulation
regarding consideration of
other resources seems
material, in any event, for
purposes of Code section
678 (a) (1) .
(i) Arguably, the
effectiveness of a
standard to prevent
attribution according to
Code section 678(a) (1)
requires that the
standard prevent the
power holder from having
the absolute ability to
pay and not to pay.
(ii) Therefore, "not
considering" or
"considering or not
considering" might
dissipate any protection
that a formulation of
"considering" might
afford.
(f) This writer recommends the
conservative approach: do
require the power holder to
take into account resources
otherwise available to the
distributee.
ii. Second, the mandatory "shall"
(rather than the permissive "may")
requires the trustee to exercise
the power if the ascertainable
event occurs.
(a) The issue is whether an
ascertainable standard is
sufficient if it limits the
extent to which the power is
exercisable but does not
control whether and when the
power holder must exercise the
power. See generally Estate
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of Carpenter v. united states,
80-1 USTC ~13,339 at 84,323
(W.D. wis. 1980).
(b) Is the standard sufficient if
it places a "ceiling" upon the
exercise of the power but does
not place a "floor" under it?
(c) The answer might depend upon
the nature of the power and
upon the particular tax risk
that it presents.
(i) Certain sections of the
Internal Revenue Code
appear to describe the
amount of power that a
person might possess to
benefit himself or
herself without owning
the property for estate,
gift or income tax
purposes. They suggest
that the standard need
limit only the extent to
which the power is
exercisable. See Code §§
2041 (b) (1) (A), 2514 (c) (1)
and 678 (a) (1) i Cf. reg.
§20.2041-1(c) (2).
(ii) Other statutory and
regulatory provisions
seem concerned with
control or discretion,
per see They suggest
that the standard must
limit the exercise, and
the nonexercise, of the
power. See Code
§ § 674 (b) (5) (A) and
674(d) i reg. §§25.2511-
1 (g) (2) and 2 0 . 2 04 1 -
l(c) (2) i Jennings v.
Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d
Cir. 1947), 47-1 USTC
~10,551i Estate of
Budlong, 7 T.C. 756
(1946) i and Estate of
Carpenter v. united
States, 80-1 USTC ~13,339
(W.D. wis. 1980).
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(d) Again, this writer recommends
the conservative approach:
draft the standard explicitly
to limit both (i) the right to
exercise the power and (ii)
the right not to exercise it.
(i) According to this
approach, the right not
to exercise the power is
discretionary only to a
limited extent and a
person who the power can
benefit can force its
exercise. Cf. Security -
Peoples Trust Co. v.
united States, 238
F.Supp. 40 (W.D.Pa.
1965), 65-1 USTC ~12,294.
(ii) Further, this approach
might serve the
collateral function of
assuring the creator of
the trust and the
beneficiaries that the
trust will discharge
desired purposes.
iii. Third, an ascertainable standard
does not exist according to
regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2)
if the determination of the trustee
regarding exercise or nonexercise
is "conclusive."
iv. Fourth, if a power is exercisable
in favor of more than one person,
an ascertainable standard can make
the power unwieldy.
(a) A mandate to use the power
might force the power holder
unsatisfactorily to reconcile
the competing interests of the
various beneficiaries.
(b) How should the power holder
reconcile present and future
needs?
(c) How should the power holder
reconcile concurrent needs of
persons in different
generations?
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v. Fifth, unless each permissible
distributee has limited resources
and is a person, for example an
orphaned child or an unmarried
adult, to whom no one owes any
obligation of support, this writer
generally does not recommend a
trust that requires each
distribution to comply with an
ascertainable standard.
(a) Required consideration of
resources otherwise available
tends to preclude
distributions and, if each
distribution is subject to the
standard, impede the
usefulness of the trust.
(b) Rather, this writer generally
suggests that a useful format
is (1) a mandate to pay income
(see Form #1) coupled with an
ascertainable standard with
respect to principal (see Form
#9), or (2) a mandate to pay
(see first paragraph of Form
#35), or a right to withdraw
(see Form #42), a unitrust
percentage coupled with an
ascertainable standard with
respect to the balance of the
trust (see second paragraph of
Form #35 and second paragraph
of Form #40) .
2. Preventing General Powers of Appointment Due
to Power Holder's Powers to Pay to Other
Than Self.
a. Examples:
i. Removal of discretion (Form #12) .
(1) No trustee shall possess,
or participate in the exercise of,
any power that, but for this
paragraph (1), the trustee would
have to make any determination with
respect to any payment which would
discharge any legal obligation of
the trustee personally.
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ii. Prohibition of payment (Form #13) .
The Trustee shall not make (or have
any power to make) any payment
which would discharge any legal
obligation of any person to whom
the Trustee can not make payment
directly.
b. Purpose.
i. The ability of a trustee to use
trust property to discharge his or
her legal obligation seems very
unlikely in the context in which it
often is asserted to exist.
Consider a trust in which (i) the
power holder is not named or
described as a permissible
distributee and (ii) the governing
instrument does not explicitly
permit payments for the support of
any person who is named or
described as a permissible
distributee.
(a) In this context, the power
holder's distribution of trust
property in discharge of a
personal obligation of the
power holder seems to be
solely for the benefit of
someone who is not named or
described as a beneficiary.
(b) Therefore, the distribution
appears to violate the trust.
ii. However, consider a configuration
in which the problem might exist.
(a) Assume that a testator creates
a trust that requires the
trustee currently to pay
income to the grantor's child
for life and permits the
trustee to distribute
principal to the child for the
child's health, education and
support, remainder to the
child's descendants, per
stirpes, who survive the
child. Assume additionally
that the grantor creates the
trust upon the grantor's
death, the grantor's spouse
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(the child's surviving parent)
is the trustee and the child
is a minor when the grantor
dies.
(b) The person serving as trustee
is empowered only to make
distributions to other than
himself or herself.
(c) The ascertainable standard
relates to other than the
power holder and permits
distributions for the support
of the named or described
distributee.
(d) The issue is whether a person
who has a legal obligation to
support the named or described
distributee can exercise the
power to discharge his or her
personal obligation.
(e) This result seems unlikely if
the ascertainable standard
includes a requirement that
the trustee consider resources
otherwise available to the
named or described
distributee.
c. Drafting.
i. The draftsperson should assume that
an ascertainable standard can not
remove a power from the category of
a general power of appointment
unless the standard relates to the
health, education or support of the
power holder.
(a) The only ascertainable
standards that, according to
applicable statute, cause a
power not to be a general
power are those that relate to
the health, education or
support of the power holder.
Code §§2041(b) (1) (A) and
2514 (c) (1) .
(b) The Internal Revenue Service
seems to support this
assumption. Rev. Rul. 79-154,
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1979-1 C.B. 301; cf. Jennings
v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1947), 47-1 USTC '10,551;
Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756
(1946) i and Sowell v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1564
(10th Cir. 1983), 83-1 USTC
'13,526.
ii. What strategy, then, is
appropriate?
(a) The draftsperson absolutely
can prohibit any distribution
that would discharge any legal
obligation owed by a person
who is not named or described
as a permissible distributee.
See Form #13. Cf. Upjohn v.
united States, 72-2 USTC
'12,888 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
(b) However, if the drafting
objective is only to prevent a
general power of appointment,
the appropriate focus appears
to be upon the particular
power relative to the power
holder, rather than upon the
power, per see
(c) Therefore, if the drafting
objective is only to prevent a
general power of appointment,
an absolute prohibition of any
distribution that purportedly
can discharge a legal
obligation of a person who is
not named or described as a
permissible distributee of the
distribution seems
unnecessary.
IV. DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: COMBINATION OF (i)
NONINDEPENDENT TRUSTEE POSSESSES SOME DISCRETION AND
(ii) INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE POSSESSES OTHER DISCRETION.
A. Examples:
1. Single Permissible Distributee.
a. Income (Form #14) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to my
wife so much or all, if any, of the net income
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as the Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide for
her health, education and support in the manner
of living to which accustomed. Additionally,
the Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the net income as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time
to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose
or reason whatsoever, including the termination
of the trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any
net income that it does not pay.
b. Principal (Form #15) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
my wife so much or all, if any, of the principal
as the Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide for
her health, education and support in the manner
of living to which accustomed. Additionally,
the Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the principal as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time
to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose
or reason whatsoever, including the termination
of the trust.
2. Plural Permissible Distributees.
a. Income (Form #16) .
(1) Income. The Trustee shall pay to any
one or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the net income as the Trustee
determines to be necessary or advisable from
time to time, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for their respective
health, education and support in the manner of
living to which accustomed. Additionally, the
Trustee shall pay to anyone or more of my wife
and my descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the· net income as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
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trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any net
income that it does not pay.
b. Principal (Form #17) .
(2) Principal. The Trustee shall pay to
anyone or more of my wife and my descendants,
without any duty of equalization, so much or
all, if any, of the principal as the Trustee
determines to be necessary or advisable from
time to t~e, considering resources otherwise
available, to provide for their respective
health, education and support in the manner of
living to which accustomed. Additionally, the
Trustee shall pay to anyone or more of my wife
and my descendants, without any duty of
equalization, so much or all, if any, of any
balance of the principal as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from t~e to time,
considering or not considering resources
otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.
B. Purpose.
This approach is a combination of the approach
described at II, supra, and the approach described
at III, supra. It can allow greater flexibility
than either of the constituent approaches alone.
C. Drafting.
This hybrid is usable with an independent trustee
always serving or an independent trustee serving
only according to a mechanism for the discretionary
addition of an independent trustee.
This writer often uses "two tiers" of dispositive
powers, with some but not all of the powers granted
solely to an independent trustee. He particularly
uses a variation in which an independent trustee is
not required always to serve and is only a
permissible or mandatory addition, or a required
successor, to one or more beneficially interested
trustees. See generally united States v. Byrum,
72-2 USTC '12,859 (Sup. ct. 1972); United States v.
Winchell, 61-1 USTC '12,015 (9th Cir. 1961); and
Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993).
If an interest holder can add an independent trustee
and the addition shifts an interest so that the
interest holder relinquishes beneficial enjoyment,
arguably a gift lurks somewhere. Consider, for
C - 20
example, what happens if a holder of a mandatory
income interest can appoint an independent trustee
with the effect .of transforming the mandatory income
interest into a discretionary interest. Due to loss
of dominion and control, a gift might occur upon a
mere shift of the interest due to the appointment.
If a gift does not occur upon the shift of the
interest as a result of the appointment, a gift (or
a transfer for estate tax purposes) probably does
occur if and when, because of the holder's
appointment of an independent trustee, the person
who previously had the mandatory income interest
receives less than all of the income.
Consider an embellishment to the system. The
embellishment would permit a beneficially interested
trustee to possess certain powers exclusively,
notwithstanding the discretionary or mandatory
addition of an independent trustee. Absent the
embellishment, the addition of an independent
trustee, discretionary or mandatory, would mean that
the beneficially interested trustee would share all
powers with the new, independent trustee, although,
of course, the independent trustee could (but need
not) delegate back to the beneficially interested
trustee all powers except those that would be
sensitive in the hands of the beneficially
interested trustee.
* * *
V. DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: PRIMARY BENEFICIARY
POSSESSES NONFIDUCIARY DISCRETION (RIGHT TO WITHDRAW) :
FIVE-AND-FIVE POWER.
The "five-and-five" exception to the general rule
concerning the existence of a general power of
appointment permits a person to have extremely flexible
access to property for his or her benefit without the
normal tax cost.
A. Example:
Right to withdraw greater of $5000 and 5% (Form
#18) .
Additionally,
a [after the Marital Trust entirely has been
distributed or expended,]
if my wife is living immediately before the end of a
calendar year, the Trustee shall pay to my wife so
much or all, if any, of the principal, not to exceed
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in value the greater of five thousand dollars and
five percent of the value of the principal as of the
end of the year, as my wife last directs in writing
before the end of the year.
B. Transfer Tax Implications and Planning.
The transfer tax implications are discussed in
detail at VOLUME TWO, PART ONE,VI,F.8.d. Suffice it
to say here that a lapse during any calendar year
during the life of the power holder is treated as a
transfer for estate tax purposes
"only to the extent that the property, which
could have been appointed by exercise of such
lapsed powers, exceeded in value, at the time of
such lapse, the greater of the following
amounts:
"(A) $5,000, or
"(B) 5 percent of the aggregate value, at
the time of such lapse, of the assets out of
which, or the proceeds of which, the exercise of
the lapsed powers could have been satisfied."
Code §2041 (b) (2) .
The gift tax rules are similar. See Code
§2514 (e) .
C. Income Tax Implications and Planning.
The most important of the income tax implications is
that the right to withdraw causes the power holder
to own both (i) all ordinary income that is subject
to the power and (ii) all income, ordinary and
other, that is attributable to the principal that is
subject to the powe~. Code §678(a) (1) i see
generally Code §671 and reg. §1.671-3. The income
tax implications are discussed in detail at VOLUME
TWO, PART ONE,VI,F.8.e.
* * *
3. Annuity Trusts and unitrusts.
The ability of the trustee, as a matter of law,
to concentrate upon total return seems to
enhance the importance of annuity trusts and
unitrusts.
a. A traditional annuity trust pays a fixed
amount of dollars per period of time,
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without regard to whether the annuity
amount is derived from income or from
principal.
b. A conventional unitrust pays a dollar
amount per period of time equal to a fixed
percentage of the total value of the trust
estate redetermined each period, also
without regard to whether the unitrust
amount is derived from income or from
principal.
c. The traditional type of annuity trust
produces a fixed, rigid and unvarying
amount to the annuitant.
i. Attorney William L. Hoisington,
commenting to this writer, suggested
the consideration of an "indexed"
annuity that fluctuates with changes in
price levels and purchasing power.
ii. According to Hoisington, by being able
to focus, simply, upon the number of
dollars necessary to accomplish an
objective (for example, the support of
the annuitant) and knowing the amount
required for this purpose at the time
of the creation of the trust and that
the purchasing power will remain
constant, a client might understand an
indexed annuity trust better than a
unitrust.
d. Whereas a traditional annuity does not
change at all and an indexed annuity
changes according to changes in values
outside the trust, a unitrust amount is
linked to changes in value of the trust
property itself. Therefore, a unitrust
amount precisely reflects changes in the
trust but only roughly reflects changes in
price levels and purchasing power.
i. Since the unitrust amount varies
directly with changes in value of the
trust property, the number and the
timing of valuation dates affect the
fluctuation of the amount.
ii. A greater number of dates and a greater
time over which they occur tends to
produce a "smoother" flow than a fewer
number of dates over a shorter time.
C - 23
e. An annuity trust periodically generates an
obligation, or debt, in an amount that is
fixed upon the creation of the trust,
subject, however, in the case of a trust
that provides an annuity which is indexed
to changes in cost of living, only to
fluctuation because of changes in price
levels.
f. By comparison, a conventional unitrust
periodically generates an obligation in an
amount that is fixed only on the date on
which the trust value that determines the
unitrust amount is determined.
g. Both an annuity trust and a unitrust seem
to permit the trustee to focus upon total
return.
i. An annuity trust seems to require the
trustee to seek the total return that
best will generate the annuity and,
consistent with payment of the annuity,
enhance the assets that can inure to
others upon termination of the annuity.
ii. Similarly, a unitrust impels the
trustee to seek the total return that
best will enhance both the unitrust
interest and the property that will
inure to others upon termination of the
unitrust interest.
iii. Because the level of payout that is
required from an annuity trust or a
unitrust is the principal factor that
determines the value of the property
that can continue to produce the
annuity or unitrust amount and remain
when the annuity or unitrust interest
terminates, determination of the
investment objectives for the trust
involves a complex analysis of the
extent to which payments should
decrease the value, and the extent to
which ordinary income and capital
appreciation should increase the value.
iv. By contrast, a trust that pays only
income might imply, relatively
directly, that the investment
objectives of the trustee are to
produce a reasonable stream of income
and yet maintain, in real terms, a
constant value of principal.
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h. The payout requirement of the conventional
unitrust seems to place less pressure upon
the trustee than the payout requirement of
a traditional annuity trust, regardless of
whether the distributions are in cash or in
kind.
i. The reason is that in a declining
market the payout required from a
traditional annuity trust represents an
increasing percentage of a decreasing
value, whereas the payout required from
a unitrust is an unvarying percentage
of a changing value.
ii. Because satisfaction of the required
distribution in kind seems to produce
the same economic effect as
satisfaction of the required
distribution in cash, the trustee seems
unable to relieve the pressure by
satisfying the annuity interest or the
unitrust interest in kind.
i. Special problems confront any attempt to
draft a trust that both (i) is to qualify
for the marital deduction and also (ii) is
to permit the trustee to invest for total
return.
i. An annuity trust that is created by
gift, or by a decedent who dies, after
October 24, 1992, might not qualify for
the marital deduction. Code
§§2056 (b) (7) (B) (ii), 2056 (b) (10) ,
2523 (e) and 2523 (f) (3) i reg.
§§20.2056(b)-7(e) and 25.2523(f)-
l(c) (3).
ii. Similarly, a trust that is solely a
unitrust might pay less than its income
and, therefore, cannot meet the income
requirement of the marital deduction.
Code §§2056(b) (5) and (b) (7). Cf.,
however, prop. reg. §§20.2056(b)-
5 (f) (ll, 2 0 . 2 05 6 (b) - 7 (d) (1) and
20.2056(b)-10, which, from and after
taxable years that begin on or after
the date that final regulations are
published in the Federal Register,
assuming the existence of the required
substance of state law, would overturn
this result.
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iii. A trust that pays the greater of (i)
trust accounting income and (ii) a
unitrust amount must pay at least its
income and, therefore, can meet the
income requirement.
(a) However, the important issue is
whether this "greater-of"
arrangement permits the trustee to
focus upon total return.
(b) The concern is that the
possibility that income can exceed
the unitrust amount might force
the trustee to continue to
concentrate on producing a yield
in the form of income for trust
accounting purposes.
(c) Attorney William L. Hoisington,
commenting to this writer,
suggested, and this writer agrees,
that if the unitrust percentage
that is specified is clearly as
high as the yield of ordinary
income that an income beneficiary
could demand a trustee to generate
according to state law, the
"greater-of" arrangement would
protect the income beneficiary
and, therefore, should free the
trustee to invest for total
return. Cf. reg. §20.2056(b)-
5 (f) (5) .
(i) However, the grantor usually
has no way to know with
certainty what this amount is.
(ii) Selection of a lesser amount
can undermine the elimination
of the focus upon ordinary
income.
(iii) While selection of a greater
amount can eliminate the focus
on ordinary income, it also
can eliminate a portion of the
trust.
j. Purposely, no form mentions income or
principal.
i. The forms contrast in this respect with
most forms of charitable remainder and
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charitable lead arrangements. See,
~, Rev. Procs. 89-20, 89-21, 90-30,
90-31, 90-32 and 90-33.
ii. Indeed, the forms in this outline also
contrast with most forms, of which this
writer is aware, of private annuity
trusts and private unitrusts.
iii. Code sections 661 and 662 govern what
the trust is deemed to distribute and
what the annuitant or the unitrust
recipient is deemed to receive.
(a) The "deeming" generally appears to
occur regardless of any statement
in the governing instrument to the
effect that a distribution has a
specified complexion.
(b) A notable exception is that
prov1s10n in the governing
instrument can determine the
extent, if any, to which dni
includes corpus income, i.e.,
capital gains. See Code
§643 (a) (3) and reg. § 1.643 (a) -3
(including particularly (a) and
Example 2 at (d)).
(i) However, a mandate to pay an
annuity (or, by implication, a
unitrust amount) seems not to
include capital gains in dni
even when a distribution of
principal is necessary in
order to satisfy the
distribution obligation. Reg.
§1.643(a)-3(d), Example 2.
See also Rev. Rul. 68-392,
1968-2 C.B. 284.
(ii) The apparent rationale is that
even though a distribution of
principal is necessary,
capital gains still are not
" [a]llocated to corpus and
actually distributed to
beneficiaries during the
taxable year .... " Reg.
§1.643 (a) -3 (a) (2).
(c) Arguably, because it would seem
(in the context of a private
annuity trust and a private
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unitrust) to have no economic
substance apart from tax results,
the inclusion in a governing
instrument of an ordering system
similar to that which applies
(according to Code section 664(b))
to charitable remainder
arrangements, is ineffective to
determine the income-tax
complexions of distributions from
private annuity trusts and private
unitrusts to annuitants and
unitrust recipients. Cf. Code
§661 (b) .
(d) Given (i) the apparent difficulty
of including capital gains in the
dni of an annuity trust or
unitrust and (ii) the apparent
lack of other tax function of the
mandate that usually appears in
the forms of others to pay the
annuity or the unitrust amount
first from income and, to any
extent that income is
insufficient, from principal,
apparently the only function of
the mandate is to· require a
purposeless separation, and
accounting, of income and
principal.
(e) The reason that this writer does
not include the mandate is to
attempt to dispense entirely with
separate treatment of income and
principal and to permit accounting
simply on the basis of receipts
and disbursements.
(f) As a planning matter, because
taxation of a given amount of
income of any complexion might
tend to generate less tax in the
hands of an individual (i.e., an
annuitant or a unitrust recipient)
than in the hands of the trustee
of a trust, a grantor might want
to maximize dni and, hence,
maximize the dni that a
distribution of a given value
carries from a trust to a
beneficiary.
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(g) However, movement of a tax burden
from a trust to a beneficiary will
tend to reduce the after-tax value
of any distribution and,
correspondingly, necessitate a
compensating increase in the
annuity amount or unitrust
percentage in order to produce a
given amount after tax.
4. Annuity Trust Examples.
a. No trustee possesses any discretion:
mandatory distribution of annuity, no
additional distribution (Form #25) .
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X]
dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of
this instrument and the date of the first
payment for the year]
The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount
in equal quarter-annual instal1ments. The
Trustee shall prorate the annuity amount
for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall not distribute to the
descendant any principal or income other
than according to (1).
b. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of annuity,
independent trustee can make additional
distributions (Form #26) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of
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this instrument and the date of the first
payment for the year]
The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount
in equal quarter-annual instal~ents. The
Trustee shall prorate the annuity amount
for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to t~e, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
c. Nonindependent trustee possesses
discretion: mandatory distribution of
annuity, nonindependent trustee can make
additional distributions (Form #27) .
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of
this instrument and the date of the first
payment for the year]
The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount
in equal quarter-annual installments. The
Trustee shall prorate the annuity amount
for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
d. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii)
independent trustee possesses other
discretion: mandatory distribution of
annuity, independent and nonindependent
trustees can make additional distributions
(Form #28) .
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Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the max~um extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Annuity Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant [X] dollars
a [, adjusted to reflect any increase in the
consumer price index between the date of
this instrument and the date of the first
payment for the year]
The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount
in equal quarter-annual instal~ents. The
Trustee shall prorate the annuity amount
for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from t~e to t~e, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the trust estate
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to t~e, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
5. Conventional unitrust Examples.
a. No trustee possesses any discretion:
mandatory distribution of unitrust amount,
no additional distribution
(Form #29) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year, the
Trustee shall pay to the descendant a
unitrust amount equal to [X] percent of the
a [net fair market value of the trust estate
of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year]
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b [average of the net fair market values of
the trust estate of the trust valued as of
the first business day of the year and of
each year of the preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust
amount in equal quarter-annual
installments. The Trustee shall prorate
the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall not distribute to the
descendant any principal or income other
than according to (1).
b. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandatory distribution of unitrust amount,
independent trustee can make additional
distributions
(Form #30) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant a unitrust amount equal to [X]
percent of the
a [net fair market value of the trust estate
of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year]
b [average of the net fair market values of
the trust estate of the trust valued as of
the first business day of the year and of
each year of the preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust
amount in equal quarter-annual
installments. The Trustee shall prorate
the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
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whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
c. Nonindependent trustee possesses
discretion: mandatory distribution of
unitrust amount, nonindependent trustee can
make additional distributions
(Form #31) .
(l) unitrust Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant a unitrust amount equal to [X]
percent of the
a [net fair market value of the trust estate
of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year]
b [average of the net fair market values of
the trust estate of the trust valued as of
the first business day of the year and of
each year of the preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust
amount in equal quarter-annual
installments. The Trustee shall prorate
the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
d. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii)
independent trustee possesses other
discretion: mandatory distribution of
unitrust amount, independent and
nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #32) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
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* * *
(1) Unitrust Interest. Each year,
after the descendant has attained thirty
years of age, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant a unitrust amount equal to [X]
percent of the
a [net fair market value of the trust estate
of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year]
b [average of the net fair market values of
the trust estate of the trust valued as of
the first business day of the year and of
each year of the preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust
amount in equal quarter-annual
installments. The Trustee shall prorate
the unitrust amount for any short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the ·Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the trust estate
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
6. Mandated-Percentage unitrusts.
Consider expressing as a percentage of the trust
estate, rather than as a dollar amount, the
unitrust interest that the trustee is required
to distribute.
a. Compared to a conventional unitrust in
which the unitrust interest is expressed as
a dollar amount, this arrangement enhances
flexibility in (i) timing of recognition of
gain and (ii) determining the identity of
the taxpayer that recognizes the gain.
i. Unless the trustee elects to the
contrary according to subsection 643(e)
of the Code, satisfaction of the
percentage in kind should not produce a
deemed sale. See generally Code
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§663 (a) (1); reg. § §1 . 6 61 (a) - 2 (f) (1) ,
1 . 1 014 - 4 (a) (3) and 1. 6 63 (a) - 1 (b) (1) ;
Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Kenan
v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1940); and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), affirmed 83
F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied
299 U.S. 573 (1936).
ii. However, if the satisfaction in kind
does not produce a deemed sale, (a) the
distributee takes for income tax
purposes the same basis that the
trustee had and (b) the dni that the
distribution carries to the beneficiary
is the lesser of (i) the basis of the
property in the hands of the
beneficiary and (ii) the fair market
value of the distributed property.
Code §643(e).
iii. By making or not making the election
according to subsection 643(e) of the
Code, the trustee can defer or
accelerate recognition of gain and can
determine which, the trustee or the
unitrust recipient, shall pay the tax
on any gain.
b. The ability of the trustee to satisfy the
percentage in kind (rather than in dollars)
should permit the trustee (but not the
unitrust recipient) to avoid the need for
cash.
i. Any distribution of an asset in kind
will carry distributable net income
from the trust to the distributee and
include it in the gross income of the
distributee to the extent of the lesser
of (a) the income tax basis of the
distributed asset in the hands of the
beneficiary and (b) the fair market
value of the distributed property.
Code §§643(e), 661 and 662.
ii. Therefore, although the distribution of
dni is limited to the basis of the
distributed asset in the hands of the
beneficiary, the distribution in kind
nevertheless will tend to require the
distributee to obtain cash in order to
pay tax.
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c. Use of the concept of a percentage gives
the trustee considerable flexibility about
how to satisfy the unitrust interest. If
the governing instrument authorizes the
trustee to make distributions in nonprorata
shares, the trustee should have flexibility
that ranges from satisfying the unitrust
interest with one asset to satisfying it
with a fractional share of each and every
asset including both income and principal.
i. Absent Code section 643(e) and the
trustee's possession and use of "pick-
and-choose" authority to distribute
other than the fixed percentage of each
and every asset, the mandated
percentage unitrust would seem to carry
to the unitrust recipient the fixed
fraction of all ordinary income and
capital gain attributable to the trust.
ii. Code section 643(e) would seem to
limit, to the lesser of the bases of
the distributed property in the hands
of the beneficiary and the fair market
value of the distributed property, the
ordinary income component of dni that
is deemed distributed because of the
distribution in kind.
iii. The more important inquiry for purposes
of this analysis is the effect upon the
dni distribution of the trustee's use
of "pick-and-choose" authority to
determine the exact assets to
distribute.
(a) Does the use of this authority
transform the trust, subject to
the mandate concerning the total
amount, into a discretionary trust
for income tax purposes?
(b) However, if the unitrust recipient
is the trustee and, therefore, by
means of the pick-and-choose
authority, the unitrust recipient
has unlimited power to select the
exact assets that are to satisfy
the unitrust interest, does the
paradigm shift to that of an
individual who, according to Code
section 678, is treated as owning
particular assets for income tax
purposes?
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(i) According to grantor-trust
principles under Code section
678, can the trustee-unitrust
recipient own (for income-tax
purposes) whatever assets the
unitrust recipient in fact
receives?
(ii) stated differently, do
principles of Code section 678
"trump" a portion of the
principles of Code sections
651, 652, 661 and 662 when the
recipient has the unlimited
power to select the assets
that the recipient shall
receive?
(iii) The writer is not aware of any
application of this theory,
notwithstanding that the issue
would seem to appear
frequently in the context of
nonprorata allocations of
assets to dispositions.
(iv) Compare with this issue the
similar issue that attends a
Give-Me-Five withdrawable-
percentage unitrust when, in
one version, the donee has
pick-and-choose authority as a
trustee and, in an alternative
version, the donee has pick-
and-choose authority both
personally and as a trustee.
Whereas in the mandated-
percentage unitrust the issue
arises in the context of a
potential clash between the
dni rules, on the one hand,
and the grantor-trust rules,
on the other, in the Give-Me-
Five withdrawable-percentage
unitrust the issue arguably
arises only in the context of
the proper interpretation of
Code section 678.
d. An economic difference between a
conventional unitrust, in which the
unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar
amount, and the mandated-percentage
unitrust, in which the unitrust interest is
expressed as a fraction of the trust
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estate, is that the former describes a
fixed number of dollars but the latter
describes something that can change in
value until the trustee satisfies it.
7. Mandated-Percentage unitrust Examples.
a. No trustee possesses any discretion:
mandated distribution of unitrust
percentage, no additional distribution
(Form #33) .
(1) unitrust Interest. If the
descendant is living immediately before the
end of a calendar year, the Trustee shall
pay to the descendant a [Xl fractional
share of the trust estate. The Trustee
shall prorate the fractional share for any
short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall not distribute to the
descendant any of the trust estate other
than according to (1).
b. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
mandated distribution of unitrust
percentage, independent trustee can make
additional distributions
(Form #34) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the max~um extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after
attaining thirty years of age, the
descendant is living immediately before the
end of a calendar year, the Trustee shall
pay to the descendant a [Xl fractional
share of the trust estate. The Trustee
shall prorate the fractional share for any
short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
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advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
c. Nonindependent trustee possesses
discretion: mandated distribution of
unitrust percentage, nonindependent trustee
can make additional distributions
(Form #35) .
(1) Unitrust Interest. If, after
attaining thirty years of age, the
descendant is living immediately before the
end of a calendar year, the Trustee shall
pay to the descendant a [Xl fractional
share of the trust estate. The Trustee
shall prorate the fractional share for any
short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
d. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii)
independent trustee possesses other
discretion: mandated distribution of
unitrust percentage, independent and
nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #36) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) unitrust Interest. If, after
attaining thirty years of age, the
descendant is living immediately before the
end of a calendar year, the Trustee shall
pay to the descendant a [Xl fractional
share of the trust estate. The Trustee
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shall prorate the fractional share for any
short year.
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the trust estate
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
8. withdrawable-Percentage ("GIVE-ME-FIVE")
unitrusts.
Next, instead of requiring the trustee to
distribute a unitrust percentage or a unitrust
amount, consider specifying a percentage of the
trust estate, not in excess of five percent (or
specifying, alternatively, so much of the trust
estate as has a value equal to the value of a
percentage of the trust estate, not in excess of
five percent) and providing that the unitrust
recipient may, but need not, withdraw all or any
of it until a particular time each year. The
withdrawable-percentage (nGIVE-ME-FIVE")
unitrust is an attractive alternative to (i) a
trust that mandates the current payment of
income, (ii) a conventional unitrust in which
the unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar
amount and the current payment of the unitrust
amount is mandated and (iii) a unitrust in which
the unitrust interest is expressed as a
percentage of the trust estate and the current
distribution of the unitrust percentage is
mandated.
The withdrawable-percentage unitrust is
particularly attractive when (as in a credit
shelter or generation-skipping configuration)
the trust is exempt from the generation-skipping
tax, the primary beneficiary is a nonskip person
(~, the grantor's spouse or child), or is a
skip person (~, the grantor's grandchild) who
is assigned to a generation higher than that of
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another skip person, and the primary beneficiary
might not need, but wants the security of, the
beneficial enjoyment that the trust can provide.
The withdrawable-percentage unitrust allows the
primary beneficiary to consume the resources of
the beneficiary that, if not consumed, will
generate liability for gift tax, estate tax or
generation-skipping tax (or more than one of
them). Thus, the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust allows the primary beneficiary to
conserve the trust's resources that are
sheltered from the transfer taxes.
As an example, instead of forcing the grantor's
spouse to receive all income from a marital
deduction trust and all income from a credit
shelter trust, a withdrawable-percentage
unitrust can permit the grantor's spouse to
receive all income from the marital deduction
trust and to consume the spouse's property (or
principal of the marital deduction trust) in an
amount that approximates the income of the
credit shelter trust. Thus, the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust allows the spouse to
conserve the trust estate of the credit shelter
trust.
As a similar example, instead of forcing the
grantor's child to receive all income from a
trust that has an inclusion ratio of zero for
generation-skipping tax purposes, a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust can permit the
grantor's child to consume the child's property
in an amount that approximates the income of the
generation-skipping trust, or can permit the
trustee to distribute property from a trust that
is not exempt from the generation-skipping tax
in an amount that approximates the income of the
trust that is exempt from the generation-
skipping tax. Thus, the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust allows the child to conserve the trust
estate of the generation-skipping trust.
a. Alternative Versions.
One version of the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust permits the beneficiary to
withdraw a percentage or fractional share
of the trust estate. An alternative
version permits the beneficiary to withdraw
so much of the trust estate as has a value
equal to the value of a specified fraction
of the trust estate as of the time of lapse
of the right to withdraw. Technically,
this aspect of the latter version seems
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identical to that which appears in a
conventional unitrust. The only economic
difference between the versions is that the
former version seems to describe something
that can change in value until the trustee
satisfies it, but the latter version seems
to impose a ceiling of a fixed number of
dollars. At least if a withdrawal
according to the alternative version is not
expressed as a dollar amount and the dollar
ceiling in fact does not define the
withdrawal, each version should produce
similar income tax results. See generally
reg. §1. 671-3 .
The version that permits the beneficiary to
withdraw "so much . . . of the trust
estate" might offer greater flexibility
than the version that permits the
beneficiary to withdraw a "fractional
share." If the governing instrument
authorizes the trustee to distribute
nonprorata shares of assets in satisfaction
of any withdrawal, the version that permits
the beneficiary to withdraw a "fractional
share" should vest in the trustee, and
arguably solely in the trustee, the ability
to satisfy a withdrawal with other than a
fractional share of each and every asset.
The version that permits the beneficiary to
withdraw "so much . . . of the trust
estate," on the other hand, might allow the
beneficiary, himself or herself, to select
the assets that are to satisfy any exercise
of the right to withdraw.
b. Advantages.
i. Use of a lapsing right to withdraw,
instead of a mandated payment, permits
the unitrust recipient to exclude the
trust estate from the gross estate of
the recipient for estate tax purposes
and from the gifts of the recipient for
gift tax purposes. See, however, the
text at VOLUME TWO, PART ONE, VI.F.8.f,
infra.
ii. The right to withdraw also permits the
unitrust recipient to regulate the
efficiency of the trust for generation-
skipping tax purposes by determining
whether a nonskip person (or a skip
person who is in a generation that is
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higher than that of another skip
person) shall receive distributions.
iii. Additionally, the lapsing right to
withdraw permits the power holder to
avoid dissipation of GST exemption.
rd.
iv. The unitrust concept eliminates any
functional distinction between income
and principal. Therefore, it permits
the trustee to take full advantage of
the prudent investor rule and modern
portfolio theory by investing for total
return.
v. Expression of the unitrust interest as
a percentage, rather than as a dollar
amount, permits satisfaction of the
interest in kind without recognition of
gain.
vi. Similarly, at least if (i) the exercise
of the right is expressed as a
percentage rather than as a dollar
amount and (ii) the dollar ceiling in
fact does not define the withdrawal,
expression of the right to withdraw as
so much of the trust estate as has a
value equal to the value of a
percentage at the time of the lapse or
exercise should permit satisfaction of
the interest in kind without
recognition of gain.
Example: Assume a right to withdraw so
much of the trust estate as
has a value equal to 5% of the
value of the trust estate at
the end of the year. Assume
that the donee exercises the
right by withdrawing, as an
example, a 1% fractional share
of the trust estate, or, as
another example, particular
assets that have an aggregate
value of less than five
percent of the value of the
trust estate at the time of
the partial exercise and
partial lapse (i.e.,
immediately before the end of
the year) of the right. The
portion withdrawn does not
have a fixed value and does
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fluctuate in value subject to
a dollar ceiling. See Rev.
Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286.
vii. The unitrust percentage of five percent
assures that the unitrust recipient can
receive approximately the same
enjoyment that he or she would receive
if he or she were to receive all income
of a trust that owned a balanced
portfolio of investments.
viii. The primary beneficiary can serve as
the sole trustee of a withdrawable-
percentage unitrust at least as well as
he or she can serve as the sole trustee
of a mandated-payment-of-income trust.
The primary beneficiary can serve as
the sole trustee of a withdrawable-
percentage unitrust just as well as he
or she can serve as the sole trustee of
a conventional unitrust and a mandated-
percentage unitrust.
ix. Because, within limits, the unitrust
recipient, himself or herself, can
determine the transfer tax results, a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust seems
more flexible for transfer tax purposes
than (i) a grant of discretion to an
independent trustee to make
distributions (see Form #22), (ii) a
mandate to a trustee to make
distributions (see, for example, Form
#19 and Form #29) and (iii) a grant of
discretion, limited by an ascertainable
standard, to a person to make
distributions to himself or herself
(see Form #21) .
c . A Problem.
Although the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust offers superior results for
transfer tax purposes, it poses a problem,
fortunately solvable, for income tax
purposes.
i. The right to withdraw includes in the
gross income of the power holder all
gross income that is attributable to
the sUbject property. Code §678(a) (1).
(a) If (i) the inclusion is
inadvertent and not desired and
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(ii) the power causes inclusion of
more than the income that is
attributable to the property to
which the power applies during the
taxable year, the inclusion can
present the power holder with an
unexpected and unwanted obligation
that the power holder can lack the
resources to discharge.
(b) A grantor can avoid the issue by
permitting or requiring the
trustee to pay to the donee each
year at least an amount equal to
the marginal amount of tax
increase that the donee incurs
because of the existence of the
trust. See,~, (i) the
discretionary power of an
independent trustee, in Form #39
and Form #41, and (ii) the
optional provisions in Form #38,
Form #39, Form #40 and Form #41.
(c) The attribution potentially is
desirable. See the discussion at
f, infra.
ii. Although the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust seems less flexible for income
tax purposes than a power granted to an
independent trustee and, arguably, a
power to withdraw limited by an
ascertainable standard, the more
appropriate comparison is probably
between (i) the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust and (ii) a mandate to a
trustee to distribute all income (see,
for example, Form #19) .
d. Transfer Tax Implications and Planning.
i. Generally, the lapse of a general power
of appointment is treated as a transfer
for gift and estate tax purposes. Code
§ § 2 04 1 (a) (2) and 2 514 (b) .
ii. However, a lapse during any calendar
year during the life of the power
holder is treated as a transfer for
estate tax purposes
"only to the extent that the property,
which could have been appointed by
exercise of such lapsed powers,
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exceeded in value, at the time of such
lapse, the greater of the following
amounts:
"(A) $5,000, or
"(B) 5 percent of the aggregate
value, at the time of such lapse, of
the assets out of which, or the
proceeds of which, the exercise of the
lapsed powers could have been
satisfied. " Code §2 041 (b) (2) .
The gift tax rules are similar. See
Code §2514(e).
(a) A lapse that is within the limits
of Code sections 2041(b) (2) and
2514(e) is not a gift for gift tax
purposes. Reg. §§20.2041-3(d) (3)
and 2 5 . 2 514 - 3 (c) .
(b) Similarly, the lapse is not a
transfer with retained enjoyment
for estate tax purposes. Reg.
§2 0 . 2 04 1 - 3 (d) (3) and (4) .
(c) Possession of the right to
withdraw at the death of the power
holder does include in the gross
estate of the power holder any
property that the power holder
could have withdrawn immediately
before death. Code §2041(b) (1)
and reg. §20. 2041-3 (d) (3) .
(i) However, confining the
possession of the power to
immediately before the end of
the year should prevent the
power from including any of
the trust estate in the gross
estate of the power holder.
(ii) Similarly, conditioning the
power upon the exhaustion of
another trust (for example, a
marital-deduction trust, such
as a QTIP or testamentary-
power-of-appointment trust)
that the power holder does not
have discretion to exhaust
prevents the power from
including property in the
gross estate of the power
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holder unless the power holder
dies after the other trust is
exhausted. Reg. §20.2041-
3(b) i cf. Estate of Kurz v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 44
(1993), affirmed 95-2 USTC
'60, 215 (7th Cir. 1995).
(d) Except to any extent that the
power subjects property to gift
tax or estate tax or the power
holder exercises the power, the
power does not cause the power
holder to become the transferor
for generation-skipping tax
purposes. Therefore, the power
does not dissipate the effect of
allocation of GST exemption of the
original transferor. Code
§2652 (a) .
iii. Where a power of appointment is
necessary to qualify property for the
marital deduction, a right to withdraw
is sufficient only if the grantor's
spouse can exercise the right in all
events. Cf. Ltr. Rul. 8202023 with
Estate of Hollingshead v. Commissioner,
70 T.C. 578 (1978).
e. Income Tax Implications and Planning.
i. The most important of the income tax
implications is that the right to
withdraw causes the power holder to own
both (i) all ordinary income that is
subject to the power and (ii) all
income, ordinary and other, that is
attributable to the principal that is
subject to the power. Code §678(a) (1) i
see generally Code §671 and reg.
§1.671-3.
(a) For example, a right to withdraw a
fractional portion of a trust
estate causes the power holder to
own, for income tax purposes, all
of the ordinary and other income
of the fractional portion.
(b) If, as in the alternative version
of the Give-Me-Five unitrust in
Form #42, the donee has the
unlimited power to select the
exact assets that are to satisfy
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the right, what portion of the
trust is subject to the right,
and, thus, what items of income
and deduction, etcetera is the
donee deemed to own? Cf. Rev.
Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
(i) According to grantor-trust
principles under Code section
678, does the donee of the
right to withdraw own (for
income-tax purposes) whatever
assets the donee in fact uses
to satisfy the right?
(ii) Even if this theory can apply
to an exercise of the right to
withdraw, this theory, per se,
seems not to offer any
guidance to the extent of any
lapse of the right.
(A) To such extent (if any) as
the Give-Me-Five power is
not exercised, what basis
exists for attributing
certain assets rather than
others?
(B) Absent any basis (and this
writer does not know of
any), treatment of the
Give-Me-Five power as a
right to withdraw a
fractional portion (at
least except to any extent
that any withdrawal
exceeds a fractional
portion) would seem
fairest.
(c) Similarly, if (as is possible in
the case of each version of the
Give-Me-Five unitrust, including,
for example, Form #38, Form #39,
Form #40, Form #41 and Form #42)
(i) the trustee has an unlimited
power (subject in Form #42 to a
similar power in the donee
personally) to select the exact
assets that are to satisfy the
right and (ii) the donee is the
trustee, what portion of the trust
is subject to the right, and,
thus, what items of income and
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deductions, etcetera is the donee
deemed to own?
(i) Again, according to grantor-
trust principles under Code
section 678, can the donee of
the right to withdraw own (for
income-tax purposes) whatever
assets the donee in fact uses
to satisfy the right?
(ii) Again, even if this theory can
apply to an exercise of the
right to withdraw, this
theory, per se, seems not to
offer any guidance to the
extent of any lapse of the
right.
(A) Again, to such extent (if
any) as the Give-Me-Five
power is not exercised,
what basis exists for
attributing certain assets
rather than others?
(B) Again, absent any basis
(and this writer does not
know of any), treatment of
the Give-Me-Five power as
a right to withdraw a
fractional portion (at
least except to any extent
that any withdrawal
exceeds a fractional
portion) would seem
fairest.
(d) The rules that apportion income,
for income tax purposes, between a
trust and its beneficiaries based
upon the amount of distributable
net income ("dni") that is, or is
not, carried from the trust to the
beneficiaries upon distributions
of assets from the trust should
not apply to any portion of the
trust that, because of the right
to withdraw, is treated as owned
by the donee according to Code
section 678. Rev. Rul. 67-241,
1967-2 C.B. 225.
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(i) Rather, the system should
treat the holder of the power
as receiving that which he or
she already owns.
(ii) The holder, for example, of a
right to withdraw a fractional
portion is regarded, for
income tax purposes, as owning
the fractional portion.
(iii) Even though Revenue RUling 67-
241, 1967-2 C.B. 225, seems to
support the proposition that
the power holder owns, for
income tax purposes, that
which he or she can withdraw
and, therefore, the dni rules
do not apply to any exercise
of the power, the regulations
promulgated according to Code
section 665 (regulations
section 1.665(b)-lA(d),
Example 4) clearly assert that
the throwback rules do apply
to any exercise of the power.
(A) SUbsequent to the
promulgation of the
regulations, Congress
abolished most of the
application of the
throwback rules.
(B) However, the abolition
might not prevent the
reasoning from continuing
to apply. See Code
§665 (c) .
(C) Although the two sets of
rules seem inconsistent,
and arguably the dni rules
should not oust the
grantor trust system where
the two systems overlap,
the planner should
appreciate the possibility
that the dni rules might
apply to an exercise.
(e) The Internal Revenue Service
asserts that even after the right
to withdraw lapses because the
power holder fails to exercise it,
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except to any extent that the
power holder ceases to be the
"grantor" according to the
principles of Code sections 671
through 677 r the power holder
owns r for income tax purposes r all
of the trust estate that the
exercise of the power would have
permitted the power holder to
possess. Code §678(a) (2); and
Ltr. Ruls. 200022035 r 9034004 and
8701007.
(i) This result depends upon (i)
the theory that a "lapse" is a
"release" for purposes of Code
section 678(a) (2) or (ii) the
theory that a lapse of a right
to withdraw has the same
economic effect r and should
have the same tax effect r as a
withdrawal of property from a
trust and a recontribution of
the property to the trust.
See EarlYr "Income taxation of
lapsed powers of withdrawal:
Analyzing their current
status r " Journal of Taxation
(April r 1985) 198.
(ii) Neither of the theories
mentioned in the preceding
paragraph clearly controls.
(A) Code sections 2041(b) (2)
and 2514(e) r on the one
hand r state that a lapse
is treated as a release
except to any extent that
a lapse within the limits
of the five-and-five rules
is not treated as a
release.
(B) Code section 678(a) (2)r on
the other hand r does not
state that a lapse ever is
treated as a release.
(C) Therefore r according to
the argument r a release is
something other than a
lapse r for purposes of
Code section 678(a) (2).
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(D) Nevertheless, for purposes
of planning, this writer
assumes that a lapse is
equivalent to a release
for purposes of Code
section 678 (a) (2) .
(f) Assume that a person has a right
to withdraw five percent of a
trust that has $1,000 of principal
and that generates $50 of ordinary
income and $100 of corpus income
ratably during its first year.
(i) As a first example of the
application of the Service's
position, assume that the
power applies during the
entire year and lapses at the
end of the year.
(A) The power holder is
regarded as owning five
percent of the trust
estate and, therefore, as
owning five percent of the
$50 of ordinary income and
five percent of the $100
of corpus income.
(B) Even if the power holder
never possesses any other
power to withdraw, except
to any extent that the
power holder ceases to be
the "grantor" according to
the principles of Code
sections 671-677, the
power holder owns, for
income tax purposes, all
of the fractional portion,
and thus all of the income
of the fractional portion,
both during the year in
which the power exists and
at all times after the
power lapses.
(ii) As a second example, assume
that the facts are the same as
in the first example except
that the power holder
exercises the power. The
results are the same as in the
first example for the first
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year and for as long as the
power holder owns the
withdrawn property and the
withdrawn property continues
to be a fractional share of
the aggregate of what is
withdrawn and what remains in
the trust.
(iii) As a third example, assume
that the facts are the same as
in the first example except
that the power exists only on
the first day of the first
year. The results are the
same as in the first example.
(iv) As a fourth example, assume
that the facts are the same as
in the first example except
that (as in the forms) the
power exists only immediately
before the end of the year.
The results are the same as in
the first example except that
in the first year the power
holder arguably does not own,
for income tax purposes, any
of the trust estate.
(v) As a fifth example, assume
that the facts are the same as
in the first example except
that the power recurs each
year. The Internal Revenue
Service might assert that the
power holder becomes the
owner, for income tax
purposes, of an additional
portion of the trust estate
each year. See Code
§678(a) (2) and Ltr. Ruls.
200022035 and 9034004.
(A) The theory of the Service
in Letter Rulings
200022035 and 9034004 is
that a power to withdraw
five percent each year
applies to all of the
trust estate (i.e., the
same property) each year
and, therefore, the power
holder has the right each
year to withdraw both (i)
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five percent of the
portion of the trust
estate that the power
holder previously did not
own for income tax
purposes and (ii) five
percent of the portion of
the trust estate that the
power holder previously
did own for income tax
purposes.
(B) The effect of the theory
is that each year the
power holder additionally
becomes the owner for
income tax purposes of
five percent of the
portion of the trust
estate that previously the
power holder did not own.
(C) The theory of Letter
RUlings 200022035 and
9034004 is not binding.
(vi) According to another theory
applied to the fifth example,
the power applies each year to
all of the trust estate (i.e.,
the same as according to the
theory of Letter Rulings
200022035 and 9034004) but the
power applies, for income tax
purposes, each subsequent year
the same as it applies the
first year, so that the
portion that the power holder
owns does not increase each
year.
(vii) According to yet another
theory, previously discussed,
a lapse is not a release.
Therefore, Code section
678(a) (2) is not operative and
the taxpayer owns only any
portion that the taxpayer
presently can withdraw.
(A) An implication of this
theory is that the amount
of income that the
taxpayer owns is a
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function of the time that
the power exists.
(B) Arguably, a power that is
exercisable only
immediately before the end
of the year does not cause
the taxpayer to own any
income.
(viii) Perhaps a taxpayer can choose
any of the theories, if he or
she follows the chosen theory
consistently.
(g) If the gross income of the power
holder would include all ordinary
income of the trust even if the
power were not to exist, the power
additionally would include only a
portion of corpus income in the
gross income of the power holder.
(h) If, on the other hand, the gross
income of the power holder would
not include all ordinary income of
the trust if the power were not to
exist, the power additionally
would include a portion of
ordinary income and a portion of
corpus income in the gross income
of the power holder.
(i) The extent to which the addition
of the power would alter the tax
burden of the power holder would
depend upon whether the power
would cause the power holder to
own the same, or an additional,
portion of the trust estate each
year.
(j) The grantor, in any event, should
consider including sufficient
flexibility to permit the power
holder to receive from the trust
sufficient property to discharge
any income tax liability of the
power holder that is attributable
to the trust.
ii. An additional implication for income
tax purposes is that even if
satisfaction in kind of a right to
withdraw a dollar amount would produce
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a deemed sale of the property that is
distributed, expression of the unitrust
interest as a right to withdraw a
fractional (or percentage) portion of
the trust estate (or, alternatively, at
least if the exercise of the right is
not framed as a withdrawal of a dollar
amount and the dollar ceiling in fact
does not define the withdrawal,
expression of the right to withdraw as
so much of the trust estate as has a
value equal to the value of a
fractional portion at the time of lapse
or exercise of the right) should cause
satisfaction of the right in kind not
to produce a deemed sale. Code
§ 663 (a) (1); reg. § § 1 . 6 61 (a) - 2 (f) (1) ,
1.1014-4(a) (3) and 1.663(a)-1(b) (1);
Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286; Kenan
v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1940); and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F.
Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), affirmed 83
F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied
299 U.S. 573 (1936); cf. Rev. Rul 67-
241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
(a) Even more comprehensively, an
alternative theory might prevent
sale or exchange treatment upon
satisfaction in kind of the
alternative version of the right
to withdraw which appears at Form
#42.
(b) According to grantor-trust
principles under Code section 678,
because of how the right to
withdraw is expressed, the donee
of the right to withdraw arguably
is the owner (for income-tax
purposes) of whatever assets in
fact satisfy the right. Cf. Rev.
Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
(i) According to the theory, any
deemed sale is a sale by the
trustee to the donee.
(ii) However, because of grantor-
trust principles, the trust,
to this extent, is an alter
ego of the donee.
(iii) A sale by a person to himself
or herself is not cognizable
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for income-tax purposes. See
Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B.
194.
f. Interface Between Income Tax and Transfer
Tax Implications, and Planning for It.
By including income in the gross income of
a unitrust recipient who does not receive
the income but who nevertheless pays the
income tax upon it and thus preserves it
intact for others, the right to withdraw
might enhance the property that a given
amount of transfer (for gift or estate tax
purposes) can make available for members of
the family of the power holder.
i. However, with uncertain effect, the
Internal Revenue Service might attempt
to treat the power holder's payment of
income tax as a contribution to the
trust to any extent that the payment
exceeds the amount that the power
holder receives from the trust.
(a) The Internal Revenue Service
announced this position in Letter
RUling 9444033.
(b) However, the Internal Revenue
Service withdrew the position in
Letter Ruling 9543049, which the
Service used to modify Letter
Ruling 9444033.
ii. Treatment of the payment of tax as a
contribution would include the deemed
contribution in the gross estate or
transfers for gift tax purposes, or
(depending upon the configuration of
the trust) both the gross estate and
the transfers for gift tax purposes, of
the power holder. Code §2511.
iii. The power holder can avoid these
results by receiving from the trust,
each year, property that has a value at
least equal to the marginal amount of
income tax that the right to withdraw
causes the power holder to pay.
iv. A grantor can arm the power holder,
himself or herself, with the solution
to this transfer-tax result by giving
the power holder a nongeneral power to
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appoint the trust estate and a
continuing right to withdraw any of the
trust estate that, because the power
holder contributed it or is deemed to
have contributed it, would be included
in the gross estate of the power holder
for estate tax purposes if the power
holder were to die.
v. Alternatively, the grantor can address
the issue by giving the power holder a
nongeneral power to appoint the trust
estate and, instead of giving the power
holder a power to withdraw the would-
be-"included portion," give an
independent trustee a discretionary
power to pay the would-be included
portion to the donee of the Give-Me-
Five power.
vi. As an additional alternative, perhaps a
trustee can address the issue by
exercising an ascertainable-standard-
limited power to pay the would-be-
included portion to the donee.
vii. Due to the apparent dissipation of the
transfer-tax issue as an issue, the
writer now prefers not to include a
right to withdraw the included portion
but, rather, to rely upon a
discretionary power in the hands of an
independent trust and an ascertainable-
standard-limited power in the hands of
any trustee and, if the grantor wants,
to add only a provision that eliminates
any income-tax burden which the donee
of the Give-Me-Five power might want
not to assume.
viii. The writer regards the issue of
imposition of an unwanted burden to pay
income tax as more important than the
issue of whether a donee's payment of
income tax is deemed a contribution to
the trust.
(a) Even if the donee's payment were a
contribution, the existence of the
contribution would tend not to
increase exposure to transfer tax
any more than a trust provision
that required the trustee to
return the contribution to the
donee.
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(b) Additionally, an independent
trustee with discretionary power
(or perhaps even any trustee
pursuant to an ascertainable-
standard-limited power) could
avoid the inclusion by
distribution to the donee of any
of the trust estate that, but for
the distribution, the Give-Me-Five
power would include in the
transfer tax base of the donee.
(c) By contrast, although an
independent trustee can use a
discretionary power (or perhaps
even any other trustee can use an
ascertainable-standard-limited
power) to eliminate the burden of
a donee of a Give-Me-Five power to
pay income tax that the donee is
deemed to own according to Code
section 678, the donee might
prefer in any event to avoid the
insecurity of not knowing whether
the trustee will relieve the
burden.
(d) A grantor who is considering
eliminating the insecurity
confronts a dilemma.
(i) Elimination of the insecurity
seems to require inclusion of
a mandate in the governing
instrument.
(ii) Although a donee can use a
power of appointment to
install or eliminate the
mandate for beneficiaries
after the death of the donee,
the donee appears unable to
install or eliminate a mandate
for the donee.
(iii) Inclusion of a mandate will
tend to enhance the security
of the donee but, assuming
that a donee's payments of
income tax are not deemed
contributions, reduce the
portion of the trust estate
that can escape transfer tax.
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(iv) Elimination of a mandate will
tend to reduce the security of
the donee but, assuming that a
donee's payments of income tax
are not deemed contributions,
increase the portion of the
trust estate that can escape
transfer tax.
(v) The solution that the writer
currently endorses is to
include the mandate but to
permit an independent trustee
to remove it.
g. Conclusion.
Compared to a trust that mandates the
current payment of all income, a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust might
increase the taxable income of the primary
beneficiary and reduce the taxable income
of the trustee. However, the rate that
applies to the taxable income of a trustee
reaches the maximum at a lower level of
taxable income than the rate that applies
to the taxable income of an individual.
Therefore, the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust usually will not increase (and
often will decrease) the aggregate of the
income tax. Although the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust will tend to increase
the difficulty of determining the income
tax, it will tend not to increase the tax
itself. A withdrawable-percentage unitrust
that is designed for flexibility can cope
with the additional complexity.
Transfer tax advantages and investment
advantages are what make the withdrawable-
percentage unitrust an attractive
alternative to a trust that mandates the
current payment of income. Free of
transfer tax, the primary beneficiary of
the withdrawable-percentage unitrust can
cause the trust to shelter from transfer
tax at least all of the trust estate in
excess of the aggregate of the income tax
liabilities of the beneficiary, and of the
trustee, with respect to taxable income
that is attributable to the trust. By
contrast, the most that the primary
beneficiary can allow to pass free of
transfer tax by means of the pay-alI-income
trust is the portion of the trust estate
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that exceeds the sum of the trust
accounting income and the income tax
liability of the trustee. Stated
differently, this portion consists of the
trust accounting principal that remains
after the trustee pays all income tax upon
corpus income.
Even assuming that the Internal Revenue
Service is correct about a beneficiary
making a contribution to a trust to the
extent that the beneficiary's payment of
income tax upon taxable income which is
attributable to the trust exceeds what the
beneficiary receives from the trust, (i)
all of the trust estate (i.e., trust
accounting income plus trust accounting
principal) net of the income tax upon the
taxable income that is attributable to the
trust exceeds (ii) the trust accounting
principal net of income tax upon corpus
income. The difference is significant. It
consists of the amount by which trust
accounting income exceeds the income tax
that is attributable to the trust
accounting income. stated differently,
this amount is the after-tax income of the
trust.
9. withdrawable-Percentage (nGIVE-ME-FIVEn)
unitrust Examples.
a. No trustee possesses any discretion:
permissive withdrawal of unitrust
percentage, no additional distribution
(Form #38) .
(1) Give-He-Five. If the descendant
is living immediately before the end of a
calendar year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant such fractional share (not to
exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the trust
estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year.
[As soon as possible after each taxable
year of the descendant, except to such
extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee
in its sole and absolute discretion last
directs in writing before the end of the
year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant (i) the amount (if any) by which
the income tax liability of the descendant
for the year is increased because, as a
result of one or more lapses of rights
granted according to the preceding
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sentence, the descendant is deemed,
according to Subpart E of Subchapter J of
Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code, to own
any of the trust estate for purposes of
determining the united States income tax of
the descendant and (ii) the amount (if any)
by which the income tax liability of the
descendant is increased because the Trustee
must pay according to this sentence.]
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall not distribute to the
descendant any of the trust estate other
than according to (1).
b. Independent trustee possesses discretion:
permissive withdrawal of unitrust
percentage, independent trustee can make
additional distributions
(Form #39):
Each trust is pr~arily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Give-He-Five. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is
living immediately before the end of a
calendar year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant such fractional share (not to
exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the trust
estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year.
[As soon as possible after each taxable
year of the descendant, except to such
extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee
in its sole and absolute discretion last
directs in writing before the end of the
year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant (i) the amount (if any) by which
the income tax liability of the descendant
for the year is increased because, as a
result of one or more lapses of rights
granted according to the preceding
sentence, the descendant is deemed,
according to Subpart E of Subchapter J of
Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code, to own
any of the trust estate for purposes of
determining the United states income tax of
C - 62
the descendant and (ii) the amount (if any)
by which the income tax liability of the
descendant is increased because the Trustee
must pay according to this sentence.]
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
c. Nonindependent trustee possesses
discretion: permissive withdrawal of
unitrust percentage, nonindependent
trustee can make additional distributions
(Form #40) .
(1) Give-He-Five. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is
living immediately before the end of a
calendar year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant such fractional share (not to
exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the trust
estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year.
[As soon as possible after each taxable
year of the descendant, except to such
extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee
in its sole and absolute discretion last
directs in writing before the end of the
year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant (i) the amount (if any) by which
the income tax liability of the descendant
for the year is increased because, as a
result of one or more lapses of rights
granted according to the preceding
sentence, the descendant is deemed,
according to Subpart E of Subchapter J of
Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code, to own
any of the trust estate for purposes of
determining the United states income tax of
the descendant and (ii) the amount (if any)
by which the income tax liability of the
descendant is increased because the Trustee
must pay according to this sentence.]
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Trustee determines to be necessary or
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advisable from time to t~e, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed.
d. Combination of (i) nonindependent trustee
possesses some discretion and (ii)
independent trustee possesses other
discretion: permissive withdrawal of
unitrust percentage, independent and
nonindependent trustees can make additional
distributions (Form #41) .
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of
the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but
do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not
exist) to the maximum extent in favor of
the descendant.
* * *
(1) Give-He-Five. If, after attaining
thirty years of age, the descendant is
living immediately before the end of a
calendar year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant such fractional share (not to
exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the trust
estate as the descendant last directs in
writing before the end of the year.
[As soon as possible after each taxable
year of the descendant, except to such
extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee
in its sole and absolute discretion last
directs in writing before the end of the
year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant (i) the amount (if any) by which
the income tax liability of the descendant
for the year is increased because, as a
result of one or more lapses of rights
granted according to the preceding
sentence, the descendant is deemed,
according to Subpart E of Subchapter J of
Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code, to own
any of the trust estate for purposes of
determining the United States income tax of
the descendant and (ii) the amount (if any)
by which the income tax liability of the
descendant is increased because the Trustee
must pay according to this sentence.]
(2) Additional Distributions. The
Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much
or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
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Trustee determines to be necessary or
advisable from time to time, considering
resources otherwise available, to provide
for the descendant's health, education and
support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much or all,
if any, of any balance of the trust estate
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and
absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to t~e, considering or
not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of
the trust.
Alternative version of first sentence of
sUbparagraph (l) (Form #42) .
(1) Give-He-Five. If
[, after attaining thirty years of age,]
the descendant is living immediately before
the end of a calendar year, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant so much, if
any, of the trust estate, not to exceed in
value five percent of the value of the
trust estate as of the end of the year, as
the descendant last directs in writing
before the end of the year.
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PART TWO: PAYMENTS TO OTHER BENEFICrARIES:
DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: NONINDEPENDENT PERSON
POSSESSES NONFIDUCIARY DISCRETION
(POWERS OF APPOINTMENT) .
I. DURING POWER HOLDER'S LIFE: NONGENERAL POWER OF
APPOINTMENT.
A. Example (Form #43) :
Additionally, the Trustee shall pay so much or all,
if any, of the principal to such one or more
a [members of a group consisting exclusively of my
descendants]
b [appointees, other than my wife and the estate,
creditors and creditors of the estate of my wife,]
in such amounts and portions and subject to such
trusts, terms and conditions as my wife directs in
writing at any t~e and from time to time.
c [Section 4.06. Certain Powers of
Appointment. Anything to the contrary
notwithstanding, no power of appointment granted in
this instrument with l~itation of permissible
appointees shall be exercisable, directly or
indirectly, (a) to discharge any legal obligation of
the person given the power or (b) in favor of the
person given the power or the creditors or the
estate or the creditors of the estate of the person
given the power. The preceding sentence shall not
apply to any power given a trustee or to any power
to withdraw . ]
B. Effect of Possession and Exercise.
The exercise of a nonfiduciary, nongeneral power of
appointment by a power holder who has a beneficial
interest in the subject property is deemed to be a
gift to such extent as the exercise transfers the
beneficial interest of the power holder. Rev. Rul.
79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342; Regester v. Commissioner,
83 T.C. 1 (1984); contra James C. Self, Jr. v.
united States, 142 F. SUpp. 939 (ct. Cl. 1956), 56-2
USTC ~11,613.
1. Since the power is not a fiduciary power of a
trustee, an ascertainable standard is not a
solution. Reg. §25.2511-1(g) (2).
2. The mere possession of this power does not
include the property in the transfer tax base of
the power holder.
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C. Preventing General Power of Appointment Due to Power
Holder's Powers to Pay to Other than Self.
The ability of a person to exercise this power to
discharge his or her legal obligation seems very
unlikely. The power permits payments only to other
than the power holder. Any payment that would
discharge a legal obligation of the power holder
would seem to be solely for the benefit of, and,
therefore, a payment to, someone to whom the power
does not permit distributions and, therefore, would
appear to violate the trust. Assuming that the
issue otherwise would exist, use of variable c in
Form #43 should avoid it.
II. AFTER POWER HOLDER'S DEATH: NONGENERAL POWER OF
APPOINTMENT EXERCISABLE BY WILL.
A. Example (Form #44) :
(B) Disposition on Death of Survivor. Upon the
death of my wife, if my wife survives me, the
Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the
Remainder Trust to such one or more
a [members of a group consisting exclusively of my
descendants]
b [appointees, other than the estate, creditors and
creditors of the estate of my wife,]
in such amounts and portions and subject to such
trusts, terms and conditions as my wife may appoint
by will specifically referring to this power. Upon
the death of the survivor of my wife and me, to such
extent, if any, as the trust estate of the Remainder
Trust is not effectively appointed, the Trustee
shall distribute the trust estate of the Remainder
Trust to the Trustee of the Family Trust under
Section 3.04.
B. Estate and Gift Tax Effect.
Neither the possession nor the exercise of the
testamentary power generates any liability for gift
tax or estate tax.
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I. The Issue
A. There are a lot ofpets in the United States.
1. The American Veterinary Medical Association estimates that over 58
million households own a "companion anima1." The U.S. domestic animal
population includes:
a) 59 million cats.
b) 53 million dogs.
c) 55 million fish.
d) 12.6 million birds.
e) 4 million-horses.
f) 4.8 million rodents.
g) 3.5 million reptiles.
B. People are nuts about their pets.
1. According to an American Animal Hospital Association pet owner
survey:
a) 79 percent ofpet owners said they give their pets holiday or
birthday presents;
b) 69 percent said they often sign letters or cards from them and
their pets;
c) 55 percent consider themselves as mom or dad to their pets,
2. According to a 1999 USA Today Snapshot survey:
a) 20% ofAmericans have altered a romantic relationship over a
pet-related issue.
b) 80% ofpet owners brag about their pets to others.
c) 79% allow their pets to sleep in bed with them.
d) 37% carry photos of their pets in their wallets.
e) 31% take time off from work to stay home with a sick pet.
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4,567,598
1,978,636
1,850,665
1,801,445
1,102,524
964,708
698,921
659,545
393,758
216,567
Give dog ice cream
Give dog a new bone
Sing or wish dog happy birthday
Give dog a party with other dogs or pets
Take dog to favorite place
Take photographs
3. According to the May 1999 American Pet Association poll:
a) 9,843,962 dog owners celebrate their dogs' birthdays in the
following ways:
Give dog a special treat
Make dog a special meal
Give dog a cake
Give dog a new toy
b) More than half of American dog owners are more attached to
their pets than to at least one other human being. The following
numbers represent those who say they are as attached to their dogs
as to the following persons:
A) Best Friend 13,070,134
B) Children 6,245,539
C) Spouse 4,301,563
C. People outlive their animals.
1. Although the oldest dog on record was 29, the average life span of all
dog breeds is around 13.5 years. Small dogs and cats are considered
geriatric at 11.5 years, but giant dogs breeds have reached the "twilight"
period at 7.5 years. 3 American Veterinary Medical Association,
Schaumberg, Ill., "Changing Times Bring Good News for Graying Pet
Population" available at http://www.avma.org/press/pioldpets01.asp.
Life Expectancy of Certain Animals
Animal Longevity, in years (record exceptions)
Ass 18-20 (63)
Bear 15-30 (47)
Cat 10-12 (26+)
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Chicken
Cow
Deer
Dog
Duck
Elephant
Fox
Goat
Groundhog
Guinea pig
Hamster, golden
Hippopotamus
Horse
Kangaroo
Lion
Monkey
Mouse
Parakeet (Budgerigar)
Pig
Pigeon
Rabbit
Rat
Sheep
Squirrel
Wolf
7-8 (14)
9-12 (39)
10-15 (26)
10-12 (24)
10 (15)
30-40 (71)
8-10 (14)
12 (17)
4-9
3 (6)
2 (8)
30 (49+)
20-25 (50+)
4-6 (23)
10 (29)
12-15 (29) (depending on kind)
1-3 (4)
8 (12+)
10 (22)
10-12 (39)
6-8 (15)
3 (5)
12 (16)
8-9 (15)
10-12 (16)
/)()urce: Ja:tnes (j. Doherty, (le11eral C~u.rato:r, The \\Jildli.f.e
Conservation. Society.
D. Pets are property and thus by law, cannot be the direct beneficiary of an estate.
(Besides they are terrible money managers).
1. Between 12% and 27% of American pet owners have included their
animals in their wills. Anne R. Carey &. Marcy E. Mullins, USA
Snapshots - Man's Best Friend?, USA Today, Dec. 2, 1999, at IB, and
Elys A. McLean, USA Snapshots - Fat Cats and Dogs, USA Today, June
28, 1993, at ID., citing Jon Winokur, Mondo Canine 40 (1991).
2. Harper's Index reported in 1991 that over one million dogs had been
named as Will beneficiaries.
II. Possible Solutions
A. ByWi11
1. Direct that the pet be euthanized after the owner's death.
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a) Even though a pet is property, the courts have been reluctant to
order them destroyed by order of their now-deceased owners
finding that do so would violate public policy. See e.g. Estate of
Howard H. Brand, No. 28473 (Vennont 1999) (in which the court
distinguished between the decedent's horses (and mules) and his
Cadillac, all ofwhich he directed be destroyed after his death.);
Smith v. Avalino, No. 225698 (Super. Ct., San Francisco County,
June 1980) (in which a California court invalidated a will provision
directing the destruction of a dog); In re Capers Estate, 34 D & C
2d 121 (Pennsylvania 1964)(in which the court invalidated a will
provision directing the destruction of two dogs); In re Estate of
Hack, No. 97-P-274 (3rd Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Ill.
1998)(in which the court invalidated a will provision ordering the
testator's dog to be killed); and In re Estate of Clive Wishart,
(Newcastle, New Brunswick N/M/74/92) (in which a Canadian
court drew heavily upon United States precedent to invalidate a
will provision directing the destruction ofhorses).
b) This is not surprising, imagine a Will provision directing the
destruction of any other property (e.g. antique cars, books) rather
than sale. (Art or literary works may be a notable exception).
Interestingly, however, the court in the Brand case, cited above,
noted that it "received more than fifty letters from citizens across
the nation concerned about the outcome of this case, and not a
single communication addressing [the decedent's] desired
destruction ofhis perfectly good Cadillac."
c) First give the opportunity to locate an appropriate home for the
animals. There is less likelihood a court would overturn such a
prOVISIon.
2. Direct that the pet be placed at a shelter or other organization for
adoption. Some breeders will agree to accept their animals back after the
owner dies.
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a) May couple this with a charitable gift to the organization
b) Certain organizations have programs that guarantee placement -
- e.g. Kentucky Humane Society, Shamrock Foundation.
3. Direct that the pet be placed into a perpetual care institution run by
certain charitable organizations.
a) Organization remains free to reject gift and animal if for any
reason, such as the gift being too small, it chooses to do so.
b) Contract is not subject to rule against perpetuities, so this may
be appropriate for long-lived animals.
c) Have an alternative plan in case the organization no longer
exists or "looks the barking dog in the mouth" and rejects it when
the time comes.
d) Sample organizations that provide perpetual pet care following
owner's death.
(1) The School ofVeterinary Medicine at Purdue
University has a "Purdue Peace ofMind Program" in which
it agrees to care for a pet after your death for a gift of
$25,000 per pet. Telephone: 800-830-0104.
(2) The KSU Perpetual Pet Care Program, Kansas State
University School ofVeterinary Medicine,
http://www.vet.ksu.edu/depts/development/perppet.htm.
According to this website, under the Perpetual Pet Care
program, if a pet owner will fund an endowed scholarship
for a veterinary student, then that student will care for the
pet if the owner becomes incapacitated or predeceases her
pet. The program promises that the owner may specify a
great many of the details as to how the pet will be cared for.
Although this seems to offer a contractual arrangement for
pet care, it is unclear how the contract and the owner's
wishes will be enforced over time.
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(3) Stevenson Companion Animal Life-Care Center
(Texas A&M University).
(4) Wild Cat Ranch (Comfort, Texas). (Although this
program houses much smaller felines, it is interesting to
note that there are more tigers in captivity in Texas than in
the wild. Source: stray recollection of Turney P. Berry).
(5) Gabriel Foundation, the Oasis, and other sanctuaries
established for the benefit ofbirds specifically
(6) Assisi Animal Foundation, PO Box 143, Crystal Lake
IL60039-0143. Telephone: 815-455-9411
(7) Associated Humane Societies, Kitty City 124
. Evergreen Ave Newark NJ 07114. Telephone: 201-824-
7080.
(8) Bide-A-Wee Home Association, Golden Years
Retirement Home, 410 East 38th Street, New York NY
10016. Telephone: 212-532-6395.
(9) The Bluebell Foundation, Bertha's House, 20982
Laguna Canyon Road, Laguna Beach CA 92651.
Telephone: 714-994-1586.
(10) California Feline Foundation, 500 N Van Ness,
Fresno CA 93728. Telephone: 559-223-8690.
(11) Home For Life, Angel Care Program, Star Prairie WI.
Telephone: 800-252-5918.
(12) Kent Animal Shelter, 2259 River Road, Calverton NY
11933. Telephone: 516-727-5731.
(13) National Cat Protection Society, Retirement Centers,
PO Box 6218, Long Beach CA 90806. Telephone: 714-
650-1232.
(14) Vivisection Investigation League, The Last Post, PO
Box 259, Falls Village CT 06031. Telephone: 860-824-
0831.
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(15) Volunteers for Inter-Valley Animals, Sylvester House,
PO Box 896, Lompoc CA 93438. Telephone: 805-735-
6741.
(16) Zimmer Foundation, TLC/for The Love of Cats PO
Box 130944, Ann Arbor MI 48113. Telephone: 734-663-
8000.
4. Make an outright gift of the pet to an individual, with a gift ofmoney
to care for the animal. Problem: no mechanism to ensure pet gets proper
care. In addition, if the individual is not a family member the gift may
create Kentucky inheritance tax (paid by whom?).
5. Make an outright gift of the pet to an individual coupled with naming
the individual as the income beneficiary of a testamentary charitable
remainder trust which will last for a term ofyears equal to the estimated
life of the pet.
a) No way to link payments to actual life ofpet so pet may
outlive payments or vice versa.
b) No way to ensure that payments are actually used for pet care.
c) Estate gets a charitable deduction for the actuarial value of the
remainder interest.
d) Arguably, the charitable remainder beneficiary may act as
Trustee, depending on the meaning ofKRS 395.001 which defines
testamentary fiduciary.
6. Made a conditional gift to an individual ofboth the pet and money to
care for the animal.
a) Permitted in all states
b) Simpler but less predictable. May be appropriate for small
estates.
c) Condition precedent vs. condition subsequent
(1) Precedent: Caretaker receives property only ifhe cares
for the animal. If the animal predeceases the grantor, no
gift is made.
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(2) Subsequent: gift vests in the Caretaker and is divested
if the Caretaker fails to provide proper care.
(a) If the pet predeceases the grantor, without
explicit language to the contrary - the Caretaker
may still receive the gift. See e.g. In Re Andrew's
Will, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 591, 594 (Surr. Ct. 1962.)
(b) Avoids rule against perpetuities problems.
d) Suppose a gift were made to Sam of $25,000, with instructions
to pay it to Sue at Rover's death if Sue cared for Rover. Is such a
direction enforceable? Is it a trust by another name? What if Sam
is a nephew of the decedent but Sue is not? Is Kentucky
inheritance tax avoided?
7. Additional Will Provisions.
a) Consider including an in terrorem clause to reduce potential
challenges.
b) Allow the Executor to use estate funds to care for the pet
during administration.
c) Preclude euthanasia or animal research by including a
boilerplate provision such as: "Every animal [the client] has shall
be given to good homes ifpossible," and if they go to a shelter,
"under no circumstances will those animals be euthanized or used
for research or testing."
B. By Trust - Bequeath pet to Trustee, in trust, with instructions to deliver the pet
to a Caretaker.
1. Three types of trusts
a) trust for benefit of a human
b) trust for a-charitable purpose
c) trust for a non-charitable purpose
2. Historically, trusts for non-charitable purposes failed for two main
reasons.
a) No beneficiary with standing to enforce the terms of the trust
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b) Violated the Rule Against Perpetuities (or as some
commentators have discussed - actually an alternative version of
the Rule Against Perpetuities that has been applied to trusts of this
nature. Instead of requiring a trust to vest or fail within the RAP
period, courts have required that these trusts terminate within the
RAP period. For more see, Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes:
Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 913 (1999).
3. In the very first American case to address the validity of a bequest or
trust for the benefit of a pet, the highest court in Kentucky held that a
testamentary gift for the care of a specific animal was a "humane purpose"
and therefore effective under the Kentucky statute that validated any gift
that had a humane purpose. Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739 (Ky. 1923).
The current version of this statute is KRS 381.260.
4. Pet Trust Statutes
a) With the most recent addition ofFlorida, 18 states now have
pet trust statutes: AZ, CA, CO, FL, lA, MI, MS, MT, NJ, NM,
NY, NY, NC, OR, TN, UT, WA, WI.
b) If a trust for pets is executed in a state with a pet trust statute,
the grantor's intent may be frustrated if she moves to a state
without such a statute.
5. Drafting Considerations
a) Generally, both a Trustee and a Caretaker are needed. The
relationship may be analogized to that of Trustee and Guardian for
mInors.
b) Trustee
(1) Ability & willingness to properly administer the funds
and to expend the time & energy to ensure the pet is
properly care for.
(2) Ask the person or institution beforehand.
(3) Name an alternative.
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(4) May want to compensate Trustee as an incentive.
(5) Trust requires an annual tax return and must be
invested in accordance with applicable state law.
c) Caretaker for the pet(s).
(1) Has right and duty to enforce the terms of the trust
(a) Because the pet beneficiary cannot enforce the
provisions of the trust, the Uniform Probate Code
provides that a person can be given the power to
enforce the trust, either by designation under the
trust instrument or by court appointment at the
request of an interested person.
(b) Some states (New York, for example) require
that both a trustee and an "enforcer" be appointed.
(2) Ability to care for the pet and willingness to care for
the pet.
(3) Ask them beforehand.
(4) Always name alternatives. People die, get sick, or
move to apartments or condominiums that do not allow
pets.
(5) Generally, the Trustee and Caretaker should NOT be
the same person to ensure checks and balances.
(6) Ifno Caretaker is available, may want to authorize
Trustee to select a permanent home for the pet.
d) Provide specific care provisions.
(1) Type of food, housing, grooming, medical care
(a) may be detailed or left to discretion of the
Caretaker. However, if left to Caretaker's
discretion, some guidelines will insulate the
Caretaker from attack.
(b) In Re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 710-11 (Ariz.
1966) (Caretaker bought car and washing machine
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needed for pets care. Court found that the car was
unreasonable, but that the washing machine might
be permissible.)
(c) Remember that if a Caretaker is not in the
owner's community, standards and expenses may
vary. For instance, many communities don't even
have pet spas and pet psychologists. See e.g., USA
Weekend.com article, "The Latest From the Pet
Front" available at:
http://www.usaweekend.com/01_issues/011014/011
o14pets.html.
(2) Include instructions for final disposition
(a) Typical pet burial costs $250 - $1,000
(b) Virtual cemetery sites
(i) plan4ever.com
(ii) in-memory-of-pets.com
(iii) mycemetery.com/m/pet.html
e) Distributions
(1) Fixed Sum per month
(a) simple
(b) Caretaker gets windfall if actual expenses are
less
(c) Caretaker may be unwilling to make needed
expenditures if expenses are greater than the
monthly stipend
(2) Reimbursement Only
(a) Caretaker must submit receipts.
(b) Additional time and burden on Caretaker.
(3) Combination ofFixed Sum and Reimbursement
(a) Caretaker receives a fixed sum monthly for
routine needs.
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(b) Caretaker can be reimbursed for extraordinary
expenses.
(4) Require Trustee to make at least one annual random
inspection of the animal & its home
(5) Pet i.d. is important to ensure Rover is really Rover
(a) Describe pet very specifically - scars, marks
etc. and/or include a picture
(b) Microchip
(c) DNA
f) Remainder beneficiary
(1) Should not be the Caretaker or you create an incentive
for the animal to meet an untimely demise
(2) Willett v. Willett, 247 S. W. 739, 741 (Ky. 1923) (Pet
owner neglected to provide for the distribution of the
remaining trust property on the pet's death and thus after
pet's death the property would pass to heirs at law.)
(3) As with any trust, give the Trustee appropriate
guidance or direction in balancing the rights of the income
(life) beneficiary - -the pet-and the remainder beneficiary.
If the purpose is to care for Rover and the remainder
beneficiary is incide~tal, then say so.
g) Duration
(1) Rule Against Perpetuities - Must not link duration of
trust to pet's life unless your state has a statute which
allows it
(a) Aha, another reason for an Alaska or Delaware
(or Ohio, Florida, etc.) trust! Kentucky, unlike a
substantial number of states, has not eliminated the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Presumably, that means
the trust must end 21 years after the grantor's death.
Suppose a trust is funded with $100,000 and
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provides that $500 per year is to be paid to Fred,
who is alive when the trust is established, with the
remaining income and principal used for Rover. Is
Fred the measuring life?
(b) The rule against perpetuities is not a problem
for most pets if anticipated by the trust draftsman.
(Although it could be a problem when planning for
a parrot that might live up to 50 years). The
instrument would provide that the trust terminates
upon the death of the last pet or upon expiration of
21 years after the death of the last measuring life,
whichever comes first.
(c) Speaking ofAlaska, Alaska law makes pet
trusts valid and enforceable for the life of the pet, up
to a maximum of21 years. The statute solves the
human beneficiary problem by providing that a pet
trust may be enforced by any designated individual
or, if necessary, by an individual appointed by the
court.
6. Trust Corpus
a) Must include the pet!
b) Don't over fund the trust. That may raise competency issues
and invite litigation.
(1) Uniform Probate Code §2-907(c) (6)(1993) authorizes
the court to reduce the amount left for pets if it
"substantially exceeds the amount required" to care for the
animal.
(2) Amount should be rational - - Calculate amount based
upon type of animal, life expectancy, standard of living,
need for medical treatments, additional funds for boarding,
grooming, pet sitting etc.
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(a) It takes $7,000 to $8,000 to care for a dog
throughout its lifetime. Lynn Asinof, "You Can't
Leave Millions to Spot, But Setting Up a Trust
Might Work," Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2002
quoting Kim Bressant-Kibwe, Trusts & Estates
Counsel at the American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals in New York.
(3) Templeton Estate, 4 Fiduciary 2d 172, 175 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1984) (applying "inherent power to reduce the
amount involved"... to an amount which is sufficient to
accomplish [the owner's] purpose"); Lyon Estate, 67 Pa. D.
& C. 2d 474, 482-83 (Orphan's Ct. 1974) (reducing the
amount left for the animal's care based on the supposition
that the owner mistook how much money would be needed
to care for the animals).
c) May want to fund trust with non-probate assets (life insurance,
POD account etc.) to insure that money is available for immediate
care of the animal.
C. Honorary Trusts
1. States without pet trust statutes or case law to the contrary (like
Kentucky and Ohio) may allow honorary trusts for pets or find that such a
trust exists when the testator has attempted to create a pet trust.
2. These trusts are not enforceable and, in some states, are limited to 21
years.
D. Notable Tax Consequences
1. Income Tax. The income tax treatment of income earned by trusts for
pets is not favorable because all income and capital gains are taxed to the
trust. Stated differently, distributions on behalfof a pet do not carry out
DNI. See Rev. Ruling 76-486,1976-2 C.B. 192
2. Generation Skipping Tax. A trust that provides for pets for their
lifetimes with the remainder to the grandchildren is a direct skip because
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animals are not persons. See PLR 9036043 (originating in Kentucky).
The trust provided for excess net income to be used for the grantor's
grandchildren's education, and terminated upon the earlier of the death of
the last surviving dog and 20 years. The clause stated that the Trustee in
its "uncontrolled discretion" was to provide for the care and maintenance
of the dogs "in a manner at least as conducive to the health, comfort and
well-being ofmy dogs the manner in which I cared for them and
maintained them before my death." There were 18 Norwegian Elkhounds
and $2,000,000 involved.
III. Miscellaneous
A. Charitable Remainder Trusts
1. Generally, a charitable remainder trust is a trust that provides for a
specified distribution, at least annually, to at least one beneficiary who is
not a charity, for life or for a term of years, with an irrevocable remainder
interest to be held for the benefit of or paid to a charity. Treas. Reg.
section 1.664-1(a)(I). Treas. Reg. section 1.664-1(a)(2) provides that a
trust is a charitable remainder trust "only if it is either a charitable
remainder annuity trust ...or ... unitrust in every respect." According to
Treas. Reg. sectionI664-2(a)(3) and 1.664-3(a)(3), distributions in
charitable remainder annuity trusts and unitrusts must be "payable to or for
the use of a named person or persons." I.R.C. section 7701(a)(I) defines
the word "person" to "mean and include an individual, a trust, estate,
partnership, association, company or corporation." The use of the term
"person" in the Code and Treasury Regulations is "specific and
unambiguous." Rev. Rul. 78-105, 1978-1 C.B. 295. "A pet animal does not
fit within the meaning of the term "person" for the purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code." Id. See also Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192 (animals
do not fall within the section7701(a)(I) definition of "person" and "cannot
be beneficiaries" under the Code).
2. Thus, a pet trust is not a charitable remainder annuity trust or unitrust
"in every respect" and is disqualified under section 2055(e)(2)(A).
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Therefore, no section 2055(a) deduction is allowed for a charitable
remainder interest where the present interest is reserved for the care of a
pet. See PLR 95-26-027 (trust for benefit of seven cats and dogs not
deductible under section 2055(a». See also Rev. Rul. 78-105, 1978-1 C.B.
295 (section 2055(a) deduction disallowed for the bequest of a remainder
interest to charity where the non-charitable distribution was for the care of
a pet during its lifetime).
3. Likewise, the income tax deduction for an inter vivos pet charitable
remainder trust is denied under section 170 and 664 because an animal is
not a "person."
4. The Morgan Bill. H.R. 1796
a) The Morgan Bill proposes amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code that are designed to accomplish two goals:
(1) Overcome IRS objections to section 170 and 2055(a)
income and estate tax deductions for bequests in trust for
the benefit of a pet when the remainder interest passes to a
qualified charity.
(2) Tax the distributions paid on behalf of a pet at the trust
level in order to discourage the possible abuse of the new
amendments.
b) The Bill was introduced by Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D. Oregon
on May 10,2001 and has been referred to the House Committee on
Ways and Means (where it has languished ever since). It is named
for his pet collie, Morgan.
c) Proposed amendments.
(1) Redefine the term "person" to include animals.
(a) Insert two new subsections within section
664(d), definitions regarding Charitable Remainder
Trusts.
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(5) CHARITABLE REMAINDER PET TRUST- For
purposes ofthis section, a charitable remainder pet
trust is a trust--
(A) from which a sum certain is to be paid, not less
often than annually, for the exclusive benefit ofone
or more pets (as defined in paragraph (6)) for a
term ofyears (not in excess of20 years) orfor the
life or lives ofsuch pet or pets,
(B) from which no amount other than the payments
described in subparagraph (A) and the taxes
imposed pursuant to subsection (c) may be paid to
orfor the use ofany person other than an
organization described in section 170(c),
(C) following the termination ofthe payments
described in subparagraph (A), the remainder
interest in the trust is to be transferred to, orfor the
use of, an organization described in section 170(c),
and
(D) the value (determined under section 7520) of
such remainder interest is at least 10 percent ofthe
initialfair market value ofall property placed in the
trust.
(6) PET- For purposes ofa charitable remainder
pet trust, a pet is any domesticated companion
animal (including a domesticated companion cat,
dog, rabbit, guinea pig, hamster, gerbil, ferret,
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mouse, rat, bird, fish, reptile, or horse) which is
living, and owned or caredfor by the taxpayer
establishing the trust, at the time ofthe crea'tion of
the trust.
(2) Redefine the character of the distributions paid on
behalfof the pet.
(a) Amend section 664(c), by inserting
and except, in the case ofa charitable
remainder pet trust, that any distribution
during such yearfor the benefit ofa pet (as
defined in subsection (d)) shall be taxable
income ofthe trust for such year, to the extent
ofthe income ofthe trust for the year and
undistributed income ofthe trust for prior
years after 'applied to such trust).
(b) Distributions from a charitable remainder trust
are taxed to the beneficiary as gross income, capital
gain, other income, or as a distribution of the trust
corpus. However, because a pet is not a taxpaying
entity, a pet cannot be taxed on the distributions
paid out of the trust on its behalf. Therefore, this
new language proposes to characterize these
distributions as taxable income of the trust and to
tax the trust itself on the amount of these
distributions at the levels provided in section 1(e).
B. Pet care provisions in Durable Power ofAttorney
D - 18
1. May want to identify each pet specifically in the DPOA so that there is
no confusion as to whether or not the agent has the authority to act in
relation to a specific pet.
2. A detailed list of activities that the agent attorney-in-fact has the power
to perform might include feeding, grooming, breeding, showing, selling,
obtaining medical care, euthanasia, post-mortem decisions, placing for
adoption etc. If the client has a specific position on an issue, the position
should be included in the POA (e.g., all female dogs over four years will
be spayed).
3. Identify specific veterinarians, handlers, pet-sitters, groomers,
cemeteries, etc. that the agent should use, ifpossible, in the event those
services are needed.
4. State whether the pet should remain at home with the client. If the
client will not be residing at home (e.g., an assisted living arrangement),
identify where the pet should reside or whether it should be placed for
adoption etc.
C. Pet care provision in Intervivos Trusts in the event of owner's incapacity.
After all, the children may hate Rover - - especially in "second pet situations."
D. Humane Society of the United States, Providing for Your Pet's Future
Without You (2000) (kit includes article, door/window sign for emergency
workers, emergency contacts sticker for inside of door, emergency pet care
instruction forms for neighbors/friends/family, wallet alert cards, detailed
instruction sheet for caregiver). You may request a copy ofthis packet by calling
(202) 452-1100 or sending an e-mail to gifts@hsus.org.
Uniform Probate Code
UPC § 2-907 states, in part:
a. [Honorary Trust.] Subject to subsection (c), if (i) a trust is a trust for a specific
lawful noncharitable purpose or for lawful noncharitable purposes to be
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selected by the trustee and (ii) there is no definite or definitely ascertainable
beneficiary designated, the trust may be perfonned by the trustee for twenty-
one years but no longer, whether or not the tenns of the trust contemplate a
longer duration.
b. [Pet Trust.] Subject to this subsection and subsection (c), a trust for the care of
a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The trust tenninates when no
living animal is covered by the trust. A governing instrument must be liberally
construed to bring the transfer within this subsection, to presume against the
merely precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the
general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in
detennining the transferor's intent.
c. [Additional Provisions Applicable to Both Honorary Trusts and Pet Trusts.] In
addition to the provisions of subsection (a) and (b), a trust covered by either of
those subsections is subject to the following provisions: .' .. 6. A court may
reduce the amount of the property transferred, ifit detennines that that amount
substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use. The amount of
the reduction, if any, passes as unexpended trust property ... 1. If no trustee is
designated or no designated trustee is willing to serve, a court shall name a
trustee. A court may order the transfer of the property to another trustee, if
required to assure that the intended use is carried out and ifno successor
trustee is designated in the trust instrument or ifno designated successor
trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve. A court may also make such other
orders and detenninations as shall be advisable to carry out the intent of the
transferor ...
Selected Pet Trust Statutes
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 13.12.907 (Michie 1999) Honorary trusts; trusts for pets.
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Honorary trusts in general, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary, can
last no longer than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the
life of the animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2907 (West 1999) Honorary trusts; trusts for pets;
conditions.
Honorary trusts in general, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary can last
no longer than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the life of
the animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
California: Cal. Probe Code § 15212 (West 1998) Trusts for care of animals; duration.
A trust for the care of an animal can last until no living animal is covered by the trust.
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-11-901 (West 1999) Honorary trusts; trusts for
pets.
Colorado allows a trust to cover not only a particular animal, but animals in gestation as
well. The trust can last until all animals covered by it have died.
Florida: Florida Statute 737.116 Trust for care of animal.
Florida law allows trusts to be established for the care of all pets that are alive during
their owners' lifetimes. The trusts terminate upon the deaths of the animals.
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. § 633.2105
The Iowa statute solves both the perpetuities and honorary trust problems with two simple
sentences: "A trust for the care of an animal living at the settlor's death is valid. The trust
terminates when no living animal is covered by its terms."
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Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 700.2722 (West 1999) Trusts for lawful
noncharitable purposes; length ofperformance; trust for care ofdesignated domestic pet
or animal; validity; length; intent and extrinsic evidence.
Honorary trusts, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary, can last no longer
than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the life of the
animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 456-055 (West 1998) Honorary trusts--pet animals--
noncharitable societies.
Under Missouri law, a trust for the care of an animal may last twenty-one years and no
longer. Pet trusts are viewed as honorary trusts with no special exceptions. Violations of
the rule against perpetuities are not determined prospectively--which means that a trust is
valid for twenty-one years or less, even though it might, by its terms, last longer.
Montana: Mont. Code. Ann. § 72-2-1017 (1999) Honorary trusts--trusts for pets.
Honorary trusts in general, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary, can
last no longer than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the
life of the animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
Nevada: NRS 163.0075
Provides for enforceable trusts for the life of the animals covered by the terms of the trust.
New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-907 (Michie 1999) Honorary trusts; trusts for pets.
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Honorary trusts in general, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary, can
last no longer than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the
life of the animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
New York: N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts § 7-6.1 (McKinney's 1999) Honorary trusts for
pets.
A trust for the care of an animal can last for the life of the animal.
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36A-147 (1999) Trusts for pets.
A trust for the care of an animal can last for the life of the animal. But note: there is no
provision for animals in gestation--only animals alive at the time of the trust's creation are
covered.
Oregon: ORS 128.308 Pet trusts.
The Oregon law provides for an enforceable trust for the lives of the animals. It also
provides for the appointment of a trustee in the event one is not named or is unable or
unwilling to perform. Interestingly, Oregon also has a statute (ORS 114.215) that
removes pets from the probate process so that they promptly may be placed under the care
of a new guardian. Anyone who does take custody of a pet under is expressly entitled to
reimbursement from the decedent's estate for the cost ofcaring for the animal.
Tennessee: Tennessee Code Ann. § 35-50-118.
A trust for the care of an animal may last twenty-one years and no longer.. Pet trusts are
viewed as honorary trusts "binding the conscience of the trustee."
Utah: Utah. Code. Ann. § 75-2-1001 (1999) Honorary trusts--Trusts for pets.
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Honorary trusts in general, with no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary, can
last no longer than 21 years. A trust for the care of an animal, however, can last for the
life of the animal. Extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the transferor's intent.
Washington: RCW 11.118
Validates trusts for the care ofnon- human animals with vertebrae for the life of the
animals, unless the trust provides otherwise.
Wisconsin: Wisconsin Statute 701.11(1)
Wisconsin has an honorary trust statute that does not specifically refer to pets but that
permits a grantor to apply trust property to any purpose that is not capricious.
SAMPLE PROVISIONS
Direction that pet be euthanized.
My dog Rover shall be delivered to [Emily Smith], Caretaker, for temporary holding.
The Caretaker shall be reimbursed from the estate for the costs for such temporary care
and feeding. The Executor shall advertise and otherwise make diligent efforts to find a
good home for the animal, taking a reasonable amount ofmoney for these purposes from
the estate. Ifno home can be found after [ ] months, the animal shall be taken to [name
and address ofveterinarian] to be euthanized by the most humane method the veterinarian
has competency to use.
Source: Association ofthe Bar ofthe City ofNew York, Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals,
uProviding For Your Pets In The Event ofYour Death or Hospitalization. "
Direction to pay for pet care during administration.
I direct my Executor to pay, as an administration expense' all expenses associated with
the feeding and care, including veterinary costs, ofmy dog Rover until Rover is placed
with the person that I (or my Executor) have selected to care for him for the duration of
his life, whether or not these expenses are deductible for estate tax purposes.
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Source: Association ofthe Bar ofthe City ofNew York, Committee on Legal Issues Pertaining to Animals,
HProviding For Your Pets In The Event ofYour Death or Hospitalization."
Outright gift ofpet and money.
As we discussed before my death, I leave my dog Rover to my sister, Emily Smith,
together with the sum of $5,000, said funds to be used to defray the costs of the care of
my dog Rover for the remainder ofRover's life. Emily may retain any funds remaining
after Rover's death as an expression ofmy gratitude for her care ofhim. Such care shall
include, but not be limited to, boarding, feeding ofpremium pet food and veterinary
care."
Source: HRemembering Your Four-Legged Family" By Jean M Beasley, Esq.
Pet Trust
I leave [description ofpet animal] and [amount ofmoney adequate for animal's care
and trust administration expenses] to the trustee, in trust, under the terms of the [name of
trust] created,under Article [] of this will. If [animal] does not survive me by [survival
period], this provision ofmy will is ofno effect.
[include as separate will article creating trust for animal's benefit]
ARTICLE []
[name of animal] TRUST
A. Conditions of Creation
This trust is to be created upon the conditions stated in Article [].
B. Governing Law
This trust is to be governed by [name of state] law unless this Article provides to the
contrary.
C. Trustees
I appoint [primary trustee] as Trustee of this trust. If [primary trustee] is unwilling or
unable to serve, I appoint [alternate trustee] as trustee.
D. Bond
No bond shall be required of any trustee named in this Article.
E. Trustee Compensation
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The trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation from the trust for serving as
trustee.
[or]
No trustee shall be entitled to compensation for serving as trustee.
F. Beneficiaries of Trust
[Caretaker] is the beneficiary of this trust provided [Caretaker] receives [name of
animal] into [his] [her] home and provides [animal] with proper care as defined in section
G of this Article. The trustee shall deliver [animal] into [Caretaker's] possession after
securing a written promise from [Caretaker] to provide [animal] with proper care. If
[Caretaker] (1) dies, (2) is unable to provide [animal] with proper care, or (3) is not
providing [animal] with proper care, [alternate beneficiary] is the beneficiary of this trust
provided [alternate beneficiary] provides [animal] with proper care. [continue in like
manner for additional alternates]
If there is no qualified alternate beneficiary, [allow the trustee to select caretaker, other
than the trustee] [donate animal].
G. Proper Care
Proper care means [description of care including, for example, requirement of regular
visits to a veterinarian].
The trustee shall visit [caretaker]'s home at least [monthly] [quarterly] [annually] to
make certain [animal] is receiving proper care. If in the trustee's sole discretion [animal]
is not receiving proper care as defined above, trustee shall immediately remove [animal]
from the beneficiary's possession and deliver the animal to the alternate beneficiary.
H. Distribution of Trust Property While [Animal] is Alive
1. Care of [Animal]
The trustee shall distribute [amount] to the beneficiary each [month] [year] provided
the beneficiary is taking proper care of [animal] as defined in section G of this Article.
[or]
The trustee shall reimburse [caretaker] for all reasonable expenses [caretaker] incurs
in the proper care of [animal] as defined in section G of this Article. Reasonable
expenses include, but are not limited to, [food, housing, grooming, medical care, and
burial or cremation fees.]
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[2. Caretaker Compensation]
The trustee [shall] [may] pay [dollar amount] to trustee on a [monthly] [annual]
basis provided [caretaker] is taking proper care of [animal] as defined in section G of this
Article.
[3. Liability Insurance]
The trustee [shall] [may] use trust property to purchase liability insurance to protect
the trust, the trustee, and [caretaker] from damage [animal] causes to property or
persons.]
[4. Offspring of [Animal]]
The trustee [shall] [may] [shall not] use trust property to reimburse [caretaker] for
expenses associated with any offspring of [animal].
I. Termination of Trust
This trust terminates on the earlier of (a) 21 years after [testator's] death, or (b) upon
the death of [animal].
J. Distribution ofProperty Upon Trust Termination
Upon the termination of this trust all remaining trust property shall pass to [remainder
beneficiary] if [he] [she] is alive at the time of trust termination. If [remainder
beneficiary] is not alive at the time of trust termination, all remaining trust property shall
pass to [alternate remainder beneficiary] if [he] [she] is alive at the time of trust
termination. [continue in like manner for additional alternates]
K. Spendthrift Provision
This is a spendthrift trust, that is, to the fullest extent permitted by law, no interest in
the income or principal of this trust may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred by any
beneficiary before payment or delivery of the interest by the trustee.
L. Principal and Income
The trustee shall have the discretion to credit a receipt or charge an expenditure to
income or principal or partly to each in any manner which the trustee determines to be
reasonable and equitable.
M. Trustee Powers
The trustee shall have [all powers granted to trustees under [name of state] law.
[or]
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The trustee shall have the following powers: [enumerate trustee powers]
N. Exculpatory Clause
The trustee shall not be liable for any loss, cost, damage, or expense sustained through
any error ofjudgment or in any other manner except for and as a result of a trustee's own
bad faith or gross negligence.
[Note: Additional provisions will be necessary if the animal and its offspring are
valuable from a monetary standpoint.]
Source: Professor Gerry W. Beyer Sample Animal Trust Provisions available at:
http://www.professorbeyer.com/Articles/Sample_Provisions.htm
Pet Trust
"I give and bequeath the sum of [amount] dollars ($ [amount]) to [first choice for trustee]
as trustee pursuant to [state] Probate Code section [section number]. If [first choice for
trustee] is unable or unwilling to serve as trustee, then my personal representative shall
serve as trustee in [his/her] place or shall select a trustee to serve in [his/her] place. The
trustee shall apply as much of the net income and principal of this trust as the trustee
determines in [his/her] sole discretion to be necessary or appropriate for the lifetime care
and maintenance ofmy dog, [name], and cat, [name], and such other animals as I may
own at the time ofmy death. After the death of all ofmy animals, or at such time as the
trust terminates or fails for any reason, any property remaining in this trust shall be
distributed to [name(s) ofperson(s) or organization(s) to receive remaining principal]."
Source: Gerhard Shipley, Pet Trusts: Providingfor Pets, Kansas Elder Law Network, Dec. 1999:
Pet Trust
ARTICLE 1 - XYZ PET TRUST
The XYZ Pet Trust shall be held and administered as follows:
1.1 PAYMENT OF MORTGAGES ON RESIDENCE: My trustee shall first apply
trust assets to payoff all mortgages on my residence, which at this time is at xxxx
(hereafter, "my residence").
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1.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF ENDOWMENT FUND: My trustee shall next set aside as
an endowment fund an amount ofproperty sufficient to generate income for the purposes
set forth in paragraph 1.4 below, for the lifetime of all animals I owned or cared for at the
time ofmy death, plus the life of any offspring of such animals in gestation at the time of
my death (hereafter, "my animals").
My trustee may add to the fund such amount as the trustee determines to be a reasonable
cushion against unforeseeable circumstances incident to carrying out the purposes of the
trust, such amount not to exceed twenty five percent (25%) of the amount my trustee
determines to be necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust.
My trustee shall set the amount of this fund no later than two (2) years after my
death based upon the trustee's experience carrying qut the purposes of this trust during
those two years; provided, however, that ifmy caretaker or trustee incurs legal expenses
to enforce the XYZ Pet Trust, my trustee shall set the amount of the fund after such
expenses are finalized and reimbursed from the trust estate.
This endowment fund shall be designated and hereafter referred to as "The XYZ Pet
Trust."
1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF EXCESS TRUST FUNDS: My trustee shall distribute any
trust funds in excess of that amount necessary to establish the XYZ Pet Trust to the
following beneficiaries; however, before making such distributions my trustee shall
obtain from each donee a written release of any claims or challenges to the validity of the
XYZ Pet Trust. With regard to the XYZ Educational Fund, my trustee shall obtain such
release from each adult beneficiary of such trust, and from the guardian of each minor
beneficiary of such trust.
(A) Fifteen percent (15%) to my spouse's brother xxx; ifxxx does not survive me, this
gift shall pass to his issue by representation. Ifxxx survives me and disclaims this gift in
the time and manner provided by law, this gift shall pass to the XYZ Educational Trust
established under this will.
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(B) Fifteen percent (15%) to remain in trust as the XYZ Educational Trust, to be
administered in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 6. Any portion of the XYZ
Educational Trust which, by reason of a person's attained age, death or otherwise, would
have become distributable before the establishment of a separate fund, may be distributed
directly by trustee without requiring that such a separate fund be established or that
distribution be made by trustee of such separate fund.
(C) Five percent (5%) to XXX ; ifXXX does not survive me, this gift shall be
distributed in proportional shares to the remaining beneficiaries listed in this paragraph
1.3.
(additional contingent specific and charitable gifts go here)
1.4 ADMINISTRATION OF XYZ PET TRUST:
(A) Appointment of Caretaker: I appoint John Doe of Lakewood, Colorado as the
caretaker ofmy residence and animals. I designate my caretaker as the person entitled to
enforce the intended use of the principal or income of the XYZ Pet Trust pursuant to
Colorado Revised Statutes §15-11-901(3)(d), as amended. If John Doe fails or ceases to
act as caretaker for any reason, I appoint Jane Smith of Longmont, Colorado as successor
caretaker.
(B) Rights of Caretaker: My caretaker shall own my animals, which I leave to his (or
her, in the case ofmy successor) kind care and judgment, and he or she shall live in my
residence rent-free, both for as long as he or she serves as caretaker ofmy animals. My
caretaker shall pay all his or her own personal living expenses, including but not limited
to all utilities, propane, phone, and other services not exclusively required by my
animals. My caretaker also shall be responsible for repairs to my residence caused by
any use which exceeds the bounds ofordinary wear and tear on the property. My
trustee's determination as to whether an expense is personal to the caretaker or a trust
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expense shall be conclusive on all persons. My caretaker shall maintain reasonable
communications with my trustee so my trustee is informed in a timely manner of
necessary maintenance and other property expenses.
(C) Distributions of Income And Principal: My trustee shall distribute to my caretaker,
or directly apply for the benefit ofmy animals, such amounts of the net income or
principal, or both, as my trustee determines, in its discretion, to be necessary or advisable
for care ofmy animals. Such care shall take into account the animals' living standard at
my death, and includes but is not limited to costs for food, medical care, and burial of
such animals' remains, which shall be adjacent to the other XYZ pet burial plots, [e.g.,
under the large tree in the front yard ofmy residence, near the satellite dish].
My trustee also shall apply trust income and principal as my trustee, in my trustee's
discretion, shall determine to be necessary or advisable for maintenance ofmy residence
in good saleable condition. Such maintenance shall include taxes, insurance, upkeep, and
any other expense for the reasonable care of the residence necessary to provide housing
for my animals and their caretaker and to carry out the other purposes of this trust.
My trustee also shall apply trust income and principal for any legal expenses
incurred by my trustee or my caretaker which are necessary to enforce the purposes of the
XYZ Pet Trust.
Any income not distributed may be added periodically to principal Although the
Fund is intended as an endowment, I authorize my trustee to distribute principal where
necessary to achieve the purposes of the trust, keeping in mind the probable future
expenses of the trust and the size of the cushion established at the outset of the fund. I do
not intend that my trustee borrow money or mortgage my residence to provide income for
the purposes of the trust.
(D) Termination ofXYZ Pet Trust: The XYZ Pet Trust shall terminate upon any of the
following termination events:
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(1) My last appointed successor caretaker resigns or fails to serve as caretaker for arty
reason.
(2) All my animals have deceased.
(3) My last appointed successor caretaker gives my trustee written notice of such
caretaker's intention to vacate my residence.
Upon any of these tennination events, my trustee shall, within 60 days, notify my
then-serving caretaker in writing that the trust has been tenninated. If such caretaker has
served as caretaker until all my animals are deceased (regardless ofwhen such caretaker
began serving), my trustee shall also notify such caretaker that such caretaker may
purchase my residence at seventy-five percent (75%) of its fair market value. This option
price shall be detennined by a quali:q.ed appraiser selected by my trustee and shall be
included in the notice oftennination. Within sixty (60) days of the date such notice of
tennination was mailed by my trustee, such caretaker shall exercise the option to purchase
granted herein by notifying my trustee, in a writing delivered to the trustee, ofhis or her
intent to purchase my residence. Such writing shall include evidence of such caretaker's
ability to finance such purchase. Ifmy caretaker has tenninated the trust before all my
animals have deceased, or ifmy caretaker fails to exercise this option in the time and
manner specified, my trustee shall sell my residence on the open market, giving
preference in the order received to offers made by any relative or friend ofmine or my
spouse mentioned in my will. My trustee shall add the proceeds of sale ofmy residence
to any assets or funds remaining in the XYZ Pet Trust, and shall distribute the balance as
follows:
(In this example, these remaindennen were the same as the contingent specific and
charitable donees in para.I.3)
If any ofmy animals are living at the time of tennination, I give them to my last
serving caretaker.
Source: Miriam Abrams Goodman, Esq., Frascona, Joiner, Goodman and Greenstein, P.C. Boulder,
Colorado available at http://www.jrascona.com/projile/miriam.htm
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1. Background: The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 allowed individual states to sponsor
qualified tuition programs, which are commonly known as 529 Plans (named for
Internal Revenue Code Section 529). Using a 529 Plan can be one of the most
effective financial planning and estate planning strategies available to clients. 529
Plans provide tremendous income tax, gift tax, and estate tax benefits, as well as many
non-tax benefits. 529 Plans fall into one of two categories:
a. Prepaid tuition programs: With this type of 529 Plan, a client can purchase
tuition credits or certificates that entitle the beneficiary (i.e. the student) to the
future waiver of tuition. One general misconception is that the student is
forced to attend an in-state college once his or her tuition has been prepaid.
Actually, states offering prepaid tuition contracts covering in-state tuition
allow you to transfer the value of the contract to a private or out-of-state
school. However, the client may be penalized by not receiving the full amount
of the contract.
b. College Savings Plans: The more popular of the two are the college savings
plans. This outline will address these 529 Plans because of the numerous
benefits they offer.
2. Brief Overview: In short, with a 529 college savings plan, the client deposits funds
into an investment account for the future college expenses of a beneficiary. Any
person (whether a parent, grandparent, other family member, or friend) can put assets
into the account for a beneficiary. Because of the numerous estate planning and tax
benefits involved, it is more than a simple college savings device.
a. Maintained by States: Section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code allowed
states to establish and maintain 529 Plans. Each state is permitted to design its
own 529 Plan, as long as the federal statutory and regulatory requirements are
satisfied. Therefore, the specific plans offered by the various states do have
administrative differences as well as differing investment options.
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b. Growing Appeal of 529 Plans: Although 529 Plans have been in existence
for several years, they had limited appeal until recently for several reasons.
First, few states offered 529 Plans and clients had few choices. Second,
initially, many states oversaw the investment of the assets in the 529 Plan and
the investment options generally were not appealing. Fortunately, numerous
mutual fund companies now manage 529 Plans and now offer these plans to
investors regardless ofwhere they reside.
Also, with the recent changes in the federal tax laws and announcements by the
IRS (which are discussed below), 529 Plans have become even more attractive
for clients.
With the increased attractiveness and familiarity with 529 Plans, it is estimated
that, as of year end 2001, there was $9.5 billion in 529 Plans across the
country. This number is expected to increase dramatically over the next several
years.
Important Note: Clients now have the ability to "forum shop" by selecting the
most favorable state programs. Although there are some differences between
the plans with regard to administrative issues, the largest differences are the
investment options. Therefore, clients should be advised to select a plan that
provides the most attractive investment options for their situation.
3. The Need for 529 Plans and Savings: 529 Plans offer tremendous tax. benefits to
clients, plus they can help clients save for the rising costs of education.
a. Increasing College Enrollment: Enrollment in U.S. colleges and universities
is expected to rise over the next 10 years. In 1998, there were more than 14.6
million students enrolled in U.S. colleges. By 2010, that number is expected to
increase to 17.5 million-a growth rate ofnearly 20%.
b. Increasing Costs of College: Most people are aware of the high cost of
college, but it is helpful to have specific numbers. According to the Trends in
College Pricing released by the College Board, college tuition inflation has
been 5%. The cost of education will likely be the most expensive purchase in
the life of a family.
c. Research on Parents and Grandparents: A recent study revealed the
following statistics:
~ 82% ofadults reported that saving for college is their top saving goal,
followed closely by saving for retirement.
Nearly 3 out of4 adults are unaware ofthe benefits of529 Plans.
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More than lout of 4 parents who expect their children to attend
college have not yet started savingfor this expense.
Most grandparents surveyed would contribute to a 529 Plan for a
child, but less than 1/3 have made any investments or given cash gifts
for education. Professional advisors, such as attorneys, CPAs, and
financial advisors, should present 529 Plans to clients.
4. Income Tax Benefits: The main reasons for using a 529 Plan are the income, estate,
and gift tax benefits.
a. Overview of Income Tax Benefits: Assets in the 529 Plan grow free from
federal taxes. This allows the account to grow faster than an identical, taxable
investment account.
When assets are eventually withdrawn from the 529 Plan to pay for qualified
educational expenses, this is completely free of federal taxes-no income or
capital gains taxes. (The tax treatment of distributions for non-qualified
expenses are discussed below). This represents a tremendous opportunity for
taxpayers who want to avoid taxes that would otherwise be due on their
investments. Even if estate and gift taxes are eventually repealed, 529 Plans
offer significant income tax benefits.
Example: Mr. Client has three young grandchildren, and he wants to provide
for their future college education. After calculating how much will be needed
for college, Mr. Client and his advisors decide to put $50,000 into each 529
Plan. The assets in the account grow without being subject to income taxes or
capital gains taxes (unlike traditional investments that are owned outside of a
529 Plan). Many years later, assume each account has grown from $50,000 to
$150,000. When the assets are withdrawn to pay for college, the full $150,000
amount comes out completely tax free. No capital gains taxes or ordinary
income taxes are due.
Important Note: The income tax treatment of 529 Plans changed with the
recent passage of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, which went into law in June 2001. Under the prior law, when
distributions were made from a 529 Plan, all of the earnings were taxed at the
beneficiary's rate and the original amount contributed was returned tax free.
The new law takes effect for distributions beginning January 1, 2002. With the
passage of the new law, using a 529 Plan becomes even more attractive and is
an excellent way to avoid income and capital gains taxes.
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b. State Income Tax Treatment: Certain states provide a state income tax
deduction for contributions to 529 Plans-Kentucky is not one of these states.
Also, many states do not tax the distributions from 529 Plans. The exclusion
from gross income of the earnings in a 529 Plan under the federal tax laws
results in a de facto exclusion from state income tax for a beneficiary who is a
resident of a state that bases its income tax on the federal system-this would
appear to include Kentucky. However, states would certainly be free to
specifically tax distributed earnings.
Therefore, clients who are residents of Kentucky should Hforum shop" by
selecting the most favorable 529 Plan, regardless ofwhich state is sponsoring
the particular plan.
5. Estate Planning Benefits: 529 Plans offer significant estate planning opportunities for
clients.
a. Gift tax benefits & planning: Contributions to the 529 Plan for another
person are deemed to be completed gifts and a "present interest" for purposes
of the gift tax and GST annual exclusion.
Also, 529 Plans allow greater gifts than traditional techniques for purposes of
gift and GST taxes. IRC Section 529 allows the contributor to treat the
contribution as a gift over a five year period if they choose. This allows the
client to "front load" the annual exclusion for the next five years in a single
year.
Please note that the annual exclusion has increased from $10,000 to $11,000
(or, for married couples, from $20,000 to $22,000). Therefore, a client can
contribute up to $55,000 per beneficiary in a single year without being subject
to federal gift taxes or GST taxes: 5 x $11,000 = $55,000. If the client is
married, then'they can gift up to $110,000: 5 x $22,000 = $110,000.
Planning Tip: Keep in mind that donors may want to make other gifts during
the 5 year period-such as birthday or holiday gifts. Therefore, you may want
to keep a "cushion" for future gifts. So, for example, a single person may want
to gift $50,000, which allows them to gift $1,000 more each year to a donee
without incurring gifts. A married couple could gift $100,000 (as an example),
which would give them the ability to gift another $2,000 each year.
If the annual exclusion increases after a 529 Plan gift has been made, this
would allow additional gifts in future years. Assume a client gifts $50,000 and
elects to treat this as a gift over 5 years. This would be a gift of $10,000 each
year. Because the annual exclusion is $11,000 in 2002, this would allow them
to gift another $1,000. If the exclusion were to rise to $12,000 in a subsequent
year, that would allow them to gift $2,000 that year.
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Planning Tip: Although a person could use some or all of their exemption
equivalent when making gifts to 529 Plans, I would generally not recommend
this. 529 Plans are ideally suited for taking advantage of the annual exclusion.
If clients are making gifts larger than the 5 year annual exclusion, I would
encourage clients to make gifts with discounted values (e.g. family LLC or
FLP units) rather than using 529 Plans.
b. Estate tax benefits & planning:
(1) Estate Tax Consequences for Contributor or Account Owner: The
assets in the 529 Plan are not included in the estate of the contributor or
the account owner for estate tax purposes. This is true even if a person
contributes assets to the 529 Plan and names himself/herself as the
account owner-which allows the client to retain significant control
over the assets.
Example: Mr. Bush and his wife contribute $110,000 in 2002 into four
529 Plans for their four grandchildren. The $440,000 in total
contributions grow income tax free, result in no gift taxes, and are not
included in their estates for estate tax purposes.
Exception-Dying within five year period: If the contributor has
made a large gift and elected to treat this as a gift over a 5 year period,
a portion of the initial gift can be pulled back into his estate if he dies
within the 5 year period. Using the above example, assume Mr. Bush
lives through 2002, 2003, but he dies on January 1 of 2004. Because
he lived one day in 2004, he and his wife are able to use their annual
exclusion for that year. However, because he did not live to 2005, one
year of the gift is included in his estate. Therefore, $22,000 is included
in his estate (1/5 of$110,000).
Important Note: Although a portion is pulled back into his estate, it is
based on the initial value ofthe gift-any appreciation after the original
gift is removed from his estate. Therefore, Mr. Bush was better off to
use the 529 Plan than to wait and make gifts each year.
(2) Estate Tax Consequences for the Beneficiary: Section 529 states
that "No amount shall be includible in the gross estate ofany individual
for purposes of chapter 11 by reason of an interest in a qualified tuition
program" (emphasis added). However, Section 529(c)(4)B) provides:
"(B) AMOUNTS INCLUDffiLE IN ESTATE OF DESIGNATED
BENEFICIARY IN CERTAIN CASES-Subparagraph A shall not
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apply to amounts distributed on account of the death of a beneficiary"
(emphasis added).
The question then becomes what are "amounts distributed on account
of the death of a beneficiary"? Some have argued that no amounts are
distributed if the beneficiary dies and (1) the account owner names a
new beneficiary, or (2) if the assets are rolled over into another plan
and another beneficiary is named.
This is a strong argument, although the Proposed Regulations provide
that "The gross estate of a designated beneficiary ... includes the value
of any interest" in the 529 Plan. Some commentators have made two
arguments against this. First, the Proposed Regulations arguably
exceed the language of Section 529 and should be declared invalid.
Second, a beneficiary does not have any vested interest in the 529
Plan-because the account owner can change the beneficiary of the
account at any time, this is simply an expectancy interest. Therefore,
there is no interest to include in the estate of the deceased beneficiary.
This issue is perhaps academic. In most cases the beneficiary will be
somewhat young and would be able to substantially or completely
avoid the estate taxes by reason of the exemption equivalent (especially
considering the projected increases in the exemption equivalent).
6. Control: One of the most attractive features of a 529 Plan is the control the client can
have over the assets. Even though we often advise clients on the benefits of making
gifts, they frequently are reluctant in losing control of their assets. Many clients,
particularly elderly clients, are concerned that they may need the assets for future
expenses, such nursing home care or medical expenses. With a 529 Plan, the client
has the following control over the assets1:
a. Control distributions: The account owner has the power to control the
distributions from the 529 Plan. This allows the client (1) to dictate when, and
if, the child will receive assets and for what purposes, and (2) to withdraw
assets for himsel(lherself at any time. This is one of the most interesting
features of 529 Plans. Even though the assets are removed from the client's
estate for income, estate, and gift tax purposes, the client has the ability to pull
the assets back for himself at anytime.
1 The client can establish an account and name himselflherself as the "account owner," "account holder," or
"participant" (the plans call this party by different names). This is the party who controls the assets in the 529
Plan account. Alternatively, a client could name a child or other person as the account owner. If this occurs, the
client has given control over to the account owner.
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NOTE: This may be the only way a taxpayer can avoid taxes but still control
assets to such a degree.
NOTE: See below for the tax ramifications for making withdrawals for non-
qualified educational expenses of the designated beneficiary.
b. Change beneficiary: The account owner has the power to change the
beneficiary at any time. The beneficiary must be a family member of the
original beneficiary (see below regarding tax consequences of changing
beneficiaries).
This control feature is advantageous if the child does not attend college, there
is a falling out in the family, there are assets left over after the child attends
college, or if you are doing dynastic planning (see below with regard to this
last point).
c. Select investment options: The account owner also has the power to select the
investment options offered by the mutual fund company. IRC Section 529
prohibits a account owner from actively managing the portfolio-i.e. buying
and selling assets. The mutual fund companies that manage 529 Plans offer
various portfolios from which the account owner can select, such as aggressive
growth, growth, balanced, or age-based portfolios; or the account owner can
select a specific asset allocation between various asset classes (e.g. equities,
bonds, and cash). The assets are then managed in a family of funds offered by
the company.
Originally, clients could not change investment options once they were
selected. Now, clients have two ways to change the investment options:
(1) Rolling assets to another plan: Clients can change the investment
options and the mutual fund company by rolling over the assets in a
529 Plan to another 529 Plan (see below).
(2) New IRS Announcement: The IRS recently announced a new policy
that permits 529 Plans to give their account owners the opportunity to
change the investment strategies once every year. This policy takes
affect immediately, although it will be up to the individual states to
change their program rules.
d. Rollover options: Prior to the passage of the 2001 tax act, it was questionable
whether a account owner could rollover assets from one 529 Plan to another
529 Plan (for example, moving from Putnam funds in Ohio to American Funds
in Virginia). Under the new law, the account owner can rollover the assets
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once every 12 months from one plan to another; which allows the account
owner to change the investment strategies.
This is important for two reasons. First, the account owner may decide that the
investments are not performing as well as anticipated and that a move is
justified. Second, the account owner may decide that the investment style
selected should be changed because there has been a change in circumstances.
For example, you could invest in a growth style in one 529 Plan and as the
child reaches college age, you could change the investments to a more
conservative portfolio with the intent to reduce volatility.
7. Contribution Limits: Each state sets the limit on how much can be contributed to a
529 Plan account. Many states allow a contribution up to $250,000 per beneficiary.
For example, wealthy grandparents with four grandchildren could transfer one million
dollars into 529 Plans. The states adjust their contribution levels each year to take into
consideration rising education costs.
a. Tax consequences of large transfers: If a married client made a significant
contribution, such as $250,000, into a 529 account (1) the first $110,000 would
not be subject to gift taxes by reason of the annual exclusion for the next five
years, and (2) the excess $140,000 would utilize a portion of their estate and
gift tax exemption (the unified credit). Because the exemption is currently
$1,000,000 and is scheduled to rise, this allows significant contributions to 529
Plans.
Planning Tip: Because assets withdrawn for non-educational expenses are subject to
taxes and a 10% penalty, in the author's opinion 529 Plans should not be overfunded.
The client's financial consultant should be able to calculate the amounts needed to
fund the possible education costs. On the other hand, if you are setting up a 529 Plan
for dynasty planning where it is intended that the current beneficiary will not use all of
the assets, then funding a 529 Plan with significant assets can make sense.
8. Qualified Educational Expenses: The account owner has complete control over the
assets and dictates how the assets will be distributed from the 529 Plan. If the assets
are withdrawn for "qualified educational expenses," then the regular taxation rules
discussed above apply: all amounts withdrawn are tax-free. Qualified education
expenses include the following:
• Tuition
• Fees
• Books
• Supplies
• Room and Board
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• Educational expenses for special needs students
• At any post-secondary institution-this includes any accredited school offering
a bachelor's, associate, graduate, or post-graduate degree. It also includes
vocational schools and some overseas schools.
a. Consequences of Withdrawals for Non-qualified Educational Expenses:
Again, the account owner has the power to withdraw assets for any reason. If
assets are used for non-qualified educational expenses (e.g. buying a house),
then the earnings will be subject to income taxes and an additional 10% tax.
Therefore, if assets have appreciated in value when a withdrawal is made, the
original amount contributed is always returned tax-free, the earnings are taxed
at the distributee's rate, plus a 10% tax applies.
b. Exceptions-Death, Disability, or Scholarship: Even if assets are withdrawn
for non-qualified educational expenses, the 10% penalty tax does not apply
when the distributions are made by reason of the beneficiary's death, disability,
or receipt of a scholarship. With regard to the scholarship, a distribution equal
to the amount of the scholarship can be made without causing the penalty to
apply. Income taxes would still apply.
9. "Dynasty Trust" Planning: There are dynasty-trust like opportunities with 529 Plans.
If clients fund the 529 Plan with substantial assets (e.g. $100,000 to $250,000 per
beneficiary), there may likely be additional assets left after the child attends college.
After the child is finished with college, the account owner could allow the assets to
accumulate tax free for a number of years and then wait until the child has children.
At this point, the account owner can change the beneficiary to this subsequent
generation. This process could be continued from generation to next. A few points
regarding this planning technique:
a. Gift tax issues: If a beneficiary is changed from one person to another, there
are no gift tax issues if the new beneficiary is a family member of the old
beneficiary. The only exception is if the new beneficiary is one or more
generations below the current beneficiary. If the beneficiary is changed to a
lower generation, then this is deemed to be a gift from the current beneficiary
to the next. Although this is contrary to common sense and has potential
constitutionality issues, this is the rule stated in the Proposed Regulations.
However, because this is a gift made via a 529 Plan, the prior beneficiary can
utilize his annual exclusion for the next five years (the $55,000 / $110,000 rule
discussed above).
Example: Assume the donor creates a 529 Plan for his child and funds the
account with $100,000. After the child attends college, there is $300,000 left
in the account. The donor (as the account owner) could name his three
grandchildren as beneficiaries-i.e. splitting the account into three accounts of
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$100,000. This is deemed to be a gift from his child to his three grandchildren.
However, the child can treat this as a gift over a 5 year period. Because there
are three donees, this would permit the gift of $100,000 to each child to be free
of gift taxes: $100,000 divided by 5 = $20,000. Because the donor can gift up
to $22,000 a year (if he is married and splits the gift with his spouse), then the
transfer is not taxable.
b. No mandatory distributions: Unlike a traditional IRA, there are no
mandatory distributions in a 529 Plan. Therefore, the account could
accumulate assets tax-free for generations.
c. Dynasty plan examples: If you have clients who want to make large, non-
taxable gifts to family members, then using a 529 Plan is an ideal vehicle.
Clients should consider funding 529 Plans even if the beneficiary will not use
the assets for college expenses-because the assets can be used for subsequent
generations.
Example: A married couple has significant assets, and they want to make
lifetime gifts to help reduce their estate while providing for their family. The
couple has three children: (1) child one (C1) is married and has no children,
(2) child two (C2) is married and has a child (GC1) who has already attended
college and a second child (GC2) who is in college; and (3) child three (C3)
has two very young children (GC3 and GC4).
If the couple wanted to transfer large amounts, they could set up 529 Plans for
all family members. However, because they want to ensure that the funds are
only used for college expenses, they could set up the following plans:
1) $100,000 into a 529 Plan for Cl: This would be set up in anticipation
of C1 having children. For example, assume four years later that the
account has grown to $140,000 (for illustration purposes only), and C1
now has two kids. The clients could change the beneficiary from C1 to
the two new grandchildren-this would be a gift from C1 to the two
grandchildren, but would not be taxable for gift tax purposes because of
the 5 year rule. It would be a $70,000 gift to each child, and this could
be treated as a gift over 5 years ($70,000 divided by 5 = $14,000,
which is below the $22,000 annual exclusion).
If C1 never has children, the clients have the ability to change the
beneficiary to the other grandchildren-Gel, GC2, GC3, and GC4.
Why would the clients want to set up an account now instead ofwaiting
until C1 has children? Answer: First, making the gifts now allows the
client to shift wealth outside of their estate (subject to the 5 year
recapture rule). Second, making gifts now removes any future
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appreciation outside the estate of the clients-even if they die within
the 5 year period. Also, this is advantageous from an income tax
standpoint because the investments are growing tax-free.
Why wouldn't the clients transfer $110,000 instead of $100,000?
Answer: Because you want to keep a "cushion" in for future gifts. This
allows the clients to be able to gift $2,000 each year to C1 without
paying gift taxes or using their exemption.
2) $100,000 into two 529 Plans for GC1 and GC2: Although GC1 has
already attended college, the account would be established in
anticipation of GC1 having children. When GC1 has children, the
beneficiary designation would be changed to these children (see above
on the tax consequences).
Because GC2 is already in college, I would not recommend
establishing a 529 Plan that will be used for GC2's college expenses. In
my opinion, at this point it is too late to' place education funds in
equities or bond funds (bond funds do not have a maturity like
individual bonds; instead, they have a fluctuating value). Instead, the
clients can make direct gifts to the college-this is not a taxable gift
and would not require the clients to use their annual exclusion.
The clients could still establish a 529 Plan with $100,000 and name
GC2 as beneficiary. However, this would be established in anticipation
of GC2 having children.
If GC1 or GC2 does not have children, the parents could change the
beneficiary to other family members.
3) $100,000 into two 529 Plans for GC3 and GC4: This would be
established to provide for their college education. If there are amounts
left over after they have attended college, then the clients could change
the beneficiary to other family members who will attend college. Or,
they could simply keep the beneficiary designation in place and wait
until GC3 and GC4 have children-meanwhile, the assets in the 529
Plan could grow tax free.
Under this example, the clients have transferred $500,000 without paying gift
taxes. They could also make traditional gifts of $22,000 a year to family
members (who were not given assets in a 529 Plan) to increase their gifts.
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10. Advanced Estate Planning Techniques with 529 Plans:
a. Current custodian accounts: Many clients with large custodian accounts are
wary of the fact that the child will have full access at age 18. These clients do
have the ability to rollover the assets into a 529 Plan to create additional
constraints.
In order to do this, the account must be liquidated and the proceeds then used
to fund a 529 Plan. Unlike traditional 529 Plans, the account owner does NOT
have the ability to change the beneficiary of the account-this is because the
child technically owns the assets in the custodian account. (There are
additional planning considerations to keep in mind when converting a
custodian account into a 529 Plan).
b. Using trusts with 529 Plans: Many clients have current trusts established for
children or grandchildren. If the trust gives the trustee the power to make
distributions for educational expenses, the trust could distribute assets into a
529 Plan for a child.
This could be structured in one of two ways: (1) the trust would be the account
owner and control the distributions, or (2) the trust would distribute the assets
to the child's parent (as guardian) on the condition that the assets be used to
establish a 529 Plan. The latter option would be easier and more practical.
Clients also have the ability to establish new trusts that will be the account
owner of the 529 Plan. You have to be careful, however, because not all 529
Plans allow entities to be an account owner.
There are two reasons why a client may want to consider using a trust with a
529 Plan:
(1) Restricting power of account owners: Because the account owner
controls the assets in the 529 Plan, donors may want to place certain
restrictions on the account. For example, the trust could provide that
the account owner could not use the assets for personal reasons, change
the beneficiaries of the account except for specified reasons, etc...
(2) Asset protection planning with trusts: See below
c. Asset Protection Planning: As it currently stands, with 529 Plans it appears
that creditors of a beneficiary could not attach or reach the assets because (1)
the beneficiary has no vested right to the assets, and (2) the beneficiary can be
changed at any time.
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With regard to the account owner, on the other hand, it is unclear whether
creditors of an account owner can gain access to assets in a 529 Plan. The
account owner does have the power to withdraw assets from the account for
whatever reason (though subject to possible tax consequences). The creditors'
could argue that they step into the account owner's shoes and have access to
the assets.
The following are some planning ideas to attempt to protect assets in a 529
Plan from the claims of unknown, future creditors:
(1) Use State with Creditor Protections: Some states specifically provide
that assets in the 529 Plan are exempt from a claim by the creditors of
either the account owner or the beneficiary.
Important Note: Do not select a 529 Plan based on the asset protection
attributes of the plan. First and foremost, you should be comfortable
with the investment options, contribution limits, and fees and expenses.
(2) Name Low-Risk Spouse as Account owner: If one spouse is less
likely to face a lawsuit than the other, then simply name this spouse as
the account owner. For example, if a physician and a teacher are
married, for asset protection planning purposes, it would make sense to
name the teacher as the account owner.
This is the most practical planning solution. This allows the client to
select the 529 Plan that best suits his or her needs.
(3) Use a 529 Plan with a Trust: In order to remove any issue, the donor
could transfer assets to a spendthrift trust which would, in turn, create a
529 Plan for another person (such as a child). However, simply naming
the lower-risk spouse is a simple strategy.
11. Impact of 529 Plans on Financial Aid: According to guidance from the U.S.
Department of Education, a 529 Plan account will be treated as an asset of the account
owner when determining eligibility for federal financial aid-it is not deemed to be an
asset of the child. For example, if $50,000 is transferred into a 529 Plan and the parent
is named as the account owner for a child, the $50,000 is deemed to be the parent's
asset for determining financial aid.
What is the significance? 35% of a child's assets are counted when determining
financial aid eligibility, whereas approximately 5% of the parent's assets are counted.
Therefore, using a 529 Plan should not materially impact the ability to receive
financial aid-especially compared to custodian accounts (see below).
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12. Comparison to Other Techniques: 529 Plans offer significant advantages over other
techniques. However, an appropriate plan may encompass using a 529 Plan in
conjunction with other techniques.
a. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act accounts (i.e. custodian accounts): Many
parents and grandparents will make gifts directly to children by using
custodian accounts. There are three disadvantages ofusing custodian accounts:
(1) No tax-free growth. There is no tax-free growth of the assets. Also, if
the child is under 14 and has sufficient amount of income, the income
will be taxed at the parents' rate under the Kiddie Tax rule. When the
assets are sold to pay for college expenses, there will also be capital
gains taxes.
(2) Child gains control: When the child turns 18, he or she has full control
and access to the assets. The child can use the assets for whatever
reason, such as buying a new car.
(3) Less control: The child owns the assets in custodian account (although
it is titled in the name of the custodian while the child is a minor). The
custodian may only use the assets for purposes permitted under state
law. The custodian cannot change the beneficiary and cannot use the
assets for hislher own benefit.
(4) Possible Inclusion in Estate: If a client transfers assets into a
custodian account, names himself/herself as the custodian, and dies
before the child turns 18, then the assets can be included in the client's
estate. Obviously, there are many planning strategies to avoid this, but
the client should be aware of these possible results.
(5) Deemed to be Child's Asset for Financial Aid
Advantages of 529 Plans
~ Account owner can change beneficiary, and can use assets for
personal reasons (although this may be subject to taxes and a 10%
penalty).
Account owner controls the account without restriction.
Assets may be held in account indefinitely--no forced distributions
Assets in 529 Plan are removed from donor's estate: in contrast, if
the custodian dies before the Beneficiary reaches age 18 and the
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custodian was also the donor, the assets are included in the custodian's
estate for estate tax purposes.
Greater estate planning opportunities with 529 Plans: Donor can
utilize the gift tax annual exclusion for the next 5 years immediately.
Also, there is dynastic planning that is not available with custodian
accounts.
Assets in 529 Plan grow free from income taxes.
529 Plan impacts financial aid eligibility less: Because the assets are
held in the child's name, this may negatively impact qualification for
financial aid. When applying for financial aid, 35% of the child's
assets are considered "available" for education costs versus only 5% of
the parent's assets. With a 529 Plan, the assets are deemed to be the
parents' .
Best Application for a Custodian Account: These could be used for small
pre-college expenses, such as summer camp or piano lessons. Be careful not to
allow the account grow ~oo large.
b. Coverdell Education Savings Accounts ("Coverdell Accounts", formerly
known as Education lRAs): Coverdell Accounts are tax-advantaged accounts
established by individuals for the benefit of another. Qualifying individuals
may contribute a set amount annually; this is currently $2,000.
Coverdell Accounts have become much more viable as a result of the 2001 tax
act. Coverdell Accounts have always been limited in usefulness because of the
maximum contribution was $500. Also, few individuals have invested in them
because of this limitation and the limitation on eligibility. Prior to the 2001 tax
act, married individuals whose adjusted gross income (AGI) exceeded
$160,000 would not use Coverdell Accounts. With the 2001 tax act, this
income limitation has been increased. Married individuals filing jointly with
AGI below $190,000 qualify, and there is a gradual phase out up to $220,000.
Key features of Coverdell Accounts:
--+ Account owner may contribute $2,000 annually.
Contributions are not tax deductible, but the earnings grow federal
income tax free when used for qualified higher education expenses.
These expenses include elementary, secondary, and post-secondary
education expenses.
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Account owner controls the investments-this can include stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, CDs, or any other investment vehicle. The
account owner can change these investments.
The Beneficiary must use the assets within 30 days after turning 30
years old. Assets remaining after this deadline will be deemed
distributed and taxed as income to the Beneficiary, subject to the 10%
additional penalty on the earnings.
The account may be rolled over for the benefit of the same
Beneficiary or a new Beneficiary who is a member of the original
Beneficiary's family. Therefore, if the original Beneficiary is
approaching 30, he or she may roll it over to a new Beneficiary who
could be substantially younger. The rollover is not subject to the gift
tax rules.
Advantages of 529 Plans
-+ Significantly higher contribution limits
No income limitations
Account owner can change beneficiary
Assets may be held in account indefinitely--no forced distributions
Greater estate planning opportunities with 529 Plans
Impacts financial aid eligibility less: Because the assets are held in
the child's name, this may negatively impact qualification for financial
aid. When applying for financial aid, 35% of the child's assets are
considered "available" for education costs versus only 5% of the
parent's assets. With a 529 Plan, the assets are deemed to be the
parents'.
Best Application for Coverdell Accounts:
The recent tax act has created a better way for using Coverdell Accounts:
Because 529 Plans can only be used for post-secondary educational
expenses (college or graduate school), Coverdell Accounts may be best
utilized as a funding vehicle for private elementary or secondary school
- if the client expects to send the child to private schooling.
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You could also supplement the 529 Plans with an Education IRA if the
client was significant control over the investments.
c. Crummey Trusts and Minor's Trusts (2503(c) Trusts): These trusts are
excellent estate planning techniques, but clients can transfer only $11,000 (or
$22,000 if they are married) each year for each beneficiary without using their
exemption. Also, there are no income tax benefits for using such trusts.
Depending on how the trust is structured, the tax consequences flow to the
grantor, the trust (at the highest tax rates), or to the beneficiaries. When assets
are sold to pay for college expenses, capital gains taxes are due. Also, for
Crummey Trusts, the beneficiaries must receive Crummey notices. With
2503(c) trusts, the beneficiary can withdraw the assets at age 21.
Best Application for Crummey Trusts: A Crummey Trust could be used in
conjunction with a 529 Plan if the family intends to make large gifts to the
child, and the gifts exceed the amounts needed to fund the anticipated
education expenses.
Example: Husband and Wife want to make $11,000 gifts to a child for the
next 20 years and grandparents would also like to make gifts. Grandparents
are concerned about creating an education account and/or estate planning. The
family calculates that it will take $60,000 to fund the anticipated college
expense. Grandmother 1 transfers $30,000 into a 529 Plan and Grandmother 2
transfers $30,000. They elect to treat this as a gift over 5 years ($6,000 a year),
which is below the gift tax annual exclusion. Husband and Wife make gifts of
$11,000 a year to the Crummey Trust.
Important Disclaimer:
The information contained in this outline is general in nature and should not be
construed as legal, tax, financial, or other professional advice. Before entering into any estate
planning or tax planning, clients should consult· their professional tax advisor. Additionally,
there may be planning considerations not addressed in this outline that may be applicable to
a client's particular situation, and professional advisors should not and cannot rely upon this
outline. Although this proposal is based on information believed to be reliable and accurate,
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. does not make representations or warranties with respect to
information contained in this outline. This outline does not constitute a representation by us
or an offer or a solicitation ofan offer to sell or buy any security. Also, the assets in the 529
Plans are not FDIC insured, are not guaranteed, and may lose value. It is important that
clients carefully review the plan prospectus before investing or sending money.
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Lifetime and Testamentary Strategies for Real Estate
Eric A. Manterfield
Krieg DeVault LLP
Real-estate frequently represents a substantial portion of our clients' net worth. This paper will
address strategies which you and your clients may wish to consider when dealing with their real
property as part of their overall estate and business planning.
Lifetime Strategies
Many couples own title to real property as tenants by the entireties. The property may be leased
to a business they own or may be income producing on its own (a working farm or ranch, for
example). Its value may be appreciating over time. What issues should be addressed with this
couple?
Control personal liability and provide unified management. There are at least two business
reasons to create an entity (either a FLP or an LLC) to own title to the real estate: (1) to limit
your clients' personal liability for accidents which occur on the property; and (2) to provide
unified management of the real estate as ownership is fractionalized in the future.
If there were an industrial accident on your clients' property, owned by them as tenants by the
entireties, they would have unlimited personal liability. Their other, non-real estate, assets could
be seized by creditors to satisfy any judgment arising from their ownership of the real estate. It
seems only practical to recommend their putting title into an entity in order to limit their liability
to the assets owned by that entity.
As ownership of the real estate is passed on to future generations, unified management will
become critical. How can multiple owners of tenant in common interests made decisions about
leases and improvements, for example? Once again, it seems only practical to recommend their
putting title into an entity in order to provide unified management of the real estate.
Some planners are comfortable with a family limited partnership for these purposes. There are
general and limited partners. Initially, your clients own all the interests, both general and
limited. They may wish to make lifetime gifts of limited partnership interests to their children, in
order to take advantage of their annual $11,000 lifetime gifts and to shift future appreciation to
the next generation. Because the general partners of a family limited partnership still are
personally liable, you may wish to create a separate corporation or limited liability company
(owned by your clients) to be the general partner, so that no family member has personal
liability.
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Other planners prefer to create a limited liability company to own title to the real estate. There is
only one entity (the LLC), rather than the two entities frequently involved in a partnership (the
company to be the general partner and the partnership itself).
As both the FLP and the LLC are "flow through entities" for income tax purposes, each operates
essentially the same for income tax purposes. Your clients must report on their 1040 all the tax
consequences of their ownership of the real estate, just as before. While a separate tax return
must be prepared for the entity, no tax is paid at the entity level.
Assure continued cash flow for a surviving spouse. Many clients own their business real
estate separately from the business itself The business typically leases the property from your
clients, paying rent which is increased from time to time. If there is a written lease at all, it may
be only for a limited number ofyears, with options to renew.
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the driving force of the business dies and the
company is sold. If the new owners of the business retain its existing location, rent is assured at
least for a few years; however, how likely is it that the surviving spouse will have the same
bargaining power with the new owners of the business as she and her husband had with
themselves?
Perhaps more importantly, what happens to the surviving spouse's cash flow if the new owners
of the business were to move it to a new location? The widow may end up the o,wner of a very
large and very empty warehouse or factory. How easy will it be for the surviving spouse to find
a new tenant?
I recommend you advise the clients to enter into a long term lease between the business and
themselves (or with the new entity you have created to own the real estate). You might, for
example, have a lease designed to last until the anticipated death ofboth spouses, with provisions
for periodic rent increases tied to inflation.
If the business were sold and moved, the buyer would still be obligated to pay rent until the end
of the lease term. Even if the buyer wanted out of the lease (as part of the purchase of the
business), some economic value would pass to the surviving spouse. Neither of these certainties
would occur if the business were moved and were subject only to a short term lease.
Shift future appreciation to the next generation. Appreciation presents a huge problem for
our clients. As the value of their assets increases over time, their tax liability will become even
worse. If their net worth consists primarily of closely held business interests and real estate,
there may be inadequate liquidity to pay taxes and other liabilities. If you think they have a
liquidity problem now, how much worse will it be ten or twenty years from now? What can be
done ~ow to shift some or all of this future appreciation to the next generation?
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Your clients should identify those assets which they reasonably believe hold the greatest
potential for future appreciation. Of all that they own, what will grow in value the fastest over
time? Perhaps the asset with the most guaranteed future growth is life insurance, which today
has a low present value, but which will have a substantially larger death benefit in the future.
Give away ownership of the life insurance first, either to an irrevocable life insurance trust or to
the children themselves (particularly if the surviving spouse has no need of the income to be
earned by the proceeds).
If the ownership is transferred more than three years prior to the death of the insured, the
proceeds will not be included in his or her estate under Code Section 2035; even if the insured
unexpectedly were to die within three years (so that the proceeds will be included in his or her
estate), that merely puts the insured back in the position he or she is in today. There is no tax
penalty for having tried (but failed due to the premature death) to get the proceeds out of the
insured's estate.
The new owners of the insurance can use the proceeds to purchase assets from the insured's
estate, thereby utilizing those proceeds to provide liquidity. Too many clients mistakenly believe
that their life insurance will not be taxed when they die. They purchase insurance to provide
liquidity to pay tax, but then have to. pay tax on the proceeds. Give ownership away now and
remove from their net worth the one asset which has the most guaranteed future appreciation.
After you have dealt with your clients' life insurance, look at their other assets. What else is
growing in value? Ifthe business is owned separately from the business real estate, which asset
is appreciating the most rapidly? The answer to that question is frequently the business, rather
than the real estate which is occupied by the business. If that is the case in your circumstance,
then efforts should be made to make lifetime gifts of the business, rather than of the business real
estate.
In other circumstances, however, the business real estate may have the greatest potential for
future appreciation. This may be the result of location, declining profits from a mature business,
increased business competition, a lack of interest in the business by the children or all of the
above. Your clients may simply own real estate with no business on it; it may be a working farm
or ranch or may be vacant real estate sitting in the path of future development.
If your clients wish to make lifetime gifts of real estate, you may wish to recommend that title be
put into a FLP or an LLC. Because most clients prefer to retain complete control over the real
estate, even after lifetime gifts have shifted some equity to their children, you may wish to have
them give away limited partnership interests or non-voting interests in the LLC. You clients
retain control through their continued ownership of the general partnership interests or the voting
interests in the LLC.
It is certainly possible to make lifetime gifts of fractional interests in real estate, taking valuation
discounts as appropriate, but I cannot recommend this strategy. Because each owner of a tenant
in common interest can sell that interest (although not easily) and may even be able to demand
partition of the real estate, the valuation discounts for gift tax purposes are not as great as are
available if the donees owned a minority, non-marketable interest in an entity. The lack of
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unified management, were fractional tenant In common interests gIven away, IS another
drawback.
Put title, instead, into an entity and give away small interests in the entity. Because each separate
gift is valued independently of the others, each interest can easily be structured to receive
valuation discounts for minority interest, lack of any vote in the entity's operation and lack of
marketability.
This frequently is a two-stage valuation, utilizing two separate appraisers: (1) the real estate
itself is valued by an appraiser with real estate expertise; and (2) the amount of the valuation
discounts is determined by an appraiser with that expertise. As those with real estate expertise
frequently know little about discounts and those with expertise in discounts know little about the
value of the ground itself, two experts are frequently required.
Depending on the other assets owned by your clients and the income produced by the real estate,
you may recommend more substantial gifts. Why just give away $11,000 per year per child?
'The value of the real estate may be appreciating more rapidly than you can give it away at that
rate.
Recall that the unified credit is available to shelter lifetime gifts, as well as gifts at death. Why
save the unified credit until your clients die? The estate tax unified credit will be available to
shelter only the potentially higher date of de~th value of the real estate; why not take advantage
of the gift tax unified credit, to shelter the much lower present value of the real property?
While the amount of the testamentary unified credit is scheduled to increase in 2004, 2006 and
2009, is the value of the real property appreciating more rapidly than that? The gift tax unified
credit remains at $1 million in 2004, when the estate tax unified credit increases to $1.5 million;
however, your clients can certainly give away even more than $1 million each today (after
valuation discounts) and remove much more future appreciation from their estates.
It is certainly possible that no valuation discounts will be available ifno lifetime gifts are made.
If your client were to die the owner of all (or a controlling portion) of the real estate, will the date
of death value be subject to valuation discounts? The interest to be valued for estate tax
purposes is a controlling, majority interest which could have been sold up to the time of your
client's death. But if your client had made lifetime gifts and each gift was of a minority interest,
the same real estate can be subject to substantial valuation discounts.
The same valuation discount provides much more leverage the more that is given away while
your client is alive. A 40% discount permits your client to give away $15,400 while making a
gift (after discount) of only $11,000; as much as $4,400 in "real" value disappears for gift tax
purposes. That same 40% discount enables your client to make $44,000 in value disappear if he
had given away $154,000 and as much as $400,000 in value disappear if he had given away $1.4
million.
Whenever value disappears as a result of valuation discounts, as much as 50% of the disappeared
value translates into estate tax savings. The client who gives away $1.4 million (and is treated
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as having made a gift of only $1 million after a 40% discount) has saved as much as $200,000 in
estate tax (the tax on the $400,000 in discounted value); in addition, he has saved as much as
50% in tax on the future appreciation of the $1.4 million he no longer owns. If that portion of
the real estate were to double before your client's later death, the tax savings from his lifetime
gift now approximate $900,000.
If the real property is being held for future appreciation and today produces no income, your
client's substantial lifetime gift will have no adverse cash flow consequences; but what if the
real estate produces income and your client does not want to share that cash flow with his
children?
If title to the real estate were held in a FLP or an LLC which is controlled by your client even
after the lifetime gifts, your client can still take reasonable compensation out of the business.
And it is your client, as the general partner or the owner of the voting interests in the LLC, which
will determine the amount of that compensation (subject to reasonableness standards).
Use real estate to balance ownership of other assets. Many married couples own separate
assets in individual names. These separately owned assets may be the business run by one
spouse or an inheritance received many years ago. If you wish to position the couple to take
advantage of the estate tax unified credit, no matter which spouse happens to die first, you may
recommend that assets be owned equally be each spouse.
So long as the assets which are equally divided between the husband and wife were previously
owned by them jointly, there are minimal emotional issues involved in your recommendation.
The right of the surviving spouse to receive full title upon the first death is removed; however,
the surviving spouse frequently is the lifetime beneficiary of a testamentary credit trust (and may
even serve as trustee of the credit trust, subject to certain conditions), so the economic impact is
minimized.
If the assets were previously owned by the spouses individually, on the other hand, there may
easily be emotional issues involved in your recommendation that each asset be divided equally
between the husband and wife. The wife who inherited her family farm may not be willing to
put one-half of the title into her husband's name; the man who has run his own business for
decades may not be willing to transfer ownership of a fifty percent interest to his wife.
You may not recommend that each and every asset be evenly divided; rather, your goal is to
have each spouse individually own at least as much in value as they wish to put into a credit trust
when the first spouse dies. You are trying to have each spouse own at least $1 million in value
today (and $1.5 million in value beginning in 2004), so that the maximum amount can be
sheltered by the first spouse's unified credit, no matter which one of them were to die first.
Title to real estate frequently provides a strategy to use when one spouse is unwilling to transfer
ownership of other assets to the other spouse. Ownership of the wife's family farm, for
example, can be split on less than a 50-50 basis with her husband, so that she retains full control.
Each tenant in common interest need not be a full 50%, ofcourse.
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Depending on the value of the assets owned by the husband, in that example, you may
recommend that his wife transfer to him a minority interest, as a tenant in common, of enough of
her family farm which, when added to his other assets, will bring his individual assets up to the
desired value. A minority interest in the business real estate may also be transferred, as a tenant
in common interest, to the spouse not active in the business, so as to increase the value of her
individually owned property.
Lifetime charitable gifts. Some clients own real estate which produces little, if any current
income. If their cost basis in the real estate is very low, capital gains taxes frequently inhibit
your client's wish to sell the real estate and invest the proceeds in assets with a much high cash
flow.
Depending on the other assets owned by those clients, a lifetime charitable remainder trust may
be a viable strategy. Transfer title to a charitable remainder net income unitrust with a "make
up" provision. The trustee can sell the proceeds without paying capital gains tax and one
hundred percent of the proceeds can be invested in new income producing assets. Because the
real estate will probably not be sold immediately, use of a NIMCRUT provides the necessary
time for the property to be sold.
The client receives the lesser of net income or the unitrust amount. So long as the property
remains unsold, the client receives only the income earned by the real estate. When the property
is later sold and a higher rate of income is earned, the client can receive the anticipated unitrust
amount. For any year in which the net income exceeds the unitrust amount, your client can
receive the excess amount until the "shortfall" for any early year in which the net income was
less than the unitrust amount is made up.
Because the sale proceeds will later pass to charity after the death of your client (and, perhaps,
the death of your client's spouse), you may recommend your client consider additional life
insurance to replace the sale proceeds which will not go to your client's children. If the new life
insurance were applied for by an irrevocable life insurance trust or by the children themselves,
the proceeds will be free of estate tax even if your client were unexpectedly to die within three
years.
Make discounted gifts of the real estate. Many clients own rapidly appreciating real estate,
such as commercial real estate and vacation homes. Strategies exist to make gifts of those
parcels at a fraction of the present value, while shifting years of future appreciation to the next
generation.
Commercial Real Estate frequently has substantial cash flow associated with it. This cash flow
may represent a considerable annual yield, when compared with the appraised value of the
commercial real estate.
Your client could create an irrevocable grantor retained annuity trust (a "GRAT") or an
irrevocable grantor retained unitrust (a "GRUT"), to last for a set number of years. Title to the
F-6
commercial real estate is transferred to the irrevocable trust; your client receives either a fixed
annuity or a unitrust payment each year until the term of the trust expires; title to the commercial
real estate then passes to the next generation.
Your client makes a gift when title is put into the trust. The amount of the gift, however, is only
the present value of the right of the children to receive title many years into the future. The size
of the gift depends on (a) how long the trust will last; and (b) how high a payment is made to
your client each year during the term of the trust.
Here is a chart which shows the percentage by which a sixty-five year old client can reduce the
present value of the commercial real estate, depending on how long the trust lasts and how high a
payout is made to the grantor, based on interest rates in summer of 2002, if the client were to
create a grantor retained annuity trust:
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust
Percentage Reduction in Market Value
Term of the Trust Annuity Rate Paid to Grantor
10 years
15 years
20 years
5%
33.8%
42.3
47.0
7%
47.4%
59.2
65.7
9%
60.9%
76.1
84.5
11%
74.4%
93.0
100.0
If the trust were to last for 15 years with a 9% annuity paid each year to your client, for example,
the present value of the commercial real estate can be reduced by 76.1%, based on current
interest rates. If the real estate had an appraised value of $1 million, the amount of the gift is
only $239,000. The present value of the children's right to receive the commercial real estate
fifteen years from now, with a 9% annuity paid to your client in the meantime, is only $239,000.
This is a gift of a future interest, of course, so that much of your client's unified credit would be
utilized with this gift.
When the trust terminates fifteen years from now, the children receive the title to the real estate
tax free, with fifteen years of appreciation. They take title with your client's cost basis.
Here, on the other hand, is a chart which. shows the percentage by which a sixty-five year old
client can reduce the present value of the commercial real estate,. depending on how long the
trust lasts and how high a payout is made to the grantor, based on interest rates in summer of
2002, if the client were to create a grantor retained unitrust:
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Grantor Retained Unitrust
Percentage Reduction in Market Value
Term of the Trust
10 years
15 years
20 years
Unitrust Rate Paid to Grantor
5% 7% 9%
35.2% 45.6% 54.3%
44.3 55.6 64.4
49.5 60.8 69.1
61.6%
71.2
75.2
You will see that the percentage reduction in the amount of gift is less in the case of a grantor
retained unitrust because the payments to the grantor from a GRUT will fluctuate with the annual
value of the real estate.
If the real estate were put into a 10 year GRAT with a 9% annuity paid each year to your client,
the present value of the commercial real estate could be reduced by 76.1%, based on current
interest rates; if that same real estate had been put into a 10 year GRUT with a 9% unitrust
amount paid each year to your client, on the other hand, the present value of the commercial real
estate could be reduced only by 69.1%.
Because of this fact and to avoid the necessity of an annual appraisal 9f the real estate (required
if a GRUT is used), many clients prefer a GRAT.
You can see that the amount of the gift declines as the length of the trust and the payment to your
client increases. It is tempting to have the trust last for many years, so as to reduce the gift as
much as possible; nevertheless, this strategy works only if your client outlives the term of the
trust. If the client were unexpectedly to die while the trust was in existence, the date of death
value of the real estate would be included in the client's gross estate under Code Section 2036;
therefore, the client should select a trust term which he or she reasonably expects to outlive.
Vacation Homes frequently have no cash flow associated with them. Therefore, use of a grantor
retained annuity trust will not work, as there is no income available to pay to the grantor each
year in satisfaction of the trust's obligation to pay a fixed annuity.
The alternative vehicle for a vacation home is the qualified personal residence trust. Your client
could create an irrevocable QPRT, to last for a set number ofyears. Title to the vacation home is
transferred to the irrevocable trust; your client retains the right to use the vacation home until the
term of the trust expires; title to the vacation home then passes to the next generation.
Just as with the commercial real estate going into a GRAT, your client makes a gift when title to
the vacation home is put into the trust. The amount of the gift, however, is only the present value
of the right of the children to receive title many years into the future. The size of the gift
depends on how long the trust will last.
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Here is a chart which shows the percentage by which a sixty-five year old client can reduce the
present value of the vacation home, depending on how long the trust lasts, based on interest rates
in summer of2002, if the client were to create a qualified personal residence trust:
Qualified Personal Residence Trust
Term of the Trust
10 years
15 years
20 years
Percentage Reduction in Market Value
55.9%
73.9
86.6
You will see that the percentage reduction does not depend on an annuity or unitrust rate paid to
your client; rather, your client's continued use of the home is what counts. The present value of
the gift to children depends merely on how long they must wait to receive the title.
Once again, this strategy works only if your client were to outlive the term of the trust; therefore,
resist the temptation to "go long" and stay with a term which your client reasonably will outlive.
The children will later take title with your client's cost basis. If the children have no intention of
keeping the vacation home in the family and will immediately sell it, the capital gains tax
consequences must be considered. Because this home is not the "principal residence" of the
children, the exemption which normally applies to the sale of someone's home does not apply.
Testamentary Strategies
Control the business and the business real estate together. Many clients own their real
estate as tenants in common and lease it to the business which is frequently in an entity
(corporation, FLP or LLC). If your clients intend to give control of the entity to those children
who work in the business after they die, care should be taken to be certain that those who control
the business will also control the business real estate.
If your clients were to give the business to one child (or at least give the voting stock to the
business child) and were to divide ownership of the business real estate among all the children,
the one who controls the business must seek the approval of his or her siblings every time any
action needs to be taken with the real estate or building. If the child who controls the business
wishes to have everyone contribute to a new root: how eager will the other children be? How
cooperative will the siblings be when it is time to renegotiate the lease?
I recommend that control of the real estate coincide with control of the business entity, both
today and in the future. For reasons which discussed earlier, I recommend that the business real
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estate be put into either an LLC or an FLP. The real estate entity could be structured to have
both voting and non-voting interests.
If the clients utilize voting interests in the business to give control to the business child, they can
also utilize voting interests in the real estate entity to give control of the real estate to the
business child. Non-voting interests in both entities might be given to the other children, so as to
treat everyone "fairly."
Exit strategies for those not involved. If non-voting interests in either the business or the real
estate entity are given to non-business children, however, I recommend you give them a "put," so
that they can force the business child to purchase their interests over time; in a similar fashion,
you may wish to give the business child a "call," so that he or she can buyout the non-business
children over time. Each child has an exit strategy.
Position the real estate for valuation discounts. Some clients mistakenly believe that the
taxable value of their business at death will be reduced by as much as 40% or more due to the
valuation discounts they hear discussed. They may also believe that the taxable value of their
business real estate will also be discounted.
Are these assumptions accurate? Like the answer to most questions, the answer here is "it
depends." Valuation discounts are not awarded like prizes to every owner of a family business
or of business real estate; rather, both the business and the business real estate must be
positioned to entitle the estate to valuation discounts.
There typically is no estate tax when the first spouse dies; the taxable value of the business and
real estate is most critical when the second spouse dies.
Suppose the estate plan calls for a credit trust to be funded when the first spouse dies, with the
remaining assets given outright to the surviving spouse. It is certainly possible (if not likely) that
the surviving spouse will end up the owner ofmore than 50% of the business and real estate after
the first death. Indeed, it is possible that the credit trust will be funded with non-business assets,
with the entire business and all the business real estate passing to the surviving spouse.
When the surviving spouse later dies, what valuation discounts will be available? There will be
no minority interest discount because the surviving spouse owned a majority interest; there will
be no (or only a nominal) discount for lack of marketability because the surviving spouse could
have sold the majority interest at any time.
This very typical scenario destroys the assumption of many clients that the business and the
business real estate values will be discounted for estate tax purposes. It will not happen. Rather,
the Internal Revenue Service will tax the full, undiscounted fair market value of the business and
the real estate under those circumstances.
F - 10
How can you position the business and the business real estate for valuation discounts? There
are several steps in my recommendation:
• change your clients' estate plan to provide that the marital gift go into a QTIP
trust, rather than outright to the surviving spouse;
• put the business real estate into an LLC or an FLP;
• divide ownership ofboth the business and of the business real estate entity, so that
each spouse owns a one-half interest in both entities; and
• have each spouse give one share of each entity away to each child (this may
consist ofnon-voting interests in each entity).
If you were to adopt these recommendations, each spouse would own less than a 50% interest in
both the business and the real estate entity because each has given a:way at least one share.
When the first spouse later dies, that spouses 49%+ interest in each entity is put in a QTIP trust.
There is still no estate tax when the first spouse dies.
The benefit of this strategy comes when the surviving spouse later dies. The 49%+ interest in
each entity owned by the QTIP trust is included in the gross estate of the surviving spouse; the
49%+ interest in each entity owned outright by the surviving spouse is included in the gross
estate of the surviving spouse. However, each 49%+ interest is valued independently, so each
interest will be discounted for minority interest and lack ofmarketability.
Even though the surviving spouse effectively owned a 98%+ interest in each entity, the
ownership of half by the QTIP trust and half by the surviving spouse entitles both entities to be
discounted for estate tax valuation purposes. This result would not occur, of course, if the
surviving spouse had owned a 98%+ interest outright, which is the unfortunate result of too
many estate plans which are presently in place.
Bequest of a life estate. The actual language required to transfer a life estate is simple enough:
HI hereby give to my son, Benjamin, subject to a life estate reserved for my son, Justin,
for the term ofJustin's life, the property owned by me at my death commonly referred to
as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
Joint life estates can also be conveyed:
HI hereby give to my son, Benjamin, subject to a life estate reserved for my son, Justin,
and his wife, Justin, for the term of their joint lives, the property owned by me at my
death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
A life estate may also be created for the term of the life of another (the estate pur autre vie):
HI hereby give to my son, Benjamin, subject to a life estate reserved for my son, Justin,
for the term ofmy son, Dalton's, life, the property owned by me at my death commonly
referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
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Care must be taken when consulting with your client to determine his or her intent as to the
creation of a life estate. When drafting a will, keep in mind that, if the devise contains only a
simple reference to a certain piece of real property, the client will be devising his or her entire
interest in that real property. If not clarified by additional language, your client's will may pass
the entire estate of what the client owns at death, leaving the beneficiary the sole owner of that
property in fee rather than in life estate. Simply put, if it is the testator's intent to devise a life
estate only, the language must be clear.
The beneficiary need not actually take the life estate. During administration, any interest in real
property can be set in value and sold with the beneficiaries each receiving their entitled share of
the proceeds. See, Loyd v. Loyd, 731 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1984). If this is not the client's intent,
the language of the will must clarify that the beneficiaries are to take the real estate in kind and
further clarify that a liquidation of the real estate is not allowed.
If your client holds only a life estate himself: conveyance of that life estate in the client's will is
not effective, of course, as the life estate terminates at your client's death.
A final consideration in life estates is maintenance and repair provisions. When leaving a life
estate, your client's will should specify which party is responsible for insurance, repairs and
maintenance, capital improvements and real estate taxes.
Bequest of real estate subject to a lease. Leasehold interests in the property of your clients can
be created both prior to death and during the administration of the estate. Both lease
arrangements will follow the property to the ultimate beneficiary and should be addressed in the
planning documents.
A will which provides for a gift of real estate which is subject to a lease arrangement will pass
that real estate subject to the lease agreement. In the case of leased real estate, the client holds
title to the real estate subject to the possessory interest of the lessee. Even though this may be
true, it is better form and provides for better administration of a client's estate if any lease
arrangements are mentioned in the will itself.
Again, the language of the will itself should be simple enough:
HI hereby give to my son, Justin, subject to that certain lease agreement entered into
between Farm Company and myself, dated May 3, 2002, the property owned by me at my
death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
Depending on the term of the lease, it mayor may not be advisable to reference any specific
lease agreement. The language of the will could simply reference that a lease agreement may be
in place:
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HI hereby give to my son, Justin, subject to any lease agreement that may be entered into
by me prior to my death, the property owned by me at my death commonly referred to as
123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
Lease arrangements can also arise after the death of your client. One alternative to an outright
devise of real estate, for example, is granting an option to lease the real property of the estate for
a period of time after the client's death:
HEffective as of my death, if my son, Justin, is then living, he shall have the option,
exercisable within ninety (90) days ofmy death, to lease the property owned by me at my
death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky, from my estate, and
thereafter the beneficiaries ofmy estate for fair market rental value for a period of time
not to exceed twenty (20) years. "
It is wise to select a maximum term for the lease period in this type of option. It is also wise to
mention if other members of Justin's family (i.e. his spouse) have a similar right to lease the
property if Justin is not able to for any reason.
Granting the right to occupy the real estate for a specific term. Like the transfer of a life
estate, the actual language required to transfer real estate for a specific term is simple enough:
HI hereby give to my son, Justin, for the term oftwenty (20) years, the property owned by
me at my death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. At the
end ofthat term, the property shall be distributed to my son, Benjamin. "
Like the situation of a life estate, although the real estate is granted to the beneficiary for a period
of time, someone must pay the expenses of the real estate. Those expenses must be paid by the
term tenant or out of funds set aside by the grantor. Regardless, some language, such as the
following, needs to be included in the bequest of the real estate for the term certain:
HThe term tenant shall pay all ofthe costs and expenses necessary for the management,
maintenance andpreservation ofthe real estate. "
Also similar to the discussion about life estates, other provisions are also necessary to provide
protection against the ultimate devisees of the real estate or, in the alternative, protection for the
term tenant of the real estate:
HJustin shall be entitled to the exclusive use, possession and enjoyment ofthe real estate,
without rent, during the grant term. The term ofthe grant shall be from the date ofdeath
ofthe grantor until the twentieth (2d~ anniversary ofmy death and (i) Justin shall not be
liable in any manner whatsoever for any damage to or waste to the real property or any
part thereof, but shall pay the real property taxes on the residence from his own funds.
Justin shall be solely responsible for any improvements to the real estate and Ben shall
not be responsible for reimbursement for the costs ofthese improvements. "
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In addition, insurance should be dealt with and maintained on the property as well. If the real
property is rendered unusable by damage or destruction, the language should state who is
responsible for the replacement and repairs to the real estate. The language of the bequest should
also state who is to receive the insurance proceeds and in what percentages.
Receipt of insurance proceeds would be akin to a sale of the property and both the term
beneficiary and the ultimate beneficiaries would have a readily valuable interest in those
proceeds. Because the gift is given to the beneficiaries for a term of years, the gift to the
beneficiary has a readily valuable interest in the property (the same as is true for life estates). If
the real estate is to be sold, the beneficiary can give up his or her interest in the real estate and
that interest given up has a value. Again, if it is your client's intent that the beneficiary not be
able to "cash out" his or her interest, a prohibition against this possibility needs to be included in
the bequest.
Should a bequest like this be done in a will? It is not difficult to see that a bequest of real
property for a term of years is very much like a trust. If your client is considering a gift for a
term of years, you might counsel your client to place the property into a trust instead. Although
there would be administrative burdens placed on the selected trustee, the client would have one
individual or corporation in charge of the real estate, its maintenance and other costs throughout
the term. Additionally, a trust allows your client to set aside funds in that trust along with the
real estate itself in order to have the income from those funds available for the maintenance
costs.
Granting an option to purchase real estate from the estate. Options to purchase real estate
from the estate can be "paid" for out of the devisee's own funds or out ofhis distributive share of
the estate, if any. The grant of an option itself is not a difficult drafting task:
HFor a period ofsixty (60) days after my death, my brother, Ryan, shall have the option
to purchase any part or all ofthe property owned by me at my death commonly referred
to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky, for fair market value determined as of the
date of my death by qualified appraisal without taking into account any discount in
valuation. Such purchase price shall be paid in cash on the date of closing mutually
determined by Ryan and my Executor. "
There are a couple things of note in this drafted paragraph. "Any part or all" may be changed to
all or none or only certain parcels of the real estate or any other division your client may have in
mind. The biggest concern in this clause, however, is the determination of the sales price. This
clause provides for a "qualified appraisal" (an alternative is to tie the purchase price to the final
estate tax value of the real estate) and no discounts in valuation. The fair market value of a piece
of property can be reduced by discount in the valuation of the property for, among other things,
lack of marketability as in the case of a piece of property which is the smaller part of a larger
whole. Fairness to the purchaser would dictate a removal of the prohibition against discount in
value, fairness to the beneficiaries of the will, however, may dictate that the language remain.
Fairness becomes an even larger issue when the parties involved are all children of your client.
A provision giving a child an option to take certain real estate as part of his distributive share of
your client's estate is no more difficult to draft than the outright sale contemplated above:
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HFor a period ofsixty (60) days after my death, my son, Justin, shall have the option to
take any part or all of the property owned by me at my death commonly referred to as
123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky, as part ofhis share ofmy estate. Ifthe value ofthe
portion ofproperty to be received by Justin exceeds his portion ofhis share ofmy estate,
then Justin shall pay the difference, in cash, to my Executor in order for my Executor to
make an equalizing distribution to my remaining children. "
This provision does not, but could, contain the same language as discussed above concerning the
valuation of the real property by qualified appraisal. To avoid argument among the beneficiaries
it is always wise to provide the method by which the value of the property will be determined.
Another area in which arguments among the beneficiaries can arise is when more than one child
is given the opportunity to exercise the option. The language below is lengthy but provides two
sons with the ability to each take a portion of the real estate:
HFor a period of sixty (60) days after my death, my sons, Justin and BenJ·amin, or the
survivor between them, shall have the option to take any part or all ofthe property owned
by me at my death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky, as part
ofhis share ofmy estate. Ifboth sons decide to exercise such option, the property shall
be divided between them as they shall agree. Ifmy sons cannot agree, any portions ofthe
property then in dispute shall be auctioned between them with the resulting auction value
being considered as the value of the portion in dispute and the prevailing son being the
recipient of such portion of the property as part of his distribution at the value of the
winning auction bid.
If the value ofthe portion ofthe property to be received by either son exceeds that son's
portion ofhis distribution, such son shall pay the difference, in cash, to my Executor in
orderfor my Executor to make an equalizing distribution to the remaining son. "
Another consideration for your client may be the option on personal property which is used on
the real estate. This is especially true in the context of the family fann. Substantial value may
be held in fann equipment or other personal property which needs to go with the real estate. An
option can be granted on specific items of this property along with the real estate itself and
should be if the laild is useless to the purchaser without the equipment to use the land.
A final consideration is making sure that the granted option is also mentioned in the division of
the remaining estate property. The options discussed above are styled so that one son takes any
property he gets under the option as part of his distributive share of the estate. If the ultimate
division clause of the estate does not clearly reference the option, however, time and money of
the estate can be lost to litigation over whether or not one son gets his option real estate and an
equal portion of the remaining estate as well:
HEffective as ofmy death, my Executor shall divide all the rest, residue and remainder of
my property into separate shares, with one share for each of my sons who survives me
and one share for the descendants, taken collectively, ofeach ofmy sons who dies before
me, leaving a descendant who survives me; provided, however, that such division shall
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take into account any option exercised by either son with respect to the property owned
by me at my death commonly referred to as 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky. "
The payment of taxes, expenses and encumbrances associated with the real estate. The vast
majority of wills contain "catch all provisions" for a blanket payment of debts, expenses and
taxes.
"My Executor shall payout ofthe residue ofmy estate all my legal debts enforceable as
claims against my estate, any expenses of my last illness, funeral and burial, any
expenses of administering my estate and all taxes which are payable by reason of my
death. My executor may allocate receipts and disbursements during the administration
of my estate to .income or principal in any manner, even though that allocation is
inconsistent with state law. "
Each will needs to direct the executor pay the decedent's debts and expenses ofadministering the
estate. If such language were omitted, an inexperienced executor may not pay the debts, even
though they were fully due and payable. In addition, the manner in which the debts and
expenses are directed to be paid can become important for tax purposes. Whether or not these
expenses and taxes due on account of real estate being devised needs to be specifically
addressed. Generally, Federal law provides that each beneficiary should pay his or her portion of
the taxes generated by that person's gift, unless the will provides otherwise. See, e.g., Code
§2002, 2205, 2206, 2207. Tax charging clauses must be used ifyoll intend the real estate to pass
tax free:
"I direct that all estate, inheritance, succession and other death taxes of any nature
which may be assessed or imposed, either by the United States or by the State ofIndiana,
or by any otherjurisdiction, based upon my ownership or control ofproperty at or before
my death, or the transfer or devolution thereofto take effect at, in contemplation of or by
reason ofmy death, be paid by my personal representative out ofthe property disposed of
by this Will and charged against the residue ofmy estate. "
Both sets ofprovisions above direct that all taxes and expenses be paid from the residuary estate.
The result being that any specific bequest of real estate passes free from these encumbrances.
These specific real estate bequests may generate large tax dollars, which are then charged against
the residuary estate. If the real estate does not pass tax free, however, the possibility of a tax lien
on the real estate exists, or personal liability on the devisee of the real estate.
Aside from taxes and expenses of the estate, a simple devise of real estate can become quite
complicated when issues of debt and mortgage on the real estate need to be addressed. When the
will requires the executor to pay all debts from the residuary estate, as the provisions above state,
this provision may necessarily include a mortgage that encumbers real estate to be paid off prior
to distribution to the distributee. This may not necessarily follow your client's wishes.
It is important that the will provide how encumbrances on the real estate should be handled:
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UMy Executor shall distribute the real estate located at 123 West Street, Lexington,
Kentucky, and all other real estate that I own at my death, or the proceeds thereofifsold,
equally to my sons, Justin, Ben and Dalton, if living at the time ofmy death. If the real
estate is encumbered by a mortgage at the time ofmy death, Justin shall be responsible
for payment ofany mortgage balance within ninety days ofmy death. IfJustin is not able
to payoffthe mortgage, the real estate shall be sold and Justin's share shall be reduced
by the amount ofthe·mortgage payoffamount. "
The laws of many states provide that, when real property subject to a mortgage is specifically
devised, the devisee takes the property subject to such mortgage unless the will provides
expressly or by necessary implication that such mortgage be otherwise paid. If your client does
not wish the devisees to take title subject to the mortgage, the will must express your client's
wishes very clearly.
An alternative to having the encumbrance paid off from the residue of an estate is to have the
conveyance that is subject to the encumbrance drafted in such a way that the devise specifically
states that the encumbrance should be paid off and from what funding the encumbrance should
be paid. Another method would be to devise an amount to the devisee equal to the indebtedness:
UI devise real estate located at 123 West Street, Lexington, Kentucky, to my son, Justin, if
he shall survive me and I also bequeath to my son, Justin, if he shall survive me, an
amount equal to the unpaidprincipal and interest on any mortgage or mortgages on such
real estate as such is constituted at the date ofmy death. "
Another consideration that must be addressed is that of a third party lender. Even though your
client may wish to have the real estate transferred with the mortgage attached, in some instances,
the mortgagee will require that the mortgage be paid off at the death prior to any transfer.
Regardless of the language in the will, under those circumstances, the devisee of the real estate
may be required to refinance the mortgage on the property. If the devisee in unable to qualify for
the loan, further complications may arise resulting in the sale of the property contrary to what
your client may have intended.
A final consideration of encumbrances is all manner of easements, oil and gas rights, highway
use and mineral interests. These must be considered as encumbrances on the real estate as they
will follow the real estate to your client's beneficiaries.
Environmental Provisions. Any attorney who engages in estate planning and represents
fiduciaries in the administration of decedents' estates (and any trusts which continue on after
death for the benefit of your clients' families) must be concerned about fiduciary environmental
liability.
Environmental liability is not limited to owners of factories, hazardous waste disposal sites or
landfills, this concept has spread to farm owners who throw fertilizer cans in the back yard, any
home or business owner who stores oil or gasoline underground, homeowners who have asbestos
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in their basements or radon gas issues, small business owners who use and dispose of chemicals
and even clients who take a security interest in contaminated property.
The best solution, of course, is for clients to clean up any environmental problems long before
they die. Absent this, however, the attorney must draft estate planning documents in a manner
designed to protect those who inherit the property and those who administer estates and trusts
containing that property from liability.
The primary federal statue in this area is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act or "CERCLA." The laws of most states purposely mirror the
federal law. CERCLA clearly applies to any owner of property where a hazardous substance has
been stored. That might include any client who owns real estate (who may have liability during
his or her lifetime) and any executor or trustee who administers your client's estate plan (who
may have liability after your client's death).
You represent the client today and you will likely represent the fiduciary in the future. Because
any client might be exposed to environmental liability, a clear understanding of the law and its
impact is critical.
Four factors must exist before CERCLA imposes liability: (1) the property is a "facility"; (2) a
"release" of a "hazardous substance" from the site has occurred or there is a "threatened release";
(3) the release or threatened release has caused clean up costs to be incurred; and (4) your client
is a "responsible party." Each of the terms in quotes contains its own definition in CERCLA.
The definitions themselves can raise uncertainty and ambiguity under the law, however, that is
beyond the scope ofwhat we will cover here.
The bad news is that any owner or operator of the facility is a potential responsible party,
whether or not there was any involvement in the release of the hazardous substance. The owner
may be a responsible party even though another entity (such as a tenant) was the operator of the
facility. Indeed, the party who owns the facility when the complaint is filed is the "owner" for
these purposes even if the release occurred when other parties owned the facility.
Further, there is strict liability, which means that a person can be liable for these clean up costs
without regard to fault. This is the main reason most corporate trust departments (i.e. "deep
pockets") will become concerned and may not allow transfer of potentially contaminated
property into a trust. For that matter, the corporation may not even agree to serve in a fiduciary
capacity with respect to an estate or trust with potentially contaminated property. This can be
mitigated by drafting in appropriate protection for the fiduciary.
Congress has provided substantial relief for fiduciaries with the enactment of The Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996. This Act limits
the liability of a fiduciary under CERCLA to the assets held in a fiduciary capacity. See 42
U.S.C. Sections 9607(n) and 6991(h)(9).
Unfortunately, a fiduciary can still be held liable for clean up costs beyond the assets held in the
fiduciary capacity under a number of circumstances: (1) if the fiduciary is otherwise personally
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liable, the fact that this person is also serving as a fiduciary does not relieve him or her of their
own personal liability (42 U.S.C. Section 9607(n)(2»; (2) if the fiduciary's negligence causes or
contributes to a release (42 U.S.C. 9607(n)(3»; (3) if the fiduciary acts "other than ... [as] a
fiduciary or in a fiduciary capacity," (42 U.S.C. Section 9607(n)(7)(A»; (4) if the fiduciary is
also a beneficiary and receives more than "customary or reasonable compensation" (42 U.S.C.
Section 9607(n)(7)(B»; (5) the fiduciary who fails to protect non-contaminated estate assets may
also be liable to the beneficiaries whose property is taken as part of the remediation effort.
Defenses to liability are available. Liability may be avoided if a preponderance of the evidence
shows that the damage was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war; or an act or omission
of a third party. Liability may also be avoided if it can be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property was acquired after the hazardous materials were released, that the
fiduciary did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous material was disposed of
on the property, and that the fiduciary exercised due care with respect to the hazardous material.
This defense is also available for those acquiring the property by inheritance.
The drafting attorney must take steps to deal with these issues before people or bank trust
departments will be willing to serve as a trustee for the client's assets. Indeed, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to find a trustee who is willing to accept some properties which your clients
wish to place in trust. Your documents must seek to minimize fiduciary environmental liability
if you are going to find a trustee willing to accept assets that might have environmental
contamination.
The devise of real estate to multiple devisees. Every issue discussed in the sections above
apply to a devise of real estate to multiple devisees. Compound all of those issues with the large
problem of figuring out the use of property by multiple beneficiaries, payment of ongoing
expenses of the real estate by multiple beneficiaries and the various other issues that may arise
and it is easy to see how this type of devise can cause serious concerns. Like the term of years
interest discussed above, this type of devise may be better accomplished by having the will place
the property in trust at your client's death.
The law of most states provides that all conveyances and devises of land or any interest therein
made to two or more persons shall be construed to create tenants-in-common and not joint
tenancy. Your client must make his intention clear as to how the multiple devisees will hold the
property, i.e., tenants-in-common or joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Absent a specific
direction in the will, the law may provide that when two or more distributees are entitled to
distribution of undivided interests in any real property, distribution shall be made of undivided
interests therein unless the executor or the distributees petition the court to make a partition
thereof. The court may also direct the executor to sell any property which cannot be partitioned
without prejudice to other parties. Partition may be made in unequal shares with compensation
being paid to one or more parties. Beneficiaries may also have a right to partition of the
property under state law.
Once the property is distributed, the problems have really just begun. Your client should take as
much precaution as possible to head off these types of problems. You may wish to recommend
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to your client that he set forth either in the will or in a separate document a joint use agreement,
to address the maintenance and control issues discussed previously. Another method is through
creation ofan LLC or FLP, which will spell out the responsibilities of each party.
Conclusions
This paper can only summarize some very basic strategies regarding planning for our clients'
real estate holdings. The estate planner must conduct additional research to learn more details
regarding a strategy which has appeal with respect to any client. My hope has been merely to
touch on the highlights.
A great deal of relevant material could not be included in this paper due to lack of time. I have
dealt with strategies available to those clients who wish to maintain control of a particular piece
of real estate; for those clients who seek to take advantage of like kind exchanges, I recommend
your consideration of Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-14 I.R.B. 733, which provides guidelines for
fractional interest programs.
Eric A. Manterfield
July 3, 2002
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THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT PRIMER*
Introduction
What are landowners to do when faced with increasing development pressures from all
sides while having an abiding interest in protecting their land from such pressures, and a strong
desire to preserve it for future generations as either undisturbed natural habitat, as productive
farm land, or a significant historic site? Just as a landowner has tools for developing his land as
a subdivision of single family residences, patio homes, apartments or a shopping center, tools
exist for a landowner to protect land from development, while potentially receiving some tax
benefits in the process. The most popular of such tools-and one increasing in popularity among
Kentucky landowners is the donated conservation easement.
Under common law, an easement is "an interest in land owned by another person,
consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific
limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a public road)."l An easement is a less-than-fee
interest, and in fact does not include a possessory interest in the underlying land. A conservation
easement, likewise is an easement with a specific purpose to protect certain characteristics of the
burdened land or to preclude certain activities thereon, such as further development. In the
Commonwealth ofKentucky, the conservation easement is statutorily defined as
nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations, the purposes ofwhich include retaining or
protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring
its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality,
* These materials are an adaptation and revision of an article that first appeared in the July 2001 issue of
Kentucky Bench and Bar, by Steve Ruschell, Bruce Reynolds, and Monica Henderson.
1 Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.).
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or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural
aspects of real property.2
Stated differently, "a conservation easement is a legal agreement a property owner makes to
restrict the type and amount of development that may take place on his or her property.,,3 One
significant distinction between a common law easement, which typically involves a benefited or
dominant estate, and a burdened or servient estate, a conservation easement is technically an
easement in gross, or one which benefits a specific person (or entity), as opposed to a piece
adjacent land. Unlike the typical easement in gross, however, a conservation easement does not
necessarily "benefit" the grantee in the traditional sense of affording the grantee a use such as
access or a right ofway; rather, the entity to which the easement is granted has rights and
obligations to protect the land encumbered by the conservation easement. The "benefit" is that
the conservation easement furthers the goals and purposes of the grantee entity.
The goal of any landowner granting a conservation easement should be to limit
development and protect values and qualities of the land existing at the time of the grant. In the
event the landowner gives or donates the conservation easement meeting requirements under the
federal tax laws to a qualified recipient, the landowner may receive substantial tax benefits. In
fact, the granting of conservation easements by landowners in Kentucky has become an
increasingly popular land use and tax planning tool since the adoption of Taxpayer Relief Act of
19974 ("1997 Act"). Even before the 1997 Act, an income tax deduction was allowed upon the
gift of an inter vivos conservation easementS and an estate tax deduction6 was permitted for an
2 K.R.S. § 382.800(1).
3 Janet Diehl and Thomas S. Barrett. The Conservation Easement Handbook: Managing Land
Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement Programs., 5 (1988).
4 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of26 U.S.C.). (Hereinafter "26 U.S.C. § " will be abbreviated "I.R.C § ").
5 I.R.C. §170(h). - -
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easement created upon the donor's death. The 1997 Act has added to these tax advantages by
providing for an estate tax exclusion7 for land subject to a qualified conservation easement. This
additional tax benefit has increased the enthusiasm for conservation easements among
prospective donors.
The purpose of this primer is to provide a primer for attorneys advising clients as to the
state law enabling the creation of conservation easements, the practical issues of donating an
easement, such as transactional steps and costs, and the requirements under federal tax law for
granting conservation easement that affords tax benefits for the donor.
Kentucky Law Enabling Creation of Conservation Easements
Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Conservation Easement Act.8 In addition to defining
"conservation easement," the statute defines who may be a "holder" of such easements to include
"[a] governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property,,,9 and charitable
corporations with the purpose or power to retain and protect the real property values typically
associated with conservation easements-that is, "natural, scenic, or open space values"--or
charitable corporations dedicated to "assuring the availability of real property for agricultural,
forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air
or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of
real property."lO
6 l.R.C. § 2055(1) permits a charitable deduction for an easement created upon a decedent's death. While
no estate tax charitable deduction is allowed for an easement created by the donor inter vivos, such an
easement may modify the real estate's highest and best use and may therefore lead to a lower estate tax
value.
7 l.R.C. § 2031 (c).
8 Uniform Conservation Easement Act, 12 U.L.A. 163 (1966).
9 K.R.S. § 382.800(2)(a).
10 K.R.S. § 382.800(2)(b).
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The statute also pennits a conservation easement to provide rights to a third party to
enforce the easement, although such party is not the holder of the easement. 11 Holders are
among the parties who have the power to bring an action affecting an easement, along with the
owner of the land encumbered by the easement, or a person authorized by other law. 12
Other key provisions of the statute include the presumption that a conservation easement
is perpetual unless stated otherwise in the instrument creating the interest or unless it is
tenninated by a court. 13 Finally, the statute recognizes that such an easement is valid although
not appurtenant to another parcel, it is assignable (unlike a common law easement in gross), may
not have been traditionally recognized at common law, imposes a negative burden, imposes
obligations on either the owner, the holder or both, creates a purported benefit that does not
touch and concern land, and lacks the traditionally required privities of estate.14
Practical Issues of Donating Conservation Easements
What's Worth Protecting?
The first step for a landowner considering the donation of a conservation easement is to
contemplate the future. That is, what vision does the owner have for the land and for future
generations-whether for the landowner's heirs or for the community. The owner should
consider special features of the land-natural habitat, geological features, waterways, scenic
vistas, open space, or historic or cultural attributes of the property. The owner should also
contemplate current uses or activities to take place on the land-hunting, fishing, farming,
hiking, wildlife observation, residential usage-and whether the owner wants such uses to be
11 K.R.S. § 382.800(3)
12 K.R.S. § 382.820(1).
13 K.R.S. § 382.810(3).
14 K.R.S. § 382.830.
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pennitted in the future. Related to the continuation of current usage is what future use the
landowner envisions. Of course, the most critical issue in this area is what development rights
with which the owner is willing to part. For example, does the owner want to preclude the right
to subdivide the property completely? Or does the owner wish to leave all of a two hundred acre
fann undeveloped, except for a five acre tract to build a future residence?
Who Should Protect the Land?
Carefully considering the qualities of the land worth protecting and the development
rights to be preserved assists the landowner with the next important step in the process-
identifying a donee organization to accept the easement. Beyond the qualifications required
under the federal tax laws (discussed in more detail below), the landowner needs to keep in mind
that the various potential governmental and charitable donees that exist have limited purposes
and/or geographical areas of interest. So, for example, River Fields, Inc. a land trust located in
Jefferson County, Kentucky has as its purpose and focus conservation along and within fifty
miles of the Ohio River from Westport to West Point, Kentucky, and along tributaries of the
Ohio River in that area. A donor with land in Jefferson County that is not along a tributary of the
Ohio would not likely find River Fields a suitable donee organization. On the other hand, that
same donor might find the Jefferson County Environmental Trust, with its broader purpose and
geographical interest throughout Jefferson County, a suitable donee organization.
Similarly, the Kentucky Heritage Council accepts donated easements throughout the
Commonwealth, but as a matter ofpolicy, only on properties listed on the National Register of
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Historic Places (the "National Register"). In some instances, it is wise to inquire into the
suitability of two potential donee organizations serving as co-grantees. For example, the owner
of a farm that has been listed on the National Register in the bluegrass area ofKentucky might
approach both the Kentucky Heritage Council and the Bluegrass Conservancy, Inc. to act as co-
grantees of a donated easement. The Blue Grass Conservancy has the expertise for monitoring
the open-space and agricultural use of the farm, whereas the Kentucky Heritage Council has the
expertise for monitoring and protecting the historic resources on the property.
Local and state organizations are not the only options for donors to consider. The American
Farmland Trust and the Nature Conservancy are just two examples of land trusts that are national
organizations which have accepted conservation easements in Kentucky. IS Each organization
has a particular property type its interested in protecting, however, so be prepared to help them
determine if a donor's land fits the donee's mission.
In addition to considering the donee organization's purpose and geographical areas of
interest, landowner's should consider the donee's flexibility in negotiating the easement, and the
organization's commitment and resources for monitoring and defending the easement in the
future. In this regard, it may be advisable to request a list of donor's from the prospective donee
to investigate the donee's track record on these matters.
What are the Costs?
Many donee organizations follow a particular process in accepting donated easements
which is designed to protect the shared interests of the owner/donor and the donee organization
to properly protect the land and to facilitate the donor's obtaining the tax benefits associated with
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the donation. Much like any other substantial land transaction, the donee organization typically
undertakes due diligence and investigation to carefully document the property. Each of the
following items are either steps that may be required by the donee, or are required under the
federal tax law for the donor to receive the tax benefits for donating the easement (certain ones
required in the tax code are discussed in more detail later). To the extent that the tax code or
donee organization requires them, they all are potential expenses for the donor:
1. Oualified Appraisal. Donors seeking tax deductions for donating easements must
obtain a qualified appraisal to justify the value of the any gift being claimed in excess of $5000. 16
The landowner is responsible for paying for the appraisal. Donee organizations can recommend
appraisers that are experienced in appraising conservation easements.
2. Boundary Survey. Depending on the size of the land to be encumbered by the easement and
the complexity of the instrument creating the easement, the donee organization may require a
boundary survey that also reflects special features of the property to be protected. The final plat
will typically be attached to the instrument creating the easement as an exhibit. The survey
serves several functions. First, it helps the donee to accurately identify the area to be
encumbered by the easement. Second, in the event that special provisions of the easement effect
certain buildings or areas of the property (such as wooded areas, or pasture lands, or building
envelopes where future construction is permitted), such features or areas need to be identified on
15 The Land Trust Alliance maintains a National Directory of Conservation Land Trusts which indicates
each organization's purpose, area of operation, main land types accepted and main means of protecting
land, whether by purchase of fee interests or by accepting conservation easements. The Land Trust
Alliance can be reached by phone at (202) 638-4725 bye-mail at lta@lta.org. Its website is www.lta.org.
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13T(c)(2)(i)(A).
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the survey. Finally, the survey will be incorporated into the Baseline Documentation Report
(discussed below), which helps donee monitor compliance with the easement in the future.
3. Baseline Documentation Report. The Baseline Documentation Report (the "Baseline") is
compilation ofdata, including reports, maps, surveys, photographs and other information that
provides an accurate record or "snapshot" of the property at the time of the grant of the
Easement. It provides a benchmark to which the donee will compare the property at least
annually to determine if donor and future owners are in compliance with the terms of the
easement. Some donee organizations hire third-party consultants to compile the Baseline; others
use in-house staff. Depending on the donee's practice, this expense may be passed on to the
donor.
4. Legal Fees. Increasingly, donee organizations are unwilling to accept conservation
easements from landowners who do not have independent legal representation. The transaction
is complex, involving detailed negotiations, and potentially, complicated income and estate tax
planning. Thus, the donor will incur legal expenses ofhis own counsel. Moreover, donee
organizations engage outside counsel to draft and negotiate the easement, and to coordinate all
matters related to closing the transaction. Because some non-profit organizations feel obligated
to their trustees and membership to keep costs low in order to fulfill their mission, those
organizations may request donors pay all legal fees incurred by the donee in connection with the
easement transaction.
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5. Environmental Site Assessment. The standard ofpractice for land trusts is to have a policy
of undertaking an environmental site assessment for each property on which an easement may be
donated. This involves engaging an environmental consultant to perform an the assessment of
the property to review ownership and usage history and to review public agency records
regarding environmental issues to determine if there are any recognized environmental
conditions at the property. Such an assessment protects both the donor and donee from liability
under state and federal environmental laws.
6. Stewardship Endowment. Because the donee organization's responsibility as a holder of
conservation easements is to protect and monitor the easements in perpetuity, some donees
request donors to make a cash contribution to help offset monitoring costs. Perpetuity is, of
course, a long time for a non-profit organization to make a commitment ofresources. The term
for monitoring and protecting land in the long term that the conservation community uses is
"stewardship," and the cash contribution to fund it is to establish a "stewardship endowment."
The funds are kept in a segregated account and are designed to generate sufficient income to
monitor the property forever.
7. Legal Defense Fund Endowment. Another potential future cost ofprotecting the land under
easement is the cost that may be incurred in defending the easement in court from legal attack.
Owners taking the land after the original donor may not share the original donor's vision for the
property and may seek to challenge the terms of the easement in court. Some donee entities
therefore may request another cash contribution to fund a "legal defense endowment"-again, a
dedicated account intended to generate sufficient income to fund a defense of the easement.
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The various expenses listed above can be substantial and it is not unusual for them to
total in the tens of thousands of dollars. This is often a shock to donors, who, because they are
making a "gift" do not contemplate incurring expenses for ·making the gift. A bit ofperspective
on the transaction usually helps diminish the shock-the protection the donor seeks for the land
is perpetual, and the tax savings may be substantial. Often, the transactional expenses are a
fraction of the potential tax savings of the gift, and in fact, such expenses may themselves be tax
deductible. The deductibility of such expenses will depend on the donor's tax circumstances. It
is important for potential donors who are flabbergasted by such expenses to understand that the
gift they are proposing to make creates nothing but long term liabilities for the donee
organization-admittedly liabilities that fulfill the donee's mission, but nevertheless, liabilities
for which the donee organizations must properly plan. Moreover, a non-profit organization that
does requests stewardship or legal defense fund endowment contributions are demonstrating
their commitment to the perpetual responsibility that accompanies accepting the gift.
Qualifying for Federal Tax Deductions and Exclusions
Qualified Charitable Income Tax Deduction
A charitable income tax deduction is allowed to a landowner upon making a "qualified
conservation contribution." To be eligible for a charitable income tax deduction, such a
contribution must be a "qualified real property interest" I?, granted to a "qualified organization,,18,
and used "exclusively for conservation purposes,,19. Substantial Treasury Regulations exist that
define and amplify these and other key terms.20
17 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(A).
18 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(B).
19 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14.
G - 10
A conservation easement is one of three types of "qualified real property interests,"
defined by the Internal Revenue Code.21 To qualify for the tax deduction, a conservation
easement must be a perpetual restriction on the use of the property. A qualified easement can
include an actual easement or similar restriction recognized under state law, such as a restrictive
covenant or equitable servitude. Also included are affirmative rights to use land. For purposes
of the Treasury Regulations, the terms "easement", "conservation restriction" and "perpetual
conservation restrictions" are used interchangeably. 22
To be deductible, a conservation easement must be granted to an eligible donee which
includes any state or a governmental unit thereof, the United States, publicly supported charities,
and private charities that are controlled by governmental entities or public charities. In addition,
to qualify as an eligible donee, an organization must have a commitment to protect the
conservation purpose of the property and have the resources to enforce the conservation
restriction.23 Some of the eligible donees in Kentucky include the previously mentioned
Kentucky Heritage Council, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the Bluegrass
Conservancy, Inc. located in Lexington, River Fields, Inc. located in Louisville, the Jefferson
County Environmental Trust, and P.A.C.E., Inc., (Purchase ofAgricultural Conservation
Easements) operated under the auspices of the Commonwealth ofKentucky Department of
Agriculture.
The final requirement for deductibility is that the conservation easement be made for one
of several acceptable conservation purposes which are to be protected perpetually. Such
21 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2) states:
For the purposes of this subsection, the tenn "qualified real property interest" means any of the
following interests in real property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real property.
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2).
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acceptable conservation purposes include:
(i) the preservation of land areas for public outdoor recreation or education, scenic
enjoyment, or pursuant to clearly delineated governmental conservation policy;
(ii) the protection ofrelatively natural habitats of fish, wildlife, or plants, or a similar
ecosystems; and
(iii) the preservation of a historically important land area or a certified historic
structure.24
Each of these acceptable purposes is described in detail by regulation.25 Even though the
easement must be exclusively for an acceptable conservation purpose, an incidental benefit
inuring to the donor merely as the result of the conservation easement will not prevent a
deduction for the gift. Importantly, a donor may continue a pre-existing use of the property that
does not conflict with the conservation purpose of the gift. On the other hand, a deduction may
be denied if the stated conservation purpose permits the destruction ofother significant
conservation interests.26
Deduction Established by Appraisal
If the value of the donated conservation easement exceeds $5,000, the donor must obtain
a qualified appraisal for the contributed easement and must attach a summary of the appraisal to
his tax return for the year of the gift.27 As a general rule, in setting a value for an easement, an
appraiser must use comparable data from the sales of similar easements ("Comparable Sales
Method") if a substantial record of such sales exist.28 If a substantial record of such market-
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c).
24 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d).
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c).
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3).
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place sales is not available, the value of the easement may be determining by valuing the subject
property before and after the creation of the easement ("Before and After Method,,).29 Any
difference in the value of the land under this method will be deemed the value of the easement.
Although the Comparable Sales Method is the preferred approach in setting value, such sales
must reflect a meaningful or valid comparison to be considered comparable. For example, in
Browning v. Commissioner, 30 the Tax Court rejected the use of the Comparable Sales Method
when all sales of conservation easements in the particular county where the donor's land was
located were made pursuant to a governmental program that arbitrarily set the values of such
easements at a percentage of their fair market value. Under those facts, the Tax Court held the
Before and After Method should be used in valuing the easement.31
In addition, under the regulations, the amount of the charitable deduction granted for the
donation of the easement will be reduced for any positive economic benefit to other property
owned by the donor or a related person.32 For this purpose, a related person is defined to include
certain family members and entities in which the donor or his family has an economic interest.33
As an example, if donor owns two adjacent tracts, Tract A and Tract B, but only donates an
easement on Tract A, any benefit or increase in fair market value that Tract B derives from being
located adjacent or near to the protected property will have to be taken into account in the
easement appraisal.34
29 Id.
30 109 T.C. 303, 315 (1997).
31 Id.
32 Treas. Reg. 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i).
33 I.R.C. §§ 267(b).
34 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(4)(Ex.10).
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Baseline Documentation
In addition to an appraisal, a donor may also be required to provide additional
documentation to obtain an income tax deduction for his conservation easement. In cases where
the donor has reserved development rights over his land that could impair the conservation
easement, he must make available to the donee, prior to the time the donation is made, sufficient
documentation to establish the condition of the property at the time of the gift. The record of the
condition of the property at the time of the gift is designed to permit the donee to protect the
easement against the adverse use of the donor's reserved rights over the land. Such
documentation may include maps, surveys, photographs, and land use histories of the existing
man made improvements and natural features of the land. Further, the donor must agree to
provide the donee with written notice before exercising a reserved right. Additionally, the donee
must be given reasonable inspection rights and the right to enforce the conservation rights by
appropriate legal action.35
Subordination ofPrior Lien Rights
As noted above, a conservation easement must be granted in perpetuity, and therefore,
any mortgage or similar encumbrance must be made subordinate to the conservation easement,
thus precluding the possibility of extinguishment of the easement upon a subsequent foreclosure
action.36 Sometimes, this requirement involves educating mortgage holders so that they
understand that the easement holder does not seek any type of financial priority. Usually, so
long as the donor and donee organization can show that a prior mortgagee's equity is not
impaired, the mortgagee will subordinate. The resulting subordination agreement should be
35 Treas. Reg. § 1. 170A-14(g)(5).
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2).
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recorded immediately after the conservation easement and meet all the formalities for recorded
instruments.
Subsequent Change ofCircumstances
Although the regulations require the conservation easement to be perpetual, they do
provide, however, that the conservation easement may be extinguished by judicial proceedings if
the enforcement of the conservation purpose becomes impossible or impractical because of a
subsequent change in circumstances.37 A subsequent sale of the real property after judicial
extinguishment of the conservation easement must provide for payment of a proportionate share
(based on the original ratio of the value of the conservation easement to the fair market value of
the land) of the sale proceeds to the donee to be used in a manner consistent with the
conservation purpose at the time of the original transfer (i.e., an original scenic easement transfer
must be replaced with a scenic easement or similar easement). 38 The regulations also address an
involuntary conversion of the property subject to the conservation easement. All conversion
proceeds must be distributed in the same manner as described above, absent state law awarding
all proceeds to the donor.39 It is further required that the instrument creating the easement
prohibit the donee organization from subsequently transferring the conservation easement to an
ineligible donee or for a different purpose.40
Estate Tax Exclusion
An income tax deduction is not the only potential tax benefit for easement donors. As
mentioned above, the estate tax provision permitting a charitable deduction for a conservation
37 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (g)(6)(ii).
39 Id.
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easement has been joined by an estate tax exclusion. The Internal Revenue Code now allows an
executor to make an election to exclude from a decedent's gross estate a portion of the value of
"land subject to a qualified conservation easement." 41 Formerly, to qualify for this exclusion,
the land must have been located within: (i) 25 miles of a metropolitan area (as defined by the
Office ofManagement and Budget); (ii) 25 miles of a national park or designated wilderness
area if such land was under significant development pressure; or (iii) 10 miles of an Urban
National Forest. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of2001, however, amended the
Internal Revenue Code to delete these location requirements.42 For decedents dying after
December 31, 2000, land may qualify for the exclusion irrespective of its location within the
United States or its possessions.
In addition, to qualify for the exclusion, the decedent or his family must have
continuously held the property for the three (3) year period preceding his death, and the
decedent, his executor or trustee, or family members must have granted a conservation easement
(as defined in I.R.C. § 170(h) but excluding historic easements) prior to the due date of filing the
decedent's estate tax retum.43 Ofnote for estate planners, executors and heirs is that the
exclusion provisions are drafted such that executors and heirs can make the donation of the
conservation easement post-mortem on behalfof a decedent land owner and make the estate tax
exclusion election.44 The easement, however, must prohibit activity that is "more than a de
minimis use for a commercial recreational activity.,,45
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (c)(2).
41 I.R.C. § 2031(c)(5)(D).
42 I.R.C. § 2031 (c)(8)(A) as amended by The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 for the
estates of decedents dying after December 31, 2000.
43 I.R.C. § 2031(c)(6).
44 See I.R.C. §§ 2031(c)8(C) and 2031(c)(9).
45 I.R.C. § 2031(c)(8)(B).
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Substantial limits apply to the exclusion. The exclusion is calculated by multiplying the
value of the land at death (reduced by the amount of any estate tax charitable deduction taken as
a result of the easement) by the "applicable percentage." The maximum applicable percentage
is forty percent (40%) and it will be used in calculating the exclusion if at the time of creation of
the conservation easement, the value of the easement equals at least thirty percent (30%) of the
value of the land. For every percentage point the value of the easement is less than 30% of the
value of the land, the maximum applicable percentage is reduced by 2%. For example, if the
value of the easement on creation equals twenty-five percent (25%) of the value of the land, the
applicable percentage used in computing the exclusion will be 30% (40% - (5%x2) = 30%).
Obviously, if the value of the easement is a small enough fraction of the overall value of the
property, no exclusion will be allowed.
In addition to limitations placed on the maximum applicable percentage, other limits
apply. In no event can the excluded amount exceed the designated statutory limit that has been
phasing in since 1998. In 2001, the limit is $400,000 and in 2002, the final year of the phase-in,
the limit will rise to $500,000. The excluded amount can be further reduced when the real
property is debt-financed or when the donor has retained certain rights to commercially use the
land for purposes other than fanning.46
The Deed of Easement
An essential step in granting a conservation easement is the preparation of the deed of
easement. A well-drafted easement will incorporate the applicable language I.R.C. § 170(h) and
relevant Kentucky law. The' following non-exhaustive checklist may be helpful in drafting the
easement and maintaining the essential record to support the tax benefits and the future
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permissible use of the land:47
1. Qualifications of the donee.
2. Establishment of the Conservation Purpose. (Remember the regulations are specific.)
3. Preparation of the Baseline Documentation.
4. Provide the easement is in perpetuity.
5. Establish the rights of the donee to prevent misuse of the easement, to monitor
compliance by inspection and to take corrective action, by injunction, ifnecessary, to
maintain integrity ofconservation easement. Additionally, the donee's right to seek
damages and costs should be considered.
6. Establish prohibited uses for donor. For example, can the donor remove trees, dump
hazardous materials, subdivide, create new roads, change paint on exterior buildings? The
restrictions must be tailored to insure the Conservation Purpose is protected now and in
the future.
7. Establish the residual rights of the donor. The donor needs to clearly establish those
rights and activities reserved for continued use (i.e., fanning and agricultural uses over a
fann with a scenic conservation easement or continued use of a historical building).
46 See IoRoC. § 2031(c)(5)(D).
47 See Thomas So Barrett and Stefan Nagel, Model Conservation Easement and Historic Preservation
Easement, 1996 (Revised Easements and Commentary from The Conservation Easement Handbook
(1996))0 The list of key provisions was culled from actual easements recorded in Kentucky based on the
Model Easement.
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8. Establish the donor's intent to allow/prohibit public access to the property.
9. Establish real estate tax payment responsibilities. Normally these remain with the donor,
whose tax assessment should be reduced by the appraised value of the conservation
easement.
10. Establish responsibility for environmental remediation both before and after the granting
of the conservation easement.
11. Establish the criteria for extinguishment of the conservation easement along with
application ofproceeds both for extinguishment and condemnation.
12. Provide for subordination ofall mortgages or similar liens.
13. Restrict the rights of the donee to subsequently transfer or assign the conservation
easement to an ineligible donee or for an impermissible purpose. Also a backup donee
should be named in the event the donee ceases to qualify as an eligible donee or ceases to
exist without making provision to assign the conservation easement.
14. Provide that the conservation easement may be amended consistent with provisions of
I.R.C.§§ 170(h) and 50I(c)(3).
15. Provisions for notice, severability, controlling law, construction, recording, binding
effect, compliance with laws and other standard features of a will drafted general deed of
easement should be included as well.
G - 19
Conclusion
Conservation easements may not be desirable for all landowners; property owners not
prepared to forego future development rights should not consider using this important tool. For
those owners committed to preserving the things they love about their property for future
generations, a qualified easement can allow them to achieve this purpose with obtaining
significant tax savings.
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UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT
AS ADOPTED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES §§ 382.800 - 382.860
382.800. Definitions.
As used in KRS 382.810 to 382.860, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real
property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations, the purposes ofwhich include retaining
or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for
agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or
cultural aspects of real property.
(2) Holder" means:
(a) A governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the
laws of this state or the United States; or
(b) A charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes
or powers ofwhich include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space
values of real property, assuring the availability of real property for agricultural, forest,
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing
air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural
aspects of real property.
(3) "Third-party right of enforcement" means a right provided in a conservation
easement to enforce any of its terms granted to a governmental body, charitable
corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, which, although eligible to be a
holder, is not a holder.
382.810. Creation - Acceptance and recordation necessary - Duration - Preexisting
property interest.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 382.810 to 382.860, a conservation
easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified, terminated, or
otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.
(2) No right or duty in favor of or against a holder and no right in favor of a person
having a third-party right of enforcement shall arise under a conservation easement before its
acceptance by the holder and a recordation of the acceptance.
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(3) Except as provided in KRS 382.820(2), a conservation easement shall be
unlimited in duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.
(4) An interest in real property in existence at the time a conservation easement is
created shall not be impaired by it unless the owner of the interest is a party to the conservation
easement or consents to it.
382.820. Actions affecting easements.
(1) An action affecting a conservation easement may be brought by:
(a) An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement;
(b) A holder of the easement;
(c) A person having a third-party right of enforcement; or
(d) person authorized by other law.
(2) KRS 382.810 to 382.860 shall not affect the power of a court to modify or
terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity.
382.830. Validity of easement.
A conservation easement shall be valid even though:
(1) It is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;
(2) It can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) It is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) It imposes a negative burden;
(5) It imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened
property or upon the holder;
(6) The benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) There is no privity of estate or of contract.
382.840. Applicability and effect.
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(1) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall apply to any interest created after July 15, 1988,
which complies with KRS 382.800 to 382.860, whether designated as a conservation easement or
as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction, easement, or otherwise.
(2) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall apply to any interest created before July 15, 1988,
ifit would have been enforceable had it been created after July 15, 1988, unless retroactive
application contravenes the constitution or laws of this state or the United States.
(3) KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall not invalidate any interest, whether designated as a
conservation or preservation easement or as a covenant, equitable servitude, restriction,
easement, or otherwise, that is enforceable under other law of this state.
382.850. Transfer of easement - Effect on mining operations and on eminent domain
powers.
(1) A conservation easement shall not be transferred by owners ofproperty in which
there are outstanding subsurface rights without the prior written consent of the owners of the
subsurface rights.
(2) A conservation easement shall not operate to limit, preclude, delete or require
waivers for the conduct of coal mining operations, including the transportation of coal, upon any
part or all of adjacent or surrounding properties; and shall not operate to impair or restrict any
right or power of eminent domain created by statute, and all such rights and powers shall be
exercisable as if the conservation easement did not exist.
382.860. Application and construction - Uniformity of interpretation.
KRS 382.800 to 382.860 shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the laws with respect to conservation easements among states enacting them.
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26 U.S.C. § 170(h)
TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Subtitle A - Income Taxes
CHAPTER 1 - NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
Subchapter B - Computation of Taxable Income
PART VI - ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS FOR INDNIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS
Section 170(h)
(h) Qualified conservation contribution
(1) In general
For purposes of subsection (f)(3)(B)(iii), the term "qualified conservation contribution"
means a contribution -
(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
(2) Qualified real property interest
For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified real property interest" means any of
the following interests in real property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real
property.
(3) Qualified organization
For purposes ofparagraph (1), the term "qualified organization" means an organization
which-
(A) is described in clause (v) or (vi) of subsection (b)(1 )(A), or
(B) is described in section 501(c)(3) and-
(i) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(2), or
(ii) meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3) and is controlled by an
organization described in subparagraph (A) or in clause (i) of this subparagraph.
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(4) Conservation purpose defined
(A) In general
For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation purpose" means-
(i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the
general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or
similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and forest land) where
such preservation is -
(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or
local governmental conservation policy, and will yield a significant public benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a certified historic
structure.
(B) Certified historic structure
For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the term "certified historic structure" means
any building, structure, or land area which -
(i) is listed in the National Register, or
(ii) is located in a registered historic district (as defined in section 47(c)(3)(B))
and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as being ofhistoric
significance to the district.
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it satisfies such
sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due date (including extensions) for
filing the transferor's return under this chapter for the taxable year in
which the transfer is made.
(5) Exclusively for conservation purposes
For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Conservation purpose must be protected A contribution shall not be treated as
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in
perpetuity.
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(B) No surface mining permitted
(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a contribution of any interest where
there is a retention ofa qualified mineral interest, subparagraph (A) shall not be
treated as met if at any time there may be extraction or removal ofminerals by any
surface mining method.
(ii) Special rule
With respect to any contribution ofproperty in which the ownership of the surface
estate and mineral interests has been and remains separated, subparagraph (A) shall
be treated as met if the probability of surface mining occurring on such property is so
remote as to be negligible.
(6) Qualified mineral interest
For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified mineral
interest" means -
(A) subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals, and
(B) the right to access to such minerals.
Downloaded from the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Office of the Law Revision Counsel
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26CFRCH.l
§ 1.170A-14 Qualified conservation contributions.
(a) Qualified conservation contributions. A deduction
under section 170 is generally not allowed for a
charitable contribution of any interest in property that
consists of less than the donor's entire interest in the
property other than certain transfers in trust (see §
1.170A-6 relating to charitable contributions in trust
and § 1.170A-7 relating to contributions not in trust
of partial interests in property). However, a deduction
may be allowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) for the
value of a qualified conservation contribution if the
requirements of this section are met. A qualified
conservation contribution is the contribution of a
qualified real property interest to a qualified
organization exclusively for conservation purposes.
To be eligible for a deduction under this section, the
conservation purpose must be protected in perpetuity.
(b) Qualified real property interest-
(1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified
mineral interest.
(i) The entire interest of the donor other than a
qualified mineral interest is a qualified real property
interest. A qualified mineral interest is the donor's
interest in sub surface oil, gas, or other minerals and
the right of access to such minerals.
(ii) A real property interest shall not be treated as
an entire interest other than a qualified mineral
interest by reason of section 170(h)(2)(A) and this
paragraph (b)(l) if the property in which the donor's
interest exists was divided prior to the contribution in
order to enable the donor to retain control of more
than a qualified mineral interest or to reduce the real
property interest donated. See Treasury regulations §
1.170A-7(a)(2)(i). An entire interest in real property
may consist of an undivided interest in the property.
But see section 170(h)(5)(A) and the regulations
thereunder (relating to the requirement that the
conservation purpose which is the subject of the
donation must be protected in perpetuity). Minor
interests, such as rights-of-way, that will not interfere
with the conservation purposes of the donation, may
be transferred prior to the conservation contribution
without affecting the treatment of a property interest
as a qualified real property interest under this
paragraph (b)(1).
(2) Perpetual conservation restriction. A "perpetual
conservation restriction" is a qualified real property
interest. A "perpetual conservation restriction" is a
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restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which
may be made of real property-including, an
easement or other interest in real property that under
state law has attributes similar to an easement (e.g., a
restrictive covenant or equitable servitude). For
purposes of this section, the terms easement,
conservation restriction, and perpetual conservation
restriction have the same meaning. The defmition of
perpetual conservation restriction under this
paragraph (b)(2) is not intended to preclude the
deductibility of a donation of affrrmative rights to use
a land or water area under § 1.170A-13(d)(2). Any
rights reserved by the donor in the donation of a
perpetual conservation restriction must conform to
the requirements of this section. See e.g., paragraph
(d)(4)(ii), (d)(5)(i), (e)(3), and (g)(4) of this section.
(c) Qualified organization-
(1) Eligible donee. To be considered an eligible
donee under this section, an organization must be a
qualified organization, have a commitment to protect
the conservation purposes of the donation, and have
the resources to enforce the restrictions. A
conservation group organized or operated primarily
or substantially for one of the conservation purposes
specified in section 170(h)(4)(A) will be considered
to have the commitment required by the preceding
sentence. A qualified organization need not set aside
funds to enforce the restrictions that are the subject of
the contribution. For purposes of this section, the
term qualified organization means:
(i) A governmental unit described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(v);
(ii) An organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(vi);
(iii) A charitable organization described in
section 501(c)(3) that meets the public support test of
section 509(a)(2);
(iv) A charitable organization described in
section 501(c)(3) that meets the requirements of
section 509(a)(3) and is controlled by an organization
described in paragraphs (c)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of this
section.
(2) Transfers by donee. A deduction shall be
allowed for a contribution under this section only if
in the instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits
the donee from subsequently transferring the
easement (or, in the case of a remainder interest or
the reservation of a qualified mineral interest, the
property), whether or not for consideration, unless the
donee organization, as a condition of the subsequent
transfer, requires that the conservation purposes
which the contribution was originally intended to
advance continue to be carried out. Moreover,
subsequent transfers must be restricted to
organizations qualifying, at the time of the
subsequent transfer, as an eligible donee under
paragraph (c)(l) of this section. When a later
unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the
property that is the subject of a donation under
paragraph (b)(l), (2), or (3) of this section makes
impossible or impractical the continued use of the
property for conservation purposes, the requirement
of this paragraph will be met if the property is sold or
exchanged and any proceeds are used by 151 Internal
Revenue Service, Treasury § 1.170A-14 the donee
organization in a manner consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution. In
the case of a donation under paragraph (b)(3) of this
section to which the preceding sentence applies, see
also paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of this section.
(d) Conservation purposes-
(1) In general. For purposes of section 170(h) and
this section, the term conservation purposes means-
(i) The preservation of land areas for outdoor
recreation by, or the education of, the general public,
within the meaning of paragraph (d)(2) of this
section,
(ii) The protection of a relatively natural habitat
of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem,
within the meaning of paragraph (d)(3) of this
section,
(iii) The preservation of certain open space
(including farmland and forest land) within the
meaning ofparagraph (d)(4) of this section, or
(iv) The preservation of a historically important
land area or a certified historic structure, within the
meaning ofparagraph (d)(5) of this section.
(2) Recreation or education-
(i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to preserve land areas for the
outdoor recreation of the general public or for the
education of the general public will meet the
conservation purposes test of this section. Thus,
conservation purposes would include, for example,
the preservation of a water area for the use of the
public for boating or fishing, or a nature or hiking
trail for the use of the public.
(ii) Access. The preservation of land areas for
recreation or education will not meet the test of this
section unless the recreation or education is for the
substantial and regular use of the general public.
(3) Protection ofenvironmental system-
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(i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to protect a significant relatively
natural habitat in which a fish, wildlife, or plant
community, or similar ecosystem normally lives will
meet the conservation purposes test of this section.
The fact that the habitat or environment has been
altered to some extent by human activity will not
result in a deduction being denied under this section
if the fish, wildlife, or plants continue to exist there in
a relatively natural state. For example, the
preservation of a lake formed by a manmade dam or
a salt pond formed by a manmade dike would meet
the conservation purposes test if the lake or pond
were a nature feeding area for a wildlife community
that included rare, endangered, or threatened native
species.
(ii) Significant habitat or ecosystem. Significant
habitats and ecosystems include, but are not limited
to, habitats for rare, endangered, or threatened
species of animal, fish, or plants; natural areas that
represent high quality examples of a terrestrial
community or aquatic community, such as islands
that are undeveloped or not intensely developed
where the coastal ecosystem is relatively intact; and
natural areas which are included in, or which
contribute to, the ecological viability of a local, state,
or national park, nature preserve, wildlife refuge,
wilderness area, or other similar conservation area.
(iii) Access. Limitations on public access to
property that is the subject of a donation under this
paragraph (d)(3) shall not render the donation
nondeductible. For example, a restriction on all
public access to the habitat of a threatened native
animal species protected by a donation under this
paragraph (d)(3) would not cause the donation to be
nondeductible.
(4) Preservation ofopen space-
(i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to preserve open space (including
farmland and forest land) will meet the conservation
purposes test of this section if such preservation is-
(A) Pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal,
state, or local governmental conservation policy and
will yield a significant public benefit, or
(B) For the scenic enjoyment of the general
public and will yield a significant public benefit. An
open space easement donated on or after December
18, 1980, must meet the requirements of section
170(h) in order to be deductible.
(ii) Scenic enjoyment-
(A) Factors. A contribution made for the
preservation of open space may be for the scenic
enjoyment of the general public. Preservation of land
may be for the scenic enjoyment of the general public
if development of the property would impair the
scenic character of the local rural or urban landscape
or would interfere with a scenic panorama that can be
enjoyed from a park, nature preserve, road,
waterbody, trail, or historic structure or land area, and
such area or transportation way is open to, or utilized
by, the public. "Scenic enjoyment" will be evaluated
by considering all pertinent facts and circumstances
germane to the contribution. Regional variations in
topography, geology, biology, and cultural and
economic conditions require flexibility in the
application of this test, but do not lessen the burden
on the taxpayer to demonstrate the scenic
characteristics of a donation under this paragraph.
The application of a particular objective factor to
help defme a view as scenic in one setting may in fact
be entirely inappropriate in another setting. Among
the factors to be considered are:
(1) The compatibility of the land use with
other land in the vicinity;
(2) The degree of contrast and variety
provided by the visual scene;
(3) The openness of the land (which
would be a more significant factor in an urban or
densely populated setting or in a heavily wooded
area);
(4) Relief from urban closeness;
(5) The harmonious variety of shapes and
textures;
(6) The degree to which the land use
maintains the scale and character of the urban
landscape to preserve open space, visual enjoyment,
and sunlight fer the surrounding area;
(1) The consistency of the proposed
scenic view with a methodical state scenic
identification program, such as a state landscape
inventory; and
(8) The consistency of the proposed
scenic view with a regional or local landscape
inventory made pursuant to a sufficiently rigorous
review process, especially if the donation is endorsed
by an appropriate state or local governmental agency.
(B) Access. To satisfy the requirement of
scenic enjoyment by the general public, visual (rather
than physical) access to or across the property by the
general public is sufficient. Under the terms of an
open space easement on scenic property, the entire
property need not be visible to the public for a
donation to qualify under this section, although the
public benefit from the donation may be insufficient
to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of
the property is visible to the public.
(iii) Governmental conservation policy-
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(A) In general. The requirement that the
preservation of open space be pursuant to a clearly
delineated Federal, state, or local governmental
policy is intended to protect the types of property
identified by representatives of the general public as
worthy of preservation or conservation. A general
declaration of conservation goals by a single official
or legislative body is not sufficient. However, a
governmental conservation policy need not be a
certification program that identifies particular lots or
small parcels of individually owned property. This
requirement will be met by donations that further a
specific, identified conservation project, such as the
preservation of land within a state or local landmark
district that is locally recognized as being significant
to that district; the preservation of a wild or scenic
river, the preservation of farmland pursuant to a state
program for flood prevention and control; or the
protection of the scenic, ecological, or historic
character of land that is contiguous to, or an integral
part of, the surroundings of existing recreation or
conservation sites. For example, the donation of a
perpetual conservation restriction to a qualified
organization pursuant to a formal resolution or
certification by a local governmental agency
established under state law specifically identifying
the subject property as worthy of protection for
conservation purposes will meet the requirement of
this paragraph. A program need not be funded to
satisfy this requirement, but the program must
involve a significant commitment by the government
with respect to the conservation project. For example,
a governmental program according preferential tax
assessment or preferential zoning for certain property
deemed worthy of protection for conservation
purposes would constitute a significant commitment
by the government.
(B) Effect of acceptance by governmental
agency. Acceptance of an easement by an agency of
the Federal Government or by an agency of a state or
local government (or by a commission, authority, or
similar body duly constituted by the state or local
government and acting on behalf of the state or local
government) tends to establish the requisite clearly
delineated governmental policy, although such
acceptance, without more, is not sufficient. The more
rigorous the review process by the governmental
agency, the more the acceptance of the easement
tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated
governmental policy. For example, in a state where
the legislature has established an Environmental
Trust to accept gifts to the state which meet certain
conservation purposes and to submit the gifts to a
review that requires the approval of the state's
highest officials, acceptance of a gift by the Trust
tends to establish the requisite clearly delineated
governmental policy. However, if the Trust merely
accepts such gifts without a review process, the
requisite clearly delineated governmental policy is
not established.
(C) Access. A limitation on public access to
property subject to a donation under this paragraph
(d)(4)(iii) shall not render the deduction
nondeductible unless the conservation purpose of the
donation would be undermined or frustrated without
public access. For example, a donation pursuant to a
governmental policy to protect the scenic character of
land near a river requires visual access to the same
extent as would a donation under paragraph (d)(4)(ii)
of this section.
(iv) Significant public benefit-
(A) Factors. All contributions made for the
preservation of open space must yield a significant
public benefit. Public benefit will be evaluated by
considering all pertinent facts and circumstances
germane to the contribution. Factors germane to the
evaluation of public benefit from one contribution
may be irrelevant in determining public benefit from
another contribution. No single factor will necessarily
be determinative. Among the factors to be considered
are:
(1) The uniqueness of the property to the
area;
(2) The intensity of land development in
the vicinity of the property (both existing
development and foreseeable trends of development);
(3) The consistency of the proposed open
space use with public programs (whether Federal,
state or local) for conservation in the region,
including programs for outdoor recreation, irrigation
or water supply protection, water quality maintenance
or enhancement, flood prevention and control,
erosion control, shoreline protection, and protection
of land areas included in, or related to, a government
approved master plan or land management area;
(4) The consistency of the proposed open
space use with existing private conservation
programs in the area, as evidenced by other land,
protected by easement or fee ownership by
organizations referred to in § 1.170A-14(c)(I), in
close proximity to the property;
(5) The likelihood that development of the
property would lead to or contribute to degradation of
the scenic, natural, or historic character of the area;
(6) The opportunity for the general public
to use the property or to appreciate its scenic values;
(7) The importance of the property in
preserving a local or regional landscape or resource
that attracts tourism or commerce to the area;
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(8) The likelihood that the donee will
acquire equally desirable and valuable substitute
property or property rights;
(9) The cost to the donee of enforcing the
terms of the conservation restriction;
(10) The population density in the area of
the property; and
(11) The consistency of the proposed open
space use with a legislatively mandated program
identifying particular parcels of land for future
protection.
(B) Illustrations. The preservation of an
ordinary tract of land would not in and of itself yield
a significant public benefit, but the preservation of
ordinary land areas in conjunction with other factors
that demonstrate significant public benefit or the
preservation of a unique land area for public
employment would yield a significant public benefit.
For example, the preservation of a vacant downtown
lot would not by itself yield a significant public
benefit, but the preservation of the downtown lot as a
public garden would, absent countervailing factors,
yield a significant public benefit. The following are
other examples of contributions which would, absent
countervailing factors, yield a significant public
benefit: The preservation of farmland pursuant to a
state program for flood prevention and control; the
preservation of a unique natural land formation for
the enjoyment of the general public; the preservation
of woodland along a public highway pursuant to a
government program to preserve the appearance of
the area so as to maintain the scenic view from the
highway; and the preservation of a stretch of
undeveloped property located between a public
highway and the ocean in order to maintain the scenic
ocean view from the highway.
(v) Limitation. A deduction will not be allowed
for the preservation of open space under section
170(h)(4)(A)(iii), if the terms of the easement permit
a degree of intrusion or future development that
would interfere with the essential scenic quality of
the land or with the governmental conservation
policy that is being furthered by the donation. See §
1.170A-14(e)(2) for rules relating to inconsistent use.
(vi) Relationship ofrequirements-
(A) Clearly delineated governmental policy
and significant public benefit. Although the
requirements of "clearly delineated governmental
policy" and "significant public benefit" must be met
independently, for purposes of this section the two
requirements may also be related. The more specific
the governmental policy with respect to the particular
site to be protected, the more likely the governmental
decision, by itself, will tend to establish the
significant public benefit associated with the
donation. For example, while a statute in State X
permitting preferential assessment for farmland is, by
defInition, governmental policy, it is distinguishable
from a state statute, accompanied by appropriations,
naming the X River as a valuable resource and
articulating the legislative policy that the X River and
the relatively natural quality of its surrounding be
protected. On these facts, an open space easement on
farmland in State X would have to demonstrate
additional factors to establish "significant public
benefit. " The specificity of the legislative mandate to
protect the X River, however, would by itself tend to
establish the significant public benefit associated
with an open space easement on land fronting the X
River.
(B) Scenic enjoyment and significant public
benefit. With respect to the relationship between the
requirements of "scenic enjoyment" and
"significant public benefit," since the degrees of
scenic enjoyment offered by a variety of open space
easements are subjective and not as easily delineated
as are increasingly specific levels of governmental
policy, the significant public benefit of preserving a
scenic view must be independently established in all
cases.
(C) Donations may satisfy more than one test.
In some cases, open space easements may be both for
scenic enjoyment and pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental policy. For example, the preservation
of a particular scenic view identified as part of a
scenic landscape inventory by a rigorous
governmental review process will meet the tests of
both paragraphs (d)(4)(i)(A) and (d)(4)(i)(B) of this
section.
(5) Historic preservation-
(i) In general. The donation of a qualified real
property interest to preserve an historically important
land area or a certified historic structure will meet the
conservation purposes test of this section. When
restrictions to preserve a building or land area within
a registered historic district permit future
development on the site, a deduction will be allowed
under this section only if the terms of the restrictions
require that such development conform with
appropriate local, state, or Federal standards for
construction or rehabilitation within the district. See
also, § 1.170A- 14(h)(3)(ii).
(ii) Historically important land area. The term
historically important land area includes:
(A) An independently significant land area
including any related historic resources (for example,
an archaeological site or a Civil War battlefield with
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related monuments, bridges, cannons, or houses) that
meets the National Register Criteria for Evaluation in
36 CFR 60.4 (Pub. L. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915);
(B) Any land area within a registered historic
district including any buildings on the land area that
can reasonably be considered as contributing to the
significance of the district; and
(C) Any land area (including related historic
resources) adjacent to a property listed individually in
the National Register of Historic Places (but not
within a registered historic district) in a case where
the physical or environmental features of the land
area contribute to the historic or cultural integrity of
the property.
(iii) Certified historic structure. The term
certified historic structure, for purposes of this
section, means any building, structure or land area
which is-
(A) Listed in the National Register, or
(B) Located in a registered historic district (as
defmed in section 48(g)(3)(B» and is.certified by the
Secretary of the Interior (pursuant to 36 CFR 67.4) to
the Secretary of the Treasury as being of historic
significance to the district. A structure for purposes
of this section means any structure, whether or not it
is depreciable. Accordingly easements on private
residences may qualify under this section. In
addition, a structure would be considered to be a
certified historic structure if it were certified either at
the time the transfer was made or at the due date
(including extensions) for filing the donor's return for
the taxable year in which the contribution was made.
(iv) Access.
(A) In order for a conservation contribution
described in section 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) and this
paragraph (d)(5) to be deductible, some visual public
access to the donated property is required. In the case
of an historically important land area, the entire
property need not be visible to the public for a
donation to qualify under this section. However, the
public benefit from the donation may be insufficient
to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of
the property is so visible. Where the historic land
area or certified historic structure which is the subject
of the donation is not visible from a public way (e.g.,
the structure is hidden from view by a wall or
shrubbery, the structure is too far from the public
way, or interior characteristics and features of the
structure are the subject of the easement), the terms
of the easement must be such that the general public
is given the opportunity on a regular basis to view the
characteristics and features of the property which are
preserved by the easement to the extent consistent
with the nature and condition of the property.
(B) Factors to be considered in determining
the type and amount of public access required under
paragraph (d)(5)(iv)(A) of this section include the
historical significance of the donated property, the
nature of the features that are the subject of the
easement, the remoteness or accessibility of the site
of the donated property, the possibility of physical
hazards to the public visiting the property (for
example, an unoccupied structure in a dilapidated
condition), the extent to which public access would
be an unreasonable intrusion on any privacy interests
of individuals living on the property, the degree to
which public access would impair the preservation
interests which are the subject of the donation, and
the availability of opportunities for the public to view
the property by means other than visits to the site.
(C) The amount of access afforded the public
by the donation of an easement shall be determined
with reference to the amount of access permitted by
the terms of the easement which are established by
the donor, rather than the amount of access actually
provided by the donee organization. However, if the
donor is aware of any facts indicating that the amount
of access that the donee organization will provide is
significantly less than the amount of access permitted
under the terms of the easement, then the amount of
access afforded the public shall be determined with
reference to this lesser amount.
(v) Examples. The provisions of paragraph
(d)(5)(iv) of this section may be illustrated by the
following examples:
Example 1. A and his family live in a house in a
certified historic district in the State of X. The entire
house, including its interior, has architectural features
representing classic Victorian period architecture. A
donates an exterior and interior easement on the
property to a qualified organization but continues to
live in the house with his family. A's house is
surrounded by a high stone wall which obscures the
public's view of it from the street. Pursuant to the
terms of the easement, the house may be opened to
the public from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on one
Sunday in May and one Sunday in November each
year for house and garden tours. These tours are to be
under the supervision of the donee and open to
members of the general public upon payment of a
small fee. In addition, under the terms of the
easement, the donee organization is given the right to
photograph the interior and exterior of the house and
distribute such photographs to magazines,
newsletters, or other publicly available publications.
The terms of the easement also permit persons
affiliated with educational organizations, professional
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architectural associations, and historical societies to
make an appointment through the donee organization
to study the property. The donor is not aware of any
facts indicating that the public access to be provided
by the donee organization will be significantly less
than that permitted by the terms of the easement. The
2 opportunities for public visits per year, when
combined with the ability of the general public to
view the architectural characteristics and features that
are the subject of the easement through photographs,
the opportunity for scholarly study of the property,
and the fact that the house is used as an occupied
residence, will enable the donation to satisfy the
requirement ofpublic access.
Example 2. B owns an unoccupied farmhouse built in
the 1840's and located on a property that is adjacent
to a Civil War battlefield. During the Civil War the
farmhouse was used as quarters for Union troops.
The battlefield is visited year round by the general
public. The condition of the farmhouse is such that
the safety of visitors will not be jeopardized and
opening it to the public will not result in significant
deterioration. The farmhouse is not visible from the
battlefield or any public way. It is accessible only by
way of a private road owned by B. B donates a
conservation easement on the farmhouse to a
qualified organization. The terms of the easement
provide that the donee organization may open the
property (via B's road) to the general public on four
weekends each year from 8:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The
donation does not meet the public access requirement
because the farmhouse is safe, unoccupied, and easily
accessible to the general public who have come to the
site to visit Civil War historic land areas (and related
resources), but will only be open to the public on four
weekends each year. However, the donation would
meet the public access requirement if the terms of the
easement permitted the donee organization to open
the property to the public every other weekend during
the year and the donor is not aware of any facts
indicating that the donee organization will provide
significantly less access than that permitted.
(e) Exclusively for conservation purposes-
(1) In general. To meet the requirements of this
section, a donation must be exclusively for
conservation purposes. See paragraphs (c)(1) and
(g)(1) through (g)(6)(ii) of this section. A deduction
will not be denied under this section when incidental
benefit inures to the donor merely as a result of
conservation restrictions limiting the uses to which
the donor's property may be put.
(2) Inconsistent use. Except as provided in
paragraph (e)(4) of this section, a deduction will not
be allowed if the contribution would accomplish one
of the enumerated conservation purposes but would
permit destruction of other significant conservation
interests. For example, the preservation of farmland
pursuant to a State program for flood prevention and
control would not qualify under paragraph (d)(4) of
this section if under the terms of the contribution a
significant naturally occurring ecosystem could be
injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides in the
operation of the farm. However, this requirement is
not intended to prohibit uses of the property, such as
selective timber harvesting or selective farming if,
under the circumstances, those uses do not impair
significant conservation interests.
(3) Inconsistent use permitted. A use that is
destructive of conservation interests will be permitted
only if such use is necessary for the protection of the
conservation interests that are the subject of the
contribution. For example, a deduction for the
donation of an easement to preserve an
archaeological site that is listed on the National
Register of Historic Places will not be disallowed if
site excavation consistent with sound archaeological
practices may impair a scenic view of which the land
is a part. A donor may continue a preexisting use of
the property that does not conflict with the
conservation purposes of the gift
(t) Examples. The provisions of this section relating
to conservation purposes may be illustrated by the
following examples.
Example 1. State S contains many large tract forests
that are desirable recreation and scenic areas for the
general public. The forests' scenic values attract
millions of people to the State. However, due to the
increasing intensity of land development in State S,
the continued existence of forestland parcels greater
than 45 acres is threatened. J grants a perpetual
easement on a 100-acre parcel of forestland that is
part of one of the State's scenic areas to a qualifying
organization. The easement imposes restrictions on
the use of the parcel for the purpose of maintaining
its scenic values. The restrictions include a
requirement that the parcel be maintained forever as
open space devoted exclusively to conservation
purposes and wildlife protection, and that there be no
commercial, industrial, residential, or other
development use of such parcel. The law of State S
recognizes a limited public right to enter private land,
particularly for recreational pursuits, unless such land
is posted or the landowner objects. The easement
specifically restricts the landowner from posting the
parcel, or from objecting, thereby maintaining public
access to the parcel according to the custom of the
State. J's parcel provides the opportunity for the
public to enjoy the use of the property and appreciate
its scenic values. Accordingly, J's donation qualifies
for a deduction under this section.
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Example 2. A qualified conservation organization
owns Greenacre in fee as a nature preserve.
Greenacre contains a high quality example of a tall
grass prairie ecosystem. Farmacre, an operating farm,
adjoins Greenacre and is a compatible buffer to the
nature preserve. Conversion of Farmacre to a more
intense use~ such as a housing development, would
adversely affect the continued use of Greenacre as a
nature preserve because of human traffic generated
by the development. The owner of Farmacre donates
an easement preventing any future development on
Farmacre to the qualified conservation organization
for conservation purposes. Normal agricultural uses
will be allowed on Farmacre. Accordingly, the
donation qualifies for a deduction under this section.
Example 3. H owns Greenacre, a 900-acre parcel of
woodland, rolling pasture, and orchards on the crest
of a mountain. All of Greenacre is clearly visible
from a nearby national park. Because of the strict
enforcement of an applicable zoning plan, the highest
and best use of Greenacre is as a subdivision of 40-
acre tracts. H wishes to donate a scenic easement on
Greenacre to a qualifying conservation organization,
but H would like to reserve the right to subdivide
Greenacre into 90-acre parcels with no more than one
single-family home allowable on each parcel.
Random building on the property, even as little as
one home for each 90 acres, would destroy the scenic
character of the view. Accordingly, no deduction
would be allowable under this section.
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in example (3),
except that not all of Greenacre is visible from the
park and the deed of easement allows for limited
cluster development of no more than five nine-acre
clusters (with four houses on each cluster) located in
areas generally not visible from the national park and
subject to site and building plan approval by the
donee organization in order to preserve the scenic
view from the park. The donor and the donee have
already identified sites where limited cluster
development would not be visible from the park or
would not impair the view. Owners of homes in the
clusters will not have any rights with respect to the
surrounding Greenacre property that are not also
available to the general public. Accordingly, the
donation qualifies for a deduction under this section.
Example 5. In order to protect State S's declining
open space that is suited for agricultural use from
increasing development pressure that has led to a
marked decline in such open space, the Legislature of
State S passed a statute authorizing the purchase of
"agricultural land development rights" on open
acreage. Agricultural land development rights allow
the State to place agricultural preservation
restrictions on land designated as worthy of
protection in order to preserve open space and farm
resources. Agricultural preservation restrictions
prohibit or limit construction or placement of
buildings except those used for agricultural purposes
or dwellings used for family living by the farmer and
his family and employees; removal of mineral
substances in any manner that adversely affects the
land's agricultural potential; or other uses detrimental
to retention of the land for agricultural use. Money
has been appropriated for this program and some
landowners have in fact sold their "agricultural land
development rights" to State S. K owns and operates
a small dairy farm in State S located in an area
designated by the Legislature as worthy of protection.
K desires to preserve his farm for agricultural
purposes in perpetuity. Rather than selling the
development rights to State S, K grants to a qualified
organization an agricultural preservation restriction
on his property in the form of a conservation
easement. K reserves to himself, his heirs and assigns
the right to manage the farm consistent with sound
agricultural and management practices. The
preservation of K's land is pursuant to a clearly
delineated governmental policy of preserving open
space available for agricultural use, and will yield a
significant public benefit by preserving open space
against increasing development pressures.
(g) Enforceable in perpetuity-
(1) In general. In the case of any donation under
this section, any interest in the property retained by
the donor (and the donor's successors in interest)
must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for
example, by recordation in the land records of the
jurisdiction in which the property is located) that will
prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with
the conservation purposes of the donation. In the case
of a contribution of a remainder interest, the
contribution will not qualify if the tenants, whether
they are tenants for life or a term of years, can use the
property in a manner that diminishes the conservation
values which are intended to be protected by the
contribution.
(2) Protection ofa conservation purpose in case of
donation of property subject to a mortgage. In the
case of conservation contributions made after
February 13, 1986, no deduction will be permitted
under this section for an interest in property which is
subject to a mortgage unless the mortgagee
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of
the qualified organization to enforce the conservation
purposes of the gift in perpetuity. For conservation
contributions made prior to February 14, 1986, the
requirement of section 170 (h)(5)(A) is satisfied in
the case of mortgaged property (with respect to
which the mortgagee has not subordinated its rights)
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only if the donor can demonstrate that the
conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity
without subordination of the mortgagee's rights.
(3) Remote future event. A deduction shall not be
disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and this
section merely because the interest which passes to,
or is vested in, the donee organization may be
defeated by the performance of some act or the
happening of some event, if on the date of the gift it
appears that the possibility that such act or event will
occur is so remote as to be negligible. See paragraph
(e) of § 1.170A-l. For example, a state's statutory
requirement that use restrictions must be rerecorded
every 30 years to remain enforceable shall not, by
itself, render an easement nonperpetual.
(4) Retention ofqualified mineral interest-
( i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (g)(4)(ii) of this section, the requirements
of this section are not met and no deduction shall be
allowed in the case of a contribution of any interest
when there is a retention by any person of a qualified
mineral interest (as defmed in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of
this section) if at any time there may be extractions or
removal of minerals by any surface mining method.
Moreover, in the case of a qualified mineral interest
gift, the requirement that the conservation purposes
be protected in perpetuity is not satisfied if any
method of mining that is inconsistent with the
particular conservation purposes of a contribution is
permitted at any time. See also § 1.170A- 14(e)(2).
However, a deduction under this section will not be
denied in the case of certain methods of mining that
may have limited, localized impact on the real
property but that are not irremediably destructive of
significant conservation interests. For example, a
deduction will not be denied in a case where
production facilities are concealed or compatible with
existing topography and landscape and when surface
alteration is to be restored to its original state.
(ii) Exception for qualified conservation
contributions after July 1984.
(A) A contribution made after July 18, 1984,
of a qualified real property interest described in
section 170(h)(2)(A) shall not be disqualified under
the fITst sentence of paragraph (g)(4)(i) of this section
if the following requirements are satisfied.
(1) The ownership of the surface estate
and mineral interest were separated before June 13,
1976, and remain so separated up to and including
the time of the contribution.
(2) The present owner of the mineral
interest is not a person whose relationship to the
owner of the surface estate is described at the time of
the contribution in section 267(b) or section 707(b),
and
(3) The probability of extraction or
removal of minerals by any surface mining method is
so remote as to be negligible. Whether the
probability of extraction or removal of minerals by
surface mining is so remote as to be negligible is a
question of fact and is to be made on a case by case
basis. Relevant factors to be considered in
determining if the probability of extraction or
removal of minerals by surface mining is so remote
as to be negligible include: Geological, geophysical
or economic data showing the absence of mineral
reserves on the property, or the lack of commercial
feasibility at the time of the contribution of surface
mining the mineral interest.
(B) If the ownership of the surface estate and
mineral interest fIrst became separated after June 12,
1976, no deduction is permitted for a contribution
under this section unless surface mining on the
property is completely prohibited.
(iii) Examples. The provisions of paragraph
(g)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section may be illustrated by
the following examples: Example 1. K owns 5,000
acres ofbottomland hardwood property along a major
watershed system in the southern part of the United
States. Agencies within the Department of the
Interior have determined that southern bottomland
hardwoods are a rapidly diminishing resource and a
critical ecosystem in the south because of the intense
pressure to cut the trees and convert the land to
agricultural use. These agencies have further
determined (and have indicated in correspondence
with K) that bottomland hardwoods provide a superb
habitat for numerous species and play an important
role in controlling floods and purifying rivers. K
donates to a qualified organization his entire interest
in this property other than his interest in the gas and
oil deposits that have been identified under K's
property. K covenants and can ensure that, although
drilling for gas and oil on the property may have
some temporary localized impact on the real
property, the drilling will not interfere with the
overall conservation purpose of the gift, which is to
protect the unique bottomland hardwood ecosystem.
Accordingly, the donation qualifies for a deduction
under this section.
Example 2. Assume the same facts as in Example (1),
except that in 1979, K sells the mineral interest to A,
an unrelated person, in an arm's-length transaction,
subject to a recorded prohibition on the removal of
any minerals by any surface mining method and a
recorded prohibition against any mining technique
that will harm the bottomland hardwood ecosystem.
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After the sale to A, K donates a qualified real
property interest to a qualified organization to protect
the bottomland hardwood ecosystem. Since at the
time of the transfer, surface mining and any mining
technique that will harm the bottomland hardwood
ecosystem are completely prohibited, the donation
qualifies for a deduction under this section.
(5) Protection of conservation purpose where
taxpayer reserves certain rights-
(i) Documentation. In the case of a donation
made after February 13, 1986, of any qualified real
property interest when the donor reserves rights the
exercise of which may impair the conservation
interests associated with the property, for a deduction
to be allowable under this section the donor must
make available to the donee, prior to the time the
donation is made, documentation sufficient to
establish the condition of the property at the time of
the gift. Such documentation is designed to protect
the conservation interests associated with the
property, which although protected in perpetuity by
the easement, could be adversely affected by the
exercise of the reserved rights. Such documentation
may include:
(A) The appropriate survey maps from the
United States Geological Survey, showing the
property line and other contiguous or nearby
protected areas;
(B) A map of the area drawn to scale showing
all existing manmade improvements or incursions
(such as roads, buildings, fences, or gravel pits),
vegetation and identification of flora and fauna
(including, for example, rare species locations,
animal breeding and roosting areas, and migration
routes), land use history (including present uses and
recent past disturbances), and distinct natural features
(such as large trees and aquatic areas);
(C) An aerial photograph of the property at an
appropriate scale taken as close as possible to the
date the donation is made; and
(D) Onsite photographs taken at appropriate
locations on the property. If the terms of the donation
contain restrictions with regard to a particular natural
resource to be protected, such as water quality or air
quality, the condition of the resource at or near the
time of the gift must be established. The
documentation, including the maps and photographs,
must be accompanied by a statement signed by the
donor and a representative of the donee clearly
referencing the documentation and in substance
saying "This natural resources inventory is an
accurate representation of [the protected property] at
the time of the transfer.".
(ii) Donee's right to inspection and legal
remedies. In the case of any donation referred to in
paragraph (g)(5)(i) of this section, the donor must
agree to notify the donee, in writing, before
exercising any reserved right, e.g. the right to extract
certain minerals which may have an adverse impact
on the conservation interests associated with the
qualified real property interest. The terms of the
donation must provide a right of the donee to enter
the property at reasonable times for the purpose of
inspecting the property to determine if there is
compliance with the terms of the donation.
Additionally, the terms of the donation must provide
a right of the donee to enforce the conservation
restrictions by appropriate legal proceedings,
including but not limited to, the right to require the
restoration of the property to its condition at the time
of the donation.
(6) Extinguishment.
(i) In general. If a subsequent unexpected change
in the conditions surrounding the property that is the
subject of a donation under this paragraph can make
impossible or impractical the continued use of the
property for conservation purposes, the conservation
purpose can nonetheless be treated as protected in
perpetuity if the restrictions are extinguished by
judicial proceeding and all of the donee's proceeds
(determined under paragraph (g)(6)(ii) of this
section) from a subsequent sale or exchange of the
property are used by the donee organization in a
manner consistent with the conservation purposes of
the original contribution.
(ii) Proceeds. In case of a donation made after
February 13, 1986, for a deduction to be allowed
under this section, at the time of the gift the donor
must agree that the donation of the perpetual
conservation restriction gives rise to a property right,
immediately vested in the donee organization, with a
fair market value that is at least equal to the
proportionate value that the perpetual conservation
restriction at the time of the gift, bears to the value of
the property as a whole at that time. See § 1.170A-
14(h)(3)(iii) relating to the allocation of basis. For
purposes of this paragraph (g)(6)(ii), that
proportionate value of the donee's property rights
shall remain constant. Accordingly, when a change in
conditions give rise to the extinguishment of a
perpetual conservation restriction under paragraph
(g)(6)(i) of this section, the donee organization, on a
subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion
of the subject property, must be entitled to a portion
of the proceeds at least equal to that proportionate
value of the perpetual conservation restriction, unless
state law provides that the donor is entitled to the full
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proceeds from the conversion without regard to the
terms of the prior perpetual conservation restriction.
(h) Valuation-
(1) Entire interest of donor other than qualified
mineral interest. The value of the contribution under
section 170 in the case of a contribution of a
taxpayer's entire interest in property other than a
qualified mineral interest is the fair market value of
the surface rights in the property contributed. The
value of the contribution shall be computed without
regard to the mineral rights. See paragraph (h)(4),
example (1), of this section.
(2) Remainder interest in real property. In the case
of a contribution of any remainder interest in real
property, section 170(f)(4) provides that in
determining the value of such interest for purposes of
section 170, depreciation and depletion of such
property shall be taken into account. See § 1.170A-
12. In the case of the contribution of a remainder
interest for conservation purposes, the current fair
market value of the property (against which the
limitations of § 1.170A-12 are applied) must take
into account any preexisting or contemporaneously
recorded rights limiting, for conservation purposes,
the use to which the subject property may be put.
(3) Perpetual conservation restriction-
(i) In general. The value of the contribution
under section 170 in the case of a charitable
contribution of a perpetual conservation restriction is
the fair market value of the perpetual conservation
restriction at the time of the contribution. See §
1.170A-7(c). If there is a substantial record of sales
of easements comparable to the donated easement
(such as purchases pursuant to a governmental
program), the fair market value of the donated
easement is based on the sales prices of such
comparable easements. If no substantial record of
marketplace sales is available to use as a meaningful
or valid comparison, as a general rule (but not
necessarily in all cases) the fair market value of a
perpetual conservation restriction is equal to the
difference between the fair market value of the
property it encumbers before the granting of the
restriction and the fair market value of the
encumbered property after the granting of the
restriction. The amount of the deduction in the case
of a charitable contribution of a perpetual
conservation restriction covering a portion of the
contiguous property owned by a donor and the
donor's family (as defmed in section 267(c)(4)) is the
difference between the fair market value of the entire
contiguous parcel of property before and after the
granting of the restriction. If the granting of a
perpetual conservation restriction after January 14,
1986, has the effect of increasing the value of any
other property owned by the donor or a related
person, the amount of the deduction for the
conservation contribution shall be reduced by the
amount of the increase in the value of the other
property, whether or not such property is contiguous.
If, as a result of the donation of a perpetual
conservation restriction, the donor or a related person
receives, or can reasonably expect to receive,
fmancial or economic benefits that are greater than
those that will inure to the general public from the
transfer, no deduction is allowable under this section.
However, if the donor or a related person receives, or
can reasonably expect to receive, a fmancial or
economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly
shown that the benefit is less than the amount of the
transfer, then a deduction under this section is
allowable for the excess of the amount transferred
over the amount of the fmancial or economic benefit
received or reason ably expected to be received by
the donor or the related person. For purposes of this
paragraph (h)(3)((i), related person shall have the
same meaning as in either section 267(b) or section
707(b). (See Example (10) of paragraph (h)(4) of this
section.)
(ii) Fair market value of property before and
after restriction. If before and after valuation is used,
the fair market value of the property before
contribution of the conservation restriction must take
into account not only the current use of the property
but also an objective assessment of how immediate or
remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the
restriction, would in fact be developed, as well as any
effect from zoning, conservation, or historic
preservation laws that already restrict the property's
potential highest and best use. Further, there may be
instances where the grant of a conservation restriction
may have no material effect on the value of the
property or may in fact serve to enhance, rather than
reduce, the value of property. In such instances no
deduction would be allowable. In the case of a
conservation restriction that allows for any
development, however limited, on the property to be
protected, the fair market value of the property after
contribution of the restriction must take into account
the effect of the development. In the case of a
conservation easement such as an easement on a
certified historic structure, the fair market value of
the property after contribution of the restriction must
take into account the amount of access permitted by
the terms of the easement. Additionally, if before and
after valuation is used, an appraisal of the property
after contribution of the restriction must take into
account the effect of restrictions that will result in a
reduction of the potential fair market value
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represented by highest and best use but will,
nevertheless, permit uses of the property that will
increase its fair market value above that represented
by the property's current use. The value of a
perpetual conservation restriction shall not be
reduced by reason of the existence of restrictions on
transfer designed solely to ensure that the
conservation restriction will be 162 26 CFR Ch. I
(4-1-01 Edition) § 1.170A-14 dedicated to
conservation purposes. See § 1.170A-14 (c)(3).
(iii) Allocation of basis. In the case of the
donation of a qualified real property interest for
conservation purposes, the basis of the property
retained by the donor must be adjusted by the
elimination of that part of the total basis of the
property that is properly allocable to the qualified
real property interest granted. The amount of the
basis that is allocable to the qualified real property
interest shall bear the same ratio to the total basis of
the property as the fair market value of the qualified
real property interest bears to the fair market value of
the property before the granting of the qualified real
property interest. When a taxpayer donates to a
qualifying conservation organization an easement on
a structure with respect to which deductions are taken
for depreciation, the reduction required by this
paragraph (h)(3)(ii) in the basis of the property
retained by the taxpayer must be allocated between
the structure and the underlying land.
(4) Examples. The provisions of this section may
be illustrated by the following examples. In examples
illustrating the value or deductibility of donations, the
applicable restrictions and limitations of § 1.170A-4,
with respect to reduction in amount of charitable
contributions of certain appreciated property, and §
1.170A-8, with respect to limitations on charitable
deductions by individuals. must also be taken into
account.
Example 1. A owns Goldacre, a property adjacent to
a state park. A wants to donate Goldacre to the state
to be used as part of the park, but A wants to reserve
a qualified mineral interest in the property, to exploit
currently and to devise at death. The fair market
value of the surface rights in Goldacre is $200,000
and the fair market value of the mineral rights in
$100.000. In order to ensure that the quality of the
park will not be degraded, restrictions must be
imposed on the right to extract the minerals that
reduce the fair market value of the mineral rights to
$80,000. Under this section, the value of the
contribution is $200,000 (the value of the surface
rights).
Example 2. In 1984 B, who is 62, donates a
remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Greenacre is
a tract of 200 acres of undeveloped woodland that is
valued at $200,000 at its highest and best use. Under
§ 1.170A-12(b), the value of a remainder interest in
real property following one life is determined under §
25.2512-5 of this chapter (Gift Tax Regulations).
(See § 25.2512-5A of this chapter with respect to the
valuation of annuities, interests for life or term of
years, and remainder or reversionary interests
transferred before May 1, 1999.) Accordingly, the
value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount
eligible for an income tax deduction under section
170(f), is $55,996 ($200,000X .27998).
Example 3. Assume the same facts as in Example (2),
except that Greenacre is B's 200 acre estate with a
home built during the colonial period. Some of the
acreage around the home is cleared; the balance of
Greenacre, except for access roads, is wooded and
undeveloped. See section 170(f)(3)(B)(i). However,
B would like Greenacre to be maintained in its
current state after his death, so he donates a
remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes pursuant to
section 170 (f)(3)(B)(iii) and (h)(2)(B). At the time of
the gift the land has a value of $200,000 and the
house has a value of $100,000. The value of the
remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for
an income tax deduction under section 170(f), is
computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See § 1.170A-
12(6)(3).
Example 4. Assume the same facts as in Example (2),
except that at age 62 instead of donating a remainder
interest B donates an easement in Greenacre to a
qualifying organization for conservation purposes.
The fair market value of Greenacre after the donation
is reduced to $110,000. Accordingly, the value of the
easement, and thus the amount eligible for a
deduction under section 170(f), is $90,000 ($200,000
less $110,000).
Example 5. Assume the same facts as in Example (4),
and assume that three years later, at age 65, B decides
to donate a remainder interest in Greenacre to a
qualifying organization for conservation purposes.
Increasing real estate values in the area have raised
the fair market value of Greenacre (subject to the
easement) to $130,000. Accordingly, the value of the
remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for a
deduction under section 170(f), is $41,639
($ 130,000X.32030).
Example 6. Assume the same facts as in Example (2),
except that at the time of the donation of a remainder
interest in Greenacre, B also donates an easement to a
different qualifying organization for conservation
purposes. Based on all the facts and circumstances,
the value of the easement is determined to be
$100,000. Therefore, the value of the property after
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the easement is $100,000 and the value of the
remainder interest, and thus the amount eligible for
deduction under section 170(f), is $27,998
($100,000x.27998).
Example 7. C owns Greenacre, a 200-acre estate
containing a house built during the colonial period.
At its highest and best use, for home development,
the fair market value of Greenacre is $300,000. C
donates an easement (to maintain the house and
Green acre in their current state) to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. The fair
market value of Greenacre after the donation is
reduced to $125,000. Accordingly, the value of the
easement and the amount eligible for a deduction
under section 170(f) is $175.000 ($300,000 less
$125,000).
Example 8. Assume the same facts as in Example (7)
and assume that three years later, C decides to donate
a remainder interest in Greenacre to a qualifying
organization for conservation purposes. Increasing
real estate values in the area have raised the fair
market value of Greenacre to $180.000. Assume that
because of the perpetual easement prohibiting any
development of the land, the value of the house is
$120,000 and the value of the land is $60,000. The
value of the remainder interest, and thus the amount
eligible for an income tax deduction under section
170(f), is computed pursuant to § 1.170A-12. See §
1.170A-12(b)(3).
Example 9. D owns property with a basis of $20,000
and a fair market value of $80,000. D donates to a
qualifying organization an easement for conservation
purposes that is determined under this section to have
a fair market value of $60,000. The amount of basis
allocable to the easement is $15,000 ($60,0001
$80,000=$15,000/$20,000). Accordingly, the basis of
the property is reduced to $5,000 ($20,000 minus
$15,000).
Example 10. E owns 10 one-acre lots that are
currently woods and parkland. The fair market value
of each ofE's lots is $15,000 and the basis of each lot
is $3,000. E grants to the county a perpetual easement
for conservation purposes to use and maintain eight
of the acres as a public park and to restrict any future
development on those eight acres. As a result of the
restrictions, the value of the eight acres is reduced to
$1,000 an acre. However, by perpetually restricting
development on this portion of the land, E has
ensured that the two remaining acres will always be
bordered by parkland, thus increasing their fair
market value to $22,500 each. If the eight acres
represented all of E's land, the fair market value of
the easement would be $112,000, an amount equal to
the fair market value of the land before the granting
of the easement (8x$ 15,000=$120,000) minus the fair
market value of the encumbered land after the
granting of the easement (8x$I,000=$8,000).
However, because the easement only covered a
portion of the taxpayer's contiguous land, the amount
of the deduction under section 170 is reduced to
$97,000 ($150,000-$53,000), that is, the difference
between the fair market value of the entire tract of
land before ($150,000) and after
«8xl,000)+(2x22,500)) the granting of the easement.
Example 11. Assume the same facts as in example
(10). Since the easement covers a portion ofE's land,
only the basis of that portion is adjusted. Therefore,
the amount of basis allocable to the easement is
$22,400 «8x$3,000)x($112,000/$120,000)).
Accordingly, the basis of the eight acres encumbered
by the easement is reduced to $1,600 ($24,000-
$22,400), or $200 for each acre. The basis of the two
remaining acres is not affected by the donation.
Example 12. F owns and uses as professional offices
a two-story building that lies within a registered
historic district. F's building is an outstanding
example of period architecture with a fair market
value of $125,000. Restricted to its current use,
which is the highest and best use of the property
without making changes to the facade, the building
and lot would have a fair market value of $100,000,
of which $80,000 would be allocable to the building
and $20,000 would be allocable to the lot. F's basis
in the property is $50,000, of which $40,000 is
allocable to the building and $10,000 is allocable to
the lot. F's neighborhood is a mix of residential and
commercial uses, and it is possible that F (or another .
owner) could enlarge the building for more extensive
commercial use, which is its highest and best use.
However, this would require changes to the facade. F
would like to donate to a qualifying preservation
organization an easement restricting any changes to
the facade and promising to maintain the facade in
perpetuity. The donation would qualify for a
deduction under this section. The fair market value of
the easement is $25,000 (the fair market value of the
property before the easement, $125,000, minus the
fair market value of the property after the easement,
$100,000). Pursuant to § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii), the
basis allocable to the easement is $10,000 and the
basis of the underlying property (building and lot) is
reduced to $40,000.
(i) Substantiation requirement. If a taxpayer makes a
qualified conservation contribution and claims a
deduction, the taxpayer must maintain written records
of the fair market value of the underlying property
before and after the donation and the conservation
purpose furthered by the donation and such
information shall be stated in the taxpayer's income
tax return if required by the return or its instructions.
See also § 1.170A-13(c) (relating to substantiation
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requirements for deductions in excess of $5,000 for
charitable contributions made after 1984), and section
6659 (relating to additions to tax in the case of
valuation overstatements).
G) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in §
1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii), this section applies only to
contributions made on or after December 18, 1980.
[T.D. 8069, 51 FR 1499, Jan. 14, 1986; 51 FR 5322,
Feb. 13, 1986; 51 FR 6219, Feb. 21, 1986, as
amended by T.D. 8199, 53 FR 16085, May 5, 1988;
T.D. 8540, 59 FR 30105, June 10, 1994; T.D. 8819,
64 FR 23228, Apr. 30, 1999]
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26 U.S.C. § 2031
Sec. 2031. - Definition of gross estate
(a) General
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be detennined by including to the extent
provided for in this part, the value at the time ofhis death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated.
(b) Valuation of unlisted stock and securities
In the case of stock and securities of a corporation the value ofwhich, by reason of their not
being listed on an exchange and by reason of the absence of sales thereof, cannot be detennined
with reference to bid and asked prices or with reference to sales prices, the value thereof shall be
detennined by taking into consideration, in addition to all other factors, the value of stock or
securities ofcorporations engaged in the same or a similar line ofbusiness which are listed on an
exchange.
(c) Estate tax with respect to land subject to a qualified conservation easement
(1) In general
If the executor makes the election described in paragraph (6), then, except as otherwise provided
in this subsection, there shall be excluded from the gross estate the lesser of -
(A) the applicable percentage of the value of land subject to a qualified
conservation easement, reduced by the amount of any deduction under section 2055(f) with
respect to such land, or
(B) the exclusion limitation.
(2) Applicable percentage
For purposes ofparagraph (1), the tenn "applicable percentage" means 40 percent reduced (but
not below zero) by 2 percentage points for each percentage point (or fraction thereof) by which
the value of the qualified conservation easement is less than 30 percent of the value of the land
[1] (detennined without regard to the value of such easement and reduced by the value of any
retained development right (as defined in paragraph (5)). (FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. No
closing parenthesis was enacted.
(3) Exclusion limitation
For purposes ofparagraph (1), the exclusion limitation is the limitation detennined in accordance
with the following table: In the case of estates of The exclusion decedents dying during:
limitation is: 1998 $100,000 1999 $200,000 2000 $300,000 2001 $400,000 2002 or thereafter
$500,000.
(4) Treatment of certain indebtedness
(A) In general
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The exclusion provided in paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent that the land is debt-
financed property.
(B) Definitions
For purposes of this paragraph-
(i) Debt-financed property
The term "debt-financed property" means any property with respect to which there is an
acquisition indebtedness (as defined in clause (ii)) on the date of the decedent's death.
(ii) Acquisition indebtedness
The term "acquisition indebtedness" means, with respect to debt-financed property, the unpaid
amount of-
(I) the indebtedness incurred by the donor in acquiring such
property,
(IT) the indebtedness incurred before the acquisition of such
property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for such acquisition,
(ill) the indebtedness incurred after the acquisition of such
property if such indebtedness would not have been incurred but for such acquisition and the
incurrence of such indebtedness was reasonably foreseeable at the time of such acquisition, and
(IV) the extension, renewal, or refinancing of an acquisition
indebtedness.
(5) Treatment of retained development right
(A) In general
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the value of any development right retained by the donor in the
conveyance of a qualified conservation easement.
(B) Termination of retained development right
If every person in being who has an interest (whether or not in possession) in the land executes
an agreement to extinguish permanently some or all of any development rights (as defined in
subparagraph (D)) retained by the donor on or before the date for filing the return of the tax
imposed by section 2001, then any tax imposed by section 2001 shall be reduced accordingly.
Such agreement shall be filed with the return of the tax imposed by section 2001. The agreement
shall be in such form as the Secretary shall prescribe.
(C) Additional tax
Any failure to implement the agreement described in subparagraph (B) not later than the earlier
of-
(i) the date which is 2 years after the date of the decedent's death, or
(ii) the date of the sale of such land subject to the qualified conservation
easement, shall result in the imposition of an additional tax in the amount of the tax which would
have been due on the retained development rights subject to such agreement. Such additional tax
shall be due and payable on the last day of the 6th month following such date.
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(D) Development right defined
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "development right" means any right to use the land
subject to the qualified conservation easement in which such right is retained for any commercial
purpose which is not subordinate to and directly supportive of the use of such land as a farm for
farming purposes (within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(5)).
(6) Election
The election under this ·subsection shall be made on or before the due date (including extensions)
for filing the return of tax imposed by section 2001 and shall be made on such return. Such an
election, once made, shall be irrevocable.
(7) Calculation of estate tax due
An executor making the election described in paragraph (6) shall, for purposes of calculating the
amount of tax imposed by section 2001, include the value of any development right (as defined
in paragraph (5)) retained by the donor in the conveyance of such qualified conservation
easement. The computation of tax on any retained development right prescribed in this paragraph
shall be done in such manner and on such forms as the Secretary shall prescribe.
(8) Definitions
For purposes of this subsection -
(A) Land subject to a qualified conservation easement48
The term "land subject to a qualified conservation easement" means land -
(i) which is located -
(I) in or within 25 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is a metropolitan area (as defined by the Office of Management and
Budget),
(II) in or within 25 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is a national park or wilderness area designated as part of the National
Wilderness Preservation System (unless it is determined by the Secretary that land in or
within 25 miles of such a park or wilderness area is not under significant development
pressure), or
(III) in or with·in 10 miles of an area which, on the date of the
decedent's death, is an Urban National Forest (as designated by the Forest Service),
(ii) which was owned by the decedent or a member of the decedent's
family at all times during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, and
(iii) with respect to which a qualified conservation easement has been
made by an individual described in subparagraph (C), as of the date of the election
described in paragraph (6).
(B) Qualified conservation easement
48 Note that this definition was amended by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, the relevant portion of which is excerpted at the end of this Code Excerpt.
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The term "qualified conservation easement" means a qualified conservation contribution (as
defined in section 170(h)(I)) ofa qualified real property interest (as defined in section
170(h)(2)(C)), except that clause (iv) of section 170(h)(4)(A) shall not apply, and the restriction
on the use of such interest described in section 170(h)(2)(C) shall include a prohibition on more
than a de minimis use for a commercial recreational activity.
(C) Individual described
An individual is described in this subparagraph if such individual is -
(i) the decedent,
(ii) a member of the decedent's family,
(iii) the executor of the decedent's estate, or
(iv) the trustee of a trust the corpus ofwhich includes the land to be
subject to the qualified conservation easement.
(D) Member of family
The term "member of the decedent's family" means any member of the family (as defined in
section 2032A(e)(2)) of the decedent.
(9) Treatment of easements granted after death
In any case in which the qualified conservation easement is granted after the date of the
decedent's death and on or before the due date (including extensions) for filing the return of tax
imposed by section 2001, the deduction under section 2055(f) with respect to such easement
shall be allowed to the estate but only ifno charitable deduction is allowed under chapter 1 to
any person with respect to the grant of such easement.
(10) Application of this section to interests in partnerships, corporations, and trusts
This section shall apply to an interest in a partnership, corporation, or trust if at least 30 percent
of the entity is owned (directly or indirectly) by the decedent, as determined under the rules
described in section 2057(e)(3).
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H.R.1836
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (Enrolled as Agreed to or
Passed by Both House and Senate)
Subtitle F--Conservation Easements
SEC. 551. EXPANSION OF ESTATE TAX RULE FOR CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS.
(a) REPEAL OF CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON WHERE LAND IS LOCATED- Clause
(i) of section 2031(c)(8)(A) (defining land subject to a qualified conservation easement) is
amended to read as follows:
"(i) which is located in the United States or any possession of the
United States,".
(b) CLARIFICATION OF DATE FOR DETERMINING VALUE OF LAND AND
EASEMENT- Section 2031 (c)(2) (defining applicable percentage) is amended by adding at
the end the following new sentence: 'The values taken into account under the preceding
sentence shall be such values as of the date of the contribution referred to in paragraph
(8)(B).'.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this section shall apply to estates of
decedents dying after December 31, 2000.
26 U.S.C. § 2055
Sec. 2055. - Transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses
(a) In general
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be
detennined by deducting from the value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests, legacies,
devises, or transfers -
(1) to or for the use of the United States, any State, any political subdivision
thereof: or the District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes;
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the encouragement of
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art, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), and the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings ofwhich inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or individual, which is llot disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by
reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalfof (or
in opposition to) any candidate for p~blic office;
(3) to a trustee or tru~tees, or a fraternal society, order, or association operating
under the lodge system, but only if s~ch contributions or gifts are to be used by such trustee or
trustees, or by such fraternal societyJ order, or association, exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational putposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, such trust, fraternal society~ order, or association would not be disqualified for tax
exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and such
trustee or trustees, or such fraternal ~ociety, order, or association, does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishiqg or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalfof (or in opposition to) any c~didate for public office;
(4) to or for the use qf any veterans' organization incorporated by Act of
Congress, or of its departments or IOlcal chapters or posts, no part of the net earnings ofwhich
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; or
(5) to an employee stock ownership plan if such transfer qualifies as a qualified
gratuitous transfer of qualified employer securities within the meaning of section 664(g).
For purposes of this subsection, the complete termination before the date prescribed for the filing
of the estate tax return of a power to I consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of
an individual before such power has Ibeen exercised by reason of the death of such individual or
for any other reason shall be consid~redand deemed to be a qualified disclaimer with the same
full force and effect as though he ha~ filed such qualified disclaimer. Rules similar to the rules of
section 501 (j) shall apply for purposes ofparagraph (2).
(b) Powers of appointment
Property includible in the decedent's! gross estate under section 2041 (relating to powers of
appointment) received by a donee described in this section shall, for purposes of this section, be
considered a bequest of such decedent.
(c) Death taxes payable out ofbequests
If the tax imposed by section 2001, or any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance taxes, are,
either by the terms of the will, by the law of the jurisdiction under which the estate is
administered, or by the law of the jurisdiction imposing the particular tax, payable in whole or in
part out of the bequests, legacies, or devises otherwise deductible under this section, then the
amount deductible under this section shall be the amount of such bequests, legacies, or devises
reduced by the amount of such taxes.
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(d) Limitation on deduction
The amount of the deduction under this section for any transfer shall not exceed the value of the
transferred property required to be included in the gross estate.
(e) Disallowance of deductions in certain cases
(1) No deduction shall be allowed under this section for a transfer to or for the
use of an organization or trust described in section 508(d) or 4948(c)(4) subject to the conditions
specified in such sections.
(2) Where an interest in property (other than an interest described in section
170(f)(3)(B» passes or has passed from the decedent to a person, or for a use, described in
subsection (a), and an interest (other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's
death) in the same property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth) from the decedent to a person, or for a use, not described in
subsection (a), no deduction shall be allowed under this section for the interest which passes or
has passed to the person, or for the use, described in subsection (a) unless -
(A) in the case of a remainder interest, such interest is in a trust which is a
charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust (described in section 664) or
a pooled income fund (described in section 642(c)(5», or
(B) in the case of any other interest, such interest is in the form of a
guaranteed annuity or is a fixed percentage distributed yearly of the fair market value of the
property (to be determined yearly).
(3) Reformations to comply with paragraph (2). -
(A) In general. - A deduction shallbe allowed under subsection (a) in
respect of any qualified reformation.
(B) Qualified reformation. - For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"qualified reformation" means a change of a governing instrument by reformation, amendment,
construction, or otherwise which changes a reformable interest into a qualified interest but only
if -
(i) any difference between -
(I) the actuarial value (determined as of the date of the
decedent's death) of the qualified interest, and
(II) the actuarial value (as so determined) of the reformable
interest, does not exceed 5 percent of the actuarial value (as so determined) of the refonnable
interest,
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(ii) in the case of -
(I) a charitable remainder interest, the nonremainder
interest (before and after the qualified reformation) terminated at the same time, or
(II) any other interest, the reformable interest and the
qualified interest are for the same period, and
(iii) such change is effective as of the date of the decedent's death.
A nonremainder interest (before reformation) for a term ofyears in excess of20 years shall be
treated as satisfying subclause (I) of clause (ii) if such interest (after reformation) is for a term of
20 years.
(C) Reformable interest. - For purposes of this paragraph-
(i) In general. - The term "reformable interest" means any interest
for which a deduction would be allowable under subsection (a) at the time of the decedent's death
but for paragraph (2).
(ii) Beneficiary's interest must be fixed. - The term "reformable
interest" does not include any interest unless, before the remainder vests in possession, all .
payments to persons other than an organization described in subsection (a) are expressed either
in specified dollar amounts or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the property. For
purposes of determining whether all such payments are expressed as a fixed percentage of the
fair market value of the property, section 664(d)(3) shall be taken into account.
(iii) Special rule where timely commencement of reformation. -
Clause (ii) shall not apply to any interest if a judicial proceeding is commenced to change such
interest into a qualified interest not later than the 90th day after -
(I) if an estate tax return is required to be filed, the last
date (including extensions) for filing such return, or
(II) ifno estate tax return is required to be filed, the last
date (including extensions) for filing the income tax return for the 1st taxable year for which
such a return is required to be filed by the trust.
(iv) Special rule for will executed before January 1, 1979, etc. - In
the case of any interest passing under a will executed before January 1, 1979, or under a trust
created before such date, clause (ii) shall not apply.
(D) Qualified interest. - For purposes of this paragraph, the term
"qualified interest" means an interest for which a deduction is allowable under subsection (a).
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(E) Limitation. - The deduction referred to in subparagraph (A) shall not
exceed the amount of the deduction which would have been allowable for the reformable interest
but for paragraph (2).
(F) Special rule where income beneficiary dies. - If (by reason of the death
of any individual, or by termination or distribution ofa trust in accordance with the terms of the
trust instrument) by the due date for filing the estate tax return (including any extension thereof)
a reformable interest is in a wholly charitable trust or passes directly to a person or for a use
described in subsection (a), a deduction shall be allowed for such reformable interest as ifit had
met the requirements ofparagraph (2) on the date of the decedent's death. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, the term "wholly charitable trust" means a charitable trust which, upon the
allowance ofa deduction, would be described in section 4947(a)(I).
(G) Statute of limitations. - The period for assessing any deficiency of any
tax attributable to the application of this paragraph shall not expire before the date 1 year after
the date on which the Secretary is notified that such reformation (or other proceeding pursuant to
subparagraph (J) [1] has occurred.
(H) Regulations. - The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, including regulations providing such
adjustments in the application of the provisions of section 508 (relating to special rules relating
to section 501(c)(3) organizations), subchapter J (relating to estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and
decedents), and chapter 42 (relating to private foundations) as may be necessary by reason of the
qualified reformation.
(I) Reformations permitted in case of remainder interests in residence or
farm, pooled income funds, etc. - The Secretary shall prescribe regulations (consistent with the
provisions of this paragraph) permitting reformations in the case of any failure -
(i) to meet the requirements of section 170(f)(3)(B) (relating to
remainder interests in personal residence or farm, etc.), or
(ii) to meet the requirements of section 642(c)(5).
(J) Void or reformed trust in cases of insufficient remainder interests. - In
the case of a trust that would qualify (or could be reformed to qualify pursuant to subparagraph
(B)) but for failure to satisfy the requirement ofparagraph (1 )(D) or (2)(D) of section 664(d),
such trust may be -
(i) declared null and void ab initio, or
(ii) changed by reformation, amendment, or otherwise to meet
such requirement by reducing the payout rate or the duration (or both) of any noncharitable
beneficiary's interest to the extent necessary to satisfy such requirement, pursuant to a proceeding
that is commenced within the period required in subparagraph (C)(iii). In a case described in
clause (i), no deduction shall be allowed under this title for any transfer to the trust and any
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transactions entered into by the trust prior to being declared void shall be treated as entered into
by the transferor.
(4) Works of art and their copyrights treated as separate properties in certain cases. -
(A) In general. - In the case of a qualified contribution of a work of art, the
work of art and the copyright on such work of art shall be treated as separate properties for
purposes ofparagraph (2).
(B) Work of art defined. - For purposes of this paragraph, the term "work
of art" means any tangible personal property with respect to which there is a copyright under
Federallaw.
(C) Qualified contribution defined. - For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "qualified contribution" means any transfer ofproperty to a qualified organization if the use
of the property by the organization is related to the purpose or function constituting the basis for
its exemption under section 501.
(D) Qualified organization defined. - For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "qualified organization" means any organization described in section 501(c)(3) other than a
private foundation (as defined in section 509). For purposes of the preceding sentence, a private
operating foundation (as defined in section 4942(j)(3)) shall not be treated as a private
foundation.
(f) Special rule for irrevocable transfers of easements in real property
A deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) in respect of any transfer of a qualified real
property interest (as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C)) which meets the requirements of section
170(h) (without regard to paragraph (4)(A) thereof).
(g) Cross references
(1) For option as to time for valuation for purpose of deduction under this
section, see section 2032.
(2) For treatment of certain organizations providing child care, see section
501(k).
(3) For exemption of gifts and bequests to or for the benefit ofLibrary of
Congress, see section 5 of the Act ofMarch 3, 1925, as amended (2 U.S.C. 161).
(4) For treatment of gifts and bequests for the benefit of the Naval Historical
Center as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 7222 of title 10,
United States Code.
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(5) For treatment of gifts and bequests to or for the benefit ofNational Park
Foundation as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 8 of the Act of
December 18, 1967 (16 U.S.C. 191).
(6) For treatment of gifts, devises, or bequests accepted by the Secretary of State,
the Director of the International Communication Agency, or the Director of the United States
International Development Cooperation Agency as gifts, devises, or bequests to or for the use of
the United States, see section 25 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.
(7) For treatment of gifts or bequests ofmoney accepted by the Attorney General
for credit to "Commissary Funds, Federal Prisons," as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the
United States, see section 4043 of title 18, United States Code.
(8) For payment of tax on gifts and bequests ofUnited States obligations to the
United States, see section 3113(e) of title 31, United States Code.
(9) For treatment ofgifts and bequests for benefit of the Naval Academy as gifts
or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 6973 of title 10, United States Code.
,
(10) For treatment of gifts and bequests for benefit of the Naval Academy
Museum as gifts or bequests to or for the use of the United States, see section 6974 of title 10,
United States Code.
(11) For exemption of gifts and bequests received by National Archives Trust
Fund Board, see section 2308 of title 44, United States Code.
(12) For treatment of gifts and bequests to or for the use of Indian tribal
governments (or their subdivisions), see section 7871
[1] So in original. Probably should be followed by an additional closing parenthesis.
Search this title:
Downloaded from: http://www.law.comell.edu/lii.html
G - 53

ASSET PROTECTION
A Discussion Of Why It Is Necessary And A Presentation
Of Significant Tools and Methods
Craig Mann
u.s. Bank N.A.
Cincinnati,Ohio
Copyright 2002. Craig Mann. All Rights Reserved.
SECTIONH

ASSET PROTECTION
A Discussion Of Why It Is Necessary And A Presentation
Of Significant Tools and Methods
WTRODUCTION H-l
Avoid Fraudulent Conveyance .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-2
Domestic Trusts For Asset Protection H-3
Spendthrift Trusts H-3
Discretionary Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-4
Support Trusts H-5
Some Basic Rules For Asset Protection Trusts H-5
Some Aids to Flexibility H-6
A Simple Example H-7
Inter Vivos QTIP Trusts H-8
Characteristics H-8
Tax Consequences H-8
Reasons To Use H-8
Charitable Remainder Trusts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-9
Tax Consequences H-9
Reasons To Use H-I0
Non Trust Asset Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-11
Family Limited Partnerships H-ll
What Is A Family Limited Partnership? H-ll
Management Of The Family Limited Partnership H-12
Family Limited Partnerships Can Provide Protection From Creditors H-12
Estate And Gift Tax Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-12
Income Tax Implications .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-13
Other Benefits H-14
Considerations Weighing Against The Family Limited Partnership. . . . . . . . . . . .. H-14
Limited Liability Companies H-15
Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-15
Disadvantages H-15
SECTIONH
Protecting Retirement Assets H-16
Qualified Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. H-16
Individual Retirement Accounts, Etc. H-16
Offshore Asset Protection Trusts H-17
General OAPT Outline H-18
I. The foreign jurisdiction chosen for an OAPT should provide H-18
ll. What are the characteristics of an OAPT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-18
ill. Fraudulent conveyance issues in both U.S. and foreign
jurisdictions H-19
IV. Suitability of the client and acceptance of the trust by
the trustee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-20
V. Business should not be accepted if H-20
VI. New business procedures H-20
Offshore Trusts - Recent Cases H-21
FTC v. Affordable Media and Anderson H-21
In re Portnoy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-22
In re B.V. Brooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. H-22
In re Stephan Jay Lawrence H-22
Endnotes H-24
SECTIONH
ASSET PROTECTION
a discussion ofwhy it is necessary and a presentation ofsignificant tools and methods
Asset protection is a method of arranging assets in a way that will preserve as much
value as possible for your clients and their families. Estate planning often focuses
on avoiding probate and saving tax dollars. Yet, litigation, divorce, unprofessional
trustees and executors and the imprudent spending and investment management of .
the clients and their families, are just as threatening to the family's wealth, as are
taxes.
There is good reason for our clients and for ourselves to be concerned with asset
protection. Tort litigation is now a $50 billion a year activity in this country. We
are living in a milieu where an escalating risk of loss of all our resources exists. i
Humor columnist Dave Barry produced an instructional, if fictional, provision of
the constitution: "If any citizen of the United States shall ever, at any time, for any
reason have any kind of bad thing happen to him or her, then this is probably the
result of negligence on the part of a large corporation with a lot of insurance." Dave
was only partly correct - we should add presumed negligence on the part of small
business owners, physicians and even retired persons serving on the boards of
charitable organizations, with or without a lot of insurance.
While this discussion will not spin off on a tangent and spend a lot of time of family
law, all estate planners should be aware that nearly one half of the marriages in the
United States end in divorce. Marrying someone for their money is still a very
popular career path. In addition to the cost of divorce, multi-marriage families are
another difficulty in estate planning, necessitating additional custom-tailoring.
The third major risk, and perhaps the one hardest to quantify, is the risk of loss of
family wealth due to profligate spending and imprudent investing. Family members
with emotional weakness and even mental illness, including drug, alcohol and
gambling addictions are often very poor budgeters and money-managers.
According to Dr. John Stark, clinical psychologist with the Performance
Enhancement Group, "Nineteen percent of the population has a definable mental
illness."ii The number of your clients and their family members who are
dysfunctional, when it comes to planning and money-management, is noteworthy.
Given the very real and pervasive risks to the loss of our clients' family wealth, asset
protection is a very necessary part of estate planning and should be integrated into
the other planning methods and occupy a space in all of our tool boxes.
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Asset protection is an interdisciplinary endeavor involving multifarious subjects,
some of which include:
~ Fraudulent Transfers
~ Ethics
~ Criminal Law
~ Estate & Gift Taxation
~ Trusts
~ Partnerships
~ Laws of Foreign Countries
~ Conflicts of Law
~ Pension Plans & Other ERISA Plans
~ FamilyLaw
~ Social Security
~ Medicare & Medicaid
The very broad scope of academics involved in asset protection increases its
complexity, and when added to the nuances and idiosyncrasies of each client, makes
it more of an art than a science It requires a more individualized approach as it is
integrated into the estate plan.
Avoid Fraudulent Conveyance
Every asset protection plan must consider the application of the fraudulent transfer
laws. Violation of these laws will render all transactions voidable and may subject
all parties to the transaction, including the attorney, to civil and criminal liability.
The most important factor in determining whether transfers are fraudulent is
whether the transferor is insolvent.iii Avoid any intent to defraud, either actual or
constructive, because if fraudulent intent is established, then all creditors, including
those creditors that arise after the transaction, will be able to assert the broad
remedies available under the fraudulent transfer laws to protect their financial
interests. Even without the intentional fraud, there may be constructive fraud if:
~ The transferor is rendered insolvent
~ The transferor is left with unreasonably small capital
~ The transferor is about to incur debts beyond his ability to pay iv
In short, the estate planner needs to know the client and the client's personal
balance sheet. A signed financial statement from the client is probably a good idea
- not just to avoid fraudulent conveyance but to aid the entire planning process.
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DOMESTIC TRUSTS FOR ASSET PROTECTION
Settlors make gifts in trust in order to protect the intended beneficiary of the gift.
Almost any substantial gift or inheritance should be made in trust. This is because
the transfer of a gift or inheritance in trust can confer more benefits upon a
beneficiary than the beneficiary would have if the property were conveyed outright.v
A carefully drafted trust can provide enough flexibility for the grantor, beneficiary
and trustee, so that the beneficiary has all of the benefits of the property, without
the responsibility, and retaining the necessary protection against creditors and
transfer taxes.
Asset protection is generally only achieved with an irrevocable trust. The results are
due to the transference of property to an irrevocable trust - the settlor completely
transfers ownership of the property to another person, the trustee. It is this lack of
ownership and a lack of control that create the asset protection benefits. Note, that
in this entire exercise, irrevocable trusts provide the least benefit when the settlor
either needs or strongly desires to retain an interest in or control over the conveyed
property. A strong-willed client or settlor needs to know, up front, that such a trust
is not their personal "piggy-bank".
Spendthrift Trusts
American law has long recognized a settlor's right by use of a "spendthrift" clause to
protect trust assets. A spendthrift clause prohibits the beneficiary from voluntary or
involuntarily alienating his or her interest in a trust. In every state except New
Hampshire, a spendthrift clause affords at least some measure of protection from
the claims of a beneficiary's creditors.vi The degree of protection provided by a
spendthrift clause varies significantly from state to state. Georgia and Louisiana, by
statute, allow certain trust creditors to reach a beneficiary's interest with a
spendthrift trust. The Sligh Case in Mississippi undermined the protection afforded
by a spendthrift trust clause in order to pay a judgement awarded as the result of a
particularly negligent automobile crash. Furthermore, the distribution standard
adopted in the trust instrument has a significant impact on the scope of a creditor's
ability to reach the assets of a spendthrift trust in various states.
In addition to the above cracks in the armor, some states will ignore spendthrift
clauses in favor of certain classes of creditors. Today, the most frequently
recognized exception to the trust doctrine involves claims against a beneficiary for
child or spousal support. The general opinion is that the non-payment of such
debts is against public policy. Most professional trustees will consider such
beneficiary expenses as necessary when budgeting distributions of income or
principal.
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In those states which recognize spendthrift trusts, it is clear that if the spendthrift
trust is validly created, the creditors of a beneficiary will have no greater claim to
the assets of the trust than the beneficiary could have. Accordingly, if the trust is a
purely discretionary trust and the beneficiary has no right of withdrawal, the
beneficiary's interest should be insulated from the claims of one's creditors and any
attempt at alienating, pledging or otherwise charging one's beneficial interest in the
trust should be void.vii
Discretionary Trusts
Discretionary trusts give the discretion to payor apply, to or for the beneficiary's
benefit, any, all or no trust income or principal as the trustee deems appropriate.
Because the trust beneficiary has no right to any trust income or principal before a
trustee elects to payor apply income or principal to or for the beneficiary's benefit
and because creditors can only reach the interest that a beneficiary has a legal right
to - the beneficiary can not assign one's interest to creditors and the creditors can
not reach the beneficiary's trust interest. Generally, beneficiaries of true
discretionary trusts (that is, a trust whose terms entitle the beneficiary only to the
amount of the trust income or principal that the trustee, in uncontrolled discretion,
decides to give to the beneficiary) can not force the trustee to pay any amount from
the trust, The only exception to this rule occurs when the beneficiary can show that
the trustee abuses the discretion. Consequently, the beneficiary's creditors can not
reach the beneficiary's trust interest because the creditor can not reach any greater
interest than the beneficiary can reach. This results even in jurisdictions that do not
allow spendthrift trusts.viii
Even for purely discretionary trusts, once the trustee elects to pay trust income to or
for the benefit of a beneficiary, creditors may reach that amount. Furthermore,
once the beneficiary's creditors serve the trustee with process, the trustee will be
liable to those creditors for any amounts subsequently paid to or for the benefit of
the beneficiary. However, if the trust includes a valid spendthrift provision, then
the beneficiary's creditors can not reach amounts that the trustee elects to pay to or
for the benefit of the beneficiary.ix
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Support Trusts
Support trusts provide that the trustee must payor apply trust income or principal
for the benefit of the beneficiary, but only to the extent required to educate and
support that beneficiary, and then only to the extent that the trust distributions can
accomplish the goals of educating and supporting the trust beneficiary. Because the
trustee may only make trust distributions that will accomplish the education and
support of the beneficiary, creditors and the beneficiary's assignees can not reach
the beneficiary's interest because such distributions would not accomplish the
trust's objectives. This is true even when the trust is not a spendthrift trust or in
jurisdictions where spendthrift trusts are not valid.x
A "support" trust, which allows distributions only for the support of the beneficiary
will typically offer less creditor protection than a "discretionary trust, providing that
distributions can be made in the discretion of the trustee. This can be seen even in
states with significant general limitations on the enforcement of spendthrift clauses.
In California, for example, notwithstanding a spendthrift clause, a beneficiary's
creditors may reach up to 25% of the payment (whether income or principal) that
otherwise would be made to, or for the benefit of, the beneficiary. At the same time,
however, a creditor cannot compel a trustee to make a discretionary payment to or
for the benefit of the beneficiary. Likewise, in Oklahoma, "income due or to accrue
to the beneficiary in the future" over $25,000 per year is subject to all creditor
claims, notwithstanding a spendthrift clause, but a creditor has no rights with
respect to a discretionary trust until the trustee exercises his or her discretion in
favor of the beneficiary. The distinction between support and discretionary trusts
does not apply in Virginia, which limits the amount of property that can be
sheltered in a spendthrift trust to $600,000.xi
SOllle Basic Rules for Asset Protection Trusts
~ The trust must be irrevocable
~ The settlor (grantor) may not be a mandatory beneficiary, but may only be a
discretionary beneficiary
~ Neither the settlor, a related party, or a beneficiary should be the trustee
~ At least some of the assets of the trust must be located in the jurisdiction where
the trust is established
~ Some part of the trust's administration must occur within that jurisdiction
~ There must be no incidence of ownership by the beneficiaries
~ Include a classic "spendthrift" clause
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SOIne Aids to Flexibility
An essential ingredient in formulating a successful strategy is flexibility - flexibility
to meet changing family needs and changing laws, particularly tax laws.
~ Use a protector or advisor. The protector or advisor is a disinterested person
(not a beneficiary) who advises the trustee on such matters as; (1) beneficiary
health, (2) beneficiary marital status and (3) beneficiary needs (both income
and principal). This person may also be able to change trustees or investment
mangers and may be able to extend the term of the trust. He or she may also
be able to appoint their own successor. Remember that the advisor will only
have the powers given to them in the document.
~ Limited powers of appointment.
~ Allow for the trust's income to be sprinkled or reinvested.
~ Allow the trustee, perhaps with the advisor's guidance, to pay bills for a
beneficiary.
~ Allow for a change of situs or jurisdiction.
~ Allow for the use of disclaimers.
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A SilDple ExalDple
One simple asset protection strategy would involve either a complete or incomplete
gift to an irrevocable trust that would benefit the settlor and spouse and/or children
that:
~ Is a wholly discretionary trust
~ Permits distributions to the settlor (a) only for the settlor's health, support and
maintenance; when (b) such a distribution would not jeopardize distributions
for the children's or spouse's health, support, maintenance and education
~ Gives a settlor a special power of appointment over the trust corpus, only in
favor of the objects of the settlor's bounty (i.e. the settlor's spouse or children)
~ Prohibits the trustee from using discretionary power to distribute or discharge
any of the settlor's legal obligations to the objects of the settlor's bounty - This
prevents the settlor from becoming a deemed beneficiary of the trust
~ Includes a spendthrift provision in the trust instrument
This strategy would have the following asset protection impact:
~ The settlor retains no income interest that would be exposed to the creditor's
claims
~ The settlor receives protection from the possibility of impoverishment by the
trustee's power to distribute to the settlor, which is limited by both the
trustee's discretion and an ascertainable standard
~ The settlor's creditors can not reach the trust corpus
~ Because the trust instrument prohibits the trustee from using trust assets to
discharge any of the settlor's legal obligations to support beneficiaries who are
objects of their bounty, this plan protects the settlor from creditor claims that
are based on the argument that one is an indirect beneficiary of the trust and
thus can reach funds for the support and maintenance of their beneficiaries.
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Inter Vivos QTIP Trusts
Characteristics
An inter vivos qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) trust is an irrevocable
trust funded during the lifetime of a donor spouse. The corpus of the trust is held
for the benefit of the donee spouse during his or her lifetime. The net income of the
trust must be distributed at least annually to the donee spouse. Upon the death of
the donee spouse, the remaining corpus of the trust may be distributed to any
remaindermen.
Tax Consequences
The initial transfer by the donor spouse to the trust is not subject to gift tax. The
donee spouse will be taxed on the income received each year. Upon the death of the
donee spouse, the remaining corpus of the trust will be includable in his or her
estate.
Reasons to Use
An inter vivos QTIP trust can be an effective way to protect assets from the claims of
creditors and also provide divorce protection. By making an irrevocable transfer of
assets to the trust, creditors of the donor spouse will not be able to look to the
transferred assets for satisfaction of claims. By transferring the assets of the trust,
instead of outright to the donee spouse, the donor spouse will be able to ensure that
the donee spouse will not spend the corpus of the trust. This also makes it easier to
refuse the requests from children and others for gifts and loans. In addition, upon
the death of the donee spouse, the remaining corpus will go to the person(s)
directed by the trust, as opposed to the person(s) whom the donee spouse would
prefer if the initial transfer had been made to the donee spouse. An inter vivos
QTIP trust can also be used to reduce estate taxes. If one spouse does not own assets
the value of which are equal or greater to the unified credit amount (i.e.
$1,000,000), the trust can be funded with assets sufficient to enable a combined
$2,000,000 of assets to be protected from federal estate taxes when combined with
a credit shelter trust.
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Charitable Remainder Trusts
A charitable remainder trust (CRT) must provide for the distribution of a specified
payment, at least annually, to one or more persons, at least one of which must be a
non-charitable beneficiary. The payment period must be for the life or lives of the
individual beneficiaries (all of whom must be living at the time the trust is created)
or a term of years, not in excess of 20 years. Upon the termination of the non-
charitable interest(s), the remainder must be held in continuing trust for charitable
purposes or be paid to, or for the use of, one or more charitable organizations.
There are two types of CRT's. A charitable remainder annuity trust is required to
pay a sum certain annually to one or more beneficiaries, at least one of which is not
a charity. The sum must be equal to at least 5% of the fair market value of the trust
assets valued as of the date of funding. The charitable remainder unitrust is
required to pay a fixed percentage of it's net fair market value to one or more
beneficiaries, at least on of which is not a charity. The fixed percentage must be
equal to at least 5% of the fair market value of the trust assets as valued annually.
In addition, the charitable remainder unitrust may provide for the payment of the
lesser of the fixed percentage or the trust income (a "net income only unitrust"). In
a "net income only unitrust" , the unitrust may, but need not, provide any amount
by which the trust income falls short of the fixed percentage is to be paid out in
subsequent years to the extent of the trust's income exceeds the fixed percentages in
such later years.
Tax Consequences
The grantor of a CRT is entitled to an immediate charitable income and gift tax
deduction for the fair market value of the remainder interest ultimately passing to
the charity. The creation of the income interest may, however, have gift tax
consequences if the recipient is an individual other than the grantor. The creation
of a testamentary CRT entitles the estate to a charitable estate tax deduction for the
fair market value of the remainder interest.
A CRT is exempt from income tax so long as it has no unrelated business taxable
income. A CRT is not taxable on any gain realized in selling appreciated property
contributed by the grantor. The income beneficiary is taxed under a tiered system
in which the annuity or unitrust distributions are deemed to be made in the
following order; (1) from ordinary income, (2) from capital gains, (3) from other
income, and (4) from corpus.
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Reasons to Use
·A CRT can be an effective way to protect assets from the claims of creditors. By
making an irrevocable transfer of the assets to the CRT, creditors of the grantor
would not be able to look to the transferred assets for satisfaction of claims.
Although the corpus would be safe from the claims of creditors, the annuity or
unitrust amount may not be safe. However, creditors may only be able to attach the
payments on a year by year basis. Creditor's claims would be further frustrated by
the use of a net income only unitrust. A CRT can be a desirable method to provide
assets to charity, while simultaneously minimizing income, gift and/or estate taxes
payable to the IRS. For example, a CRT can be used to convert a single valuable,
highly appreciated asset into a well diversified portfolio of assets at a minimum tax
cost.
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NON TRUST ASSET PROTECTION
Fantily Lintited Partnerships
Family limited partnerships can provide numerous advantages - asset protection,
estate and income tax reduction and centralized management of the partnership
assets. The following addresses the basic requirements of a family limited
partnership, it's management structure, asset protection attributes and estate, gift
and income tax advantages. The possible shortcomings of a family limited
partnership are also considered.
What is a Fantily Lintited Partnership?
A family limited partnership is owned by members of an immediate family and
created under the formalities of state law. (i.e. Ohio) In a family limited partnership
there are two classes of partners; (1) general partners who manage the
partnership's operations and assets and (2) limited partners who have no
management rights. Both general and limited partners participate in the profits of
the partnership usually in proportion to the amount of their investment. While the
general partners of the family limited partnership have management control of the
partnership business, they are also fully liable for the losses of such. The limited
partners, however, are only liable for the losses of the partnership to extent of their
investment in the partnership.
The family limited partnership is formed by an agreement between as few as two
people, upon the filing of a certificate of limited partnership. As a general rule, a
family limited partnership is formed by spouses, one or both of whom contributes
real estate or liquid investments to the partnership, such as marketable securities or
a family business. Both spouses are given general and limited partnership units.
The general partnership units normally represent between 1% and 10% of the
partnership, while the limited partnership units represent the balance of the
partnership participation. The rights and obligations of each partner are set out in a
partnership agreement signed by each partner. The partnership comes into
existence upon the filing of a certificate of the limited partnership in the county
courthouse. This certificate; (1) must comply in form and content with state law,
(2) among other things, the names and addresses of all partners, and (3) the right of
each partner to receive distributions of property from the partnership.
Once a family limited partnership is formed, the parents can proceed to gift limited
partnership units to their children. The parent, as general partners, retain complete
control of the partnership and it's assets, while the children have the right to receive
partnership distributions in proportion to the interests which they receive from
their parents.
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Managentent ofthe Fantily Lintited Partnership
The persons listed in the partnership certificate as the general partners are those
persons who can exercise control over the partnership. If both parents are listed as
the general partners, the partnership will be managed by them jointly. However,
the general partnership interests can be divided among various members of the
family so the that each has a percentage of the management. In this case, each
family member will be liable for the losses of the partnership, but will also have a
right to participate in it's management.
The certificate of limited partnership can establish the percentages that each
general partner will be allocated, thereby establishing the degree of control which
each general partner can exercise. It is advisable to have more than one general
partner to insure that the partnership has continuity of management in the event of
the death of a general partner. Although most family partnerships are established
with the parents holding the general partnership interests, as children become more
capable of managing the family business or family investment portfolio, parents
often share management control with the children by distributing to them a
percentage of the general partnership interests.
Fantily Lintited Partnerships can Provide Protection frOnt Creditors
In the formation of a family limited partnership the family can limit the interest that
a creditor of a partner can take in the partnership assets. The terms of the
partnership agreement and certificate of limited partnership can specifically restrict
a limited partner's right to withdraw from the partnership, and restrict the
admission of a substitute limited partner only to those persons approved by all
partners. Although a limited partner can assign his or her interest in the
partnership, the assignee can receive only the rights of the limited partner to
distributions, and not to the other rights of the limited partner. Therefore, a
creditor, as an assignee of a child's limited partnership interest, would only have the
right to receive cash distributions from the partnership when distributions are
declared by the general partners. In addition, a creditor who becomes an assignee
of a limited partnership interest my be in the unenviable position of being taxed on
partnership income in proportion to the interest held. Because of this
disadvantageous position, a creditor might be willing to dispose of a limited
partnership interest at a deep discount.
Estate and Gift Tax Benefits
There are significant estate and gift tax benefits to the use of family limited
partnerships in transferring assets to a younger generation. If a parent were to
contribute real estate or securities to a family limited partnership worth $100,000
in exchange for go limited partnership units and 10 general partnership units, the
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value of each partnership unit would initially appear to be $1000. However, for
transfer tax purposes, the value of each of the 90 limited partnership units would be
considerably less than $1000, reduced by as much as 30% to reflect the fact that
there is a lack of marketability and control inherent in the units. Therefore, the gift
of one limited partnership unit would be valued at approximately $700 for gift tax
purposes. Through the use of a limited partnership structure, a family member can
gift considerably more than $10,000 in real value each year without exceeding the
$10,000 annual exclusion amount. Furthermore, upon the of a parent, the value of
the partnership units in the estate may also be subject to deep discount if the
partnership is not liquidated upon the death of the parent and the parent is not in
complete control of the partnership. It is for this reason that it is wise to divide the
control of a family limited partnership among family members so that there is no
individual member who holds all, or even a majority, of the general partnership
interests.
Inconte Tax Intplications
There are also capital gains and income tax benefits to be derived from the limited
partnership structure. If a parent contributes real estate or securities to a family
limited partnership in exchange for limited and general partnership units, the
Internal Revenue Code does -not require the parent to recognize a taxable gain upon
the formation of the partnership. This is so even if the current market value of the
assets are considerably higher than the parent's cost basis. If a husband and wife
together contribute assets worth a total of $100,000 (having a cost basis of
$10,000) to a family limited partnership in exchange for 10 general partnership
units and 90 limited partnership units they will not recognize any taxable gain at
that time. If they then gift partnership units to their children, there will not be any
taxable capital gain recognized at the time of the gift, although each unit will have a
basis for capital gains purposes of $100. If at some later date, the general partners
decide to liquidate the partnership and distribute assets to the children, there will
not be a capital gain recognized by the parents or children upon this distribution.
The partners, both limited and general, will have a taxable capital gain if the
partnership sells the assets or, following distribution, a partner sells his or her
portion of the assets. The gain will be the difference between the sales proceeds and
the original cost basis applicable when the parents first contributed the assets to the
partnership. (Note that upon the death of a partner, the partnership may elect to
change the cost basis of the partnership assets attributable to the deceased partner's
interest to reflect the value of the partnership interest in the estate of the deceased
partner) Furthermore, as income is earned by the partnership, the tax on that
income will fall upon the partners in proportion to their interest held. Therefore,
the parents can shift some of the income earned on these assets to the children who
may be in a lower tax bracket. There are some significant exceptions to the income
and capital gains taxes outlined above, but with careful planning these traps can be
avoided and the above benefits achieved.
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Other Benefits
A family limited partnership can be used to streamline the transfer of assets to a
younger generation. This is a particularly effective way to transfer ownership, for
example, in a vacation home to children over time. By putting the vacation property
into a family limited partnership, the parents can transfer limited partnership units
to the children, thereby taking the value thereof out of the estate, while maintaining
control of the property for the rest of their lives. The parents can also transfer a
small percentage of the general partnership units to the children, thereby giving
them participation in management, and ultimately full control of the property. The
parents will have to pay the partnership for the right to enjoy the property, but the
rental payment can be used to pay the ongoing costs of the property. This not only
provides a method of decreasing the estate of the parents, but allows for a smooth
transition of the property to the children, with no significant effect upon the income
stream or lifestyle of the parents.
Considerations Weighing Against the Fantily Lintited Partnership
There are some negative aspects to the use of a family limited partnership. To begin
with, there are income tax reporting requirements. The general partners will be
responsible for filing an annual income tax return for the partnership. There will
also be additional expenses incurred for accounting and tax advise that will result
from the formation of the partnership. Most significantly, the general partners will
be personally responsible for the losses and liabilities of the partnership. They may
have particular significance if the partnership runs a family business or holds real
estate. In either event, the general partners could become liable for the losses of the
business or the claims of individuals injured on the property.
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LIMITED LIABLITY COMPANIES
In the last fifteen years, Ohio and 47 other states, have adopted a new legal form
known as the Limited Liability Company. The purpose of this legal form is to create
a company that is managed like a corporation but taxed like a partnership. Subject
to the advantages and disadvantages listed below, one should consider the use of a
limited liability company in structuring family holdings.
Advantages
If properly structured, a limited liability company will have capital gains and
income tax attributes identical to those of a family limited partnership. The major
advantages of a limited liability company over a family limited partnership is the
fact that no member of the company will be personally liable for the losses of the
company. As mentioned above, the general partners of a family limited partnership
are personally liable for the losses of the partnership - this could be particularly
significant where the entity holds real estate upon which an individual could be
injured and sue for resulting damages. Such a liability would be limited to the
assets of the limited liability company in which the property was held.
Disadvantages
There are some disadvantages in using a limited liability company - they are
relatively new legal entities. Therefore, there is question to how some states and the
Internal Revenue Service will rule on matters pertaining to them. Of a particular
concern in this regard will be the control which the parents can retain over the
company while still taking advantage of the income tax benefits available when the
company is taxed as a partnership. Furthermore, in order to insure that the limited
liability company is taxed as a partnership, it is essential that the operating
agreement under which the company is managed strictly complies with the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations passed thereunder.
This can cause restrictions with which the family may not wish to contend.
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PROTECTING RETIREMENT ASSETS
Qualified Plans
An Ohio debtor's interest in a qualified retirement plan is generally exempt from
execution, garnishment, attachment or sale to satisfy a judgement or order. State
laws vary widely, and of course, change - frequent updates are necessary.
Individual Retirentent Accounts, Etc.
An Ohio debtor's rights in; (1) an IRA, including an IRA rollover from a 401K plan,
(2) an individual retirement annuity, or (3) a Keogh or H.R. 10 plan; are only
exempt from the claims of creditors to the extent they are reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and of his or her dependents. Whether such assets are
"reasonably necessary" for the support of the debtor and his or her dependents
depends on various factors including the:
~ debtor's present and anticipated living expenses
~ debtor's present and anticipated income from all sources
~ age of the debtor and his or her dependents
~ health of the debtor and his or her dependents
~ debtor's ability to work and earn a living
~ debtor's job skills, training and education
~ debtor's other assets, including exempt assets
~ liquidity of the debtor's assets
~ debtor's ability to save for retirement
~ special needs of the debtor and his or her dependents
~ debtor's financial obligations
Many other states have statutes which protect IRA accounts to a much greater
degree - some offer 100% protection.
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OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
When a domestic irrevocable trust is judged to offer insufficient asset protection or
lacks the anticipated need for flexibility, then locating the trust in a specific foreign
country may meet all of the client's needs.
Foreign trusts, i.e. trusts that are governed by the laws of foreign jurisdiction are
often used by u.s. citizens or residents to protect assets from creditors. In addition,
non-U.S. citizens and non u.s. residents also use foreign trusts to protect assets,
not only from creditors, but also from taxation or expropriation by the country of
their citizenship and taxation or seizure by the u.s. government. Creditors face the
problems regarding the application and interpretation of local laws and will likely
discount the value of their claims in light of the expense of litigation and the
uncertainty of enforcement of their judgements against assets located in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Before using an Offshore Asset Protection Trust COAPT) we must decide whether
such a vehicle is appropriate for the client involved. OAPT's are normally
appropriate only for clients with substantial wealth. They are not suitable for
replacing ordinary levels of malpractice and liability insurance protection. Nor are
OAPT's useful for clients who may be facing certain litigation. Also, the client must
feel comfortable with transmitting a substantial amount of one's wealth to a foreign
jurisdiction.
After careful consideration and study, the professional advisor may come to the
conclusion that OAPT's are simple, effective and cost efficient. The following
material should help with this study.
Until the late 1970'S, offshore jurisdictions attracted trust business because they
operated as tax havens. The tax reform act of 1976 eliminated most of the tax
advantages associated with creating offshore trusts by providing that, for income
tax purposes, the settlor would be treated as the owner of the property of an
offshore trust
A strategic advantage offered by Offshore Asset Protection Trusts COAPT's) is that
differences in competing legal systems can be arbitraged to produce favorable and
protective results for the trust, it's settlor and beneficiaries. This is an important
planning situation when it comes to matters such as the ability to force the legal
battle over the trust assets into the foreign court, and the ability to protect the
settlor against the awkward position of being forced to either repatriate trust assets,
or being held in contempt of court.
H - 17
General OAPT Outline
I The foreign jurisdiction chosen for an OAPT should provide:
A Very, debtor-friendly statutes - for example: The Cayman Islands
i Has not adopted the sixteenth century statute of Elizabeth and instead
has a much more relaxed fraudulent conveyance law
11 Has no comity - the trust statute provides that judgements elsewhere
(the U.S.A.) are not to be given force and effect
III Required burden of proof - the burden of proof in challenging asset
transfers to a trust is always on the party making the allegations and
does not shift to the transferor
IV Requisite standard of proof - the standard of proof that must be met by
the party making the allegations is the u.S. criminal standard of "beyond
reasonable doubt"
v Has no investment restrictions for trustees
VI The country is not a party to the Hague Convention on trusts - forcing
other countries to honor Cayman law relative to Cayman trusts
VII Has a six year statute of limitations on attaching gifts made to
irrevocable trusts
viii Requires that all counsel be licensed in the Caymans and counsel must
be paid up-front, as there are no contingency fee agreements
B Political and economic stability
C Language barriers
D Modern infrastructure including telecommunications
E Minimal time zone differences and general accessibility via commercial
airlines
F Favorable tax laws - or zero tax
G General maturity of the legal system
H The country is in compliance and good standing with the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S.A. Patriot Actxii
II What are the characteristics of an OAPT?
A The trust is irrevocable and developed in consert with the trust statutes of
the foreign jurisdiction
B Taxation - generally tax neutral for u.S. citizens and residents for both
income and estate taxes
i Pick a country with no income, estate or gift taxes
ii Follow strict reporting requirements
a At the inception of the trust
• IRS Form 926 "Return by Transferor of Property to a Foreign
Estate or Trust" is filed at inception of trust even if no excise tax
is due
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• IRS Form 3520"Creation of or Transfers to Certain Foreign
Trusts" is an information return due within 90 days of inception
b Annually
• IRS Form 3520-A "Annual Return of Foreign Trusts" is
essentially an annual grantor trust return
• Treasury Form 90-22.1 "Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts", generally every person subject to u.S. jurisdiction
must file Form 90-22.1 every year that such person possesses a
financial interest in, or signature of authority over any bank,
securities or other financial account in any foreign country - due
by June 30th annually
C How much control can the settlor keep?
The trustee has a fiduciary duty to the settlor and the beneficiaries,
however, as with all irrevocable trusts, some control is given up -
additionally, transactions in the foreign jurisdiction are usually quite
confidential and only certain trustee representatives can initiate
transactions
i Settlor as beneficiary
a Income interest - attachment possibility
b Limited powers of appointment
11 Other beneficiaries - pure discretionary distributions
III Trust Protectors Committee
IV Successor trustee selection and flight provisions
v At some time in the future, the settlor may wish to convince the
protector or the trustee that the protection features of the trust are no
longer necessary and ask that the trust be closed and distributed
III Fraudulent conveyance issues in both u.S. and foreign jurisdictions
A Existing obligations - insurance coverage
B Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
C Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
D The foreign jurisdiction should have a fraudulent conveyance statute which
is more "debtor friendly" than either of the more prevalent U.S. statutes, as
well as the sixteenth century Statute of Elizabeth
E To avoid fraudulent conveyance, the trustee needs to qualify the
clientjsettlor:
i Do assets exceed all known, current and long-term liabilities by a wide
margin?
11 What will the asset to liability ratio be after the transfer on the trust?
III Has the client signed as grantor or co-signer on someone else's debt?
IV Financial statements with creditors should not show OAPT assets
v There should be no current, threatened or pending litigation where the
client is a defendant
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IV Suitability of the client and acceptance of the trust by the trustee
A The settlor should have a clear intellectual and emotional understanding of
the transaction
B The settlor should have considered simpler domestic trusts and other asset
protection methods
C The settlor already has a practical amount of malpractice and/or liability
Insurance
V Business should not be accepted if:
A The settlor either is, or is likely to be in the future, in financial difficulties
B The setlor's motive is to place such assets beyond the reach of any person or
persons to whom the settlor is presently or contingently liable or to whom
the settlor owes an existing obligation
C The settlor's motive is to protect one's assets in contemplation of divorce
proceedings
D The settlor has knowledge of facts of circumstances which may render
oneself liable to a claim
VI New Business Procedures
A The settlor must provide an audited financial statement of assets and
liabilities, showing without a doubt one's solvency before and after the
creation of the trust - in particular the statement should reflect all
contingent liabilities
B As a general rule, no more than 60% of the settlor's net assets will be
accepted into the trust - assets must be readily marketable securities of
limited partnership shares
C Settlor must provide an affidavit to the effect that:
i there are no current legal proceedings being prosecuted or contemplated
against the same
11 there are no liabilities or contingent liabilities which are not disclosed in
the financial statement
III settlor is not aware of any currently existing facts which might render
liability to legal proceedings
D The settlor must sign a consent, irrevocably authorizing the trustee to
disclose all information and deliver copies of documents pursuant to an
order by the u.S. court on behalf of the u.S. government or any of it's
agencies including but not limited to, the Internal Revenue Service
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Offshore Trusts - Recent Cases
FI'C v. Affordable Media andAnderson
179 F. 3 rd 1228 (9 th Circuit 1999)
The Anderson's (husband and wife) where involved in a telemarketing Ponzi
scheme that defrauded thousands of investors. Seeking to protect the fortune they
had amassed through this scheme, the Andersons created a trust for their own
benefit under the laws of the Cook Islands - in most respects the most debtor-
friendly offshore jurisdiction. The Federal Trade Commission brought a civil action
against the Andersons to recover as much money as possible on behalf of the
defrauded investors, and the District Court entered a preliminary injunction
requiring the Andersons to repatriate the assets held in the offshore trust. The
Andersons, as their own "trust protector" and their Cook Islands trustee refused to
comply. The ninth circuit recognized that inability to comply with an order is a
defense to a charge of civil contempt, but stated that "it is readily apparent that the
Andersons' inability to comply with the District Court's repatriation order is the
intended result of their own conduct - the inability to comply and the foreign
trustee's refusal to comply appears to be the precise goal of the Andersons' trust".
The court noted that the Andersons were the protector of their trusts and thus had
significant power over the trust assets; "The Andersons' trust gives them affirmative
powers to appoint new trustees and makes the anti-duress provisions subject to the
prosecutors' powers, therefore they can force the foreign trustee to repatriate the
trust assets to the United States." The Ninth Circuit Court also noted in a footnote
that, although it concentrated on the fact that the Andersons were trust protectors
in order to support the District Court's finding, the other facts not considered might
further support the argument that the Andersons had control over the trust.xiii
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In re Portnoy
201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.1996)
The debtor was president and sole shareholder of a company and unconditionally
guaranteed by any indebtedness of the company to Marine Midland Bank. The
bank loaned the company over $1 million. The company was involuntarily
petitioned into bankruptcy. The debtor had established a self-settled spendthrift
trust in the Jersey Channel Islands only months before the company defaulted on
its obligation to the bank. The debtor made motion for summary judgement and
discharge in bankruptcy. The court held that New York had a greater interest in the
issue and that applying Jersey Island's substantive law would offend New York and
the federal bankruptcy policies - the motion for summary judgement was denied.xiv
In re B.V. Brooks
217B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)
In 1990, debtor transferred stock in several Connecticut corporations to his wife.
Within days, his wife transferred the stock to on trust in Bermuda and another in
the Jersey Channel Islands, naming the debtor as the primary beneficiary. The
court did not believe the Brooks' claim that the trusts were created as part of a long
term estate planning strategy, most likely because an involuntary bankruptcy
petition was filed against the debtor one year following the funding of the offshore
trusts. The court held that self-settled trusts were contrary to Connecticut public
policy and therefore the assets of the two trusts were includable in the bankruptcy
estate.XV
In re Stephan Jay LaUJrence
251 B.R. 630 (Bankr. S.D. Flor. 2000)
Two months prior to the conclusion of an arbitration dispute with Bear, Stearns &
Co. that resulted in a $20.4 million award in favor of Bear, Stearns, Lawrence
created an offshore trust in the Jersey Channel Islands. Lawrence then changed the
governing law of the trust to the Republic of Mauritius and amended the trust so
that the settlor's powers could not be executed under duress and so that his life
interest would terminate if he became bankrupt. Lawrence subsequently amended
the trust again excluding himself as a beneficiary. Lawrence filed a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court ordered that Lawrence turn over the
assets of the trust, account for its transactions and surrender his passport.
Subsequent to the Turn Over Order, the bankruptcy court issued a Contempt Order,
holding Lawrence in contempt for violating the court's Turn Over Order and fining
Lawrence $10,000 a day until he purged his contempt. In a further status
conference, the bankruptcy court found that Lawrence's alleged attempts to comply
with the Turn Over Order were "entirely unacceptable" and ordered the Lawrence
be incarcerated until he complied.xvi Lawrence appealed the Turn Over Order,
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Contempt Order and Incarceration Order. The District Court Affirmed the Turn
Over Order, agreeing with the bankruptcy court that Lawrence had the ability to
comply with the order. The trust instrument granted nearly unfettered discretion to
the trustees, and thus Lawrence retained "de facto" control over the trust through
his ability to appoint trustees who could in their absolute discretion reinstate
himself as a beneficiary and assign the entire proceeds to himself. The district court
noted the strong public. policy against allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts and
stated that, based on the timing of the trust's creation, it could only be inferred that
Lawrence was seeking to shelter his assets in a protected offshore trust.
Furthermore the fact that Lawrence excluded himself as a beneficiary was not
controlling because there was no mention in the declaration of exclusion as to
whether the exclusion was revocable or irrevocable.xvii
In all of the above cases, we see examples of debtors who were clearly trying to
evade and defraud known creditors. In addition, the debtors and settlors of the
trusts personally retained too much control. In Anderson and Lawrence, their
claims of impossibility were not believable, or were patently untrue.
A properly structured offshore asset protection trust in which the settlor does not
retain too much control and established to protect the settlor's assets from future,
unknown creditors is still viable.xviii
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SECTION I

I. Pre-Immigration Planning
A. The Latin Method.
Most Latin American clients employ the easiest methodology for pre-immigration
planning - give all your money to a relative of yours then come to the US. Now this may
not seem feasible to most US planners but in Latin countries they trust their relatives.
Even though this may seem like a light hearted approach to planning, it does have its
advantages. First, there is no income or gift tax upon the transfer of money each year
from the non-US relative to the US recipient. Second, there is no estate tax upon the
death of the US person. Finally, there is an asset protection element in that the funds are
not available for the US person's creditors or spouse. However a word of caution, once
the money is transferred it is transferred. This means that the funds are now subject to
any spousal or forced inheritance rights in the non-US relative's country. These rights
can be quite significant. The basis for this type of planning though warrants some
discussion.
The Code subjects individuals who are either citizens or residents of the United
States! to income tax on their worldwide income and transfer tax on their worldwide
assets.2 Foreign individuals, on the other hand, are taxed by the US on their source
income and on income effectively connected with the conduct of a US trade or business.3
The criteria for a non-US citizen being deemed a US person from US transfer tax
purposes differs from the criteria for a non-US citizen being deemed a US person for
income tax purposes. For US transfer tax purposes, a non-US citizen is a US person ifhe
or she is a "US domiciliary." On the other hand, for US income tax purposes, a non-US
citizen is a US person ifhe or she is a "US resident."
Domicile in the United States is acquired by living there, for even a brief amount
of time, with no definite present intention of later removing therefrom. Whether an
individual has established US domicile for transfer tax purposes is essentially a question
1 Section 7701(a)(30).
2 Section 61.
3 See, generally, Sections 864, 871 and 881.
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of the individual's subjective intent, which may be inferred from the individual's
objective actions and circumstances.
A non-US person will qualify as having a closer connection to a foreign country
than to the US if it is satisfactorily determined that the non-US person maintains more
significant contracts with the foreign country.4 In determining whether an individual has
established US domicile for estate and gift tax purposes, courts often look to facts and
circumstances such as: (i) the amount of time spent in the United States; (ii) the location
of the individual's principal home and the nature of the individual's living
accommodations in the United States;5 (iii) the residence of the individual's family and
friends;6 (iv) the location of the individual's church arid club memberships;? (v) the
location of the individual's place of business;8 (vi) the location of the individual's bank
accounts;9 (vii) the location of the individual's voter's registration;10 and (viii) the
location of the individual's driver's license. II Under US law, there is a presumption that
an individual's domicile continues until it is shown to have changed.
A nonresident alien will be deemed a United States resident for US income tax
purposes ifhe or she meets either: (i) the lawful permanent resident ("green card" test)I2;
or (ii) the "substantial presence test." The substantial presence test is satisfied if an alien
is present in the United States for 183 days or more during the current calendar year. The
substantial presence test is also satisfied if an alien is present in the United States for (i)
at least thirty-one days during the current year; and (ii) at least 183 days for the three year
period ending on the last day of the current year, using a weighted average formula. 13
The weighted average formula equals the sum of (i) the number of days present during
current calendar year, (ii) one-third of the number of days present during the preceding
year; and (iii) one-sixth of such number ofdays present during the second preceding year.
4 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-2(d).
5 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-1(i).
6 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-1(ii).
7 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-1(iii).
8 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-1(vi).
9 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-I(v).
10 Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-2(d)(I)(viii).
II Reg. Section 3301.7701(b)-2(d)(l)(vii).
12 Reg. Section 301.7701(b)-4(a).
13 Reg. Section 301.7701(b)-1(c)(1).
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The "substantial presence test" is subject to several exceptions.14 The first
exception is often known as the "closer connection exception." This exception arises
where the individual is present in the United States for less than 183 days during the
calendar year but the weighted average fonnula (183 days over three years) equals or
exceeds 183 days. For the exception to apply, it must be established that for the current
year the individual has (i) a tax home in a foreign country, and (ii) a closer connection to
that foreign country than to the United States. The exception will not apply for any year
in which the individual was in the United States for 183 days or more.
Persons who are neither US citizens nor domiciliaries are subject to US estate tax
only on assets actually located in or originating from the United States ("US situs
assets"). The estate tax is applied for non-US persons at the same rates as those
applicable to US citizens, but with only a $60,000 exemption. Generally, US situs assets
include, but are not limited to, real estate located in the United States (including personal
residences), tangible personal property located in the US, shares of stock in US
corporations, mutual funds incorporated in the US, cash deposit in the US, and debts of
US obligors. Persons who are neither US citizens nor domiciliaries are subject to US
estate tax only on gifts ofUS situs property and US situs tangible personal property.
If the value of the aggregate "foreign gifts" received by a US person (other than a
501(c) organization) exceeds a specific threshold amount ($10,000), the US person must
report, but not necessarily pay tax on, each "foreign gift" to the IRS. 15 If the US person
fails to report a "foreign gift" within the prescribed time without reasonable cause,16 the
IRS is authorized to detennine the tax consequences of the gift. 17 The penalty for failure
to make the required report within the prescribed time is 5% of the amount of the gift for
each month that the failure continues up to a maximum amount of 25%.18 A "foreign
gift" includes any amounts received fonn a person that is not a US person which the
recipient treats as a gift or bequest. 19
14Exceptions include the foreign-government related individuals, teachers, trainees, students and
professional athletes.
15 Section 6039F(a).
16 Section 6039F(c)(2).
17 Section 6039F(c)(1)(A).
18 Section 6039F(c)(1)(B).
19 Section 6039F(b).
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To determine whether the receipt of a gift from a foreign person is reportable the
IRS has decided to utilize different reporting thresholds for gift received from (i)
nonresident individuals and (ii) foreign entities.2o Reporting is required for a gift
received from a nonresident individual only if the aggregate amount of gifts exceeds
$100,000 per year.21 Once the $100,000 threshold has been met, a Form 3520 must be
filed and the donee of the gifts must separately identify each gift in excess of $5,000.22
However, the form does not require the identification of the donor. If a gift is received
from a foreign entity, reporting is required for gifts which exceed in the aggregate
$11,642.23 If the threshold amount is met, Form 3520 requires the donee to separately
identify all the gifts and the gifts are subject to recharacterization under the foreign
grantor ownership rules.
In calculating the threshold amount for a foreign individual, the U.S. person must
aggregate gifts from foreign persons that he knows or has reason to know are related with
the meaning of Section 643(i)(2)(B). This rule also applies for gifts from different
foreign persons if the U.S. person knows (or has reason to know) was acting as a nominee
for the foreign person.24
It should be noted, however, that Form 3520 is merely an informational return.
Reporting the gift is not determinative of its taxability. The reporting allows the Service
to argue that the gift was not a gift but rather disguised compensation. Generally
speaking, if you can identify the individual and they are foreign, the gift is not taxable.
B. Use of Trusts.
A less popular but better method of planning for U.S. immigration is the use of
foreign trusts. The establishment of a trust for the benefit of the individual and the family
members is an alternative to outright gifts prior to an individual becoming a US citizen or
domiciliary. The use of a trust can remove assets from the individual's estate and from
the estates of the individual's family members if those family members were to become
US citizens or residents.
20 Notice 97-34, 1997-1 CB 422.
21Id.
22 Id.
23 Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 IRB 623.
24 Notice 97-34, 1997-1 CB 422.
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Prior to the time an individual become a US citizen or domiciliary, the trust may
be revocable and amendable by the individual. However, if an individual becomes a US
citizen or domiciliary, the trust should be irrevocable. The trust should be established in
a non-US "tax haven" jurisdiction. To the extent that the trust is structured so that
transfers to the trust are completed before the .individual becomes a US citizen or
domiciliary, and its assets are not includible in the individual's estate for US estate tax
purposes, the assets can be removed from US transfer taxation.
In order to remove the trust assets from the US transfer taxation regime, no US
citizen or US domiciliary may retain any enforceable nondiscretionary interest, directly
or indirectly, in or to income or principal of the trust. The US person may only retain the
right of being one of a number of discretionary beneficiaries of the trust who can receive
distributions of the trust at the sole discretion of the trustee. If the trustee is an
independent trustee, the Service is less likely to assume that the US person had retained
an enforceable right to any of the trust proceeds. It is permissible to name one or more the
children of the US person as trustee. However, if any of those individuals are US persons
and are also beneficiaries, they cannot have unrestricted rights to distribute trust assets
without attracting US tax consequences. It should be noted that the ability to remove a
trustee and replace that trustee with an "independent trustee" should not, by itself, create
tax consequences.
The trust should say that once the individual is a US person it cannot be changed
or amended by the grantor at any time. Unlike US trust instruments, it is permissible to
have a "Trust Protector" named. The Trust Protector would have the power to amend the
trust within stated guidelines. A family member, spouse, parent or trusted advisor can
serve in that role. However, an employee of a corporation which is controlled by either
the trust or the individual cannot serve in that capacity. The trust instrument otherwise
would mirror the types ofprovisions in traditional US trusts with the proviso that the trust
must comply with the local law it adapts.
If the individual retains the ability to decide how the income and principal of a
trust is to be used, or the power to direct the trustee how to use it, the trust assets will be
includible in the individual's estate for US transfer tax purposes. This means that the
trusts must be managed in a manner that will not imply that the individual has reserved a
right to distributions from the trust through an implied understanding with the trustee.
Therefore, regular and consistent distributions of trust income or principal should be
avoided.
The objective of removing the non-US assets can be accomplished only (i) if the
transfers in trust occur before the individual becomes a US domiciliary for transfer tax
purposes, and if the initial transfer was to a revocable trust, the individual must cause the
trust to become irrevocable before they become a US domiciliary, (ii) if the trust is
properly structured so that assets transferred to the trust are completed gifts before the
individual becomes a US domiciliary and (iii) if the trust assets are not includible in the
individual's estate for US estate tax purposes.
Generally, a transfer of assets to a trust is treated as "complete" for US gift tax
purposes only if the owner of the property has given up control so that he has no power to
change the disposition of property. If, by the provisions of the trust instrument or
otherwise, the individual reserves any power over the disposition of the trust assets, the
transfer of the assets to the trust will remain subject to US transfer taxation. Similarly, if
the discretion of the trustee to distribute the income and principal of the trust to the
individual or the individual's descendants is limited so that a certain amount of trust
assets must be distributed to the individual during his or her life, all or a portion of the
trust assets will remain part of the individual's estate subject to US transfer taxation.
The trust assets will also be "includible" in the individual's estate if the individual
retains, directly or indirectly, (i) the possession or enjoyment of the income from the trust
property, (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or its income, or (iii) the right to direct
the trustee how to use the income or principal of the trust.25
Thus, the individual should not reserve or hold any of these types of rights or
powers over the trust property, either in the trust instrument or otherwise.26 For example,
if the individual holds any of the following powers (obviously this is not a complete list)
25 Commissioner v. Nevius, 76 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1935).
26 See, generally, 'Section 673-677.
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with respect to the trust it will cause the trust's assets to become subject to US transfer
taxation:
(1) a power to appoint, add or remove any beneficiary of the
trust;
(2) a general or special power to appoint trust income or
principal;
(3) a power to revoke, vary or amend the trust instrument or any
trusts or powers arising thereunder in whole or in part;
(4) any enforceable right, either express or implied, to a
beneficial interest in the income or principal of the trust or to
its payment in satisfaction of the grantor's legal obligations
or in favor or the grantor's pecuniary interest; and
(5) a power to restrict the exercise of any powers or discretions
of the trustee by requiring that they shall only be exercisable
with the grantor's consent or the consent of any other person
whom the grantor controls directly or indirectly.
An additional but often overlooked provision is that the IRS has taken the position
that the funding of the trust will not be considered a completed gift if the trust assets
remain subject to the grantor's creditors under applicable law. Thus, it is essential that
the trust be established in a non-US "tax haven" jurisdiction that has appropriate asset
protection laws, such as the Bahamas.
It will also be necessary for the grantor (once they are a US person), the trustee (if
they are a US person), and each US resident family member who receives distributions
from the trust to comply with the annual reporting requirements under US tax law.
If the grantor of the trust is not a US citizen or resident at the time the trust is
created, Sections 673 through 677 will not apply and the trust will not be treated as a
grantor trust for income tax purposes. The income of the trust will be taxed under the
normal US source income tax rules and the conduit principles governing trust taxation
under Subchapter J of the Code. Therefore, as a general rule, income from United States
sources that is accumulated in the trust is taxable to the trust, and income that is
distributed to a US beneficiary is taxable to the beneficiary regardless of the source of the
Income.
Accumulation distributions from foreign trusts are treated differently than
accumulation distributions from domestic trusts in two respects. First, in a foreign trust,
a nondeductible annual accumulation interest surcharge is payable by the US beneficiary
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of an accumulated distribution.27 Second, accumulated capital gaIns are treated as
ordinary income when distributed to the US beneficiary.28 Because of these
disadvantages to accumulation of income in foreign trusts, it may be prudent to distribute
all income of a foreign non-grantor trust currently unless it is anticipated that US
beneficiaries will never receive accumulated income distributions.
c. Dispositions ofForeign Investments in US Real Property.
Non resident aliens and foreign corporations are subject to federal income tax on
dispositions ofUS real property interests ("PI"). Any gain or loss on those dispositions is
treated as effectively connected with a US trade or business of the foreign person.29 The
amount of gain or loss on the disposition of a PI is determined under Section 1001(a).3o
A US real property interest means: (i) an interest in real property located in the
US or the Virgin Islands,31 (ii) any interest in a domestic corporation.32 The transferee
must deduct and withhold 10% of the amount of realized upon the disposition of a US
real property interest by a foreign person.33 If two or more persons are joint transferees
of a PI, each person is subject to the obligation to withhold. The transferees duty to
withhold and the amount to be withheld are not affected by the amount of cash actually
paid to the transferee.34 · The amount to be withheld cannot exceed the transferor's
maximum tax liability with respect to the transfer of a PI as determined by the IRS.35
The IRS must determine the transferor's maximum tax liability on request of either the
transferor or the transferee.36 Generally, the transferor's maximum tax liability is the
sum of the maximum amount of US income tax that could be imposed with respect to the
disposition of the PI plus the amount the IRS determines to be the transferor's unsatisfied
withholding liability with respect to the PI.37
27 Sections 667(a)(3) and 668.
28 Section 643(a)(6)(C).
29 Section 897(a)(1).
30 However, the nomecognition provisions of Section 897(d) or (e) are applicable.
31 Regs. Section 1.897-1(d)(1).
32 Unless certain requirements under Section 897 are met.
33 Section 1445.
34 Reg. Section 1.1445-1(b)(1).
35 Section 1445(c)(1)(A).
36 Section 1445(c)(1)(B).
37 Section 1445(f)(4).
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The maximum amount of tax that a transferor would be required to pay on the
disposition is more likely than not the contract price of the property less its adjusted basis
multiplied by the maximum income tax rate applicable to the transferor on long-term
capital gain.38 Once again, the transferees may request a maximum tax liability
determination before or after the transfer of a PI. Nonetheless, transferees may request a
maximum tax liability determination only to cure overwithholding errors. The Service is
required to act on a request for a determination of a taxpayer's maximum tax liability
within 90 days after it receives the request.39
There are a number of exemptions to the general rule which require a withholding
of 10% of the amount realized by a transferor on the disposition of PI. First, if the
transferor supplies an affidavit to the transferee stating the transferor's US taxpayer
identification number and that he is not a foreign person, then withholding is not
required.40 It is recommended by the author that a nonforeign affidavit should be
obtained.
The nonforeign affidavit must be present at or before the transfer to be valid. The
regulations give examples of acceptable language that can be used.41 A foreign person
for this purpose is a nonresident individual, a foreign corporation, a foreign partnership or
a foreign trust, but not a US resident or a foreign corporation that has elected to be treated
as a domestic corporation under Section 897(i).
The receipt of a nonforeign affidavit will not relieve the transferee of its
withholding responsibility if it had knowledge that the affidavit was false or if it received
notice that the affidavit was false.
Second, there is no withholding requirement on a disposition of an interest in a
US corporation if the US corporation furnishes an affidavit to the transferee of the
interest stating that the corporation is not and has not been a US real property holding
company. The non-USRPHC (US real property holding corporation) affidavit has the
same requirements as stated above for the nonforeign affidavit.
38 Reg. Section 1.144503(c)(2).
39 Section 1445(c)(3)(B).
40 Section 1445(b)(2).
41 Reg. Section 1.1445-2(b)(2)(iii).
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Third, under Section 1445(b)(5), withholding is not applicable to a disposition of
a PI if the property is used by the transferee as his residence and the amount realized does
not exceed $300,000. A PI is deemed as a residence if on the date of transfer, the
transferee has made a determination to reside at the property for at least one-half of the
number of days that the property is used by any individual during the first two years
following the transfer. If the transferee relies on this exception and does not withhold
and does in fact not reside at the property the requisite number of days, will be liable for
the failure to withhold is the transferor was a foreign person who did not pay the full tax
upon transfer. This exception does not appty if the transferee is not an individual.
Fourth, under Section 1445(b)(6), no withholding is required if you sell shares of
stock that are regularly traded on an established securities market. This stands true even
if the sale or disposition is the result of an IPO. Withholding is required on the
acquisition ofover 5% of a nonpublic interest in a public corporation.42
Fifth, if the US, a State or political subdivision of the US acquires the property, no
withholding is required.43
Sixth, if the amount realized on the sale is zero, no withholding is required.44
Additionally, no withholding is required when the transfer is a nonrecognition
transaction, and certain requirements are met.45 For this exemption to apply, the
transferee must have total nonrecognition. If this is the case, the transferee must apply
for a certificate with the IRS.46
A foreign corporation recognizes gain, regardless of any nonrecognition provision
of the Code, on the distribution of a PI in an amount equal to the excess of the fair market
value of the interest over its adjusted basis, except to the extent otherwise provided in the
regulations.47
42 Treas. Reg. Section 1.1445-2(c)(2).
43 Treas. Reg. Section 1.1445-2(d)(5).
44 Treas. Reg. Section 1.1445-2(d)(8).
45 Treas. Reg. Section 1.1445-2(d)(2)(i)(A).
46 Treas. Reg. Section 1.1445-2(d)(2)(i)(B).
47Section 897(d)(l).
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Generally, the best way for foreign individuals to own US property is through a
domestic LLC or other related entity. This will allow the foreign individual to no be
subjected to the withholding requirements.
II. Planning for the Non-Citizen Spouse
A. Background.
The availability of the unlimited federal estate and gift tax marital deduction is
restricted by Section 5033 of TAMRA48 where the recipient spouse or the donee spouse
is not a U.S. citizen. Section 2056A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code")
places substantial burdens and restrictions on recipient noncitizen spouses and actually
discriminates against noncitizen spouses rather than equalizing the tax treatment afforded
citizen and noncitizen spouses.
It should be noted that the rules under Section 2056A of the Code remain
important both during the period prior to the repeal of the estate and generation-skipping
transfer taxes and the implementation of the carryover basis regime in 2010.49 In the
implementation of the new carryover basis regime, the 2001 TRA enacted a new section
1022.50 Section 1022 will permit a decedent's estate to increase the basis of assets
transferred, as determined on an asset-by-asset basis, by up to a total of $1,300,000. This
amount will further be increase the basis of assets by the amount of the decedent's
unused capital losses, net operating losses, and certain built-in losses. Unlike current
law, Section 1022 will allow an additional $3,000,000 increase to the basis of outright
transfer of property and qualified terminable interest property transferred to a surviving
spouse, regardless ofcitizenship. Section 1022 also allows nonresident aliens to increase
the basis of the property up to another $60,000. However, in no case may the basis of an
asset be adjusted above its fair market value.
48This Act was amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
49 2001 Tax Relief Act, P.L. 107-16.
50 Effective as of2010.
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B. General Rules.
In calculating the federal estate tax of a decedent, the value of the gross estate is
reduced, subject to the application of the tenninable interest rules of Section 2056(b) of
the Code, by the value of all property passing to a surviving spouse.51 If the surviving
spouse is not a U.S. citizen at the date of death of the decedent spouse, no marital
deduction is allowed to the decedent spouse's estate unless such property passes to the
surviving spouse in a QDOT. The regulations52 provide two requirements. First, the
property must pass from the decedent to either (a) a QDOT described in section 2056A
and Regs. Section 20.0256A-2; (b) a trust that, although meeting all the requirements for
a QDOT, is refonned after the decedent's death to meet the requirements ofa QDOT; (c)
the surviving spouse not in a trust and, prior to the date that the estate tax return is filed
and during the time that the QDOT election may be made53 the surviving spouse either
actually transfers the property to a QDOT or irrevocably assigns the property to a QDOT;
or (d) a plan or other arrangement that would have qualified for the marital deduction had
the surviving spouse been a U.S. citizen, and whose payments are not assignable or
transferable to a QDOT, if the requirements of Regs. Section 20.2056A-4(c) are met.
Second, the personal representative or the executor, as the case may be, of the decedent
spouse's estate must make a timely QDOT election under Regs. Section 20.2056A-3.
1. Jointly Held Property.
In the case ofjointly held property when both spouses are U.S. citizens, the value
of property titled jointly with the right of survivorship or as tenants by the entireties is
included in the gross estate of the first joint tenant to die except to the extent that the
personal representative or the executor of the estate can demonstrate that the surviving
joint tenant supplied the consideration for the property. Only one-half of the value of the
property is included in the decedent's estate where the property was acquired by the joint
tenants by gift, devise, bequest or inheritance.54 If a personal representative or an
executor can demonstrate that such property was not acquired entirely with consideration
51 Section 2056(a); Regs. Section 20.2056(a)-l(a).
52 Regs. Section 20.2056A-l(a).
53 No more than one year after the time prescribed by law, including extensions, for filing the return.
54 Section 2040(a); Regs. Section 20.2040-1(a)(l), (2).
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furnished by the decedent, or was acquired by the decedent and the other joint owners by
gift, bequest, devise or inheritance.55 Property that was owned as tenants by the
entireties by the decedent and the decedent's spouse under section 2040(b) only one-half
of the value of the property is included in the decedent's estate regardless of the amount
of consideration furnished by the decedent.
TAMRA made section 2040(b) inapplicable to the estate of a decedent spouse
where the surviving spouse is not a U.S. citizen.56 A decedent's personal representative
or executor must trace the consideration provided by each spouse in order to determine
how much of the property must be included in the decedent's gross estate. Only the
portion of the value of a jointly held property interest is includible in a decedent's gross
estate.57 As is the case with most estates, the decedent's estate bears the burden of proof
regarding the consideration furnished by the decedent and the surviving joint tenant.58
There is limited relief under OBRA 1989 for interests acquired by the decedent
and the non-resident spouse prior to July 14, 1988. If the only reason that the "half-half'
rule under section 2040(b) is inapplicable solely by reason of the TAMRA changes, then
in this limited circumstance the rules of TAMRA will not apply because the property will
be treated as a gift to the nonresident spouse. It should be noted that this rule only
applies if the resident spouse provided the consideration for the property. Under the
language of OBRA 198959, if the noncitizen spouse provided the consideration and dies
first, the rule would not apply and the property would be fully includable in the resident
spouse's estate.
2. When Surviving Spouse Becomes a U.S. Citizen
The disallowance of the estate tax marital deduction under section 2056(d) will
not apply and the regular marital deduction rules of section 2056(a) will apply to the
estate of the decedent spouse if two conditions are met: (1) the surviving spouse
becomes a U.S. citizen prior tot the day on which the decedent's federal estate tax return
is made; and (2) the surviving spouse is a U.S. resident at all times after the date of death
55Id.
56 Section 2056(d)(1)(B); Regs. Setion 20.2056A-8(a)(1).
57 Regs. Section 20.2056A-8(a)(3). See, e.g., PLR 9551014.
58 Regs. Section 20.2041-1(a)(2).
59 See, Section 7815(d)(16).
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of the decedent spouse and before becoming a u.s. citizen.6o The provisions of section
2056(d)(4) are limited in that the surviving spouse must actually become a U.S. citizen
prior to the date in which the federal estate tax return is filed. Application for citizenship
is insufficient.61
c. How to Qualify as a QDOT.
The statute and the regulations clearly set out the requirements for qualification as
a QDOT. In the most general terms, there are three main concepts that are addressed: (1)
the marital deduction requirements; (2) the statutory requirements; and (3) the collection
requirements.
1. Marital Deduction Requirements.
There are three different methods by which the marital deduction requirements
can be satisfied. Which method you use depends on the type of property and the manner
it passes to the surviving spouse.
First, if property passes directly from a decedent spouse to a QDOT, the QDOT
trust must qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction under section 2056(b)(5)62,
section 2056(b)(7)63, section 2056(b)(8)64, or Regs. Section 20.2056(c)-2(b)(I)(i)-(iii).65
Second, if property passes outright to the noncitizen spouse, the property must be
irrevocably assigned to a trust which meets the statutory and collection requirements
infra. The transfer of such property to a QDOT must take place prior to the filing of
federal estate tax return and before the due date of the QDOT election. It should be noted
that in this scenario, the surviving noncitizen spouse is deemed the transferor of the
property. Thus, the QDOT need not meet the requirements mentioned above. In fact, the
60 A "resident" is a resident for purposes of the federal estate tax. See Reg. 20.0-1(b)(1), Khan Estate v.
Comr., T.e. Memo 1998-22.
61 See PLR 9021037. See also, IRS rejection ofT.D. 8612,60 Fed. Reg. 43531 (April 22, 1995) (filing an
application for naturalization within a reasonable time after death then late filing return pending outcome
should be reasonable cause under section 6651).
62 A life estate with power of appointment.
63 As a QTIP.
64 A charitable remainder trust with the surviving spouse as the only noncharitable beneficiary.
65 An estate trust. An estate trust is a form of a marital trust specifically sanctioned by the regulations. The
estate trust allows for the accumulation of some portion or all of the trust income, provided that any such
accumulated income must be paid over to the surviving spouse's estate upon death.
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surviving noncitizen spouse does not even need to retain the right to income or principal.
However, if the surviving noncitizen spouse retains customary marital trust rights the
trust would be included in the surviving noncitizen spouse's estate upon death. There are
therefore unique planning opportunities for the surviving noncitizen spouse if property is
passed through an outright bequest or devise.
Third, if property passes under a plan or arrangement (e.g. an annuity), such
property will be treated as satisfying the marital deduction rules, the statutory rules, and
the collection rules if the special rules under Regs. section 20.2056A-4(c) are satisfied.
2. Statutory Requirements.
A. Trustee.
Section 2056A(a)(1) requires in order for a trust to qualify as a QDOT, the trust
instrument must require that at least one trustee be an individual who is a u.S. citizen or a
domestic corporation. Additionally, the trust instrument must provide that no distribution
(other than income) may be made from the trust unless a U.S. trustee "has the right to
withhold from such distribution the QDOT tax imposed on such distribution.66 However,
regarding the requirements of a marital deduction, the provisions under section 2056A
are explicit that the ability of the U.S. trustee to withhold from any distribution the
QDOT tax would not cause the QDOT to meet the requirements of section 2056(b)(5)
and 2056(b)(7).67
If the U.S. trustee is a domestic corporation the corporation must be created or
organized under the laws of the United States or the laws of any state or the District of
Columbia.68 Most banks and trust companies qualify as a domestic corporation for the
QDOT provisions.
If the trustee is a U.S. citizen, the individual must have a tax home69 in the United
States. Section 162(a)(2) is the definitional for the term "tax home." It should be noted
66 Section 2056A(a)(1)(B).
67 Section 2056A(b)(14). See also PLR 9620015.
68 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(c).
69 See Section 911(d)(3).
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that maintenance of a home in the United States by the individual is not conclusive proof
that the individual's abode in the in the United States.70
B. Withholding Requirement.
In order to qualify a trust for QDOT status, the trust instrument must provide that
no distribution (other than income) may be made from the trust unless the U.S. Trustee
has the right to withhold the amount of any QDOT tax imposed on such disposition.71
The requirement on the trustee is not necessarily to withhold. Rather, the only
requirement is that the trustee be allowed to withhold. Practically speaking, if the trust is
not liquid, the trustee should withhold the tax due or the trustee runs the risk of not have
sufficient liquid assets to pay the tax at the appropriate time. However, if the trustee is
going to withhold, a discussion with the nonresident spouse would appear necessary to
inform them of the net distributed amount rather than the gross amount.
c. Elections by the Personal Representative/Executor.
The personal representative/executor of the decedent's estate must may an
election to treat the trust as a QDOT. This election must be made on the Form 706
federal estate tax return.72 Once the .election is made, it is irrevocable.73 The timing of
the election provides that one has until the last federal estate tax return filed before the
due date, including extensions. If a timely return is not filed, on the first return filed after
the due date, provided, however, that in no event may the election be made more than one
year after the time prescribed by law for filing such return.74
The personal representative/executor of the estate is not required to make a
QDOT election of the entire trust. It is permissible to make an election to treat as a
QDOT specific portions of an entire trust that would otherwise qualify for the marital
deduction but for the marital deduction limitations of section 2056(d). If a trust is
70 Regs. section 1.911-2(b).
71 Section 2056A(a)(l)(B).
72 Sections 2056A(a)(3) and 2056A(d); Regs. section 20.2056A-3(a) and (d).
73 Regs. Section 20.2056A-3(a).
74 Section 2056A(d)
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actually divided in accordance with the applicable requirements of section 2056(b)(7), a
QDOT election may be made for anyone or more the separate trustS.75
The personal representative/executor may also make a protective QDOT election
if at the time the federal estate tax return is filed, the personal representative/executor
reasonably believes there is a concern that (a) the residency or citizenship of the decedent
is at issue; (b) the citizenship of the surviving spouse is at issue; (c) an asset is includible
in the decedent's estate; or (d) the amount or nature of the property that the noncitizen
spouse is due to receive is at issue.76 The regulations couch these concerns as "bona fide
issues." The protective election must meet all the timing requirements as an authorized
QDOT election.77 The requirement of a protective election should be examined with
thoroughness. The requirements are quite strict and are irrevocable once made.
D. Trust situs and trust administration.
As we discussed earlier, to qualify as a QDOT the trust must be maintained under
the laws of a State or the District of Columbia. For purposes of QDOT qualification,
maintenance revolves around record keeping. Second, the choice of law of the trust must
elect a state.78
The QDOT must also be an "ordinary trust" as defined in Regs. Section
301.7701-4(a). This issue only may arise if an active trade or business constitutes a large
portion of the QDOT assets. It has been known for a trust to be treated as an association
rather than a trust under certain circumstances.
3. Collection requirement of the QDOT Tax.
The reason there are the aforementioned requirements is to ensure that the
collection of the QDOT tax upon the distribution of assets (other than income) is made.
As always, Congress was concerned about the ability to collect taxes once money has left
the U.S. Therefore, in addition to the trust requirements, there are trustee requirements
75 Regs. 20.2056A-3(b). See PLR 9505007. But see, 58 Fed. Reg. 305 (the Preamble to the proposed
regulations stated that such partial elections were not authorized by statute).
76 Regs. section 20.2056A-3(c).
77 Regs. section 20.2056A-4. A protective election is in addition to, not in lieu of, the requirements of a
QDOT election.
78 If the trust was executed outside of the U.S., it must elect to use a State of the Union's law. Regs. section
20.2056A-2(a).
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that tum on the size of the QDOT trust. In order to qualify as a QDOT, the trust must
contain specific language in the governing instrument which will satisfy various
provisions. The service has provided model language in Rev. Proc. 96-54,79 to ensure
that the trust instruments are properly drafted. It is recommended that the trustee be
given the power to amend the trust to meet the requirements of section 2056A, any
applicable treasury regulations, any administrative pronouncements made by the service
and any court decisions.
The initial inquiry for the collection requirements revolves around the size of the
QDOT. The value of the QDOT assets will determined the value of the bond or letter of
credit needed in order to satisfy the Bond Requirement80 or Letter of Credit
Requirement.81
A. Large QDOT's vs. Small QDOT's
For purposes of the collection requirements, the regulations divide QDOTs into
two categories. Category one are QDOTs having assets at the date of the decedent's
death of $2,000,000 or less ("Small QDOTs") and category two are QDOTs having assets
in excess of $2,000,000 ("Large QDOTs). This asset determination is based on the
values as of the state of death (or the alternate valuation date, if appljcable) without any
reduction for any indebtedness of such assets.82 If there is an adjustment on audit to
cause a Small QDOT to now be classified as a Large QDOT, the trustee has up to 60 days
to comply with the more stringent trustee requirements discussed infra.
There is a personal residence exclusion from the Small QDOT/Large QDOT
determination. In determining whether the $2,000,000 threshold is met, the personal
representative/executor may elect to exclude up to $600,000 in value attributable to real
property, wherever situated, as well as related furnishings, that are directly owned by the
QDOT.83 The term personal residence refers to the surviving spouse's principal
residence84 and one other residence of the surviving spouse.85 It should be noted that the
79 1996-2 C.B. 336.
80 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(1)(i)(B).
81 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(1)(i)(C).
82 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(1)(i) and (ii).
83 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(iv)(A).
84 As defmed in former Section 1034.
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residence may be located in or outside the U.S. but it must be available to the surviving
noncitizen spouse at all times and may not be rented. Additionally, the residence must be
owned by the QDOT. Land interests held by limited partnerships, ect., do not qualify.
This election does carry a potential pitfall for the unwary. If the residence ceases to be a
personal residence or it is sold during the term of the QDOT, the election no longer
applies (unless the proceeds are reinvested in a new personal residence within 12 months)
a informational filing must be made which also includes extensive information about the
assets held in the QDOT and their value.86 Besides the disclosure requirement, if the
QDOT was classified as a Small QDOT and the inclusion of the proceeds trigger Large
QDOT status, the additional security requirements must then be adhered to.
B. Large QDOTs.
If the QDOT meets the Large QDOT definition (over $2,000,000), the bank
trustee requirement,87 the bond requirement,88 or the letter of credit requirement89 must be
met. Under the regulations, the QDOT may post any of the aforementioned
requirements.
Under the bank trustee requirement, the trust instrlljIDent must require that during
the QDOT term at least one U.S. trustee be a bank.9o This is an easy requirement to meet
for a trust. However, not all individuals desire to have a corporate fiduciary.
Under the bond requirement, the QDOT must require that the U.S. trustee furnish
a bond in favor of the IRS in an amount equal to 65% of the fair market value of the
assets without reduction by reason of indebtedness. It should be noted that if the personal
representative/executor of the estate elects the personal residence exception, supra, that
there could be an increase in the bond amount if the QDOT no longer qualifies for the
exemption. As always, the bond must be "real." The bond must have satisfactory surety
8S Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(iv)(D).
86 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(I)(iv)(F) and (d)(3)(i).
87 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(I)(i)(A).
88 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(I)(i)(B).
89 Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)( 1)(i)(C).
90 Under the Section 581 defmition.
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and is subject to IRS review.91 As one can easily see, these requirements can become
costly for the fiduciary.
The final security alternative is the U.S. trustee's ability to furnish an irrevocable
letter of credit. The letter must be issued by a section 581 bank, a U.S. branch of a
foreign bank or a foreign bank described in section 581. The amount of the letter of
credit is 65% of the fair market value of the trust assets without reduction by reason of
indebtedness.92
c. Small QDOTs
As is the case with Large QDOTs, the Small QDOTs (trusts with less than
$2,000,000 in assets) must meet either the bank trustee requirement, the bond
requirement or the letter of credit requirement. In addition to these requirements, there is
a fourth alternative, the foreign real property requirement.
The foreign real property requirement is satisfied where the governIng trust
document provides that no more than 35% of the fair market value of the trust assets as
determined on the last day of the QDOTs taxable year annually, consists of real property
located outsider of the U.S. This exception is very important for the common Small
QDOT. If the trust holds no property outside of the U.S., it can satisfy the collection
requirements. Therefore, it is quite common in these circumstances to prohibit the trust
from owning non-U.S. situs property.
Be aware, however, that there is a "look through rule" in the determination of the
35% threshold. The rule was designed to prohibit trusts from hiding the true value of
assets by owning shares in foreign entities. The rule is applicable when a trust either (a)
owns 20% or more of the voting stock or value of a corporation with 15 or fewer
shareholders, or (b) owns 20% or more of the capital interest of a partnership with 15 or
fe'Yer partners. In either case theQDOT is treated as holding a pro rata share of all assets
owned by such entity. Because this valuation determination does not tum on the value of
the share but on the proportionate value of the underlying assets, valuation discounts
might not be applicable.
91 For an example ofa form bond see Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(l)(i)(B)(2).
92 For an example of a form letter of credit see Regs. section 20.2056A-2(d)(l)(i)(C)(2) and (3).
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4. Annual Reporting Requirements.
The U.S. trustee must file an information report in any year the QDOT satisfies
anyone of the following two items. A QDOT relying on the foreign real property
requirement in order to satisfy the collection requirements owns or is deemed to own
through any applicable look-through rules, any foreign real estate on the last day of the
taxable year. The personal residence which was previously subject to the personal
residence exception was sold and not replaced during the trusts taxable year.
D. Estate Tax Consequences.
The QDOT tax is imposed on certain distributions from a QDOT during the life of
the noncitizen spouse and upon the remaining trust assets at the date of death of the
noncitizen spouse. Furthermore, if the trust ceases to meet the requirements on collection
(i.e., bank requirements, letter of credit), the QDOT tax will be imposed as if the
surviving spouse died on the date the trust ceased to qualify as a QDOT.93 If a taxable
event occurs, the QDOT tax is imposed on the amount of money and the fair market
value of the property that is then distributed. This includes any amount withheld from the
distribution to pay the tax like a net gift.
The amount of the tax due is equal to the federal estate tax that would have been
imposed under section 2001 on the estate of the decedent spouse had the decedent's
taxable estate been increased by the sum of the (i) the amount of property involved in the
taxable event and (ii) the aggregate ofprevious taxable events then reduced by the federal
estate tax which would have been imposed on the decedent's spouse's estate had it been
increased by the amount of the prior taxable events.94 This can result in a movement
through the brackets of the estate tax due.
Example
Carl who is a U.S. citizen died in 1997 with a gross estate of $1,200,000. Under
his will $700,000 passed to Canada his spouse in a QDOT. Carl's estate tax ~ould be
computated as follows. Gross estate ($1,200,000) less the marital deduction ($700,000)
93 Section 2056A(b)(4).
94 Section 2056A(b)(2)(A).
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equals a taxable estate of $500,000. The gross estate tax on $500,000 was $155,000. In
1997, the unified credit amount was $155,800. Therefore, no estate tax was due.
At Canada's death, assume the QDOT did not appreciate in value. The
computation of her estate tax would be as follows. Carl's actual taxable estate was
$500,000. The QDOT was $700,000 for a total of $1,200,000. The gross tax on
$1,200,000 was $427,800. The current unified credit amount is $192,800. Thus, the net
tax is $235,000 ($427,800 - $192,800). From $235,000 we would subtract the amount
that would have been imposed on Carl's taxable estate of $500,000. This amount is $0.
Thus the deferred estate tax was $235,000.
There is an exception in the QDOT rules for so-called "hardship" distributions.
These distributions are not subject to the imposition of the QDOT tax. There is no
definition of "hardship" in the statute, legislative history or the instructions to the tax
return. The regulations do provide a general definition by referencing a second
regulation dealing with the distributions from deferred compensation plans. Generally
speaking, a distribution is on account of hardship if it is made on account of an
immediate and substantial financial need relating to health, maintenance, education, or
support taking into account all other resources available to the surviving spouse. Sounds
a lot like the ascertainable standard definition.
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I. Ethical Issues: Where to go for help.
A. Ethics Hot Line
1. SCR 3.130 provides that any attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety
ofhis/her own conduct may request an informal or fonnal advisory
opinion. The Ethics Hot Line Committee has been established to provide
a resource for attorneys seeking informal advisory opinions. See attached
list ofKBA Ethics Hotline Committee members or visit www.kybar.org.
2. Although both formal and informal opinions are advisory, no attorney
shall be disciplined for any professional act performed in reliance upon an
advisory opinion from the Ethics Hot Line, provided that hislher petition
clearly, accurately and completely states his/her contemplated professional
act. SCR 3.130(3).
3. All inquiries treated as confidential.
B. Formal Ethics Opinion.
1. Reserved for questions of "sufficient importance," as detennined by the
Chair of either the Ethics or Unauthorized Practice Committees.
2. Prepared by Ethics Committee and approved by three-fourths majority of
Board of Governors.
3. Published in Kentucky Bench & Bar.
c. Selected Resources Materials
1. Eberle and Underwood, Kentucky Legal Ethics Opinions and Professional
Responsibility Deskbook (2nd ed. 1999).
2. ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (4th ed.1999).
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3. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
4. Mallen and Smith, Legal Malpracti.ce (5 th ed. 2000).
5. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics.
II. Conflicts of Interest.
A. Trust and estate practitioners frequently find themselves in situations involving
multiple representations where the conflicts in the various parties' interests may
be subtle, shifting and, at times, difficult to recognize.
B. SCR 3.130(l.7)(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect
the relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
C. SCR 3.130(1.7)(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyers responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. WI,ell represelltatioll ofInultiple
cliellts ill a sillgle nlatter is ul,dertakel', ti,e consultatioll s/lall illclude
explallatioll Ofti,e ilnplicatiollS ofCOlnm011 represel'ltatiol'l alld ti,e
advalltages and risks illvolved. (emphasis added)
D. Conflict situations may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A
lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as
husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest
may arise. In estate administration, the identity of the client may be unclear
under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view, the client is the estate or trust, including its
beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties
involved. SCR 3.130 (1.7), Comment 12.
E. SCR 3.130(2.2) Intennediary
(a) A lawyer may only act as an intennediary between clients if:
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(1) The lawyer consults with each client~oncerning the implications
of the common representation, including the advantages and risks
involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and
obtains each client's consent to the common representation;
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client
will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter
and that there is little risk ofmaterial prejudice to the interests of
any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsucce,ssful;
and
(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making
them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if
any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon
withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the
matter that was the subject of the representation.
F. SCR 3.130(1.9), which addresses conflicts of interests between new clients
whose interests are materially adverse to those of a fonner client, may be
significant for trust and estate lawyers who are asked to perform work for other
family members and it is often difficult to detennine when a representation is
"complete," thus triggering a Rule 1.9 analysis, rather than a Rule 1.7 analysis.
III. Client Communication and Confidences.
A. SCR 3.130 (1.4) Communication
(a) A lawyer should keep a client reasonably infonned about the status ofa
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer should explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make infonned decisions regarding the representation.
B. SCR 3.130 (1.6) Confidentiality of Infonnation
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
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impliedly authorized to carry of the representation, and except as stated in
paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm or
'(2) To establish a claim or defense on behalfof the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or,
(3) To comply with other law or a court order.
IV. Client Under a Disability.
A. SCR 3.130(1.14)(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with the representation is impaired whether because of
[minority] age, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far
as reasonably possible, maintain a nonnal client-lawyer relationship with the
client.
B. SCR3.130(1.1.4)(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take
other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonable
believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.
V. Who is the Client?
A. Opinion KBA £-401 adopts the majority view, set forth in ABA Formal Ope 94-
380 (1994), that alawyer who represents a fiduciary does not also represent the
beneficiaries.
B. Identity of the client may also be implicated where client is under a disability,
where conflict arises between the interests of a new client and a former client or
where a third party engages the attorney to represent the interests of a family
member.
VI. SCR 3.130 (1.8) Conflict of Interests: Prohibited Transactions
A. SCR 3.130(1.8)(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer
or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial
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gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related
to the donee.
B. SCR 3.180 (1.8)(a) prohibition against self-dealing or SCR 3.130 (1.7) may be
triggered where attorney makes referrals for insurance, financial planning or other
services where attorney or his/her family member has a financial interest in such
services or where the referral is to another client of the attorney.
VII. Competence.
A. SCR 3.130(1.1) A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
B. Includes knowledge ofcomplex tax laws and other aspects of estate planning and
fiduciary administration.
VIII. SCR 3.130 (1.15) Safekeeping Property applies to an attorney's conduct in the
administration of estates and trusts.
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Ethics Hotline CQrnmittee
Kentucky Bar Association
ETHICS HOTLINE COMMITTEE
This service is limited to members of the Kentucky Bar Association, who may request
guidance only as to !b~ir_9~;t1 contemplated conduct. Pursuant to ~.~-=-R.!-_~~5:iQ., advisory
ethics opinions may be informal or formal. Inquirie~ to Hotline committee members
ordinarily will result in a telephonic answer and a written informal letter opinion. Formal
opinions are reserved for issues of general importance and are subject to approval of the
Board of Governors. For an informal Hotline opinion, please contact a committee
member listed in your District.
****
Donald L. Burnett, Jr., Chair
(Call the Chair for a formal written ethics opinion only)
(502) 852-6095
I Ethics Hotline Committee I
I
Supreme Court
I Committee Member II
City
II
Telephone
I
District
I 1 IIRIchard C. Roberts "Paducah II (270) 443-4516 I
I 2 11KevIn C. Brooks IIBowlIng Green II (270) 781-8111 1
I
I Judge BenJamm L. IGlaSgOW II
(270) 651-8469
I
Dickinson
I 3 IIWIllIs G. Coffey IIMount Vernon II (606) 256-4405 I
I IIJennIfer NIcholson IILondon II (606) 877-6677 I
I 4 111. MIchael Brown J1LouIsville II (502) 562-7323 I
I IISheldon G. GIlman IILouisvi1le
"
(502) 589-4215 I
I IjMIke O'~onne1l IILouIsvIlle 1\ (502) 584-7196 1
I IIRebecca F. Schupbach IILouIsvIlle II (502) 587-3400 ,
I
Ie. Laurence Woods, III ILOUisville
I
(502) 568-0288 or
(502) 589-5400 ext.
8288
I 5 IIDavId L. Bohannon ItRIchlriond II (859) 623-3728 I
I IIDe11 LIttrell IILexIngton 11(859) 233-2661 ext. 1561
I IIRobert J. Turley IILexIngton II (859) 254-4739 I
I 6 IIMarcus Carey IlBr1anger II (859) 727-8005 I
I IIThomas Rouse IICovlngton II (859) 291-4060 1
I
7 raul FranklIn HeaberlIn IIp t b
11
(606) 886-1615
1
(Frank) res ons urg
I I[MIchael KeVIn Lett IIAshland 11 (606) 329-2121 I
Kentucky Bar Association Navigational Bar
HAdvertising II CLE II ConIDlittees II Honle II IOLTA/Bar Foundation II
it KBA Departments II Links II Melnber Benefits HSections II SCR 3.0 II
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Assisting with Ethical Dilemmas
Kentucky Bar Association
Assisting with Ethical Dilemmas
The KBA provides members with assistance in determining appropriate ethical conduct, and with
opinions defining the unauthorized practice of law. The Ethics and Unauthorized Practice
Committees of the KBA may issue fonnal opinions on these subjects upon request from members.
The Board ofGovernors and the Supreme Court review and approve formal opinions as educational
guides for members of the profession and public. All requests for formal ethics and unauthorized
practice opinions should be made in writing and addressed to the Chair of the appropriate committee
at the Kentucky Bar Center. The Bar Counsel sta'ff will assist you in locating published formal
opinions.
Members may obtain personal advice about their own contemplated future conduct by means of an
infonnal ethics opinion. The KBA has established an Ethics Hotlille staffed with trained volunteers in
each Supreme Court District. These volunteers work under the direction of the Ethics Committee and
are authorized to provide advice promptly upon request to members who wish to determine the
ethical course to take in a situation. The informal opinion, ifbased upon an accurate statement of the
facts, and followed, can serve as a defense to a later complaint of misconduct which arises from the
same facts.
Kentucky Bar Association
Assisting Y00 With Professional
and Personal Dilemmas
The KBA is continually aware of the many professional and personal dilemmas lawyers may face.
To assist you with these various problems, the association h'\s developed several committees
including Lawyers Helping Lawyers and Of Counsel.
La,vyers Helping Lawyers is a program to help members with alcohol and drug abuse problems
that may interfere with their personal and professional lives. For nlore information, call 502-875-
1303 or 502-564-3795 . All calls are confidential.
The Of Counsel Committee was created to assist lawyers in achieving professional goals and to
improve the quality of their professional lives. The committee is made up of a statewide network of
lawyers who are willing to discuss fears or concerns that may affect your practice. For information
on the OfCounsel Conlmittee nlembers in your area call the KBA Accounting/Menlbership office at
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SECTION I - PLANNING FOR THE DISABLED
I. Introduction.
The most important work we do is help parents plan for the future of their
children. Generally, this means seeing that surrogate parental guidance will be
provided and that funds will be available and properly managed until such time as the
children have been educated and have become responsible adults. The issues for
parents with disabled children, though similar in many aspects to the issues facing
parents of children without disabilities, are also much more difficult.
A. Information necessary before planning.
We start the planning process for parents of a disabled child the same way we
begin planning for any family. We determine what the family objectives are and we
ferret out information regarding their assets and how they are held. We add to that
information regarding the disabled child. Planning for a mildly disabled child who may
not qualify for government benefits but who has limited earning capacity may vary
greatly from the plan designed for a severely disabled child who may depend entirely on
government benefits. Answering the following questions may help you make realistic
plans for the child's well being within the context of the entire family's needs and
resources. In addition to all the usual questions, you need to ask:
1. The nature and degree of the mental and/or physical disability and
when it began.
2. The personality and behavioral traits of the disabled child.
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3. The capabilities and limitations of the child.
4. The special medical needs of the child and how they are provided.
5. The educational level of the child and future educational plans.
6. The work history or work potential of the child.
7. The child's present living arrangements and plans for future living
arrangements.
8. Money in trusts for or owned by the child and its source:
inheritance, gifts, or personal injury award.
9. Available medical insurance coverage for the child or
Medicaid/Medicare status of the child.
10. Amounts and sources of income available to the child now and
anticipated.
11. Other financial arrangements made for the child by other relatives.
12. The personal legal status of the child .
.B. Additional considerations for disabled children.
1. Disabled children have to have provisions for their entire lives.
2. Identifying family members or friends willing to assume
responsibility or oversight for a disabled child may be more difficult than
identifying someone to assume responsibility for an able child.
3. Living arrangements must be chosen, if a family member or friend
is not willing to accept the responsibility of having the disabled child live in their
home.
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4. Disabled children often have serious related medical conditions that
may be costly.
5. Determining what is a "fair" distribution of family assets when there
are able bodied and disabled children in the family must be discussed.
6. Maintaining a disabled child's eligibility for government benefits
may be paramount. Even if the child is not currently receiving benefits, we must
consider the possibility of future needs.
7. Protecting the legal rights and human needs of the disabled child
should also be discussed.
II. Estate Planning Options.
A. Spouse, able and disabled child(ren).
1. If all children are minors, then the estate plan will likely be similar to
any other plan for a family with young children, whether the family has a taxable
or nontaxable estate. The plan will likely not vary as long as the surviving
spouse is living. If a by-pass or marital deduction trust is used, rather than an
outright distribution to the spouse or a marital GPOA trust, a special power of
appointment should be included which will allow the surviving spouse to change
the distribution among the children when the able children are grown and
educated and in the event the laws regarding what disabled children can inherit
and own are changed.
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2. At the death of the spouse, the question becomes whether one
trust is drafted for all children or whether separate trusts should be created for
able and disabled children. The answer to this question will depend on the ages
of all the children, the resources available, and the anticipated needs of the
children.
3. When able children are educated, or of a mature age, the parents
must decide whether to leave all the assets in trust for the disabled child or
whether to distribute to the able children some share or an equal share. The
decision will depend on the financial stability of the able children, the total
resources available, and the needs of the disabled child.
B. Spouse and disabled child.
1. If the disabled child is a minor and spouse is relatively young, same
considerations as above.
2. If spouse is elderly and there are not a lot of resources available to
the spouse and disabled child, give consideration to the possibility that the
spouse may have to live in a nursing home and may be required to spend all the
family money on the surviving spouse's nursing home care.1 Perhaps place
some money in a discretionary special needs trust at the death of the first spouse
to assure some money will be available for both the elderly spouse and the
disabled child. Nursing home insurance might be considered if resources to
1 See also, 42 USCA § 1396p(c)(2) which provides that an individual will not be denied medicaid
coverage for transferring" assets to a trust established solely for a the benefit of an individual under 65
years of age who is disabled.
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purchase it are available for both the surviving parent and the adult disabled
child.
c. Disabled child only.
1. Disinheritance - leave the disabled child nothing with the intent that
other beneficiaries will provide for the disabled child. While this "moral
obligation" approach can work, it is fraught with problems, such as if the:
Beneficiary files bankruptcy.
Beneficiary spends money on something or someone other
than the disabled child.
Beneficiary invests unwisely and loses all the money.
Beneficiary becomes senile.
Beneficiary gets divorced and can't identify inherited assets.
Beneficiary predeceases disabled person.
2. Outright bequests - if the disabled child is receiving need based
benefits, this should never be done. If money is left to the disabled child and
the child is receiving needs based benefits, the money will likely be taken by the
state for reimbursement immediately or the disabled child is immediately
disqualified for need based benefits until all the money is spent. At minimum, a
guardian will have to be appointed and every expenditure will have to be
approved by the Court. (Trust for disabled patient in care facility, which was
created from funds to which patient was entitled as annuity benefit following
death of patient's father, who had acted as his legal guardian, and which was
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established by subsequent guardian appointed after father's death, was
Medicaid-qualifying trust rendering patient ineligible for benefits and not exempt
as non-grantor trust, where trust was created after father's death when patient
was entitled to property, and fact that guardian created trust did not establish
non-grantor trust since guardian was merely managing assets which belonged to
patient. Hatcher v Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services (1989, Fla app
D1) 545 So 2d 400,14 FLW 1394.)2
3. Discretionary special needs trust - is usually the vehicle of choice if
funds can be left for a disabled child. A DSNT is designed to supplement, not
supplant, government benefits and avoid cost of care liability for services
provided. The trust must be drafted so neither the income nor principal will be
considered an available resource.
III. Provisions for a Discretionary Special Needs Trust.
A. Generally, the requirements for Medicaid are that an individual must
qualify for social security insurance ("SSI"). The purpose of SSI is to provide for those
who cannot provide for their own basic support. Therefore, if the trust can provide for
the health, maintenance and support of the beneficiary, it will be considered a support
trust and vulnerable to claims of creditors, cost of care claims, Medicaid liens and estate
recovery. The beneficiary of a support trust can compel the Trustee to provide support
and can enforce the Trustee's obligation i~ Court. Under the law of most states,
creditors of the beneficiary of a support trust can piggyback on the beneficiary's
2 Note that OBRA 1993 now allows disabled individuals to establish trusts and reserve a benefit if
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enforceable rights to require the Trustee to pay their claims. Be clear that it is not a
support trust and state that it is intended to benefit the beneficiary for his or her entire
lifetime including ways not presently predictable.
1. Be clear that Trustee's exercise of discretion is not subject to
second-guessing by anyone, including a Court.
2. Include a strong spendthrift provision.
3. Direct the Trustee to explore all other resources available to meet
the needs of the beneficiary and to qualify the beneficiary for the benefits. This is
a job for an Advisory Committee if there is a corporate Trustee.
4. List expenditures Trustee does have discretion to make: travel,
evaluations, clothing, t.v., CDs, athletic contests, movies, etc.
5. Consider adding other permissible "spray" beneficiaries as may
help insulate the trust.
6. Trustee should have authority to distribute money to the guardian to
assist the guardian in fulfillment of guardian duties.
7. Include an early termination provision in the event laws change and
states or the federal government can take the trust, if another family member has
an urgent need, trust becomes too small, or any other unforeseen circumstance
occurs and it is best to terminate the trust.
8. If siblings are trustee and remainder beneficiaries, consider waiving
or at least acknowledging their conflict of interest.
9. Review boilerplate to make sure nothing unintended is included.
structured correctly. This type of trust is discussed later in the outline.
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IV. Judicial Response to Various Trust Language.
A. Various programs established to help the disabled with public funds are
premised on the disabled person's inability to meet the costs of supporting himself with
funds from other sources. Thus, when a disabled person is or becomes a beneficiary of
a trust, a question arises as to whether the disabled person's interest in the trust, will
allow him to support himself, even temporarily, without public assistance. Most courts
have decided the question of whether trust income or principal will be considered
available to the child on the basis of the intent of the grantor of the trust. However, the
Courts have also considered the interests of the state, particularly when considering
whether a state should be reimbursed for cost of care provided to a beneficiary. Courts,
which look for the intent of the grantor or testator of a trust, look to the trust document to
determine whether the grantor intended the trust as a support trust or discretionary
trust.
B. Below are some cases in which a Court determined the Grantor intended
to support the beneficiary and thus determined the trust assets were available to the
beneficiary.
1. Trust for mentally disabled claimant was a "support trust" asset of
which had to be considered in determining her eligibility for Medicaid benefits,
rather than discretionary trust; although trust contained elements of both
discretionary and support trusts. Language of trust instructed trustee to provide
for the "proper care, maintenance, support and education " of the claimant, and
thus did not provide trustee with unfettered discretion, but provided standard by
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which trustee's conduct could be judged, trust required annual income
distribution, and language of trust indicated no intent to be supplemental rather
than primary source of support for claimant, or to look to state first for care before
trust assets were used up. Kryzsko v Ramsey County Social Services, 2000 ND
43,607 N.W. 2d 237 (N.D. 2000).
2. Disbursements from trust which was not available resource became
income for Medicaid eligibility purposes with regard to child who had trust
benefits utilized to meet basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter where
disbursements did not qualify as payments that are disregarded in determining
countable income. Trust Co. v State ex reI. Department of Human Sercs. (1995,
Okla) 890 P2d 1342.
3. Inter vivos discretionary trust fund was available asset that
disqualified mentally disabled institutionalized man from receiving Medicaid, even
though he contended that if fund were "available" it would cause rapid. and total
dissipation of his trust estate. Striegel v South Dakota Dep't of Social Servs.
(1994, SD) 515 NW2d 245, 44 Soc Sec Rep Serv 377.
4. Under testamentary trust provision authorizing trustees, "in their
uncontrolled discretion, but having in mind the income or principal that may be
available to or for her from other sources," to pay over to testator's mother "so
much of the principal ... as my Trustees shall deem needful or desirable for her
support and maintenance, including medical, surgical, hospital, or other
institutional care," principal remaining in trust was "available resource" to mother,
who was first life beneficiary and resident of nursing home, thereby precluding
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her from receiving medical assistance from state. Evidence did not show that
testator intended trustee to look first to state for care of his mother. At the time
the will was executed, there existed duty on part of testator to support his mother.
Although trust made reference to the "income or principal that may be available,"
it did not make reference to any other type of resources, and public benefits,
while they are resource, are neither income nor principal. Commonwealth Bank
& Trust Co., N. A. v Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare (1991, Pal 598 A2d
1279.
5. In Re Estate of Gaalen (1963) 38 Misc 2d 853, 239 NYS2d 312, it
was held that a trust authorizing the trustee "in his sole discretion" to apply all or
part of the principal for the proper support, maintenance, health, and welfare of
the beneficiary was intended by the testator to provide the ordinary necessities of
life for the beneficiary, so that the Department of Welfare for New York City,
which had contributed to the support of the beneficiary while he resided in a
nursing home, was entitled to reimbursement of amounts so expended from both
the principal and income of the trust, even though another provision of the trust
agreement provided that the trustee's discretion making payment of all of any
part of the principal of the trust should be binding and conclusive on all parties
who might be interested in the testator's estate or in the trust. The trustee
contended that the terms of the trust contemplated payments only if the
beneficiary had no other source of income, and that the benefits provided by the
department constituted an alternative source of income, so that the payments
from the fund to the beneficiary should be restricted to small luxury items not
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otherwise provided by the department. The court found the argument fallacious,
stating that charity bestowed by the state or citizens of the state, is not a source
of income as contemplated by the trust. The express terms of the trust, the court
continued, revealed that the care, maintenance and support of the beneficiary
was uppermost in the testator's mind, and constituted a mandate to the trustee to
disburse the trust fund for those purposes. The court found the trust provisions
giving the trustee "sole discretion" and providing that exercise of that discretion
should be binding on all interested parties was merely an indication of the
testator's desire to protect the trustee against the claims of remaindermen in the
event that the entire fund was expended for the beneficiary" support and
maintenance.
C. Below are cases in which the Court determined that the Grantor did not
intend for the trust to be used to support the beneficiary and which the Court did not
allow to be treated as a resource.
1. Rejecting the state's contention that public policy required that its
determination of welfare eligibility not be subject to any power of a trustee or
creator of a trust to withhold assets from a beneficiary collecting public benefits,
the court held that the eligibility 'of two Medicaid recipients was not affected by
their status as beneficiaries of a testamentary trust giving the trustee absolute
discretion over both the principal and income of the trust. Zeoli v Commissioner
of Social Services (1979) 179 Conn 83, 425 A2d 553. 21 ALR4th 718.
2. In Re Estate of Ross (1978) 96 Misc 2d 463. 409 NYS2d 201, an
action treated by the court as an attempt by the trust beneficiary, whose Medicaid
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benefits had been terminated, to judicially establish whether or not the corpus of
the trust was an available resource pursuant to the directive in Steinberg v New
York State Dept. of Social Services (1977) 90 Misc 2d 547. 394 NYS2d 763, it
was held that the life beneficiary of a trust which authorized the trustees to
invade the principal in their "uncontrolled discretion" but directed the trustees to
take into consideration any and all other sources of support that the beneficiary
might have and expressly stated the testatrix's intention to provide supplemental
help, rather than general support, for the beneficiary, was not an available
resource to the beneficiary. Reading the above provisions of the trust in
conjunction with the testatrix's remainder bequest to three named residuary
beneficiaries, the court found that the trust clearly indicated an intention that the
principal be substantially retained intact for the residual bequest, entitling the
trustees to consider available Medicaid assistance to the beneficiary in
determining not to invade the trust principal. Stating that its conclusion as to the
intention of the testatrix was not changed by a trust provision allowing the
trustees to close the trust and apply the full principal to the beneficiary's use, the
court found such authority to reflect the reliance that the testatrix placed on the
discretion and judgement of her named trustees rather than an intention to vest
the corpus in the beneficiary.
3. Under the terms of a trust providing that the beneficiary should
have an amount "not to exceed $250 each year" from the fund, the court held
that the Department of Public Welfare, which had provided support for the
beneficiary while he was a resident of a state mental institution, was entitled to
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reimbursement from the trust fund only to the extent of the stated limitation of
$250 per year. Noting that the department's right to reimbursement depended
upon whether the beneficiary had such an interest in the trust that he could
demand it from the trustee, the court found that the will creating the trust clearly
intended for the beneficiary to have the benefit of the trust funds so long as the
amounts required by the beneficiary did not exceed $250 in any year and did not
give the trustee absolute discretion to withhold all payments from the beneficiary.
The court additionally noted that during the short time the beneficiary had resided
outside the institution, the trustee had paid claims for his support provided by a
relative, the court stating that it could not reasonably be insisted that the relative
could not have enforced a right to reimbursement against the trust and that there
was no reason why the claim of the state hospital stood on a different footing.
Department of Public Welfare v Meek (1936) 264 Ky 771! 95 SW2d 599.
v. Choosing Fiduciaries.
Choosing a guardian for minor children can be the most difficult decision parents
make in the estate planning process. When the child in question is also disabled, the
decision becomes ever more difficult. If there are no family members available, or they
are less than enthusiastic about the job, which professionals should be considered as
alternatives to family members?
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A. Guardian.
One of the first questions is, if or when the disabled child is an adult, should he or
she have a court appointed guardian, limited guardian, or conservator. Many parents
never find it necessary to have themselves appointed as guardian.3 However, it is a
good idea for the parents to choose whom they prefer to serve, if the need for a
guardian arises, after their deaths. Of course, the final decision is ultimately up to the
Court.
If there are no family members willing and able to serve, candidates are often
available through organizations which exist to support disabled persons.
B. Trustee.
The choice of a Trustee is also important for the same reasons as the choice of a
guardian. The choice of a corporate Trustee can be easy, if one has plenty of money
and wants to assure lifetime management for a beneficiary. Many parents fear,
however, that without a spokesperson, a corporate Trustee will not take the time to
become adequately informed regardi.ng the needs of the disabled child. Often, naming
an advisory committee to the Trustee of family members and/or professionals can
provide the best solution for the disabled child, or naming a person involved with the
disabled person as Co-Trustee.
3 There is no requirement of a guardianship appointment to become a disabled individual's representative
payee for 881.
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C. Advisory Committee.
I have seen and have written in elaborate detail responsibilities of various
advisors, who must, of course, in addition to the Trustee, be paid for their services.
These often include requirements that the advisors visit with the disabled person at
least quarterly and perform various evaluations based on their specialties. This can be
very expensive. The advisory committee of a disabled individual's trust may be made
up of family members, treating professionals or other individuals who are acquainted
with the needs of the beneficiary.
D. What are parents who are not extremely wealthy to do?
1. Choose the best person or persons to look after the personal needs
of the disabled child. Consider making this person an advisor to the Trustee or a
Co-Trustee.
2. Choose someone or institution that will invest the money wisely,
keep meticulous records and make sure all tax filings are done.
3. Think through succession issues carefully.
4. Build as much flexibility for replacement of fiduciaries as possible
into the documents.
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VI. Living Arrangements.
A. Options for minor disabled children.
1. There are few options for minor disabled children as most disabled
children remain in the home until early adulthood when offerings of the public
school system have been exhausted at age 21.
2. Kentucky options for minor children would include the same options
as children without disabilities who have no home; Brooklawn, Bellewood,
Kentucky Baptist Homes, Methodist Home, Masonic Home, Buckhorn, Home for
the Innocents, etc. Whether any of these residential facilities would accept a
child with disabilities Would depend on the disability. The Home for the Innocents
is the only "nursing home" for minor children in the state of Kentucky.
B. Options for adult disabled children.
1. There are a limited number of providers, so local community
options are not always available. Some available options in Kentucky are: Cedar
Lake Lodge, The Stewart Home and Oakwood.
c. How do parents find out about alternatives?
1. Word of mouth from other parents.
2. State government lists of licensed facilities.
3. Local/state/national churches, United Ways, advocacy
organizations and schools.
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D. Considerations.
1. Private or public.
2. Turnover rates of staff (30% - 40% is not uncommon).
3. Is there a continuum of care?
4. How much of facility budget goes to care of child?
5. Cost - other resources available whether public or private.
VII. Beneficiary Designations.
A. Review and coordinate all beneficiary designations including insurance
policies, retirement accounts and any other assets which will be distributed pursuant to
a beneficiary designation. If a DSNT is being utilized, it may be necessary to change
the beneficiary on some or all of these assets to the Trust.
B. It is now possible to name a DSNT as the beneficiary of a charitable
remainder trust. However, if the individual has someone who is authorized to act for
him, this option is not available.4
SECTION II - OBRA '93
I. Introduction
While planning for a special needs individual is always difficult, assisting a
special needs individual with his or her own assets adds a new twist to the problem.
The problem arises when a disabled individual who is receiving SSI or Medicaid
benefits, or who may need to receive benefits in the future, suddenly acquires assets.
This can happen through an inheritance, gift, or a personal injury settlement. As stated
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earlier in the outline in more detail, should a disabled individual suddenly acquire
significant assets, these assets will be subject to the spend down and available
resource limitations for SSI, Medicaid and other government benefits.
Of course, it is always possible that the amount of the newly acquired assets will
be of sufficient size that the disabled individual will never again need to rely on
government benefits. However, as we cannot predict the future, this will rarely be the
case. Because of Kentucky's statutory restriction on self settled spendthrift trusts5 a
disabled individual was historically required to spend down the newly acquired assets
until such time as he or she could again meet the income and resource restrictions
required to qualify for SSI, Medicaid and other government benefits.
To require a disabled individual to completely exhaust newly acquired assets in
many cases is against public policy because it does not encourage the disabled
individual to reach his or her greatest potential and enjoy a high quality of life. Such a
policy also discourages others from gifting or bequeathing assets to a disabled
individual. To cure this inequity, and as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Congress added Section 1396(d)(4) to the United States Code. Section 1396
deals with income and asset restrictions for purposes of qualifying for Medicaid along
with restrictions on transfers in trust. Specifically, this new Section provides for 3
general exceptions to the prohibition of transfers into trust to enable an individual to
qualify for Medicaid;
A. Self settled single beneficiary trusts with reimbursement provisions;
4 IRe Reg § 1.664-2(a)(3)(I)-3(a)(3)(I).
5 KRS § 381 .180.
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B. A qualifying income trust; and
C. Pooled special needs trust.
Each of these three exception is covered in greater detail below.
II. Self Settled Special Needs Trust.
A self settled trust under which the individual is the primary beneficiary will not
result in an ineligibility period for Medicaid purposes if the trust meets the following
requirements:
A. The trust contains the assets of a disabled individual who is under
age 65;
B. The Trust is established for the benefit of the individual by a parent,
grandparent, legal guardian of the individual or Court; and
C. The state will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance
paid on behalf of the individual under a stat~ plan.6
It is interesting to note th,at the Code language does not require that the trust be
a "special needs trust" or even a discretionary trust. This type of trust is the perfect
vehicle for personal injury settlements. If the disabled individual is a minor, the trust
should be drafted and submitted to the Probate Court for approval with the proposed
settlement. The trust may also be utilized where a disabled individual receives an
outright inheritance of assets. When drafting the trust, it is best to use general
6 42 USC § 1396p{d){4){A).
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reimbursement language rather than identifying a particular state where the disabled
individual may be currently residing:
"At my death the Trustee shall first distribute to each state in which I have
resided and that has provided medical assistance on my behalf (under
estate plan as defined in 42 USC § 1396 eta seq.), an amount equal to the
total medical assistance under that plan, to the extent required by applicable
law. The Trustee shall distribute any remaining trust funds to ... "
III. Qualifying Income Trust.
In general, there are two separate income standards, which are applied by states
for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. Some states, such as Kentucky, choose to provide
Medicaid assistance to "medically needy individuals", Le., those whose income exceeds
the level necessary to qualify for benefits under other need based programs but is
insufficient to meet their medical needs.7 In this situation, an individual will simply
"spend down" his income to pay for health care costs and Medicaid picks up the
difference.
Other states, known as "income cap" states do not have medically needy
programs that cover long term care. In these states, an individual whose income
exceeds certain limits will not qualify for Medicaid benefits, regardless of medical need
or the individual's ability to pay for necessary care.8 To fill this gap which is created in
income cap states, OBRA '93 provides that a trust for a disabled individual who has
excess income that holds only the income of that individual, plus its accumulation, will
7 42 USC § 1396a(a)(1 O)(C).
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not cause that individual to be ineligible for long term care benefits under the states'
income cap rules. These trusts are often referred to as "Miller" trusts and must meet the
following requirements.
A. The trust must be composed only of pension, social security, and
other income of the disabled individual, including accumulated income in the
trust; and
B. The trust must provide that upon the death of the beneficiary, the
state will receive from the amount remaining in the trust an amount equal to the
total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual under its
Medicaid plan.9
IV. Pooled Special Needs Trusts.
Certainly, there are costs involved with establishing a third party or a self settled
special needs trust. Furthermore, planning for disabled individuals is a specialized area
and in some areas finding an attorney who is experienced in the area may be difficult.
Finding a Trustee willing to assume the responsibility or an advisory committee may
also be difficult, if not impossible. Once the trust is established, there will be trustee
and/or investment fees associated with the management of the fund and it may also be
necessary for the trust to file annual tax returns. Therefore, for many families
responsible for a disabled person creating a third party or a self settled special needs
trust may not be economically feasible.
8 42 CFR § 435.236 and 435.1005.
9 42 USC § 1396p(d)(4)(B).
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As a solution to the above problem, OBRA '93 allows for pooled special needs
trusts. The assets of an individual who is disabled, which are placed in the pooled trust,
will not result in ineligibility, so long as the pooled trust meets the following conditions:
A. The trust must be established and managed by a nonprofit
association;
B. A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust,
but for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust pools those
accounts;
C. Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of
individuals who are disabled, by the parent,grandparent, or legal guardian of
such individuals, by such individuals, or by a Court; and
D. To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account
upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust pays to
the state from such remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to the
total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the
state plan.1o
The operation of a pooled special needs trust is akin to a company retirement
plan. The nonprofit organization establishes, through a single trust instrument, the
pooled trust. Generally, a corporation will serve as trustee while the nonprofit
association will manage the day to day operations of the fund. When an individual
wishes to participate in the trust, he or she will execute an adoption agreement wherein
the beneficiary agrees that the money will be administered and held pursuant to the
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terms of the trust agreement. Because the individual beneficiaries are merely joining a
preexisting trust, which is already funded, the expense of establishing an account under
the trust is greatly minimized. Furthermore, the nonprofit manager is generally unable
to secure a more favorable fee for the investment of the funds contained in the trust.
The other great benefit to the trust is that the beneficiary may elect to allow the
trust to retain any assets remaining in the trust upon the beneficiary's death. In this
manner, the trust can continue to provide for current beneficiaries who have exhausted
their resources or other disabled individuals. The state only has a claim to
reimbursement for amounts, which are not retained by the trust.
While there are great many benefits to the pooled special needs trust; the problem
is finding one in which a disabled individual may participate. The Arc of Indiana and the
Arc of Texas both operate pooled special needs trusts with a relatively long history.
Furthermore, Cedar Lake Foundation, Inc. recently established a pooled special needs
trust.
CONCLUSION
Planning for a disabled individual, whether with someone else's money or the
individual's own money is not to. be done without due attention to all the factors
considered herein. The penalty for poor planning can be a reduced quality of life for a
disabled person, something for which none of us wants to be responsible.
10 42 USCA §1396p(b)(4)(C).
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APPENDIX A
ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST FOR DISABLED CHILD
7.1 Until Disabled Child's death, the Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, shall
expend for Disabled Child's benefit as much of the trust's net income and principal as
the Trustee shall deem appropriate to enhance and improve the comfort and quality of
Disabled Child's life, to provide her with such amenities as vacations, attendants,
recreation, and items of personal use, comfort, and adornment, consistent with a high
quality of life, and to help Disabled Child reach her greatest potential. The Trustee
shall annually add to principal any undistributed income. It is my intent to provide
supplemental assistance to Disabled Child for her lifetime. As I cannot anticipate how
long Disabled Child will live or what her needs will be in the future, the Trustee shall
have complete discretion in carrying out my wishes as expressed herein.
a. The Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, shall provide for extra,
supplemental, and emergency care of Disabled Child beyond those amounts
and benefits provided by any federal or state governmental benefit, and shall not
distribute or expend the trust income or principal in a manner that is reasonably
expected to disqualify Disabled Child from available federal or state aid or
cause the trust funds to bear all or part of the cost of her treatment or assistance,
if such costs would otherwise be borne by the state or federal government.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I acknowledge that the Trustee is a financial
institution and is neither licensed nor skilled in the field of social services and/or
government assistance programs. The Trustee shall have no duty or
responsibility to determine which entitlement programs or resources are available
to Disabled Child on account of any disability.
b. The Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, shall pay the reasonable
expenses incurred by Disabled Child's friends and relations in accompanying
her on trips, whether or not such trips are overnight, to the extent that the Trustee
deems such companionship to be in Disabled Child's best interests. Such
expenses shall include (but not be limited to) travel costs, hotel and restaurant
bills, and a reasonable allowance for unspecified and miscellaneous expenses.
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c. The Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, shall pay for any medical
or other personal care that the Trustee shall deem appropriate for Disabled
Child and that shall not be provided by any available federal or state
governmental programs.
d. The Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, shall not make cash
distributions to Disabled Child, if at all possible, but shall instead expend Trust
funds for the benefit of Disabled Child, in such manner as the Trustee deems
most appropriate.
e. The Trustee, at the Trustee's discretion, may elect not to make any
payments for Disabled Child's basic support, such as food, shelter, clothing and
basic medical care.
f. In exercising its discretion with respect to any of the expenditures
contemplated herein, the Trustee shall first require Disabled Child to exhaust
her own earnings before any distributions are made. The Trustee's exercise of
discretion with respect to distributions for Disabled Child's benefit shall not be
subject to review by any person or authority, administrative or judicial, regardless
of the capacity in which such person is called upon to act.
7.2 The Trustee shall, at the Trustee's discretion, terminate the trust at
anytime if the purposes of the trust are frustrated because of changes in the law
or other reasons, or if the trust can no longer be economically administered. If
the trust is terminated, the remaining trust assets, including any accumulated
income, which has not been added to principal, shall be distributed to (not the
disabled individual).
7.3 Upon the death of Disabled Child, the remaining trust assets shall be
distributed to
---------
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I. Introduction:
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, Pub.l07-16, 115 stat.
38 (June 7, 2001) (the "Act") might be best characterized as a wolf in sheep's clothing.
While heralded as legislation benefiting taxpayers across the board and especially those
individuals subject to potential estate tax liabilities, under such veneer was legislation full
of delayed effective dates and "phase-ins" of relief provisions creating an atmosphere of
frustrating uncertainty (or false security for wealthy Pollyannas).
Promoted as "repeal" legislation concerning estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer
taxes, what resulted contained the above noted deficiencies, a "de-unification" of the
estate and gift taxes and, in accord with the Act as a whole, a "sunset" provision that,
even as tax practitioners formulate strategies to accommodate all of the other "ifs, ands or
buts" found within the legislation, complicate, if not negate, the ability of such
practitioners to accurately predict and prepare clients for the law as it will exist as of
January 2011 and beyond.
However, while the Act's estate and gift tax provisions are for the most part unsecured
promises, the provisions dealing with the generation-skipping transfer tax are, at least in
part, an exception. Although there are myriad unanswered questions and amorphous
provisions in the legislation, Congress did provide for immediate, and certain retroactive,
effective dates for the generation-skipping transfer tax legislation and managed to
provide a number of solid planning tools for the use of taxpayers and their advisers.
The following section will provide an overview of the Act's provisions relating to
deemed, or automatic, allocations of GST Exemption, retroactive allocations, trust
severance issues, relief afforded for late elections and relief from technical failures to
properly allocate exemption "substantial compliance" is found to exist. Thereafter,
Section ill will focus on the new deemed allocation provisions found in §2632(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (hereafter, IRC).
II. General overview of Generation-skipping transfer tax provisions affected by the Act
(a) IRC Chapter 13 sections amended, added or repealed by the Act:
§2604(c) Credit for certain state taxes - Termination
§2631(a) GST Exemption: General Rule
§2631(c) GST Exemption Amount
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§2632(b)(2) .. Special Rules for Allocation of GST Exemption - Deemed
Allocation to Certain Lifetime Direct Skips - Unused
Portion
§2632(c) ..... Special Rules for Allocation ofGST Exemption - Deemed
Allocation to Certain Lifetime Transfers to GST Trust
§2632(d) Retroactive Allocations
§2632(e) Allocation ofUnused GST Exemption
§2642(a)(3) Inclusion Ratio Defined - Severing of Trusts
§2642(b) Valuation Rules
§2642(g) Relief Provision - Late Elections - Substantial Compliance
§2664 Termination of Chapter 13 Applicability
(b) GST Tax Rate
(1) The GST tax rate remains governed by IRC §2641 (unaltered by the Act)
which provides that the rate shall equal the maximum Federal estate tax
rate set forth in IRC §2001, which, prior to the Act, equaled fifty-five
percent (55%). However, the Act amended IRC §2001 in a manner that
resulted in the following GST tax rates through 2009:
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Maximum Rate
50%
49%
48%
47%
46%
45%
45%
45%
(2) Chapter 13 will not apply to GST Transfers after 12/31/09. (IRC §2664)
(3) IfAct allowed to sunset, 2010 rate will equal 55%. (IRC §§2641 & 2001)
(c) GST Tax Exemption
(1) For estates of decedents dying, and generation-skipping transfers, prior to
12-31-03, the GST exemption will continue to be $1,000,000 as adjusted
for post 1997 inflation in accordance with IRC §2631(c), which remains
applicable until 12-31-03. Accordingly, the exemption equals $1,100,000
for 2002 and will likely increase $20,000 to $40,000 as of 1-1-03.
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(2) Effective for estates of decedents dying, and generation-skipping transfers,
after 12-31-03, IRC §§2631(a) and (c) provide that the GST exemption
amount for a given calendar year shall equal the applicable exclusion
amount under amended IRC §2010(c), or:
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
GST Exemption Amount
1.5 Million
1.5 Million
2 Million
2 Million
2 Million
3.5 Million
(3) For estates of decedents dying, and generation-skipping transfers, during
2010, and in accordance with IRC §2664, effective 12-31-2009, Chapter
13 will no longer apply to GST transfers.
(4) For estates of decedents dying, and generation-skipping transfers,
subsequent to 12-31-2010, and in accordance with Act Section 901(a)(2),
none of the Act's provisions shall apply. Therefore, unless future
legislation dictates otherwise, the GST tax exemption will return to
$1,000,000, as adjusted for post-1997 inflation.
(5) Sadly enough, due to the fact the gift tax exemption is frozen at
$1,000,000, reaping the benefits of the increased GST Tax exemption will
require either incurring a gift tax liability or dying.
(d) Additional Deemed Allocations
(1) IRC §2632(c) (effective for transfers subject to chapters 11 or 12 made,
and Estate Tax Inclusion Periods ("ETIPs") ending, after 12-31-00)
expands the allowance for deemed, or automatic, allocation of a
transferor's GST exemption. Prior to the Act, the only provision for such
automatic allocation was found in IRC §2632(b) and was applicable only
to "direct skips" as defined in IRC §2612(c). New IRC §2632(c) however
allows for deemed or automatic allocation to "indirect skips". Although
simple enough at first blush, the quagmire created in the absence of
technical corrections, the issuance of regulations and further guidance
requires close study such as initiated in Section ill below.
(e) Retroactive Allocations
(1) IRC §2632(d), effective for deaths of certain non-skip persons occurring
after 12-31-00, allows a transferor to retroactively allocate unused GST
exemption to previous transfers to a trust when a non-skip beneficiary
predeceases the transferor. This provision would typically be used in
scenarios similar to those discussed below.
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(A) Examples:
(i) Transferor creates a trust to benefit spouse via distributions
of principal and income for health, education, support and
maintenance for life and upon spouse's death remainder
outright to child. If child predeceases spouse, the
remainder will be distributed to child's issue, per stirpes.
Upon funding, no GST exemption was allocated to the
transfer. Therefore, if child predeceases spouse, at
spouse's death there will be a taxable tennination.
However, if the transferor has unused exemption, an
allocation thereof equal to the value of the transfer(s) at the
time of the transfer(s) to the trust may be made to the trust
on the transferor's timely filed gift tax return for the
calendar year of the child's death.
(ii) Transferor creates a trust for child, age 22, which will
tenninate when child reaches age 35. Trust provides that if
child dies prior to reaching age 35, corpus shall pass to the
benefit of child's issue. If child dies prior to age 35 and at
a time Transferor is living, Transferor may allocate unused
GST Exemption on a timely filed gift tax return for the year
of the child's death. The allocation is made based on the
value of the transfer(s) at the time of transfer(s) and
deemed effective immediately before child's death.
(B) Non-skip persons whose death allows for retroactive allocation are
defined as those persons:
having a present or future interest in the trust,
who are lineal descendants of a grandparent of the
transferor, grandparent of the transferor's spouse or
grandparent of the transferor's fonner spouse, and
who are assigned to a generation below the generation
assignment of the transferor. IRC §2632(d)(1).
Accordingly, the death of the transferor's, transferor's spouse's or
transferor's fonner spouse's child, nephew, niece, or first cousin
once removed and who is a present or future beneficiary of the
relevant trust would allow the transfer to make a retroactive
allocation.
(Q Severance
(1) IRC §2642(a)(3) provides for the division of a trust if the act constitutes a
"qualified severance." A qualified severance is a pennissible division
under the trust instrument. or applicable law dividing the trust on a
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fractional basis provided the resulting trusts provide for the same
succession of interests of beneficiaries as were set forth in the original
trust. A qualified severance is also any other severance permitted under
the regulations. IRC §2642(a)(3)(B) Accordingly, it may be possible to
"fix" trusts with inclusion ratios of between one and zero resulting in a
trust with an inclusion ratio of one, and another distinct trust with an
inclusion ratio of zero.
(2) Succession of interests: In accordance with Example 1 found in Treas.
Reg. §26.2654-1(b)(ii)(A), the division in the following scenario
maintains the requisite succession of interests:
(A) Transferor's will establishes a testamentary trust providing that
income is to be paid to spouse for life. At the spouse's death, one-
half of the corpus is to be paid to Transferor's child and one-half to
Transferor's grandchild. In the context of maintaining the original
trust's succession of interests, Transferor's executor would be able
to divide the trust into two trusts. One such trust could be for the
benefit of the spouse with remainder to child. The other such trust
could be for the spouse, remainder to grandchild.
(B) However, the preamble to such regulations indicates that a Trust
providing for an income interest to a child, with remainder to a
grandchild, could not be divided into one Trust for the child (equal
in value to the child's income interest) and another for the
grandchild while maintaining the requisite succession of interests.
(g) Late Elections
(1) IRC §2642(g)(1)(A) expressly directs the Secretary to issue regulations
prescribing circumstances and procedures under which extensions of time
will be granted to make allocations to gifts and transfers at death~
(Applicable to requests for reliefpending on, or filed after, 12-31-00.)
(2) IRC §2642(g)(1)(B) affirms that code section 9100 relief will be available
to cure failures to make timely allocations or erroneous elections out of
automatic allocations. (Applicable to requests for relief pending on, or
filed after, 12-31-00.)
(h) Substantial Compliance
(1) IRC §2642(g)(2) provides that a "relevant circumstances" analysis to
determine if the transferor's intent to allocate GST tax exemption to a
given transfer is sufficient to justify respecting the otherwise deficient
allocation to such transfer. (Applicable to requests for relief pending on,
or filed after, 12-31-00.)
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III. Expanded Deemed (or "Automatic") Allocation Rules
(a) Deemed Allocation to Indirect Skips
(1) Expanding upon IRC §2632(b)'s provisions for deemed allocations of
'GST exemption to lifetime direct skips, the Act added IRC §2632(c)
which provides for deemed allocation of a transferor's GST exemption to
certain lifetime gifts to trusts which occur or are deemed to occur after
Dec. 31, 2000. Specifically, IRC §2632(c) provides that if a transferor
makes a lifetime indirect skip, any unused portion (that portion not
previously allocated by the transferor or allocated by a previous deemed
allocation to a direct or indirect skip, respectively) of the transferor's GST
exemption shall be allocated to the extent necessary to result in a zero
inclusion ratio for the trust. IRC §2632(c)(3) in turn defines an indirect
skip as a transfer (other than a direct skip) which is subject to gift tax and
made to a GST Trust.
(b) GST Trust
(1) A GST Trust is one which could have a generation-skipping transfer with
respect to the transferor. (IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)). Therefore, any trust the
terms of which provide for the possibility of a distribution during the
trust's administration or upon its termination to a skip person (see IRC
§2613) is, in the absence of an exception or an election to the contrary, a
GST Trust. Wonderfully simple at· first glance, even if overreaching, the
content, as well as the lack thereof, of the six codified exceptions found in
IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(i)-(vi) and discussed below serve to quickly
extinguish such initial impression (but also serve to justify our existence.)
(A) Exception #1
(i) IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(i), provides that a trust is not a "GST
Trust" if the trust instrument provides that more than
twenty-five percent (25%) of the trust corpus must be
distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or more
individuals who are non-skip persons:
before the date that the individual attains age 46,
on or before one or more dates specified in the trust
instrument that will occur before the date that such
individual attains age 46, or
upon the occurrence of an event that, in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, may
reasonably be expected to occur before the date that
such individual attains age 46.
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(ii) This exception, as well as exceptions 2 and 3 below, is
intended to avoid automatic (inadvertent?) allocation of a
transferor's GST exemption to a trust that is likely to
distribute a significant amount (i.e., greater than 25%) of its
corpus to a non-skip person. In this case, such non-skip
person would be expected to reach age 46 and receive or
have already received the relevant assets, thus including
them in his or her taxable estate and "wasting" any of the
original transferor's GST exemption that was applied to the
initial transfer.
(iii) Examples:
(I) Transferor creates a trust for the benefit of his
minor son providing that during the tenn of the trust
son will receive principal and income for the son's
health, education, support and maintenance, one-
third (1/3) of the corpus at age 25, one-half (1/2) of
the remaining corpus at age 30 and the balance of
the corpus at age 35 whereby the trust shall
tenninate. If son dies prior to reaching age 35, any
remaining corpus passes to his issue, per stirpes.
Upon first impression, this appears not to be a GST
trust because greater than 25% of the trust corpus is
expected to be distributed to a non-skip person prior
to such person reaching age 46. However, the
statute refers to a trust instrument that provides that
more than 25% of the corpus MUST be distributed
to a non-skip person on or before certain events. If
son dies prior to age 25, no such distribution occurs.
(II) Same facts as above but the corpus distributions are
set to occur at ages 30, 40 and 50 respectively.
Same ambiguous result as above because greater
than twenty-five percent (25%) must be distributed
to a non skip person prior to age 46, but only if such
person lives to age 30 will distribution actually
occur.
(III) Same facts as in number (I) above but the corpus
distributions are scheduled to be one-quarter (1/4) at
age 40, one-third (1/3) at age 50 and one-half (1/2)
at age 60 and the balance at age 70. This is a GST
trust because the amount of corpus that must be
distributed prior to the non-skip person reaching age
46 is not greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of
such corpus..
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(IV) Transferor creates trust for son providing that son
will receive distributions of principal and income
for health, education, support and maintenance for a
period of ten years at the end of which the trust will
terminate and distribute its assets to son if son is
then living. If son dies prior to termination of the
trust, then the assets are to be distributed to his
issue. Ignoring the "must be distributed" language,
if the trust is created when son is age 35, this is not
a GST trust. If the trust is created when son is age
36, this is a GST Trust.
(V) Transferor creates trust for son providing principal
and income for health, education, support and
maintenance during son's life with remainder to
son's issue, per stirpes. If son earns his Ph.D. prior
to age 40, son will receive a distribution equal to
one-half of the existing trust corpus. Whether this
is or is not a GST trust is not evident until the
Secretary issues regulations defining whether it may
be reasonably expected that son will earn such
degree prior to reaching age 40.
(B) Exception #2
(i) IRe §2632(c)(3)(B)(ii), provides that a trust will not be a
"GST Trust" if the trust instrument provides that more than
twenty-five percent (25) of the trust corpus must be
distributed to or may be withdrawn by one or more
individuals who are non-skip persons and who are living on
the date of death of another person identified in the
instrument (by name or by class) who is more than 10 years
older than such individual(s).
(ii) Similar to exception #1 noted above, this exception appears
intended to avoid automatic allocation of a transferor's
GST exemption to a trust that is likely to distribute a
significant amount (i.e., greater than 25%) of its corpus to a
non-skip person. In this case, such non-skip person would
be expected to survive the relevant "other person" and
thereafter receive a significant portion, if not all, of the
trust's assets, thus including them in his or her taxable
estate and ''wasting'' any of the original transferor's GST
exemption applied to the trust. Note that this exception
also contains the "must be distributed" language and
therefore contains the same failure as Exception #1 in this
regard.
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(iii) Example:
(I) Transferor creates a trust for benefit of spouse and
son. Trust is to benefit spouse via distributions of
principal and income for health, education, support
and maintenance for life and upon spouse's death
remainder to son. Ignoring the "must be
distributed" issue, assuming that spouse is 10 years
older than transferor's children (not necessarily a
given considering second marriages) this is not a
GST trust (son expected to survive spouse and thus
receive trust's corpus). If spouse was less than 10
years older than transferor's son, this would be a
GST trust.
(II) Assumes same facts as Example (I) immediately
above but instead of son taking outright at spouse's
death, the trust assets are held in trust for son's
benefit until he reaches a specified age (such age
being older than issue's age at funding). Result?
Not covered by Exception #1 because we may not
be able to reasonably expect spouse to die prior to
son reaching age 46. Not covered by Exception #2
because can't be certain son will have reached age
required for distribution under the terms of the trust
at the date of spouse's death. Thus, better elect to
opt in or out as deemed appropriate under the
specific circumstances.
(C) Exception #3
(i) IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(iii) provides that a trust will not be a
GST trust if the trust instrument provides that if one or
more non-skip persons die on or before a date or event
described in clause (i) or (ii) more than twenty-five percent
(25%) of the trust corpus either must be distributed to the
estate or estates of one or more of such individuals or is
subject to a general power of appointment exercisable by
one or more of such individuals.
(ii) This exception is intended to avoid automatic allocation of
a transferor's GST exemption to a trust agreement under
which a significant portion of the trust's assets will be
included in the taxable estate of a non-skip person.
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(iii) Example:
(I) Transferor creates a trust which provides that son
(age 32) will receive principal and income for
health, education, support and maintenance for life
and gives son a testamentary general power of
appointment over the trust assets remaining at son's
death. If such power of appointment is not
exercised, the remaining trust assets are to be
distributed to son's issue, per stirpes. This is not a
GST Trust.
(II) Same facts as Example (I) immediately above but
testamentary general power of appointment only
applies upon and after son reaches 50 years of age.
This would be a GST trust.
(D) Exception #4:
(i) IRe §2632(c)(3)(B)(iv) provides that a trust will not be a
GST trust if any portion of the trust would be included in
the gross estate of a non-skip person (other than the
transferor) if such person died immediately after the
transfer.
(ii) This exception continues along the premise of not wasting
a transferor's GST exemption. Although the "25%"
threshold is not relevant in the determination of whether
this exception applies, again it is evident that in situations
where trust assets will be included in a non-skip persons'
taxable estate, the risk of wasting the exemption overrides
the risk of leaving assets inadvertently exposed to GST
taxes under "worse case" scenarios.
(iii) Examples:
(I) Transferor creates a trust for the benefit of son (age
42) with principal and income to be used for son's
health, education, support and maintenance and
provides that son shall have a testamentary general
power of appointment over twenty-five percent
(25%) of the trust corpus prior to and after reaching
age 40, fifty percent (50%) at age 50, seventy-five
percent (75%) at age 60 and the balance at age 70.
This is not a GST trust.
(II) Under the facts of (I) immediately above, if son was
39 upon creation of the trust, this exception would
not apply. Exception #3 also would not apply.
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(iv) See discussion at (c) below regarding disregard of certain
withdrawal (Crummey) rights.
(E) Exception #5:
(i) IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(v) provides that a trust will not be a
GST trust if the trust is a charitable lead annuity trust
(within the meaning ofIRC §2642(e)(3)(A)) or a charitable
remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder unitrust
(within the meaning ofIRC §664(d)).
(F) Exception #6:
(i) IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(vi) provides that a trust will not be a
GST trust if it is one with respect to which a deduction was
allowed under IRC §2522 for the amount of an interest in
the fonn of the right to receive annual payments of a fixed
percentage of the net fair market value of the trust property
(detennined yearly) and which is required to pay principal
to a non-skip person if such person is alive when the yearly
payments for which the deduction was allowed tenninate.
(ii) A Charitable Lead Unitrust with remainder to children
might be a GST trust. If the remainder passed to
grandchildren by the tenns of the document the trust would
be a GST trust.
(c) Impact of"Crummey" withdrawal powers.
(1) IRC §2632(c)(3) closes by providing that for purposes of such
subparagraph, the value of transferred property shall not be considered to
be includable in the gross estate of a non-skip person or subject to a right
of withdrawal by reason of such person holding a right to withdraw so
much of such property as does not exceed the amount referred to in IRC
§2503(b) (currently $11,000) with respect to the relevant transferor.
Furthennore, it provides for the assumption that powers of appointment
held by non-skip persons will not be exercised.
(A) In lieu of the above, and in the context of "Crummey" withdrawal
rights, it appears that if no "hanging" powers exist with regard to
the right of withdrawal, and the transfer's value is equal to or less
than the IRC §2503(b) amount, a trust not otherwise subject to an
exception will be a GST trust.
(B) However, if hanging powers exist with regard to the right of
withdrawal, a common result would be that in years following the
initial funding, the withdrawal right for a given year, when
combined with the "hanging right(s)" from the previous year(s),
would yield a cumulative withdrawal right valued in excess of the
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IRC §2503(b) amount. Accordingly, if such cumulative right were
held by a non-skip person, IRC §2632(c)(3)(B)(iv) (Exception #4)
would apply and the trust would not be a GST Trust for years such
rights existed and applied to amounts in excess of the IRC
§2503(b) amount.
(C) Examples:
(i) Transferor creates trust for son when son is age 30
providing that son will receive all trust income, that amount
of principal the trustee deems necessary for son's health,
education, support and maintenance and that son will have
an annual right to withdraw no greater than five percent
(5%) of the trust corpus. Such right, if not exercised, lapses
at the end of each calendar year. At son's death, the
remaining corpus is to be distributed to his issue, per
stirpes. The trust is funded with $200,000. This is a GST
trust because although an amount greater than twenty-five
percent (25%) of the corpus may be withdrawn by a non-
skip person prior to reaching age 46, up to $11,000 of such
annual amount is disregarded.
(ii) Same facts as in (i) above except that the trust is funded
with $1 million and the trust instrument mandates that the
trustee treat any amount distributed pursuant to son's 5%
withdrawal right as being made first from trust income,
then from trust principal. While son may withdraw an
amount of trust assets well in excess of 25% of the value of
the trust's corpus, (even considering the "2503(b)"
exclusion) it is not possible to determine whether the
amount actually withdrawn will be corpus or income. Even
if son withdraws the maximum amount per year, if income
is sufficient no corpus distribution will be made. Does the
trust instrument provide that more than twenty-five percent
(25%) of the trust corpus may be withdrawn by son? What
about Exception #4?
(d) Applicability in context of estate tax inclusion periods.
(1) IRC §2632(c)(4) provides that for purposes of this subsection, an indirect
skip to which IRC §2642(f) applies shall be deemed to have been made
only at the close of the ETIP. The fair market value of such transfer shall
be the fair market value of the trust property at the close of the estate tax
inclusion period.
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(2) Note that IRC §2632(c)(4) applies to transfers occurring pnor to
enactment of the act which are subject to ETIPs ending on or after
12-31-00. Accordingly, historic transfers that are "off the radar" may
receive allocation of the transferor's unused GST exemption without the
fact coming to the transferor's, or transferor's advisor's, attention.
(e) Applicability and available elections.
(1) In general note that IRC §2632(c)(5) provides that an individual may elect
to have IRC §2632(c) not apply to an indirect skip or any or all transfers
made by such individual to a particular trust and may elect to treat any
trust as a GST trust for purposes of IRe §2632(c) with respect to any or all
transfers made by such individual· to such trust. These provisions apply to
transfers subject to chapter 11 or 12 of the IRC made, or ETIPs ending,
after 12-31-00.
(A) Opt Out
(i) An election to opt out of treatment of a transfer as an
indirect skip (and thus avoid a deemed allocation) shall be
filed on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year in
which the transfer was made (or deemed to have been made
in the context of ETIPs) or on such later date or dates as
may be prescribed by the Secretary.
(ii) An election to avoid having deemed allocations made to
any or all transfers by an individual to a particular trust
may be made on a timely filed gift tax return for the
calendar year for which the election is to become effective.
(B) Opt in
(i) An election to treat any trust as a GST Trust or any or all
transfers thereto as being made to a GST Trust may be
made on a timely filed gift tax return for the calendar year
for which the election is to become effective.
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